00104145

open access

Version of Record

ロセツ セイド コウキョウ トウシ ケイザイ セイチョウ:リロン ト ジッショウ

Institution, Public Investment, and Growth : Theory and Evidence

Japanese (日本語)

国際協力論集

9(3)

147-166

神戸大学大学院国際協力研究科

2002-02

2007-05-30

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corruption on economic growth， focusing on the role of public investment. The previous literature says that corrupted politicians and bureaucrats not only steal public money but also distort the allocation of public investment. Following these studies， we investigate the effect of corruption based on the Barro-Futagami type endogenous growth model. Theoretically， we conclude that corruption lowers the growth rate in the steady- state equilibrium， in case of (a) corruption increases the share of public investment in the total government expenditure over the optimal rate， (b) corruption worsens the quality of public capital or decreases the rate of public capital accumulation. First we examine the case (a) in this paper， there are no significant relationship between corruption and the share of public investment. Second we investigate the case (b) based on the recent growth regression approach. One difficulty of this analysis is the possibilities that there exist inverted-U relationship between the rate of public investment and growth， as the Barro-Futagami model implies. In order to cope with this ， we run OLS regressions using the nonlinear specification. The regression results show the existence of this inverted-U relationship. Finally we examine whether there are differences in the impacts of public investment between corrupted and less corrupted countries by using dummy variables. From the regression results， we find that the impact of public investment on economic growth in less corrupted countries is larger than that in corrupted countries. Thus we conclude that public sector's corruption hamper the impact of public investment and lower the growth rate.

紀要論文