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I

On 19th December 1872 Nishi Amane⁽¹⁾ received a letter. It was from Sain, Left Chamber and was addressed to a secretary and assistant secretary of the Army Ministry. Nishi held one of the former post at the time. The Army Regulation Act of September 1871⁽²⁾ stipulated that all letters and correspondence which were addressed to the Army Ministry should first be circulated to the archive division which was within the Confidential History Bureau. Nishi headed the division and stood at the center of correspondence in the Ministry. The Army Ministry had engaged in the difficult task of discharging the Imperial Guards and building instead a modern-style army by conscription. The most pressing problem facing the government was to organize sufficient strength to buttress the new regime and enforce the reforms which the government pushed against internal opposition and external pressure. The leaders of the government had made a firm decision to discharge the Imperial Guards and set the time limit by the end of March 1873. Since the decision had been made, the Army Ministry had prepared the program for conscription, which was proposed to start early the next year.

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- (1) On his life, see Hackett, Roger F. "Nishi Amane—A Tokugawa Meiji Bureaucrat", *Journal of Asian Studies*, XVIII (Feb. 1959) pp. 213-225. Havens, Th. R. *Nishi Amane and Modern Japanese Thought*, (Princeton 1970). The latter relied heavily on Mori Rintaro, *Nishi Amane den*, which is more biographical fiction than biography and leaves the details of Nishi's life uninvestigated. Hasunuma, K. "A Study on the Philosophy of Nishi Amane before the Meiji Restoration", *Kobe Law Journal* XXV (March, 1976) & XXVIII (June, 1978) ;
"Nishi Amane's Introductory Notes on a Comparative Philosophy" *KLJ*. XXX (Sept. 1980) & (Dec. 1980) ;
"When did NISHI write his Poems?", *K L J*. XXX (March, 1981) ; "When did NISHI write Hyakuichi Shinron?", *K L J*. XXXI (June, 1981) ;
"NISHI Amane and the Meiji Restoration", *KLJ*. XXXI (Sept. 1981) examine parts of his life. See also Hasunuma, K. "Nishi Amane no hōtetsugaku" *Annual of Legal Philosophy* 1979. pp. 137-140
- (2) *Hōki bunrui taizen*, Heiseimon I. P. 350, 358 (Hereafter this book shall be cited as *Taizen*) This is the Act which constitute the Army Ministry (then Department) within the War Department.

By the end of the year, the Army Ministry had submitted to the Left Chamber five separate papers concerning proposed conscription. Those papers included drafts of (i) the Imperial rescript (ii) the Announcement of the Council of State (iii) the Conscription Act (iv) Conscription Procedure for 1873, and (v) *Shimin-rōn*, or paper on four social classes. The last paper argued that, as feudal customs still prevailed among the people, the conscription system needed adjustment to the current condition and that separate standards should be adopted for the conscription of the various classes of people who had been and still could be classified as *shi*, *nō*, *kō* and *shō*, that is, samurai, farmers, artisans and merchants, respectively. The letter of the 19th December 1872 was a reply to the proposals presented by the Army Ministry. It suggested that the Left Chamber favored the first two papers but required further explanation for the rest. It summoned Yamagata Aritomo⁽³⁾ to come to the government office, in which the Left Chamber was situated, to explain his plan in detail.

It was quite likely that Nishi was relieved to read the letter, for he realized that the Left Chamber stood on his side. It was Nishi who had drafted the original plan for a Conscription Act entitled "Opinion Favoring a Conscription Army" and "General Rule for Conscription". His original draft stood firmly on the principle of universal conscription. The French Government had just adopted the same principle with some exceptions a few months before. Nishi was more loyal to the principle than it, for his plan allowed no exception at all.

It called for the conscription of all twenty-year-old males and stipulated service for two years in the regular service and an additional four years in the reserves. *Nishi* strengthened his argument by proposing that the conscription be viewed as an integral part of the national educational process. He maintained that "If boys enter grammar school at six, high school at thirteen and graduate at nineteen, after which, from their twentieth year, they spend a few years as soldiers, in the end all will become soldiers and no one will be without education. In due course, the nation will become a great civil and military university."⁽⁴⁾

(3) Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922*. (Harvard Univ. Press, 1971) is the best biography of Yamagata in English.

(4) Hackett, *Yamagata*. P. 65 and "The Military-A. Japan" in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (ed.) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, (Princeton, 1964) p. 337. Hackett takes Yamagata as the author of this "Opinion", but Nishi seems more likely. This "Opinion" and "General Rule" first appeared in *Rikugunshō enkaku shi*, reprinted in Oyama, A. (ed.) *Yamagata Aritomo ikensho*, (Tokyo, 1966) with suggested revisions by three officials of the Army Ministry. These opinions clearly indicate that this was an

Though his plan was later revised profoundly by his fellow officials, the ideal of universal conscription survived in the Imperial rescript and the Announcement of the Council of State, which Nishi now knew the Left Chamber was supporting.

Yamagata must have felt annoyed, however. As the post of the Army Minister was vacant⁽⁵⁾ and the Field Marshall, Saigō Takamori was busy in Kagoshima, Yamagata, as Vice-Minister of the Army Ministry, acted as the top official in the Ministry. Thus, he was responsible for the conscription program, detailed in *Shimin-ron* and the drafts of the Conscription Act and Procedure for 1873. In sharp contrast to the original plan made by Nishi, this program allowed a wide range of exemptions. It further stipulated that the various classes of people be called up for service under

early draft for the Conscription Act, probably the original draft, of which Nishi was said to be the author by Ishiguro Tadanao in his somewhat inaccurate "Memoir of the Time when the Conscription Act was promulgated" in *Kaikōsha kiji*, April, 1932, quoted in Matsushita, Yoshio. *Chōheirei seitteishi*, (Tokyo, 1943) p. 277 Note 8. It is quite unlikely that Yamagata was involved in drafting at such an early stage and that his plan was profoundly revised at later stage of drafting in the Army Ministry. Nishi is well known to have been the headmaster of Numazu Academy. It seems to me that his experience in establishing Numazu Academy led him to draw a grand design of national education, in which military service was considered as an integral part. He believed that Confucius taught his students six disciplines, which included military skills, that is, driving and shooting. Nishi. "Hyakuichi shinron" (1873) in Okubo Toshiaki (ed). *Nishi Amane Zenshū*, 4 Vols. (1960-1981) I. p. 239. (Hereafter cited as Works.)

- (5) Yamagata became War Minister on 16th June, 1873. Hackett is wrong in stating that Yamagata was War Minister from April 1872 when the army and navy were placed under separate departments. (Hackett, *Yamagata* p. 69f ; "The Military" p. 342) This mistake led him, I believe, into two crucial errors. First, Hackett confuses the modernizing and reactionary forces which existed in the Army Ministry. Second, he overlooks the decisive role which Saigō Takamori played from early 1871, when he agreed to incorporate the Satsuma battalions to the *Goshinpei*, to October 1873, when he resigned from the Cabinet and returned to his home land. From August 1871 to April 1873 he was the prime figure in the Cabinet and from August 1872 he was Supreme Commander of the Army as well. Radical reforms were pursued energetically and some went into effect under his rule. Subsequently Hackett draws conclusion that Yamagata was "the acknowledged leader in the inauguration of conscription and, all in all, the guiding light of the army in the first decades of its development" ("The Military" p. 342). I claim that Yamagata was the leading figure of the reactionary force within the Army Ministry which led Japan to military aggression and finally to defeat. "The mantle was passed from Yamagata to Katsura Tarō to Terauchi Masatake to Tanaka Giichi" (Ibid.) It seems to me that, in general, Hackett underestimates the reactionary attitude which this faction continuously pressed on conscripts and the distort of their personalities in the process of modernization in Japan. Undoubtedly each conscript gained new attitudes and behavior patterns as Hackett claims, but it is dubious whether these are "conducive" or inimical to modernization.

separate and distinct provisions.⁽⁶⁾ Artisans and merchants were classified into three classes, rich, middle and poor by annual sales scale, and it recommended that rich and middle should pay for "exonération".⁽⁷⁾ Discount was designed for middle merchants. Moreover, "all poor merchants and the like shall be exempted from service for the next five years"⁽⁸⁾ Farmers and peasants were classified into four classes, that is, rich, average, small and laborers. All peasants who could not grow enough crops to sustain their families were exempted from service. On the other hand, Shimin-rōn denied exemption for *shizoku* and *sotsu* even for household heads and heirs. In short, this program was clearly designed to recruit solely samurai and younger sons of wealthier farmers, and to raise money from richer merchants for military expense. It is obvious that Yamagata and his fellow officials were planning to build a modern-style army from ex-samurai and younger sons of land owners.⁽⁹⁾ His experience in the *Kiheitai* convinced Yamagata that the way to build up a strong army was to recruit soldiers exclusively from samurai and wealthier farmers. All samurai boys were to be recruited at the age of 20 and after health examination and tirage, selected as the core of the standing army.⁽¹⁰⁾ In fact the program pushed by Yamagata and others was in open conflict with the official policy of the government, which aimed to abolish all the feudal privilege of *shizoku* within six years.⁽¹¹⁾ In other words, this program

(6) Though the draft of the Conscription Act is missing and the exact contents of provisions for exemptions are unknown, the outline of the Act can be reconstructed by comparing Shimin-rōn with the criticism against it, which appeared in the final reply by the Left Chamber of 26th December 1872, and the final Act of 10th January 1873.

(7) 26 Avril 1855 titre II. De l'exonération du service, abrogé par 1^{er} Février 1868 Titre I^{er} Du Recrutement de l'armée. Art 36-2.

These articles appear in appendix 2 to Umetani Noboru, *Meiji zenki seijishi kenkyū* (Essays on the Political History of Early Meiji Japan), revised and enlarged ed. 1977. Umetani discovered that it was Albert Charles Du Bousquet who had explained "l'exonération" to the Left Chamber, early in 1872. Ibid. p. 410, p. 412.

Du Bousquet was originally invited by the Bakufu in 1866 as one of sixteen military instructors for the military school at Yokohama. After the collapse of the Third Empire, he remained in Japan, and was hired by the Left Chamber from 12th December 1871. He submitted a proposal for the construction of the military system to the Left Chamber on 5th May 1872. Umetani overlooks the possible relationships which Bousquet's proposal had with the drafter of Shimin-rōn and the advocates of organizational change of the Army Ministry in March 1873.

(8) Shimin-rōn, quoted in Fujimura "Chōheirei no seiritsu" *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 428 (Jan. 1976)p. 5

(9) Fujimura, op. cit. p. 6

(10) Umetani proved that, at least, 40% of members of *Kiheitai* were *shizoku* and *sotsu*. Umetani, op. cit. p. 71

(11) Fujimura, op. cit. p.4

was a last minute attempt to rescue the honor and privilege of ex-samurai families, who were facing radical social reforms.

But unfortunately for Yamagata, the Left Chamber was a stronghold of his rivals, the Satsuma and Tosa groups, and his efforts to persuade them were in vain. In its formal reply of 26th December 1872, the Left Chamber bitterly attacked Yamagata's proposals and rejected all the devices and special provisions of *Shimin-ron*, which in its opinion contradicted the principle of equal treatment of four classes. It concluded that "it had better continue the discussion on this topic in the Chamber lest unwanted result should follow".⁽¹²⁾ The majority of the Left Chamber were against hasty promulgation and implementation of the Conscription Act. They did not believe that there was an urgent need for Japan to build and maintain a modern-style army. This was a fatal blow to Yamagata's plan to build a new samurai army and now he found himself in a predicament. He had every reason to hasten the promulgation of the Conscription Act. The Ministry of Justice, under its resolute Minister, Etō Shinpei, was engaged in an investigation of the Yamashiroya case.

Yamashiroya Wasuke had become a merchant some years after he had fought in the *Kiheitai* under his real name of Nomura Michizō. Through his personal connection with Yamagata he had received loans illegally from the army, to expand his business of producing military supplies. High officials of Chōshū origin enjoyed luxuries at Yamashiroya's expense and some were brazen enough to borrow money from him without any intention to repay.⁽¹³⁾ But speculation in silver resulted a huge loss, Yamashiroya went to Paris in a desperate effort to recoup his losses. Once there, however, he changed his mind, and when the news that he had embezzled what was left of his funds reached Japan, dissatisfied Satsuma soldiers among the Imperial Guards became so angry that they forced Yamagata to resign his post on 3rd August 1872. The Satsuma samurai army was united by the revolutionary solidarity and comradeship. It was reported that "from the general to common soldiers, ranks are just nominal, and no discrimination in fact exists between ranks." At the beginning of the campaign of 1869, they divided 1763 *ryō 2bu*, which was paid in advance by the War Department, into equal amount as an equal salary for all, and returned the remainder of 443 *ryō 2bu* to the Department.⁽¹⁴⁾ But after they were reorganized as *Goshinpei* common soldiers were treated as "out-

(12) *Kōbunroku*; Army Ministry 1872 (eleventh month) 111.

(13) Fujimura, op. cit. p. 13. Hackett mentions the case in *Yamagata*, p. 71, fn. 64.

(14) Report by the conscription headquarters of Kagoshima *han* in November 1869, in *Dajō ruiten*, I-113, quoted in Fujimura, op. cit. p. 14

cast”⁽¹⁵⁾, and dissatisfaction mounted. When the Yamashiroya case betrayed the corruption of Chōsyū officials, this dissatisfaction turned into furious anger and they accused Yamagata and forced him to resign from the Ministry only a few month after he had assumed command of the Imperial Guards. It was Field Marshall, Saigō Takamori who saved Yamagata from expulsion. Since the abolition of the *han* in 1871, Saigō had assumed the highest responsibility for military affairs in the Council of State. But for Saigō’s patronage, Yamagata would have been expelled from the government. Saigō took over the post of Commander of the Imperial Guards and restored Yamagata to Vice-Minister. From that time rivalry between Satsuma soldiers and Chōshū officials turned into open antagonism, which continued until the end of the decade.

Yamagata telegraphed Yamashiroya to return home and demanded that he repay the loan, even though he realized that Yamashiroya was in no position to do so. Since it was said that the loan amounted to 64 million or even 80 million *yen*—almost 10 percent of the total annual budget of the Army Ministry. Yamagata was anxious to discharge the revolutionary army of Satsuma before the investigation by the Ministry of Justice discover that the corrupt network of Chōshū officials had produced such a huge loss. To save Chōshū faction and himself as well he could do nothing but accept the criticism by the Left Chamber without any hesitation, abandon the Shimin-ron entirely and revise the related provisions in the conscription program.

Two days later, on 28th December 1872, the Upper Council delivered its decision to the Army Ministry. It ordered “To revise, as the attached papers require, the Conscription Act volume and the other four papers in circulation, and to submit the Conscription Act for promulgation as soon as it is printed in the Army Ministry, but the Imperial rescript and the announcement shall be printed by the Upper Council”.⁽¹⁵⁾ On the same day the Imperial rescript and a special announcement from the Council of State were issued.

The rescript, citing the experience of the past and the lessons learned from the West, declared that in ancient times “there was no distinction between soldiers and farmers, and now, based on the system of our ancient past and taking into

(15) The War Department had adopted the notorious French military system, in which common soldiers were considered as “outcasts of society” Kavacs’ “French Military Institutions before the Franco-Prussian War.” *American Historical Review* Vol. LI (Jan. 1946) p. 222

(16) *Kōbunroku*; Army Ministry, 1872 (eleventh month) quoted in Umetani, op. cit. p. 437 or *Dajō ruiten*, quoted in Fujimura, op. cit. p. 3

consideration foreign methods, it is desired to maintain the nation's security by establishing a system of universal military service."⁽¹⁷⁾

Now universal conscription was declared as official policy of the government.

The announcement of the Council of State bitterly denounced members of the samurai class "who wear two swords...are indolent and arrogant and in extreme cases irresponsibly murder innocent people with impunity," and declared that "the samurai is no longer the samurai of former times and commoners no longer the commoners of the past; all are now equal in the empire and without distinction in their duty to serve the nation." The peasant and soldier should be unified to "bring about equality and make the rights of the people uniform." For all twenty-year-old men to enter the service of their nation was to be regarded as a duty and obligation, a "blood-tax" payment, as the Westerners referred to it, in support of the nation's defense.⁽¹⁸⁾

It is unclear what Nishi felt when he knew that his original plan survived in principle and his commitment to universal service was virtually recognized as official doctrine. It is also unclear when Nishi first knew that Yamashiroya Wasuke had killed himself, after having destroyed all the documents on the affair, in the waiting room of the Army Ministry on 29th December 1872. Anyway it is quite certain that Nishi was discharged from the tiresome work of preparation of the Conscription Act, for four days later Nishi started writing a new book on the "Philosophical Investigations on the Physiological Basis of Psychology".⁽¹⁹⁾ It was the day that the 3rd day of the last month of traditional year 1872 abruptly turned into 1st January 1873 as the new Western calendar started and the reform of the Meiji Government reached its highest peak.

(17) Hackett, *Yamagata*. p. 65.

(18) *Ibid.* p. 65f.

(19) In writing the book Nishi relied heavily on the critical exposition of the Positivist Philosophy of August Comte by George Henry Lewes.

II

Nishi joined the new government on 23rd October 1870 after having organized and established the Numazu Academy as headmaster.⁽²⁰⁾ Ex-Bakufu official, Katsu Awa has been credited with initiating the invitation to Nishi to join the government. Some doubts, however, surround Mori Ōgai's statement, that Katsu had recommended Nishi to Yamagata, then Under-Minister of War, and that "Yamagata petitioned the emperor for his service."⁽²¹⁾ Ōgai wrote in *Nishi Amane den* that he once heard Katsu say "One day Yamagata Aritomo with Yamada Akiyoshi visited me and discussed with me some problems. I recommended Nishi. Yamagata thus petitioned the emperor for his service. Whenever I met Yamagata after that, he praised Nishi's ability and said what a useful recommendation I had made to him. This went on all the time Nishi worked in the Army Ministry and at Military Headquarters."⁽²²⁾ This paragraph has since been accepted as a statement of fact.⁽²³⁾ But it is not. For Yamada Akiyoshi was not in Tokyo at the time, while Katsu was there continuously since Yamagata came back from abroad late in August; thus it was impossible for Yamada to have visited Katsu with Yamagata before Nishi was appointed as an official of the War Department. The paragraph of Ōgai, quoted above, is therefore either inaccurate or fictitious.⁽²⁴⁾ The question arises, to whom did Katsu recommend Nishi? Who petitioned the emperor or anyone else for Nishi's service? It was probably Saigō Tsugumichi who, in consultation with Katsu, arranged the invitation for Nishi to join the War Department.

Saigō Tsugumichi and Yamagata Aritomo were the first prominent Japanese to

(20) On detail, see Hasunuma "NISHI Amane and the Meiji Restoration". KLJ. XXXII(Sep. 1981)

(21) Hackett, "Nishi" p. 216. Katsu was not in the Meiji government at the time, though he had played a prominent role in bringing hostilities to an end.

(22) Mori Rintarō, *Nishi Amane den*, in the note on the paragraph on the 25th day of the 9th month of 1871.

(23) Tokutomi, *Yamagata Aritomo den*. II. p. 267f. Mastushita "Rikugunsōsetsu no kōrōsha Nishi Amane" in *Meiji Gunsei shi ronshū* (Tokyo 1938) p. 293. Hackett. "Nishi" p. 216. Havens, *Nishi*. p. 86. Okubo, quoting the above paragraph from *Nishi Amane den*, conjectures that Ōgai may have gathered this from Katsu in the process of preparing and correcting the biography. (Ōkubo "Comments" on military articles in *Works* III, p. 4.) Hasunuma quoted Ōkubo in "NISHI Amane and the Meiji Restoration" KLJ. XXXI No.2 p. 282. But Ōkubo's conjecture seems mistaken, for Ōgai wrote he "once heard (Katsu) Yoshikuni saying" and this "once" seems to me to indicate that Ōgai heard it, if ever he really did, on some previous occasion. I admit I was mistaken, too.

(24) I am not certain which.

go abroad after the Restoration. In the spring of 1869 the Meiji government at their request arranged for them to travel abroad and acquire practical knowledge of "war ships, artillery, military systems and administration".⁽²⁵⁾ They sailed with an interpreter from Nagasaki in August 1869, bound for Marseilles. They arrived in Paris in winter and Yamagata soon crossed over to London. After he gave up studying English in the remaining winter months, he travelled in spring through France, Belgium, Holland, Prussia and Russia. He was deeply impressed by the militaristic spirit in the German people which convinced him of the strength of Prussia. Saigō Tsugumichi was impressed by French civilization and spent most of his time in Paris. He was busy studying the military system and institutions in France and believed in the superiority of the French system. They left Paris early in summer 1870. Yamagata and Saigō heard about the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War on the train on route from New York to San Francisco and began a friendly argument over which nation would win. Saigō confidently predicted the victory of France while Yamagata speculated that "stubborn France would probably fall",⁽²⁶⁾ remembering the martial spirit of the Germans which he had detected in Berlin.

After a year abroad, Saigō and Yamagata returned to Tokyo on 30th August 1870. They were privileged to pay a visit to the imperial palace next day. Yamagata made a personal report of his observation on Russia and Saigō explained to the young emperor his experiences in contemporary France in detail.⁽²⁷⁾ Saigō Tsugumichi met Katsu next day.⁽²⁸⁾ Within a few days, Saigō Tsugumichi was asked to become a secretary of the War Department. He accepted the offer with no hesitation. He was confident of achieving progress in military reform by applying the new knowledge which he had brought back from abroad. Yamagata was asked to become Under-Minister of War on the same day, but he refused the appointment at first on the grounds that he lacked enough prestige and authority to achieve the difficult goal which he foresaw in the future. Yamagata believed that no one but Saigō Takamori could assume such a heavy responsibility as to organize a central army and command it, and thought that "the first step toward unification was to persuade Satsuma to place its troops under the direct authority of the Tokyo government. Satsuma troops, the strongest military contingent

(25) Tokutomi, *Yamagata den*, I, p. 687. Hackett, *Yamagata*, p. 51. Translation is Hackett's.

(26) Tokutomi, *Yamagata den*, II, p. 31-33. Hackett, *Yamagata*, p. 52f. Translation is Hackett's.

(27) Yamagata, Aritomo "Chohei seido oyobi jichi seido kakuritsu no enkau" in *Meiji Kensei Keizai shiron* (Tokyo, 1919) p. 376 (Hereafter cited as *Siron*)

(28) Katsu's Diary of 5th August of the third year Meiji, in *Katsu Kaishu Zenshu* XIX p. 257.

in the nation, had been led back to Kagoshima by Saigō Takamori after friction developed between himself and other leaders of the Restoration. This peevish action had rekindled doubts in the minds of some Chōshū men whose suspicions of Satsuma intentions ever since the Kyoto incident of 1864 had not been completely extinguished.....
 ...Yamagata.....favored broad compromise to secure the cooperation of Satsuma forces in building a national army. So when Iwakura, chief minister of state, pressed him to accept a position in the military department, Yamagata placed two conditions on his acceptance: first, that the various han military systems would be unified and, second, that Saigō Takamori would be invited to⁽²⁹⁾ assume supreme command of military affairs in the government. When Saigō Tsugumichi knew that the difficulty of the task discouraged Yamagata, he made it his duty to persuade Yamagata and push him to accept the offer. Yamagata answered that he had placed two conditions. Saigō supported the conditions and proceeded to promise that he himself would undertake to go to Satsuma to persuade his brother to rejoin the government. When Iwakura Tomomi agreed that the two conditions be fulfilled, Yamagata finally accepted the appointment.⁽³⁰⁾

Within a week, Vice-Minister, Maebara Issei left the government. After his resignation the new leaders of the War Department took major steps toward the creation of a national army and navy. The first measure they took was to set up standards encouraging the leading *han* to adjust and reform their various military systems gradually. The Meiji government had adopted the French system as the standard for the army in May. But the news that Napoleon the Third had surrendered to Prussia at Sedan on 2nd September discredited the superiority of the French military system and a problem arose within the Department as to which military system should be adopted? As the Satsuma troops had adopted English system and since their leader Saigō Takamori was expected to be Supreme Commander, would it not be better to adopt the English system for the national army as well? After careful consideration the majority preferred the French system. It was probably Saigō Tsugumichi who advocated the superiority of French system, dispelled the doubts which the surrender of Napoleon the Third had cast over it and led the majority to the French side. Yamagata played a minor role in the discussion. He actually favored the Prussian model as he had been impressed by the martial spirit of the German people in Berlin but he withdrew from the discussion. As the fact that few Japanese had learned German made it difficult to translate German materials and interpret for German experts, it would follow that he would just encourage

(29) Hackett, *Yamagata*, p. 56.

(30) Yamagata, op. cit. in *Shiron*, p. 377.

the advocates of English system, if he objected to the adoption of French system. Yamagata must have feared that the adoption of English system might threaten and overthrow the achievement which Chōshū had made at Ōsaka branch of the War Department. On 21st October 1870 the War Department had submitted a draft to the Council of State, which state "since in the regular forces of the government, the navy is to adopt the English system and the army the French system in the end, each *han* army should first change its organization and adopt the French system."⁽³¹⁾

It was the next day that Nishi was appointed as an official of the War Department.⁽³²⁾ It seems that Saigō Tsugumichi and Kawamura Sumiyoshi arranged the invitation for Nishi and expected him to investigate military codes for soldiers and a system of military education⁽³³⁾ in order to reform the Military school for officers and military training for soldiers. Nishi started his official career, probably in close cooperation with the Satsuma faction within the War Department. It was a myth that Chōshū faction invited Nishi to join the War Deptment.

(cont')

(31) *Taizen*, Heiseimon I p. 33. The order was issued on 26th October 1870. See Hackett, *Yamagata*, p. 58.

(32) Nishi, diary of 28th of 9th Month of the 3rd year Meiji, in *Work* III p. 413. Concurrently he was given the duty of investigating the education system. It was he who drafted "Daigaku nankō kisoku" in November 1870. For details, see Hasunuma, "NISHI Amane and the Meiji Restoration" *KLJ*. XXXI No.2 p. 279f

(33) *Kōbunroku*, War Department. 27th of the 9th month, 1870.