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蓮沼, 啓介

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蓮沼啓介

0．はじめに

「1898年の末近く、ムーアと私はカントとヘーゲルの両方に対して反乱をおこした。ムーアが先を行き、私はすぐあとからムーアの足取りを追った」。(注1) イギリスの名門貴族の出身であり、かつ大学者であった Bertrand Russell は、その哲学者としての生涯を語った回想録の中で、自らが二才年下の G.E.ムーアと共に開始した、ドイツ観念論とその英国版に対する思想反乱のことを懐かしそうに語っている。ラッセルは『自伝』の中では、同じ思想反乱に触れて、こう語っている。「ムーアが反乱の先頭に立ち、自分は解放感をもってそのあとに従った」。(注2) ラッセルはこう続ける。「芝生はグリーンだし、太陽や星は誰れもそれに気付いていなくても実在するのだし、又、時の流れの外側に多元的でプラトン的なイデアの世界があると考えても良くなったのであるから、まるで牢獄から脱出するといった感覚であった。論理だけの痩せこけた世界が突然、豊かで変化にとみ、しかもしっかりした世界に変わった」。この思想反乱は、イギリス観念論の大家であり、ムーアやラッセルが反乱の寸前まで心酔していた Bradley の哲学に対する反逆であった。(注3) とりわけそれは、ブラッドレイのいう Absolute という絶対者と、絶対者の観点に立って毎日の生活を単なるうわべだけの見せかけの世界に過ぎないと貶めるブラッドレイの観念世界からの解放であった。尤も、晩年のムーアはこの反逆にはあまり愛着がなく、「ラッセルが自分に負うているのは mistake だけであると思う。それ以上のことはわからない」(注4)と木で鼻を括るようなことを冷淡に言い放っているが、

後年のムーアの立場から見れば mistake でしかなかった初期の思想を、よしそれが mistake であれ、最初に考え出したのが、ラッセルではなく、ムーアの方であったことは明白である。独創はムーアにあった。ムーアは『自伝』の中でそのいきさつを簡潔かつ的確に書き残している。

それは1897年から1898年にかけての年度に生じた出来事であった。当時 G.E.ムーアはケムブリッジ大学の学生であり、留年の二年目であった。G.E.ムーアは1892年にケムブリッジ大学に入学し Trinity College に奨学生として受け入れられている。1896年には好成績で卒業試験に合格し、周囲に勧められるままに、ムーアは Trinity College 恒例の Fellowship Examination に応募することにした。要するに助手試験である。専攻は哲学であった。Prize Fellowship という通称で知られた、この Fellowship は優秀な学生に与えられる、まるで賞金のごとき助手職である。受賞者は Trinity College に部屋を与えられ、6年間に亙り、毎年約200ポンドの金額が支給される。しかも義務や負担は何もない。ケムブリッジに住まなくても構わないし、何の仕事もない。文字通り好き勝手なことができるという結構な地位を約束してくれる代物であった。従って、特賞の助手になる者の中には、早速 London に移って法実務を学んで法廷弁護士になって、収入が安定するまでの生計の足しにする者も少なくは無かったわけである。

ところで助手試験に応募するには、論文 dissertation を提出して、論文審査に合格しなければならない。G.E.ムーアは留年して論文の作成に取り掛かったのであるが、留年一年目の1897年の夏に提出した論文は審査に合格せず、もう一年留年を延ばして論文の完成を目指していた年度の出来事であった。

この年度の途中に、G.E.ムーアは探求の方向を変え、Kant 哲学の研究の焦点を『実践理性批判』から『純粋理性批判』へと移動させたのである。移動の機縁となったのは Reason であった。「理性」という語を Kant はどのような意味に用いているのか。この言葉の意味を確定する必要から探求の重心が移

動することになったわけである。ムーアはこう語っている。

一体 Kant はこの語で何を意味しているのか。カントがこの世で発見されるはずの何者かをともかく直接に指し示していることは間違いないし、その何者かは別の用語で記述できることも間違いない。だが、正確には一体何を指すのか。私が取り組み、考えをめぐらしていたのは、この問いであった。こうしてまず真理という概念についてあれこれ考えることになったのだが、それはカントが理性という用語を用いる際に、時によって、真理の概念に関連を持たせている様に、私には思われたからである。真理について、考えている内に、ブラッドレイの『論理学』の第一頁にある一節をテクストとして使おうという気になった。その一節は "Truth and falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to reality" で始まり、続いて、観念の "meaning"「意味するもの」はその内容のうち"cut off, fixed by the mind"「心によって切断され固定された」部分であって、当該観念の「存在からは分離して考察されたもの」"considered apart from the existance" であると述べている箇所であったが、観念の意味するものとは観念から「切断」されたものではなくて、人の心からは全く独立の何者かであると、私には思われたからである。尤も、もし私が正しく覚えていればの話ですが。私はこの立場に立って議論を試みたが（中略）これがブラッドレイの哲学を正しいとする信念から離反する始まりであった。

こうして新しい立脚点に立って執筆された論文は首尾良く二度目の審査に合格し、G.E.ムーアは、晴れて Trinity 学寮の Fellow という助手に就職できた。前年の審査主任であった Sidgwick がこの年の審査主任であった Ward にムーアに有利な発言をするように口添えしておいたことが、或いは功を奏したのであったかも知れない。

特にブラッドレイを直接の標的とする、ドイツ観念論との訣別は、このようにして開始された。

本稿では、G.E.ムーアが助手試験に応募するために提出した二つの論文のうち、1898年論文の方を取り上げ、新しい立場がどのようにして形成されたのか、その生成過程を出来る限り再現する仕事に取り掛かる積もりである。それは、ムーアとラッセルというふたりの若き哲学の徒が敢行した、観念論への反逆という思想的事件が、どのように準備され、どのように実行されたのかを探求する試みでもある。こうした探求を通して、次の事が明らかになる筈である。まず G.E.ムーア、Bertrand Russell と鬼才 Ludwig Wittgenstein の三人の哲学者の集いと交流の中から発展したケムブリッジにおける分析哲学の源流を探り、その泉を探り当てることが出来そうであるし、また、未だに謎に包まれたままに放置されている、新カント学派の哲学潮流と分析哲学の勃興という哲学の新展開の間に存した筈の関係、いわば哲学史における missing link 失われた結び付きを、G.E.ムーアの初期の哲学に的を絞って再び見いだすことも出来そうである。と同時に更に、真、義、善、美といった価値の探求を行う価値哲学を今日的な水準で行うために強固な出発点を築いた思想を発展させた原動力を明るみに出し、かくて今日の時点において価値哲学に取り掛かる確固たる足場を求めること、ここに本稿の探求の向かうべき目標が置かれていることを予めお断りして置きたい。

1. G.E.ムーアの生涯とその業績

G.E.ムーアは第二次大戦中に戦火を逃れるために米国に渡っている。1940年の10月の初めに New York に到着し、Smith College や Prinston 大学で一定期間講義を行っているし、この折に、現役の哲学者 Living Philosohphers のシリーズの一巻として公刊された『G.E.ムーアの哲学』に

「自伝」を寄稿している。この「自伝」には、G.E.ムーアの生涯と活動の様子が、1942年に至るまで、簡潔に回想されている。それによれば、G.E.ムーアは1873年に London の郊外で生まれた。ロンドンの南にあたる Surrey にある、ロンドンの市中から8マイルほど離れた、Upper Norwood というところである。8人兄弟の五番目であった。両親が Norwood に引っ越して来たのは G.E.ムーアが生まれる二年前のことである。G.E.ムーアの父親もその父親も医者であった。母親はクェーカー教徒の家系である Sturge 家の出身である。二人は息子たちを一マイルほど離れた Dulwich College に入学させるために、Norwood に越して来たのである。Dulwich は day-boys と呼ばれる通学生が9割を占める新しいタイプの Public school であった。寄宿生は生徒数の一割に満たない数であり、生徒のほとんどは、ロンドン市内か、その郊外に住む中産階級の家庭の子供たちであった。G.E.ムーアも無論その一人であった。G.E.ムーアは兄たちと同じ様に Dulwich College に入り、毎日一マイルの道のりを走って通学した。学校ではギリシャ語やラテン語という古典が得意で、6年間のほとんどを古典の学習に明け暮れている。自然科学や数学はほとんど習ったことがないし、また得意でもなかった。特に Dulwich では実力のある古典の先生に恵まれ、その実力があがったし、ドイツ語の手ほどきも受けている。その御蔭で、大学では奨学金を貰うことが出来た。

G.E.ムーアは1892年の10月にケムブリッジ大学に入学し、12年の間そこに留まった。前半の6年間は学生として、後半の6年間は助手として、その青春をケムブリッジ大学それも Trinity 学寮で暮らすことになったわけである。はじめ G.E.ムーア は古典科に入って二年間は古典の勉強をしていたが、既に Dulwich で古典の特訓を受けていた G.E.ムーアには、ま新しいことは何もなく、学業の方は適当にやっていたようである。そんなムーアを哲学の道に誘い込んだのは、大学で知り合った Bertrand Russell である。ムーアが二年生のときにラッセルは四年生であったが、1894年6月にケムブリッジ大学を

卒業したラッセルは、自分と同じ哲学を専攻するように G.E.ムーアに強く勧めた。G.E.ムーアはラッセルの勧めに従い、Moral Science 道徳哲学を専攻することに決めたが、古典科のギリシャ哲学をも同時に専攻することにした。欲張って二科目を専攻したわけである。結局、1896年になって道徳哲学の試験の出来は良かったものの、古典の方は香ばしいとは言えない成績に終わった。G.E.ムーアの関心が古典から哲学へと移行してしまったからである。1894年の時点までは、自分は将来古典の先生になってどこかのパブリック・スクールで教えるという風に漠然と人生設計を立てていた G.E.ムーアにとっては大きな変わりようであった。

道徳哲学の成績が良かったのを見て、指導教官たちは、G.E.ムーアに Trinity の助手試験に応募するよう勧めた。そこで G.E.ムーアは哲学の教師であった Ward に相談して、Kant の倫理学について論文を書くことにした。こうして1896年から1898年までの二年間、G.E.ムーアはカントの三批判書や Prolegomena また Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten について思索を重ねる運びとなった。留年の一年目にはカントの ethical doctrine 倫理学説のうち Freedom に関する学説を取り上げ、論文に纏めた。G.E.ムーアにはカントが奇妙な説を唱えていると思われたのである。すなわち本体的自我と経験的自我という別々の自分がいて、本体的自我は自由であるが、経験的自我は自由ではないとする説を唱えているように思われたわけである。カントの学説を煮詰めて行くとこういう結論に至る。G.E.ムーアはこう考え、このおかしな神秘説に何とか理に適った説明を加えようと試みた。結局、1897年に提出した一回目の論文は審査に合格せず不合格に終わり、G.E.ムーアは留年をもう一年延長して、論文を書き直すことにしたわけである。

運命の一年がこうして訪れることになった。1897年から1898年にかけての年度に、始めに述べた様に、G.E.ムーアは新しい立場を発見したが、この立場に立って書き直した論文は見事に二回目の審査に合格して、ムーアは晴れて

Trinity の助手職に就くことができた。Trinity の fellow としての暮らしはとても居心地が良く、楽しい生活であった。その後の6年の間、G.E.ムーアはなんの気兼ねもなしに哲学の探求に没頭するという素晴らしい学究生活を送ることが出来た。

ところで『自伝』には、交友関係をめぐる箇所について何か歯切れの悪い、曖昧な記述があちこちに見受けられる。ラッセルと共に G.E.ムーアが観念論に対して反旗を翻した時点の前後に、G.E.ムーアがラッセルをはじめとする友人たちとどのように親交を深めていたのかは、ぼんやりとした霧に包まれているかの様であった。G.E.ムーアの死後、ムーア文書を預かっていたのは夫人であるが、その夫人の死後、G.E.ムーア文書が競売に出され、ケムブリッジ中央図書館がそれを買い取っている。1979年末のことである。競売に先立って G.E.ムーア文書の整理に当たり、G.E.ムーアの隠された交友関係を明るみに出したのが Paul Levy の "Moore" である。「G.E.ムーアとケムブリッジの使徒たち」という刺戟的な副題の付いた本書において、レビ氏は、ケムブリッジ大学には古典学を中心に教師と学生の参加する秘密結社を思わせる閉鎖的な結社があって、そのメンバーは結社の存在を外部に洩らしてはならないという掟を生涯守りながら活動を続けていることを暴露した。G.E.ムーア文書の中に Cambridge Conversazione Society ケムブリッジ談話会という閉鎖的な会合で行った発表の原稿がいくつも含まれていて、この談話会での活動こそが、G.E.ムーアを哲学の道に誘なった最大の原動力であったことを、レビ氏は明白にしたわけである。ラッセルもその一員であったし、G.E.ムーアもその一員であった。G.E.ムーアとラッセルとの交友も実はこの談話会を舞台に醸し出されたものであった。談話会に入るにはメンバーによる厳格な審査に合格しなければならず、新人は、メンバーのお眼鏡に適った者の中から、本人の了解を事前に取り付けた上で、入会を承認するという極めて閉鎖的なやり方で集められたのである。談話会に入会できるということは、従って、非常に名誉なこ

とであった。メンバー達は自分たちを使徒に準らえた程であった。G.E.ムーアはおとなしい聞き役から、やがて会の中心的な論客に成長していくが、レビ氏の著書にはその様子がありありと描かれている。

更に、G.E.ムーア文書が図書館に収まってから、未公開であった論文やら講義原稿やらを実見する研究が現れるに至った。「G.E.ムーアによる観念論の放棄」というボードウィン氏の論文がそれである。氏は、G.E.ムーアの初期哲学を批判的に論評するために、未発表の論文を点検し、G.E.ムーアが観念論に訣別した時点を探求して、それが1898年論文であったことを、明らかにした。G.E.ムーアがカント哲学に向けた批判の核心は、氏によれば、[注5] 認識が客観的である根拠を人間の心理過程に求めるのは間違いであるとするものであるが、それは心理主義の否定であった。これは、カントをはじめとする観念論の哲学者たちが、人間心理の探求により知識の形成を説明した、経験主義の心理学に投げかけた批判を、カント哲学に投げ返すものであった。

ボードウィン論文では、G.E.ムーアがその後に展開した様々の意見を初期の哲学と関連付ける説明が行われているが、本稿では、1898年論文において出現した新しい立場が、どのように産み出されたのか、という問題に的を絞って、更に突っ込んだ探求を行う積もりである。そのために、G.E.ムーア文書に残されている資料を点検して、そうした資料を元に、G.E.ムーアがFreedom に関する Kant の説を何とか他人にも分かる形にしようと悪戦や苦闘を繰り返していた段階から、Reason という語を Kant がどのような意味に用いているのか、という問題に考察の焦点を移動させるに至った思考過程を解明することを目指し、その用意を整えることに本稿の狙いがあることをここでお断りして置きたい。

2．G.E.ムーア文書管見

1979年に競売にかけられたムーア文書は、無事、ケムブリッジ中央図書館に買い取られ、文書室 Manuscripts Room の倉庫に保管されている。文書は1986年の時点では未整理で、目録はなく、競売用に作成されたカタログ(注6)が目録の代わりに使われている。文書は大きな紙の箱九つに収められ、ほかに card box が二つあって、G.E.ムーアにまつわる手紙の内容が要約されたカードがABC順に並べられている。(注7)

Box 1 の点検。1と番号のある箱の中には、AからLまでのアルファベットを付した Paper folders が入っている。それぞれの Paper folders の間にはG.E.ムーア宛ての手紙が差出人の initial に従ってそれぞれ別の folders に分類され、日付順に整理されている。差出人ごとに纏められた手紙は、横罫の入った用紙に挟んであり、罫線紙には差出人の名前と先に触れたカード箱の番号が記載されている。例えば、Aと付された Paper folder に束ねられた手紙の差出人の中には、Ayer や Austin,J.L. の名も見える。(注8) また、Bと付された Paper folder の中には、British Academy を含む40もの差出人の名前があるが、その中には Bradley や Bosanquet といったムーアと同時代のやや年長の哲学者の名前も見受けられる。Bradley の手紙は二通ある。Bosanquet の手紙が三通あり、うち一通は、就職したムーアを自宅の昼食に招待したものである。

Box 2 の点検。番号2の箱には、アルファベットのMからSまでを付した Paper folders が入っている。それぞれの Paper folders の間には G.E.ムーア宛ての手紙が差出人の initial に従ってそれぞれ別の folders に分類され、日付順に整理されている。差出人ごとに纏められた手紙は、横罫の入った用紙に挟んであり、罫線紙には差出人の名前と先に触れたカード箱の番号が記載されているが、これは Box 1 と同様である。めぼしい差出人としては Russell

B. の名が見える。

Box 3 の点検。番号 3 の箱には、手紙の続きとしてアルファベットのTからWまでを付した paper folders が入っている。それぞれの Paper folders の間には G.E.ムーア宛ての手紙が差出人ごとに纏められて罫線紙に挟んであるのは同じであるが、Wittgenstein の束には、Wittgenstein が Moore に宛てた手紙だけでなく、Russell に宛てた手紙も一緒にされている。ほかに1940年代の手紙が未整理のまま入っている。また番号 3 の箱には Philosophical fellowship fund に関する文書が入っている。

Box 4 の点検。学生時代の小論が集められている。Philosophy papers for Sidgwick, Ward, McTaggart, Johnson and Jackson とある。うち、Ward に提出した論文の題は、Methods of Ethics および Lotze's Metaphysics であるし、McTaggart に提出した論文は Categories という題で、これは Hegel に関する論文である。Sidgwick に提出した論文は三本あって、Egoism and altruism, Relation of reason to moral action (Eassey I + II), The distinction of formal and material in Ethics という題のものである。

また、G.E.ムーアが1898年の秋に London school of ethics and social philosophy という成人学校で行った講義の Syllabus(注9) がある。Syllabus の introduction において G.E.ムーアはカント道徳哲学の講義を行う旨の予告を行っているが、兄である Sturge Moore が1899年の初めに書いた要約ノートがあって、G.E.ムーア自身がコメントを付している。

ほかに、G.E.ムーアが1893年に書いた English Essays が四本あるし、Logic と Truthという題の Essays が、おのおの三枚、合わせて六枚ある。

また Sunday Essays が10本、Apostle papers が21本（別本を入れると24本）あるし、ほかに、Dulwich College および Cambridge Alleynian Club の年会に関する案内の類いがある。更に、Moore's paper として日記の

抜粋や家系図、Reading parties という勉強会の合宿の記録、1903年までの年譜、哲学原稿の年代順リスト、People I see という知人のリストなどの伝記資料とおぼしい書類が若干ある。次に哲学原稿の年代順リストから記事を抄して置く。

1896 I took Part II of the tripos in May of this year, and began working for my first Dissertation during the Long + October term; but I probably wrote nothing of it at all − only read Kant + his commentators.

1898 During first two terms + Long till end of August, work for second Dissertation, but probably write nothing till May term.
In October term write first cource of Lectures on Ethics, weekly for delivery.

1899 Lent term, write Lectures on Kant's Ethics, weekly for delivery.

ほかには、G.E.ムーアが Dulwich の6年生の時に使った Latin Prose の帳面がある。英文を左頁に、羅文を右頁に、対照的に記入している。それに portraits ほかの写真が若干入っている。

Box 5 の点検。"On the Idea of Necessary Connection" という A.J.Ayer の自筆の原稿10頁に手紙が添えてある。1923年1月7日付けの手紙で、Ayer は Wien から原稿をムーアに送って、Mind への掲載を依頼したものである。

ほかに、Class lists があって G.E.ムーアの講義に出席した学生の名前が控えてあるし、Dulwich College の成績表と通知の葉書のほかに、当時の Private newspapers 私家版の新聞や講演のポスターなどがある。別に書評を収めた Folder や、Wittgenstein に関するメモも入っている。

Box 6 の点検。番号 6 の箱には、ムーア一族からの手紙が保管されている。

Box 7 の点検。Syllabus が一冊の本になって入っている。10回目の講義の自筆原稿が一緒に入っている。37頁。前半はペン書き、23頁以下は鉛筆で書かれていて、講義原稿の姿をじかに伝えてくれる。

Box 8 の点検。G.E.ムーアの用いた帳面や手帳が入っている。多くは学生時代およびその後に出席した講義のノートであるが、日記の記入された帳面とか、Easter の休みに行った合宿の記録とか、あるいは Public School 時代に書いた神学の Essays もあるし、手帳には、Work と称して、毎日何時から何時まで仕事をしたか、記録が残されている。ほかには夫人 Dorothy Moore の手になる ムーアとラッセルを対照したノートと、G.E.ムーアが家族に宛てた手紙ほかが、小箱に収まっている。

Box 9 の点検。アルバムが入っていて、ほかに Sketch Book がある。

以上が G.E.ムーア文書の概要であるが、G.E.ムーアの就職論文だけは、中央図書館の文書室ではなく、Trinity College にある Wren Library に別置されている。

3．G.E.ムーアの助手就職論文

Trinity の Prize fellowship に G.E.ムーアは1897年と1898年と二度応募している。従って、Prize fellowship dissertations は一回目の論文と二回目の論文と二本ある。それぞれの論文には序 Preface があって、また一回目の論文を提出した際に1897年7月31日付けで出した提出願いも残っている。一回目の論文には Sidgwick と Caird の自筆のコメントが付されているし、二回目の論文には Bosanquet の自筆のコメントが保存されている。98年論文の序には、97年論文と98年論文との関係が簡潔に説明されている。

The greater part of the Dissertation, which I submitted for examination last year, has been included in the present work. Some omissions and alterations, involving an important change of views, have been made; and nearly as much again of new matter has been added. I have followed the suggestions of my examiners in attempting to distinguish more clearly between my own views and those of Kant ; and in deference to the same suggestions, I have added an appendix on the chronology of Kant's ethical writings (後略).

98年論文の題名と目次と実際の枚数は次の通りである。

The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics

by George Edward Moore

Table of Contents	(目次の頁数)	(実際の頁数)
Introduction	i-xxiv	i-xxiv, 2- 5
Chapter I On the meaning of 'Reason' in Kant	1- 52	1- 3, 12-44
Chapter II Reason	53- 87	1, 2, 6, 25-38
Chapter III The meaning of 'Freedom' in Kant	88-144	2-51
Chapter IV Freedom	145-185	28-56
Chapter V Ethical Conclusions	(186-197)	1-11
Appendix on the Chronology of Kant's ethical writings		
Appendix on Prof.Sidgwick's Hedonism		なし

98年論文には、Appendix のIIが欠けているが、97年論文に同一の Appendix が二本も付されているので、その一方は98年論文に付されていたものであろうと推測される。

原稿の書体であるが、Preface はペン書き、Title はタイプ打ち、Table of Cntents はペン書き、Introduction I は i-x iv まではタイプ、x v 以下はペン書きである。Chapter I はペン書き、Chapter II は他人の手で清書してあり、Chapter III はタイプ（9−11と44−51の部分はペン書き)、Chapter IV は題だけペン書きで、本文はタイプ、Chapter V はペン書きである。

さて先に掲げた序において簡潔に説明されていた97年論文と98年論文との関係を、98年論文自体を手掛かりに更に詳しく探求して、97年論文をもとに98年論文が出来上がっていく様子を復元して見ることにしよう。特に98年論文の第三章と第四章とが手掛かりを与えてくれる。この二つの章は本文のほとんどがタイプで打った原稿からなるが、タイプ原稿の肩に頁数をタイプで打った箇所をペンで抹消して、頁数を書き直してあるからである。元のタイプで打った頁数とペンで書き直した頁数とを対照すると次の通りである。(注10)

Chapter III The Meaning of 'Freedom' in Kant (題はペン書き、本文はタイプ)

タイプ頁 (1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ……14 …… (26) 27
ペン書頁 2 3 4 5 6 (9) 10
同 12 13 14

タイプ頁 (57) 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
ペン書頁 (26) 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
同 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

タイプ頁 (76 77) 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
ペン書頁 (36 37) 38 39/40
同 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51
(但し44〜51は本文ペン書き)

Chapter IV　Freedom（題だけペン書き、本文はタイプ）

タイプ頁	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46
ペン書頁	11	12	13	14	15										16	17	18	19	20

タイプ頁	47	48	49	50	51	・	・	52	53	54	55	(56)
ペン書頁	21	22	23	24	51a	51b						(25)

面白い事に、第三章はタイプ頁の1から始まって、途中が抜けて27頁に至り、そこから57頁に飛んで85頁まで並んでいる。一方、28頁から56頁までがそっくり第四章に収まっている。ということは、第三章と第四章とは、もともとはChapter I Freedom と題の付いたタイプ原稿を基本として、その配列を変更して作成された原稿である、と推定してまず間違いは無さそうである。これに対して本文がペン書きである9～11頁および44～51頁の部分は、この変更の後に加筆された箇所であろう。つまり98年論文には、その基本となったタイプ原稿があったということになる。これを仮に幻の Original Typescripts と呼ぶことにすれば、98年論文はこの Original Typescripts を第一草稿とする論文であったわけである。この第一草稿を、一部欠落を残したまま、復元して付録(注11)に掲げて置こう。

さて、この第一草稿から、どのような思考操作を経て、第三章と第四章とが生み出されたのか、そのプロセスを復元することを、ここで試みることにしよう。タイプ頁を抹消してペンで頁を書き直した箇所の中に、一旦ペンで書き直した頁数を再びペンで書き直した箇所が混じっている。これはどういう事か。おそらく G.E.ムーアはタイプ原稿を二度に亙って並び変えているのであろうと思われる。ペンで書き直され再びペンで抹消された頁数は、一度目の並び替

えの際に記入された頁数であって、二度目の並び替えの際にその一部は抹消され、他の一部は抹消の必要がなかったためそのままの形で残った、と推定されるわけである。そこで一度目の並び替えにより出来上がった原稿を修正草稿と呼ぶことにすれば、修正草稿の頁数は中段に掲げたペン書き数字に示されることになる。もともとのタイプ頁で示せば、修正草稿は 1－8、27－32、42－50、56－65、75－79 から成り立っていたと推定できる。(注12)

二度目の並び替えの折には、タイプ原稿に一旦戻って、その中程を取り去って、第三章とし、取り出した中程の原稿を第四章に編めたと推定される。

こうした二度に亘る修正の試みがなぜ行われたのかは、必ずしも、はっきりしない。詳しくは、第一草稿と修正草稿と98年論文の第三章と第四章とを対照して、その間の異同を調べる必要がある。

4．今後の研究課題

ともあれ、98年論文は審査に合格し、G.E.ムーアはめでたく Trinity の Prize Fellowship を得ることが出来たが、G.E.ムーアの助手就職論文は、審査員であった Bernard Bosanquet に深刻な衝撃を与えることになった。G.E.ムーアが98年論文で展開した説は、余りにも奇妙な説であって、ボザンケットには到底受け入れがたい内容のものであったからである。パラドックスにしても度が過ぎる。とても本気でその説を唱えているとは思えない、とボザンケットは読後感を率直に告白している有り様である。(注13) ボザンケットに深刻な衝撃を与えたのは、G.E.ムーアによる Psycologism の徹底的な破壊であった。真 Truth や善 Good は人間の認識から切り離して始めて全面的に論じることが可能になる、という G.E.ムーアの立場は、物心二分論からなる近代哲学の存在了解を、余りにもあっけなくあっさりと踏み越えてしまうものであり、それ故、こうした存在了解を強固に抱く論者には正気の沙汰とも思えない極端

な主張であったからである。

ともあれ、98年論文には革新的な存在論の芽生えが見られ、価値哲学を今後展開するには存在了解の地平を拡大する必要があるという強烈なメッセージを、既に98年論文の段階において、G.E.ムーアは発信しているのである。拡大された存在了解に立って、現実なかんずく意味の世界を探求すること、近代哲学とは区分される現代哲学の地平が拓かれたのは、こうした見地への移行が完了した時点においてであった。ケムブリッジに分析哲学が誕生したのも、この瞬間であった。分析哲学の源流は、97年論文と98年論文とを分かつ「重大な見解の変更」が G.E.ムーアの思索において生じたその地点にまで溯って始めて発見されるであろう。

残された課題であるが、こうした新しい見地すなわち革新的な存在論へと G.E.ムーアが移行を始めたのは何時のことであったのか、それは98年論文が形成される途上のどの段階において生じた思想の発展であったのか、その時点を精密に特定する仕事はまだ果たされてはいないし、また、こうした移行、こうした思想の発展を促した原動力が何であったのかを解明する仕事も未だに果たされてはいない。その時点を特定するには、次の三段階の探求が必要になる筈である。

（i）タイプ原稿と修正原稿とを対照すること。

（ii）Freedom 論文と修正原稿とを対照すること。

（iii）修正原稿と98年論文の第三章および第四章とを対照すること。

こうした地味で地道な作業を通して、ケムブリッジにおける分析哲学の誕生という思想の展開点を確定することは、別論[注14]に譲らねばならない。

注

(注1) Russell. 1959、54頁。なお、Baldwin. 1984、を参照されたい。

(注2) Russell. 1951

(注3) Passmore. 1969、第九章

(注4) Moore,G.E. 1942

(注5) Baldwin. p362

(注6) Sathabys 社のカタログである。

(注7) このカードは、G.E.ムーア文書の一部ではなく、おそらくは、レビ氏の手になるものと推定される。

(注8) ちなみに J.L.Austin が Moore に宛てた手紙は二通あって、50 Sep.29 と 52 Mar.28 の日付で、差出人の住所は Magdelin College となっている。始めの手紙は J.L.Austin が Frege の『算数の基礎』を訳した独英対訳本をムーアに送りたい旨を告げたものである。

(注9) Syllabus of a cource of ten lectures on "The Elements of Ethics, with a view to an appreciation of Kant's Moral Philosophy" By G.E.Moore, Trinity College, Cambridge,

London 1898

とある。

(注10) なお ( ) 内の数字は、実際には記入の無い頁数を、前後から推定した頁数である。

(注11) 64～133 頁。なお、このタイプ原稿は、G.E,ムーアの手になる97年論文の自筆原稿をタイプ打ちしたものと推定されるが、それが Trinity College に提出した助手応募論文の正文ないしその控えであるかどうかは、いまの処、不明である。

(注12) タイプ原稿にはタイプ頁で 9－25頁の部分が欠けているが、これは修正草稿が成立した際に切り離され、そのまま98年論文には採り入れられなかった箇所なのであろうか。

(注13) 1898年9月19日付けの Bernard Bosanquet の論評による。

(注14) 蓮沼1997a を参照されたい。

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付録

Chapter Ⅲ

The meaning of Freedom in Kant

I In beginning a discussion of Kant's notion of 'Freedom', which he himself considers to bs essentially connected with Ethical system, it seems most important to emphasize the fact that, so far as his express statements are concerned, he accepts unconditionally the view of determinism and rejects that of Freedom, in the only sense in which the two have been generally discussed by English thinkers. In ordinary controversies on the subjects, no such absolute distinction is drawn between two kinds of "causality", two kinds of "determination" (Bestimmung-the sense which is implied in "Determinism"), two kinds of "possibility", or finally, an "intelligible" and an "empirical" "character", as is drawn by Kant. Professor Sidgwick, indeed, puts the question in such a form, that Kant's answer would probably have to be on the libertarian side; but this result seems only to be obtained at the cost of the above mentioned ambiguity. "Is the self" he says,(+) "to which I refer my deliberate volitions a self of strctly determinate moral qualities, a difinite character partly inherited, partly formed by my past actions and feelings, and by any physical influences that it may have unconsciously received; so that my voluntary action, for good or for evil, is at any moment completely caused by the determinate

(+) Methods p.61

qualities of this character, together with my circumstances, or the external influences acting on me at any moment including under this latter term my present bodily conditions or is there always possibility of my choosing to act in the manner that I now judge to be reasonable and right, whatever my previous actions and experiences may have been?"

Now to the first half of the first alternative, "Is the self to which I refer my deliberate volitions a definite character etc". Kant would be compelled to give what professor Sidgewick considers to be the libertarian answer of "No", because there seems to be implied in it the alternative of what he would call an "intelligible character" though even here, he would be in some doubt, because it seems implied that the "intelligible character" cannot be "of strictly determinate moral qualities" or "difinite". And with this presumption that professor Sidgwick accepted his distinction, he would also probably answer "No" to the second half "Is my voluntary action, ··· at any moment completely caused by the determinate qualities of this character", although, had that question come by iyself, his answer would probably have been "Yes", since the sequel shows that when professor Sidgwick says "completely caused" he is only thinking of what Kant calls "natural causality" (Naturcausalität). So, too, in answer to the second question, he would only say "Yes," on the presumption that professor Sidgwick might mean by "possibility", intelligible, as well as empirical, possibility. But when professor Sidgwick goes on to exemplify the deterministic view by reference to the principle of causality as employed in the Natural Sciences; when he says (p.62) "that the

substantial dispute relates to the completeness of the causal dependence of the volition upon the state of things at the preceding instant", there could no longer be any doubt that only that causality was meant, of which Kant had been at such pains to prove the universal validity in the Critique of Pure Reason; and only some reason for surprise that reference should have been made to the possibility of a self with any other than a psychological character. Professor Clifford(1) gives a statement of the doctorine of Free Will, as commonly understood, which seems so clear as to be worth quoting. Whenever a man exercises his will, and makes a voluntary choice of one out of various possible courses, an event occurs, whose relation to contiguous events cannot be included in a general statement applicable to all similar cases. There is something wholly capricious and arbitrary, belonging to that moment only; *and we have no right to conclude that if circumstances were exactly repeated, and the man himself absolutely unaltered, he would the same course.* Now this doctrine Kant would absolutely condemm. In fact, if Determinism only mean that all men's actions conform to the laws of nature, and so, with the progress of psychology could ultimately be predicted as certainly as the motions of the planets (and this is what Professor Sidgwick seems obviously to mean, and what is usually meant by it), Kant would have no hesitation in calling himself a Determinist. "All action of man in Appearance" says he, "are determined (bestimmt) by his empirical character and contributory causes according to the order of nature,

(1) Essay on 'Right and wrong' in "Lecturer and Essays" (1886) p.318

and if we could investigate all Appearance of his choice (Willkür) to the bottom, there would be *no single human action, which we could not foretell with certainty*,[1] and recognise as following necessarily from its preceding conditions".[2]

Freedom, accoroding to him, is absolutely impossible, if reality is ascribed to events in space and time. "Since the thorough-going connection of all Appearances in a context of Nature is a law that admits of no exception, this must necessarily upset all Freedom, if one were determined to cling obstinately to the Reality of Appearances. Hence also those, who in this latter respect follow the common opinion, have never able to succeed in uniting Nature and Freedom with one another".[3] Now the dispute between Libertarians and Determinists is undoubtedly conducted in general by those who do "follow the common opinion" of ascribing reality to what Kant calls Apearances, matter as treated in Physics and mind as treated in Psycology. In so far as Determinism is regarded as bringing the phenomena of Will into harmony with the results estsblished by experimental investigation of Nature, it can only be a doctrine concerned with what Kants calls Appearances, and as such the above quotations seem to prove his unqualified adherence to it.

It would, in fact, appear absurd to the ordinary champion of Free

(1) "Willkühr" seems to correspond to the ordinary notion of "will" in the sense in which its freedom is disputed, that is "will" as a subject matter of psychology. Willkührlich may perhaps be translated "arbitrary". The translators of Hegel use "caprice" and "capricious"; but these appear to have a disparaging, sense, which prima facie is not justified.

(2) R.V. p.380

(3) R.V. p.373

will, to declare that "actions ··· which never have happened and perhaps will not happen"[1] are yet "necessary;" and yet it is only on this basis that Kant is prepared to defend Free will. If this be absurd, there is no choice but Determinism. Kant, in fact, uses "necessity" here in a totally different sense from that in which common sense usually understands it. "'Ought' expresses a kind of necessity and connection with reasons, which is found nowhere else in the whole of Nature."[2]··· "It is impossible that anyting else ought to happen in Nature, than what in all these temporal relations actually is; indeed 'ought', if we only look at the course of Nature, has absolutely no meaning." If you declare a future action to be "necessary" the ordinary man would suppose you must mean "it wil happen" - that you are predicting someting according to the Laws of Nature; if you do mean that "perhaps it won't happen" he would say that you are using terms inaccurately, you ought to have said it was only probable or possible. But meanwhile it is sufficient to point out that Kant dose say this absurd thing; and that from this second meaning of "necessity" there follows a second meaning of possibility also. Since that which according to the Laws of Nature is only possible, can be called necessary, that which according to the Laws of Nature is absolutely impossible, may, from Kant's point of view be regarded as "possible".[3] It is only on

(1) R.V. p.380
(2) R.V. p.379
(3) The words in R.V. p.379 "Now the action must undoubtedly be *possible* under natural conditions, if it is conformed to the 'ought'" must be understood to mean, that any *actual* action, which was in accordance with 'ought' must also have natural possibility i.e. have been capable of prediction according to natural laws : not that for any conceivable action to be moral, it must also be naturally, possible. So in M.d.S. p.18, it is obvious that the 'morally possible' the 'permitted', may be something which you cannot actually do'.

this supposition of the possibility of the impossible, that Kant could have answered "Yes" to Professor Sidgwick's second question.

What then, if Kant is a Determinist, dose he mean by that Freedom, the reality of which he asserts? It is noteworthy that he first approaches the problem in connnection with the Critique of Speculative Reason, in discussing application of that notion of causality, to defend the objectivity of which against Hume was one of the chief motives to the formation of his Critical Pilosophy. The principle of causality is a principle by which the existence (Dasein) of one object is necessarily connected with the existence of another. Hume had not denied the necessity of some kind of relations between objects; for instance he seems never to have suspected any insufficiency in the ground we have for saying that five apples and seven apples are equal to twelve apples. This, he would have said, is a relation which, while the objects remain the same, must also remain the same, because, whether there ever were twelve apples or not, the mere idea of them would always stand in the same relation to the ideas of seven and of five. He recognises in fact, that the certainty of a relation of this sort, is not, like the certainty of the existence of any objects, to be tested by our experience of it. Even we could never learn that $12=7+5$, unless we had seen twelve objects, yet our ground for saying that $12=7+5$, is not only that we have seen cases in which they are, as according to him, our only ground for saying that there are apples, is the perception of them. He would entitle us here to the further statement, that, if there are twelve objects of any sort, it is impossible but that they should be equal to seven and five of the

same sort. Our statement that $12=7+5$, dose not only mean, that in all cases which we have observed, this is so; as would (according to him) such a statement, as that, if there are apples, there were apple blossoms before them. In the former instance, he would say a priori that ther never could be a case in which 12 was not equal to $7+5$; whereas in the latter, he would utterly deny our right yo make a generalisation universal. According to him apples are preceded by apple-blossoms, when they are; but that they must be, or that anything must ever be so connected with anyother, is what, he would say, we have no ground to be certain of.

In fact Hume treats propositions about relations of quantity, as if they were purely analytic. Kant saw that they were not so. Mathmatical propositions are synthetic; and at the same time, as Hume admitted, they are *a priori*. Kant's object, therefore, in the Critique of Pure Reason, is to consider the validity of *a priori* synthetic propositions, as well those mathematical ones, which Hume thought to be analystic, as those expressing a causal relation to which Hume, because he saw that they were not analytic, had denied any *a priori* necessity. The precise manner of kind of Kant's Deduction is not here to the point. What the above breif account of the question at issue is designed to bring out, is his distinction between the category of causality and the mathematical categories, which makes him call the former "real" or "dynamical;" for it is upon this distinction that he conceives to rest the possibility of Freedom.

It is solely in virtue of the dynamical categories that we are able to say that if one thing exists, another must exist. The mathematical

categories only tell us that between things appearing in space and time, certain relation must hold; they do not allow us to conclude from the existence of any one thing to the existence of any other. Hence, when it appears that, in trying to obtain a complete notion of the world as "determined" by these various categories, we are involved in antinomies, the contradictory propositions resulting from such an application of the mathematical categories must both be false, since both relate solely to the temporal and spatial properties of things. But with the dynamical categories the case is different. These profess to deal with the *existence* of things. Now Kant always asserts the existence not only of appearances, but also of something of which these are appearances. It is therefore *possible* that any proposition which concerns the existence and not merely the relations of things, may be true with regard to these Things in themselves. And hence, though the contradictory propositions resulting from the attempt to obtain a complete view of the world under the dynamical categories, must both be false, if it is presupposed that we are talking only of things existing in time, it is possible that both may be true, if we are entitled also to take into account the existence of a Thing in itself. It is with regard to the proposition that things have an unconditional or first cause, i.e. a cause which is not itself the effect of something else, that Kant points out this possibility; and the causality of such a first cause would, he says, be Freedom. If, therefore, it can be shown that this proposition is true, not merely that it *may be*, then, and then only, the existence of Freedom is proved.

However, before proceeding to discuss Kant's proof that *there is*

free causality, it seems desirable to explain at greater length precisely what he means by this conception, why he calls it causality and why he calls it free. And, in the first place, it seems a pity that he should have called it causality at all; since there must evidently be a most important difference between the temporal relation of successive phenomena, usually denoted by the term, and the relation of real to phenomenal things which is here in question.

It is true that Kant is not so defenceless as might appear against the charges of inconsistency sometimes brought against him, when in the Critique of Pure Reason, he speaks of the Ding an Sich as cause of a phenomenon; since, according to him, causality is a pure category, and therefore, though only applicable by us when schematised through the form of Time, in which alone objects can appear to us, it may conceivably apply to other than temporal relation of other objects, to us known. He is, therefore /

/ two extremes of saying that our sensation are all that we can know, while the so called laws by which we attempt to groupe them are mere abstraction and represent nothing in the world itself; and of asserting that nothing is truly known except universal connections or predicates. With our present knowing faculty we can only attain a union of unity with plurality, or identity with difference, in two ways, each imperfect. Either the unity or identity takes the form of a more abstract notion or logical universal, which exists only in each given particular; or it is the given particular which persists through change and unites in itself several universals. Kant imagines that for God these two forms of unity would be the same. Each object would

be identical with every other in the sense in which the universal is identical with itself in each particular; but at the same time each would be substantial and so unite in itself all the others in the same way as now the particular unites universals. How this should be, he rightly says, is to us incomprehensible. We cannot reduce the "individuation" given by the forms of space and time to the individuation given to concepts by thought, or vice versa. The conception resembles that of Leibnitz in that each object is complete ground of all the others; but differs in that Kant, by definitely rejecting the forms of space and time as mere forms of Appearance, does not need after all to represent the objects as having grades of perfection, which is contradictory to their unity from the analytic point of view. But for the same reason, since we cannot escape our limitation to space and time, Kant thinks we cannot vouch for the reality of this conception.

Now Kant himself never clearly connects these various doctorines. They follow singly from the application of his /

Kant however dose not admit that everything may be regarded as a result of intelligible or free causality, just as every thing is a natural causality. All he claims in his discussion of Transcendental Freedom at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, is that "among natural causes there may also be some, which have a faculty, that is only intelligible."(1) And he goes on to explain that by these he means only mankind. "In inanimate or merely animal nature we find no

(1) p.378

reason to suppose any faculty conditioned otherwise than through sense. But man, who knows the rest of nature only through senses, gets knowledge of himself also through mere apperception ··· and is to himself partly, we must admit, a phenomenon, but partly also, namely in view of certain faculties, a merely intelligible object.(1) Now setting aside the statement that man knows himself through mere appreception - a kind of knowlege of which Kant has not elsewhere explained the possibility, and which seems here temporarily to take the place of the Categorical Imperative as affording a *ratio cognoscendi* for the applicability of Freedom to himself it is plain that Kant here regards man as on an absolutely different level from other things, in respects of freedom. Man has freedom and nothing else shares it in any degree. And throughout his ethical works this attitude is maintained. Free causality is attributed to man alone, among the objects of experience.(2) So that, whereas natural causality applies with absolute universality - to him as well as to all other objects, freedom appears as a sort of miraculous power, whose influence may be traced in some events, but not in others. In the Critique of Judgment he is led partly to correct this view and to see that, if freedom is to be brought in to explain anything at all, it must be brought in to explain everything. But, meanwhile, his restricted view of freedom makes it easier for him to establish a connection with the vulgar notion. In the vulgar notion, too, some action are free and some are not; and though it would not

(1) p.379
(2) Though also it would belong to any other "reasonable beings", if such there be. Gr.p.237.

be admitted, as by Kant is necessary, that those which were free, might also, in another aspects, be seen to be completely determined by natural causality, yet the mere fact that the application of freedom is so partial, and also its especial connection with man, assimilate the view more to that of Kant, than is possible with that here advocated, according to which freedom is universal.

In the vulgat notion of freedom the most universal characteristic seems to be the absence of external constraint whether exerted to impel or to prevent. Where the immediate cause of a motion or change seems to lie in the thing which moves or changes and not in anything outside it, there, in a sense at all events, freedom is predicable. But this is a notion which is obviously not limited to human actions. Many of the movements and changes of animals and plants have their proximate cause in the things themselves; and same might probably be said of any body in so far as it moved in accordance with Newton's second law of Motion. It is thus we seem to talk of "free as air", or of the wheels of a watch moving "freely".

But there is an obvious defect in this wide notion, in that the limits, whether spatial or temporal, of any group we may take for our unit or thing, are alawys more or less arbitrary. A watch may be moving freely when its spring is driving it; but the movement of any one of its wheels is not free, because the wheel is driven by the spring or by another wheel. And, again, there seems no reason why we should single out the proximate or immediate cause for such preeminence, nor anything to determine how far back in the past a cause ceases to be proximate. It is difficulties of this sort, which seems to have gradually tended to restrict the notion of freedom to

man; because in man the notion of self is far more striking than elsewhere and the distinction between the internally and externally caused, therefore, prima facie more satisfactory. The difference between himself and anything else whatever is more constantly forced on a man's notice and more practically important to him than any other difference, and it is therefore not unnatural that the notion of freedom in the sense of self-caused action, whether or not it is originally derived from his own experience and transferred anthropomorphically to other things, should at all events be more widely applied and less easy to dispense with in his own case and that of other beings like him than elsewhere.

Now the vulgar doctrine of Free Will, as "Liberty of Indifference", seems to be in the main an attempt to raise this distinction between self and the world entirely above the level of an arbitrary distinction. It was seen that this could not be done, if the self were regarded as a part in the causal chain of events, since it must then be subject to the infinite divisibility inherent in time, and the ultimate causal unit remain as arbitrary as any unite of time. It was therefore maintained that man's soul was an agent undermined by previous events in time; it was the absolutely simple unity of Rational Psychology and as such distinguished from all natural objects which were always both themselves divisible into parts and also incapable of certain discrimination from an ever wider whole. Such a notion of a finite uncaused cause inevitably follows from the attempt to dis-tinguish with in the world of experience cases of purely internal and purely external, of immanent and transeunt causation.

And there are good reasons why the human will should been taken

as the final instance of a cause which is not also an effect. The progrees made in the analysis of mental processes has been very slight in comparison with that made in physical science (1) because of their greater complexity (2) because experiment in psycology must be either indirect or encumbered by the fact that the obserbed is also the observer, and (3) because subconsciousness must be taken into account. And the region of the incompletely known is the favourite abode of a metaphysical monstrosity. In plain language, where facts are not completely understood, some short-sighted metaphysical theory is generally introduced as affording an easy road past the difficulties which stand in the way of thorough investigation. And secondly, apart from the general difficulty of establishing exhaustive causal laws, which applies in a less degree to physical science also and prevents certain prediction even there, there seems to be a real reason, which from the nature of a case can never disappear, why human volition should produce the illusion of so-called Freedom. It is this, that in virtue of the deterministic hypothesis itself the knowlege that a certain course of action was about to be pursued[1] must always exert some influence upon the course actually pursued, and so make the result different from what was foreseen after a consideration of all the other elements that would contribute to it. And even if the fact of this knowlege were taken to account in the calculation, and the prediction modified accordingly, the knowlege of this modification would again introduce a new element, which would require a fresh

(1) Unless, indeed, we are to carry out logically professor Huxley's doctrine ("Hume" p.86) that "there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and knowing one has it!"

calculation, and so on *ad infinitum*. This seems to be a difficulty inherent in the double nature of the mind as subject and object - a difficulty which makes it possible to pronounce *a priori* that complete prediction of the results of mental process must always be impossible. It is a difficulty which dose not apply to prediction in the physical world of space, considered, as seems necessary at present, in abstraction from the world of mind. It could only modify our view of that, if the real connection of body and mind were fully discovered. As it is, mental processes, though obviously corresponding to physiological, and useful for their investigation, have only too much the appearance of a totally independent world from the point of view of causality and reciprocity. So that the distinction is justifiable, when we say that the results of human volition, along among causes, must *of necessity* remain incapable of prediction. And this fact, along with the greater empirical difficulties of prediction in the case of mind, seems sufficient to account for the illusive belief that the will at any rate, is free, though it be admitted that nothing else is. The failure to discover a cause in any particular instance, of itself encourages a belief in the uncaused; and when to mere failure is added an absolute impossibity of discovery the case is naturally strengthened.

That the belief in uncaused volition is illusory, the progress in scientific method, with the resultant growth of empirical psychology, has rendered it more and more difficult to doubt. Nor is it only, as Professor Sidgwick says, that "on the Determinist side there is a cumulative argument of great force"[1] For, in however many instances

(1) Cf on this subject. P.V. pref. p.12-end.

causation were proved, though that would on Hume's principle, be a cause of our expecting it in others, yet it would not be, by itself, any *reason* for that expectation. An inductive argument always needs, as empiricists put it, to be supplemented by the assumption of the uniformity of nature. And that this assumption is not in this case an assumption but an *a priori* necessity, may, I think, be considered to have been sufficiently proved by Kant's argument in this Analytic. He there shews that every event must have a cause, if there is to be an objective succession in time; and such an objective succession is certainly presupposed by all our actual experience. Accordingly Kant himself fully recognises the *a priori* certainly of the Deterministic views as was shown at the beginning of this chapter,(1) and it seems inevitable to agree with him.

As for "the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action"(2) which is asserted to stand against Determinism, great care is needed in deciding what it is that consciousness then affirms. Professor Sidgwick expresses it thus. "Certainly, when I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable I find it impossible not think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive - supposing that there is no obstacle to my doing it except absence of adequate motive - however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yieled to such

(1) Methods of Ethics p.65

(2) Note that "action in conformity with practical reason" seems here to be identical with the "doing what *I conceive to be* reasonable" of the text.

inclinations in the past."

Now with regard to this statement, it is to be noted first that what consciousness is said to affirm as on the libertarian side in the Free Will controversy is only the possibility of choosing *the reasonable course*; and the note appended seems to be intended to defend this limitation. This note runs: "It is not the possibility of merely indeterminate choice, of an 'arbitrary freak of unmotived willing,' with which we are concerned from an ethical point of view; but the possibility of action in conformity with practical reason."(1) The same limitation is also introduced in the passage quoted above (Prof.S. p.62): "Is there possibility of my choosing to act in the manner that I now judge to be reasonable and right?" Now, what precisely is meant by "the possibility of merely indeterminate choice" mentioned in the note, I am not quite sure that I understand; especially as, in the text, the choice of which the possibility is under consideration, is pointedly distinguished as one to which the presence of adequate motive cannot be assumed so that the question presumably is of the possibility of unmotived choice, in so far as there ceases to be a question, if the motive is alone sufficient to produce the choice. We are considering the possibility of a choice "in conformity with practical reason", where something other than the motive supplied by that conformity is necessary to produce the choice; and where, therefore, the choice if possible, must be assumed to be to some extent unmotived. But,

(1) Note that "action in conformity with practical reason" seems here to be identical with the "doing what I *conceive to be* reasonable" of the text.

however this may be, I do not see how it can be denied that "we are concerned from an ethical point of view" with the possibility of a *wrong or unreasonable* choice - a choice not "in conformity with", but contrary to "practical reason;" and whether such a choice be an eyhical concern or not, Professor Sidwick has certainly elsewhere stated that the question of its possibility is essential to the Free Will controversy. For instance, in the passage, just quotated on p.61, he says the queation is whether "my voluntary action, for good or *for evil*, is at any moment completely caused;" though, as we have seen, in the following sentence, he drops the "for evil", and inquires only into the possibility of my choosing to act rightly. So too, on. p58, he says "It is obvious that the Freedom thus connected with Responsibility is not the Freedom that is only manifested in rational action, but the Freedom to choose between right and wrong *which is manifested equally in either choice*". In fact, when Professor Sidgwick on p.65 limits the possibility of Freedom, to the possibility of choosing rational actions, he seems to have fallen partially into the error of which he accuses Kant and his followers - the error of "identifying Rational and Free action"(p.57). For he seems to suppose that only rational action can be free, though he dose not complete the identification by also implying that only free action can be rational. It is noteworthy, however, that it is only against the first of these two ststements, the one which he himself subsequently seems to adopt on the immediate affirmation of consciousness, that he directs his attack as the supposed view of Kant, whereas it is the latter which, as will be shewn, Kant is really concerned to maintain. In fact, even the statement which

Professor Sidgwick quotes, as of Kant's disciple, that a man "is a free agent in so far as he acts under the guidance of reason", dose not imply, as Professor Sidgwick thinks it dose, that irrational action may not be also free; but only that all rational action is free, which is equivalent to "only free action is rational", but not to "only rational action is free".

We may therefore use the weapons supplied by Professor Sidgwick himself on pp.57-59, but there misdirected against a Kantian view, to defend ourselves in considering the possibility not only of our choosing the right course, but also of our choosing the wrong one, whatever our previous character may have been. But it seems worth while in passing, to dwell a little longer on the apparent inconsistency with which after maintaining that wrong must be just as free as right actions, he himself seems immediately to adopt the one-side view which he has been attacking. Thus he concludes the anti-Kantian paragraph on p.59 with these words: "Can we say, then, of the wilful wrong-doer, that his wrong choice was 'free', in the sense that he might have chosen rightly, not merely if the antecedents of his volition, external and internal, had been different, but supposing these antecedents unchanged? This I conceive, is the substantial issue raised in the Free Will controversy;" and he dose not seem to see that the whole tendency of his foregoing argument is to shew that it would be just as pertient to ask: "Can we say of the wilful rightdoer, that his choice was free, in the sense that he might have choosen wrongly etc.?" Now it is curious that in Aristotle's discussion of the voluntary, wherever he touches this point, he always emphasizes the remark that

vice must be considered to be as voluntary as virtue, not vice versa; as if it were a widespread notion in his day that virtue was voluntary, but vice necessitated. This, indeed, was probably due to the Socratic doctorine, that all vicious choice is merely due to our ignorance; and since to choose ignorance would itself be a vicious choice, to something beyond a man's control. In Christianity, on the other hand, just the opposite doctorine prevails, that sin is due to our free will, and virtue solely to the merit of Christ; though there, indeed, the other one-sidedness also appears, hopelessly entangled with it. But what is to be noted is the general tendency not to accept both doctrines at once, but each separately. For this, I think, whichever be the one taken, is evidence of an almost inevitable feeling that good and evil are somehow not on a par with respect to reality; that good is somehow more natural and therefore not in so much need of notice or explanation as evill. It is the Origin of Evill which has always appeared as a problem; as if the Origin of Good were not *prima facie* equally inexplicable. With the Greek, who has no personal God to start with as the author of nature, the explanation is found in blind natural necessity : man being the apparent best, it seems less obvious to soppose him the cause of the worst. Whereas the Cristian's notion of God forces him to find an explanation of what is contrary to God, and therefore cannot be regarded as directly created by him, in a power approaching nearer to God's than that of blind nature, and so in man. The one-sidedness of our judgments is also illustrated by the far greater provision made in almost every state of society for punishment than for reward, and the general feeling that we need be

much more careful whom we single out for blame than whom for praise : and here again the one-sidedness may be connected with either of the two opposite theories, according as punishment is regarded as corrective and deterrent, which harmonises with the Greek view, or as retributive, as suits the Christian. Nevertheless, it is plain, that this one-sidedness cannot be defended on such ethical principles as Professor Sidgwick's, any more than it could on Aristotle's. For those who take the world of experience to be real, there can (as Kant says) be no freedom; and similary, if freedom be nevertheless maintained there can be no ground for asserting that good is more real than evil, even if there be a greater quantity of things which are good than of things which are evils. We shall hear after try to explain how, upon Kant's principles, this one-sidednes points to a truth : not, indeed, in the vulgar form of either "only rational action is free" or "only irrational action is free : but in what we said above to be the true Kantian formula "only free action is rational" where however neither free nor rational can be understood in a proper sense.

But, let us now consider, how the admission that wrong choice must be considered by the ordinary Libertarian to be as much the work of Free Will, as right choice - an admission which, as we have seen, Professor Sidgwick is urgent to justify against Kant - affects Professor Sidgwick's statement of what he holds to be "immediately affirmed by consciousness in the moment of choice" on the Libertarian side. This statement as we have seen, runs "that I can now choose to do what I so conceive" (i.e. conceive as right and reasonable)"- supposing that there is no obstacle to my doing it except absence of

adequate motive." Now the condition here asserted in parenthesis implies that if *the doing* of a thing be impossible for other reasons than the absence of motive, there can be no question of the possibility of *choosing to do it*. In other words only Free Will, which is at all affirmed by consciousness, is only free to choose actions, to the performance of which there is no obstacle but absence of motives. And this restriction to what we may call *physically* possible actions, seems plausible when the question is also restricted to *reasonable* actions; for to the ordinary reader it would seem that an action to which there were insuperable physical obstacles could not be called a reasonable one to choose. But we have seen that the restriction of the question to *reasonable* actions cannot be defended; and, if we recognise this and accordingly put the question as to the possibility of choosing wrong and unreasonable actions, it is no longer so plain that an action, which is physically impossible, is not an unreasonable one to choose. Part therefore of the plausibility of Professor Sidgwick's statement as to the affirmation of consciousness, seems to be due to his erroneous limitation of the Free Will question to reasonable action.

But this objection is not fundamental. It only serves to lead up to another, which I believe to be of great importance, since it is based on a distinction, without recognising which it seems impossible to arrive at a clear decision in the Free Will controversy. It is obvious that my last argument depended largely on the meaning to be given to "reasonable" and "unreasonable". Now Professor Sidgwick has discussed at length in Chapter III the meaning to be given to "rea-

sonable". He distinguishes two senses of "ought", an "ethical" and a wider sense, and notes (p.36 n.4) that it is in the former sense that he will henceforward use the word. This "ethical" sense, when it is said that an action "ought to be done" implies not only that it is reasonable in the sense in which Reason may apply the unanalysable notion of "ought" to "a pattern to which no more than an approximation is practically possible (p.35), but also that the action "is thought capable of being brought about by the volition of any individual in the circumstances to which the judgement applies" (p.35). Now it may, I think, be assumed that when action is termed reasonable, Professor Sidgwick generally means by it that it "ought to be" done in this narrower ethical sense, since his definition of reasonable conduct seems to be, that which "ought to be done". There is therefore included in the notion "reasonable", as applied to conduct, both that it partakes of the "ideal" and also that it is "practically possible". But unfortunately Professor Sidgwick dose not tell us with regard to "unreasonable" action, whether the negative is to be taken as denying both these elements or only one of them. If it is to be taken as denying both, then our previous argument not only destroys the plausibility of Professor Sidgwick's statement of the Libertarian contention, but readers it manifestly unfairly. But I imagine that Professor Sidgwick would adopt the other alternative, that the negative only denies that the action partakes of the "ideal" not that it is thought to be "practically possible", for this certainly seems to be in accordance with common usage. In that case, however, the notions of "reasonable" and "unreasonable", as applied to conduct, have for a common property,

that both are reasonable: a result which seems to give occasion for reflection. For what is it, then, that distinguishes the "reasonable" from the "unreasonable?". Only that one is "ideal" and the other the opposite of that. In short, we cannot get on with an "unanalysable" notion, which, after all, turns out to be analysable into two distinct and separable elements.

Our inclusion then of "unreasonable" actions among the possible objects of free choice, if free choice there be, serves to make it plainer that the practical possibility of the action contemplated has nothing to do with the possibility of the choice : though this indeed would seem to be plain enough of itself. In other words, what it may seem unreasonable to *choose to do*, it is not therefore unreasonable *to choose*. The appearance of irrationality in the first case may be due to the fact that, when I say "choose to do", I do imply that, if the choice is made, the action may reasonably be expected to follow from it. But this reasonable expectation cannot be admitted as an ultimate element in the definition of a reasonable action as that "which ought to be". The "wider sense" in which Professor Sidgwick admits "I sometimes judge that I "ought" to know what a wiser man would know" is not only unable to be "conveniently discarded in ordinary discourse",[1] but must be recognised as the fundamental one, if we are to get a clear notion of the issue in the Free Will controversy. It would, indeed, be a "futile" conception, "if it had no relation to practice" (p.35.n.); but we cannot, witout begging the question with

(1) p.35

regard to Free Will, assume that this relation consists in the fact that what is so judged is also thereby judged to be always practically possible. And this I think is also plain from what Professor Sidgwick himself subsequently says in his chapter on Free Will(p.67). He here admits that, after we have made up our minds on the question whether I can do a thing, if I choose, "still the question remains 'Can I choose what - if I can choose - I judge to be the right to do?'" Here the ambiguous form "Can I *choose to do*?" is at least discarded; and Professor Sidgwick here explains that what he thinks his consciousness affirms is "that *I can choose*". He adds, it is true, within the limits above explained. But my point is that by putting the question in this form he has actually removed "the limits above explained." They appear, in the sentence just quoted, in the proviso "what - *if I can choose* - I judge to be right to do." But dose not that proviso make the question into nonsense? For note that the question is, can I choose what I conceive to be right(p.65) But if, before I can decide whether it is right, I have to decide that I can choose it, this question must be answered before it can be asked : which is absurd. Professor Sidgwick seems here expressly to state a relation of complete mutual dependence between the questions "Is this right?" and "Is this a possible object of free choice?" a dependence, which he maintained in a qualified form on p.35; and, if this holds, it is certainly impossible to answer the Free Will question in the form "can I choose what I conceive to be right or reasonable". Surely, the only escape from this dilemma is the view expressed above that from the definition of "reasonable" as "what is in conformity with practical reason" we must

absolutely exclude all consideration of physical possibility : and this, I suspect, dose make the Free Will question one of "an arbitrary freak of unmotived willing," and yet a quastion which must be answered, before what Professor Sigewick takes to be the question "from an ethical point of view", can be asked.

These considerations, I think, sufficiently prove that we cannot separate the Free Will question, in a supposed ethical sense, from the wider question; nor suppose that consciousness affims the Libertarian doctrine in the former sense, without prejudging the latter. It may be that this makes the question one even more unimportant for Ethics than Professor Sidgwick thinks it; but that will be afterwards discussed. There still remains the question : Dose consciousness affirm in the moment of choice that I can choose what I judge to be good or bad? - if I may state the issue in that way, to get rid of the question-begging "choose *to do*" and doubly question-begging "reasonable". Now it is to be noted with regard to this question, that it only concerns the possibility of choosing : that the free will controversy seems to have narrowed itself to the question of *free choice*. For it is only choice which distinguishes voluntary from non-voluntary action, and the ordinary Libertarian would hardly maintain that non-voluntary actions could be free. The question is thus also seen to be a wider one than that which is ordinarily discussed than is stated, for example, by Professor Sidgwick. For since, as has been shewn the physical possibility of the action, which is the possibile object of choice, cannot be considered to be a necessary element in constituting it good or reasonable, in the sense which is fundamental for "practical

reason", it seems hardly possible to exclude mere choices, such as that I should have the genius of Shakespeare, though, that I should have it might be reasonably considered physically impossible. Even such a case as a choice to prevent the sun rising tomorrow can hardly be excluded from the class which Professeor Sidgwick recognizes as "a species of volition" the adopter of an object of desire as an end to be aimed at. (p.60) For though, perhaps none but a madman would make such a choice, yet his choice would prove that it can be made : and we ourselves do often choose through ignorance what is impossible in this sense; the only reason why we do not choose what we also think impossible, seems to be not that we cannot, (either in the deterministic or Libertarian sense) but that it dose not seem worth while. The question, whether a choice will produce in any degree the effect chosen, seems merely to be one for experience to decide, and we judge of it just as we judge of the probablities and possibilities of events in the physical world. It dose not seem to be concerned in the Free Will controversy, if the issue of that controversy be cleary stated.

Locke and Hume,[1] indeed, agree marvellously in their treatment of Liberty, both asserting that it means simply a power to act, as we choose. But it would seem to be for this very reason, that they are able to treat the Free Will controversy so cavalierly as they do. If the question were merely as to whether we did not sometimes do what we choose, it would, as they say, be obvious what answer we should give; but it would not, as they also say, be obvious that

(1) Locke : Essay Ⅱ.21.14 foll. Hume : Treatise IV. p110 foll.

liberty in this sense was not contrary to "necessity" since the question "Can we choose?" would still remain unanswered. They both, it is true, leave an ambiguity even on the first point, by not sufficiently considering what is implied in their notion of "power;" but, nevertheless, when they speak of a power to act, as we choose, they would appear to mean only, as Locke says(1) that the existence or non - existence of the action is dependent upon our choice. In this part of free action, then, it may be admited that they leave no room for anything contrary to "necessity;" since their notion is that the action is necessitated by the choice. Locke, however, sees that the point in dispute occurs not here but in the question(2) : Are we free to choose? And this he dismisses as absurd, on the ground that it means : Can a man will, what he wills? But it dose not mean this, unless his definition of freedom, as power to do what I choose, be already accepted. It would indeed be absurd to ask "Can I choose to choose?" in the sense "Am I free to choose which of two alternatives I will choose?" But Locke has no right to assume that this is meant by the question "Am I free to choose? That question may mean, "Am I the original cause of my choise?" and this he leaves undiscussed. Both Locke and Hume, therefore neglect the point of the controversy by their definition of freedom. They have, however, done some service to the question, inasmuch as their treatment of it is a protest against that confusion of freedom "to do", if I choose, and "freedom to choose", which I have just pointed out. Their defect is that they assume that

(1) § 27
(2) § 22

it was an answer to the first only, which was really wanted; and hence their contempt of the dispute. As a matter of fact, I am free, in the ordinary political sense, when "I do what I choose, *because I choose it*", since there the immediate cause of my action lies in myself, i.e. in my choice. But that is not freedom in the sense demanded by Libertarians. What they wish to maintain is that the choice itself is caused only by a self which is an uncaused entity; and this implies that where alternatives are presented, their choice between them is wholly independent of their previous habits, disposition etc.

The question then is : "Does consciousness affirm, when alternatives are presented that I can choose any of them that I think either good or bad", which would seem to be equivalent to "any conceivable presented alternative?" And with this we come to the last ambiguity of statement, which seems to me to stand in the way of our giving a clear answer to the question. Professor Clifford (Lectures and Essays p.327) rather ingeniously urges that, if the deliverance of my consciousness is to be "of any use in the controversy", it must be "competent to assure me of the non-existence of something which by hypothesis is not in my consciousness" i.e. the sub-conscious mental elements which the Determinist must suppose to determine the choice. But it seems possible to surmount this objection by maintaining that it is enough if consciousness can make a positive affirmation as to what is cause of the choice, without requiring it to prove exhaustively that nothing else in the world can be. If the man of science before he enunciated a law, is always bound to prove, that no other elements besides those whose constant connection with the effect has been

observed by him, really contributed to it, no scientific laws have been discovered yet. If, therefore, consciousness dose affirm that "I" am the cause of the choice, that should be sufficient. But then the question arises what can it mean by "I"? Is it quite certain that when consciousness seems to affirm that "*I can* choose so and so", it means more than "it is possible that such and such a choice will take place in my mind?" If it dose not mean more than this, its affirmation is not against Determinism; since, as we have tried to shew above(p.30) even on the Deterministic hypothesis, it must always be entitled to affirm the latter proposition, even if it dose not always exercise its right. For by saying that such and such a choice is possible I imagine we can mean no more than that we do not know but that it will happen; and even if "the uniformity of nature" can be proved in such a sense as to justify an assertion with regard to any event whatever that it certainly will not happen, this can never be the case with regard to an event conditioned by a conscious forecast. The cases in what it is "on Determinist principles legitimate to conclude it to be certain - and not merely highly probable - that I shall deliberately choose to do what I judge to be unwise" seem to be not merely "rare" as Professor Sidgwick says (p67) but absolutely non-existent. It seems, therefore, that the "affirmation of consciousness" as against Determinism, disappears on the attempt to make it precise. The attempt to find a more exact meaning for the vulgar notion of freedom has thrown us back upon the conception with which we started. Instead of free action being the action of an "uncaused self", we have to be content with it as self-caused action: anything may be said to act

freely in so far as the immediate cause of its changes lies in itself. We have now to see how this notion is connected with that explained above as derived from Kant; and to examine whether there is any justification for applying it in an exclusive sense to Will - a restriction which Kant seems to adopt in the application of his notion also. If the restriction turns out to be unjustifiable in both cases, we shall have disposed of Schopenhauer's view of the ultimate reality - a view, which, according to Kuno Fischer, is also that of Kant. It will then remain to discuss the connection of Freedom with Ethics.

It was one of Kant's great merits(1) in the Critique of Pure Reason to have pointed out that there is nothing absolutely "inner" in the objects of experience, either of the outer or inner sense, either in nature or in mind. He gave the final blow to the doctrine of "essence" and "faculties", as principles of explanation, by showing that advance in scientific knowlege presupposed the complete interdependence of things; that all we can know for certain about them is their relation to one another. This indeed was one of his motives to his distinction of Phenomena and Ding an Sich; for he could not avoid the conviction, though he could not justify it, that there must be something self-subsistent somewhere. But his main point was that, if you treated natural objects as if they were self-subsistent, you could not escape the most unbearable contradictions. This was the "natural dialectic of reason".

In the Critique of Judgment, however, he began to see that he had

(1) E.g. in the "Amphibulie" R.V. p.225

over-emphasised the doctrine that all we can know is mere relations. He here recognises that a philosophy of nature must take into account the "matter of knowledge" as such, since it too must have some element of necessity. Thus, it is not only the categories and the pure forms of Intution, which have an *a priori* certainty; but the sense-manifold must also be of such a nature that the categories and forms of Intuition will apply to it. It must be of such a nature as to supply terms to these relations. And, though the amount of the nature of objects of experience, which is thus determined *a priori*, is far from giving them a claim to be considered completely rational, it yet gives them a certain amount of inwardness self-subsistence.

Thus, in considering the course of Nature, it becomes obvious that, though we try to explain what happens, by referring it in each case to something prior in time, and so on *ad infinitum*, there is also presented another element left out of account by this method (the only one allowed by Kant in the Pure Reason), which also helps to explain what happens. This element is the actual qualitative nature of the events we are trying to explain. So far as mere causal connection is concerned, there is no reason why there should be any change in the world whatever, except that which is involved in the lapse of time. Each moment of time is different from the one before it, just because it is after and the other before, and, if the world were quite without other differences, there would yet be a necessary connection between its state at one moment and its state at the next, exactly fulfilling the type which Kant sought to prove against Hume. For the state of the world at one moment would be a different *thing* from its

state at the next, in the sense in which Hume denied that you were really entitled to infer from the existence of one thing the subsequent existence of another. But, even if this were so, causation would obviously not afford a complete explanation of the course of nature. The world which did thus persist unchanged through time, would still itself be part of the reason of the course of nature. We could not exhaust our knowlege of each successive state by saying it was such as to have been the effect of the one before and the cause of the one which followed it. It would still remain true that each state was what it was, besides being related to those before and after it; each would have a content - the content in virtue of which each was identical with that of evrey other; and the nature of this content would require to be taken into account in explaning each state. We can assert *a priori* not only that each state of the world must be necessarily connected with those that precede and follow it, but also that it must have some definite qualitative nature. It is not only what it is because the previous state was what it was, but also because it is what it is.

This consideration seems obvious enough, but yet it is one which is very apt to be neglected. It was recognised in the Aristotelian doctrine of "formal" causes; but has been put out of sight by the procedure of modern science, which seeks always for efficient causes, without sufficiently considering that there could be no efficiency unless there were also "form". It is no doubt of more practical importance to establish the relations between things than just to recognise those things; and Kant in his desire to justify the methods of natural

science, seems to have been misled by the prominence given in it to the discovery of relations, into an unjustifiable neglect of the qualitative aspect of things. There was also, as has been pointed out above, another reason for the emphasis which he lays on relation - namely his desire to protest against the assumption that the objects of experience were real, or absolutely self-subsistent. And finally, quality so far as it is necessary, is only one: there are not as in the case of relation, a number of different forms to justify. But, still, from a philosophical point of view, it seems to be of equal importance, and is always presupposed by science in discriminating the things between which relations are to be discovered.

Things, then, in so far as they must be terms of relations, may be said to have a self. But this degree of selfhood would not suffice to define the notion of freedom. For we are as yet not entitled *a priori* to infer in the world any differences of quality. And if there were none, as in the case above supposed, there would be no resaon to suppose that the causal connection between the successive world-states was in any way dependent on their qualities. The quality would necessarily be taken into account in explaining the series as a whole; but the causal connection might be considered to hold between them purely as *existing*, in so far as they had matter, in the Aristotelian sense, not in virtue of their form. And this, it is to be noted, is all that Kant proves for causality in the Critique of Pure Reason; the necessary connection is between the existence (Dasein) of things. But, as a matter of fact, there are differences of quality in the world of experience, and whatever be the justification for it, there is connected

with this difference of quality, a most important addition to the notion of causality. Causality in Kant's sense would not justify any law of Nature, and yet without these science would be impossible. There is implied in any law, that "Like cause has like effect" and *vice versa*; and in this conception we have, at once, the causal relation between things, conceived as depending on their qualitative nature.(1) It is no longer the things, considered as individuated merely in time, which is necessarily connected with those preceding and following, but the thing, as distinguished by a particular quality, is considered to have a necessary connection with other things so distinguished. It is not assumed that all the qualities in the world might not be different from what they are; but it is assumed that given any one quality it has a unique causal relation with some other one, in the sense that only the thing of which it is a quality can be cause of the thing, of which that other is a quality, and only that other things can be the effect of first thing.

With this we seem to have arrived at the notion of a thing with a distinguishable self, having a distinct efficiency in virtue of that self. And in this conception of the course of nature there is contained the union of Determination with Freedom, in its simplest form. Each thing, marked by a simple qualitative nature, is no doubt determined in that it is the effect of some other thing, and, given that other thing, it was forced to appear. But also it is itself similarly the cause of something else, and free so far as its effect depends upon its

(1) Under "quality" is included for this purpose, position in space.

own nature. It is nothing against this, that its own nature depends in its turn upon sonething else; for that something else could not by itself have produced the effect which it produces. It is an essential link in the chain, and though the effect is not solely due to it, some part of the effect is due to it and to it only.

In this notion, then, we seem to have a quite precise distinction between free and necessary action. Every action is both free and necessary; each is an aspect under which every event must be necessarily regarded. And thus we have an ultimate and valid meaning for freedom, as appearing in the world of experience; a meaning, which, in consequence of the Kantian criticism, substitutes within that world the notion of the self-caused for that of the uncaused or original, which had been maintained by the pre-Kantian metaphysics. But neither common sense nor Kant himself are satisfied with this. Both wish to drag into the world of experience a notion of freedom which would be inconsistent with complete mecanical determination, as applying only to some of the objects of experience, and not merely as an aspect from which every mecanically determined event alike may be regarded. This is attempted no longer by maintainig the freedom of conscious will, in the sense of "Liberty of Indifference,"- the old notion, discarded by Kant, against which I have hitherto directed my attack - but by treating certain groups of qualities, discoverable in the world of experience, as bound together in a so-called "organic" unity, which confers on them a "self" in a special sense, and makes not their parts, but them, ultimate factors in natural processes. The human mind may then be regarded as a

special instance of this sort of unity, and so capable of free action as a whole, differing in degree perhaps, but of the same kind as that exercised by any organism.

Kant, it is true, in treating this notion of "organism" in the Critique of Judgment, still asserts that it is "regulative" or "reflective" only, not "constitutive" or "determinant". By this he means that our experience would be possible without it. We should still be able to have knowledge of an objective world, if all things in it were only mechanically determined. But nevertheless he dose now maintain that the explanation of certain things presented in experience, namely organisms, is absolutely impossible according to mechanical laws. By this he appears to mean that their "form" is wholly "contingent" from a mechanical point of view;(1) and this contingent form is such that all the parts of the thing may be regarded as acting *for the sake of* each other's "form" i.e. the form of each is end as well as means to all the rest.(2) Thus, in order to define an organism, Kant is obliged to use, in describing the relation of the parts to one another, the notion of "end" which he admits to be only given by the Practical Reason. He says that the form of the whole organism can only be regarded as the "end" of the parts (and that only "regu-la-tively") on condition that the parts are ends to one another. But apparently his only reason for thinking that they are so, is that thier "form" is inexplicable by mere mechanical causation; and this "form" is no longer the systematic unity which it was in the case of the whole, but

(1) p.372
(2) p.385

the presupposition of that. So that it would seem to be undistinguished from "form" in the sense above explained, in which every natural object equally may be said to have a "form". There is therefore no reason *prima facie*, why an organism should be distinguished as having a systematic unity, which would not apply to any group of interacting parts whatever; since in every case as was shewn above, the action must be conceived as affecting the "form", and likewise in every case the mere principles of the understanding will give no reason why the form should be such as it is. And as for the inference from inexplicability of form to the necessity of "end", that requires a long discussion, which, will occupy us later, in speaking to connect "freedom" with Ethics. But apart, from this, it seems to be a fact that Kant's only reason for saying that in organisms we have presented a whole or sytematic unity, such as cannot be explained by natural laws, is the assumption that its parts can be seen to be related in a non-mechanical way. And his ground for assuming this, again, is one that applies equally to all causally related elements. So that he fails, on the whole, to justify even as a regulative principle the special position which he attrbutes to organic things.

On the other hand, if we confine our attention to the relation of the parts, without employing the notion of end, something in this relation which cannot be explained by the mere "principles of the understanding". Our knowlege of nature would be impossible, unless things did act according to rules, i.e. unless the form of a thing could be taken to indicate what its effect would be. This is a principle

(1) R.V. p.380' jede Ursache eine Regel voraussetzt …und jede Regel eine Gleichformigkeit der Wirkungen erfordert.

which Kant seems merely to assume[1] but it would seem to be a properly constitutive one. In the Critiqu of Judgment, it is, however, confused with another principle, which Kant dose declare to be "regulative". It is here asserted that, if we are to have knowledge of nature the variety of qualities presented in the sense-manifold must not wholly exclude recurrence; and this is taken to be equivalent to the principles of "homogeneity, specification and continuity". These are principles according to which we should always aim at a systematic classification of the laws of nature themselves, hoping to find a continuous chain from one, general enough to embrace them all, down through regular subdivisions, to infinite particularity. Kant's view is that we cannot know a priori that Nature ia capable of such continuous classification, and there do actually appear to be gaps which spoil its symmetry; but that the ideal of science is to reach it, and that progress consists in continual approximation to it. It is, therefore, a "regulative" but not a "constitutive" Idea. Now, whether this be so or not, it seems extremly important to distinguish these principles, from the notion with which Kant connects them. It is true that there must be some recurrence of identical elements in experience, in order that we may find any Laws of Nature at all; but it dose not follow from this that these laws will themselves be capable of a completely systematic classification. The two principles seem to be on a entirely different level, whereas Kant takes them both indifferently as evidence that Nature as a whole must be regarded as if it had been designedly adapted to our intelligence. The truth is that the one is presupposed by the principles "Like cause, Like effect", and so is

necessary to a knowledge of nature as mechanically determined; whereas the other may indeed be regaeded as a mere ideal. This ideal of perfect classification would indeed presuppose the other; but the inverse proposition dose not hold.

Kant's reason, therefore, for holding the idea of complete system to be purely regulative, do not invalidate the objectivity of the principle that all the elements in nature reciprocally determine one another's form, and that therefore, though the form of Nature as a whole must be regarded as contingent, the form of the parts in relation to one another is necessary. On the other hand, the notion of a systematic whole dose not apply objectively either to Nature as a whole, or to any group of parts in nature. We must therefore be content, so far as the doctrine of experience is concerned, with regarding every element in Nature as equally free and determined; but this much we may regard as fact. It is, no doubt, convenient, to treat certain groups as wholes, and to ascribe freedom to them in the sense that thier parts and not anything external to them are immediate cause of thier changes; but this grouping must be admitted to be wholly arbitrary; It is not merely, as Kant thinks, that a mechnical determination of the parts is the only one that can be presupposed as actual, but also that there is nothing to explain in the whole, which is not also in each of the parts, taken by themselves, and presupposed by thier mechanical connection.

Now the case of human volition would seem to be precisely the same. This, too, is to be explained mechanically but is free in virtue of that very mechanical explanation in so far as the form of each

element in the series may be regarded as determining the form of the next. And there is no more ground for treating the mind as a whole as free, than there is for treating an organism as free in nature. If a precise and ultimate meaning is to be given to such freedom, it must be explained as that which properly belongs to the ultimate mental elements, not as anything which resides in the whole, as such. For there is here again no special form to fix the limits of a unity anywhere between the smallest distinct element and the whole mental world. But, on the other hand, it may be admitted that the activity of mental elements is sometimes directly perceived, in a sense in which that of physical elements never can be. For consciousness itself is an element in mental processes, so that here the form which determines the change knows itself. However, the important point to emphasize is that, from the point of the view of explanation of experience, this makes no differece. In the context of inner experience this form plays just the same part as any other form in outer experience. The difference is only to itself, it is not of an objective significance.

From the common point of view, then, which takes the world of experience as ultimately real, this, in which every part of that world is alike free and alike determined is the only sense of freedom, which can withstand criticism as in no way based on arbitrary distinctions. It is a sense, which would, to most, seem to be the same as that of determination. But it can, I think, be seen to underlie all common uses of freedom; and it is only to the difficulty of distinguishing it as an irreducible aspect in mechanical causation, that there is to be attributed the mistaken attempt to shew that the notion of freedom is

irreducible, /

'Practical Freedom' is something which must belong to all 'reasonable' beings, as such.(1) It is defined negatively as 'the independence of our choice from compulsion through impulses of sense;'(2) and positively as 'a power' or 'causality' of 'reason,' 'to begin a series of events entirely of itself'.(3) 'Pure practical reason' is identified with 'pure will;' and 'will' again, up to the end of the Critique of Practical Reason, seems to be identical with 'choice' (*Willkühr*), though in the Preface to 'The Metaphysic of Morals,' (p.23), they are distinguished in a very important manner; for it is there declared that only 'choice' can be called 'free', 'will' being concerned not with 'actions,' but only, like practical Reason, with the giving of Moral Laws.

Kant's account of the way in which we must conceive 'practical freedom' in relation, to experience is as follows. Every 'cause' (Ursache) has a 'power' (Vermögen), which may be also called its 'causality' (Causalität), which 'power' is necessarily connected with the subsequent appearance of a definite 'effect' (Wirkung); and the law of this connection is called the 'character' of the cause. The transition from the 'causality' to the 'effect', however it be conceived, is called the 'action' of the cause (Handlung). Now in 'natural causation', the 'causality' of every cause is also an effect of some previous cause, and so on *ad infinitum*; and the 'action', therefore, is merely a transition in time. But for every natural object, we must also suppose there to

(1) G.P.396.
(2) R.V.P.371 ; cf M.P.II
(3) R.V.P.372 ; cf M.P.II

be an intelligible ground; and there is no contradiction in thinking of this intelligible ground as cause (in another sense) of the 'causality' of the natural object. The 'causality' of the natural object would thus be effect both of some preceding natural object and also of its intelligible ground. But the intelligible ground is, as such, in no way subject to 'time-conditions,' and therefore its 'action' in producing the 'causality' which is its appearance, is not a time-transition. It cannot therefore be said to 'begin to act' at any time, although its effect i.e. the 'causality' of the natural object, has a beginning. It is thus original cause of an appearance, which is on another side also effect of a conditioned cause and in its turn cause of other appearances. It begins 'of itself' a series of events in time, without itself beginning to act.

Now, so far, except for the ambiguity of the word 'cause' as applied to an intelligible object, which was discussed above, and except for a lack of fixity about almost all his terms, many of which are at one time distinguished, and at another used as synonyms (e.g. Causalität = Character = Hundlung), there seems no reason to object to Kant's account. But it is an account which would apply to any natural object whatever and we have now to consider whatever it will apply, in a special sense to human volition.

I quoted above (p.74) at passage of Kant,[1] in which he says that 'man knows himself' not only through his senses but 'also through mere apperception, and that too in actions and inner determinations,

(1) R.V. p.379

which he cannot ascribe to the impression of the senses. He is to himself, it must be admitted, partly a phenomenon, but partly also, namely in view of certain faculties, a merely intelligible object, because his action cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We call these faculties Understanding and Reason.' And he goes on to say that Reason appears pre-eminently as the faculty of a supersensible being. We are next told that the Imperatives expressed by 'ought' make it plain that 'this Reason has a Causality, or at least that we represent it as having one'. And finally we have the following sentence. 'Now this "ought" expresses a possible action, of which the ground is nothing more than a mere conception; whereas, on the contrary, the ground of a merely natural action must always be an appearance'.

In this passage I think we have presented the full extent to which Kant's error of restricting practical freedom to reasonable beings goes, together with the confusions on which that restriction was based. One ambiguity occurs in the last sentence; and it is a very important one, since it seems to have given rise to many false notions of what Kant meant by freedom. This sentence expresses in all antithetical form the difference between 'free' and 'natural' causality - which he frequently says are the only two kinds of causation possible. The first is distinguished by this that its ground is a mere conception; whereas the ground of the second is always a phenomenon. Now from the account given above of Transcendental Freedom it will appear in what sense I accept this description of free causality. A free cause must necessarily appear to us as a logical reason and so far as 'a mere conception;'

because it is not, as such, presented to us as an object of intuition. It is always a universal and though we can know that it must be an individual we cannot experience it as uniting both characters. But from what Kant says in the preceding context, as well as from his general account of will elsewhere, I think it is plain that he is not thinking of 'a mere conception' in this sense. When our will is singled out as having a special kind of causality, inasmuch as it can be 'determined to action by the presentation (Vorstellung) of certain laws',(1) Kant shews what it is he is thinking of. The 'mere conception,' in the only justifiable sense for freedom would be the laws themselves, and not the 'presentation' of the laws. Every 'conception' may be regarded from two points of view, either as a psychical existent, or from the point of view of its content; and it is this very important (and obvious) distinction which Kant appears to have neglected. If the causation exercised by the presentation of a conception were enough to justify freedom, freedom would be no more than that aspect of every mechanical process, which was distinguished above as the only precise sense assignable to freedom, on the common view which regards the objects of experience as real; and thus there would not even be an appearance of conflict between it and natural causality. For it is precisely 'presentations' to which Kant repeatedly asserts that the objects of experience are reduced, when they are viewed, as he holds they must be, as appearances. An appearance is a 'mere presentation,' and it is only between such that the causal laws will hold. There

(1) G. p275

would therefore be no difference between 'an action of which the ground was no more than' the presentation of 'a conception', and an action of which the ground 'must always be an appearance': for the presentation of anything whatever is, as such, an appearance.

Kant himself would seem to recognize this in a passage of the 'Canon of Pure Reason', in which for that very reason he is driven to an almost direct contradiction of what he says in the context quoted above. In this passage (p.530) he says: 'Practical Freedom can be proved through experience. For not only that which charms, i.e., affects the senses directly, determines human choice, but we have a power to overcome impressions upon our sensual desiderative faculty (Begehrungsvermögen), through *presentations*(1) of what even in a somewhat remote way, is useful or harmful; and these considerations of that which, in view of our whole states is desirable, i.e. good and useful, are based upon Reason. Hence also Reason gives laws, which are Imperatives, i.e. objective *Laws of Freedom*, and which tell us what *ought to happen*, even though perhaps it never does happen, and are distinguished in that respect from *Natural Laws*, which deal only with that, *which happens*'. He then goes on to suggest that on a wider view, what here appears as freedom, might be seen to be nature (which would, indeed, with regard to part of his statement, be certainly the case) but this, he says, is a speculative question, irrelevant just here. Finally he comes to this: 'Accordingly we know practical freedom through experience as *one among natural causes*,

(1) My italics.

namely a causality of the reason in determination of the will; whereas Transcendental Freedom demands an independence of this reason itself (in view of its causal power to begin a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the sense-world, and so far appears to be contrary to the Law of Nature, and hence to all possible experience; it therefore remains problematic. But for reason in its practical use this problem is irrelevant..... The question with regard to Transcendental Freedom concerns solely speculative knowledge. We can set it aside as wholly irrelevant, when we have to do with the practical', Now in this passage Kant states very well what is characteristic of human volition; and his definitions of 'will' are constantly expressed in the same fashion. Will differs from other instances of natural causation, in as much as in it the idea (to use the common English word for 'Vorstellung') of something, which is not yet real, tends to bring about the realisation of that thing; and he may be justified in saying that this process 'is based upon Reason', since to have an idea of anything either real or imaginary, presupposes that faculty of cognition which distinguishes man from beasts, and still more from inanimate nature. Nay, more than this, in the special instance, which Kant takes to be the only truly 'moral' willing, where the idea which acts as cause, is the idea of conformity to a universal law, the content of the idea is so abstract, that it may be confidently asserted that only reasonable beings are capable of having such an idea. But nevertheless the idea is even here still 'an appearance,' and, as such, separated by an impassable gulf from *the content, of which it is an idea.* And, inasmuch as it is in its character of idea, i.e. as a

psychical existent, that it produces an effect, the causation is still merely 'natural'. This, as we have said, Kant in the present passage fully recognises. But it is only the more remarkable that he should speak of Reason, in the same context, as 'giving laws of Freedom', as if it were Reason in the same sense, which is the source on the one hand of objectivity, and on the other hand of abstract ideas, whether true or false. In this Kant betrays the psychological standpoint, above which he seems never to have completely risen in treating epistemologleal questions, in spite of the enormous services which he did to epistemology, as well in the Metaphysics of Ethics as elsewhere. He supplies, as it seems to me, more materials for a true view than any one else, and those, too, in a wonderfully forward state of preparation but nevertheless they are still for him encumbered and confused with the irrelevant matter, from which it was his merit to set them free for others. It is perhaps impossible to dispense with the term 'rational', for what is true or objective, especially after its full adoption by Hegel; but it is extremely important to avoid confusing the 'rational' in this sense, which is the fundamental one for Kant's system, with the 'rational' in the sense of that which implies the psychological faculty of making judgments and inferences. The distinction between what is true and what is only believed (although only a 'rational' being can believe) is one which cannot be either done away or bridged over, however small be the amount of what we may be thought to really know in comparison of what we must be content to believe; and it is this distinction which is here in question. Knowing, the function of Reason, is on one side a natural function,

and, as such, it is indistinguishable from believing; but, in so far as knowing *is* distinct from believing i.e. in so far as that which is known is true, there are no two words which express a difference more profound. When Kant talks of the only true morality as based upon the laws which Reason gives itself, the whole course of his work shews that he means laws which tell us *truly* what ought to be done; it is, indeed, only on this condition that he could claim universality for them.(1) In this sense 'Reason determines the Will' whenever the idea which is cause of our action, is an idea of what is truly good. But it is only in an utterly different sense that 'Reason' can be said to 'determine the Will', whenever the idea, which causes our actions, implies the power of abstraction. And it is only in this second sense that such determination of the will can he called a 'practical freedom' which is independent of 'Transcendental Freedom'. Accordingly Kant himself, as we have said, recognizes elsewhere that 'the practical conception of freedom is based upon' the 'transcendental Idea of Freedom' (p.371); and again, speaking of freedom, 'as one of the faculties, which contain the cause of the appearances of our sense-world,' i.e. as practical, in distinction from transcendental, freedom, he declares that we cannot hope to establish its actuality in experience, 'inasmuch as we can never infer from experience to anything, *which must not be conceived at all according to laws of experience*' (p.385). And this seems sufficiently to contradict his

(1) This is the ground of Knat's distinction between the Categorical imperative, or *Objective Law*, and the mere Maxim or *subjective principle*, which will receive fuller treatment in my second chapter.

statement in the 'Canon' that 'we know practical freedom through experience as one among natural causes' and that 'for reason in its practical use' the problem of transcendental freedom 'is irrelevant.'

Kant has therefore confused the purely natural process of human volition, with the transcendental aspect of it, which could alone entitle us to ascribe to man 'practical freedom'; and it is solely on this confusion that the special place he assigns to man as a 'free' agent seems to be based. It is true that the content of the idea, which acts as cause in volition, is different from the content of any other natural cause; but that content is merely the form of the cause, and difference of form is something which in no way readers one natural cause more or less of a natural cause than any other. The question is, however complicated by the fact that we are dealing in the case of volition, with an 'appearance of the inner sense'; and as this point also touches the legitimacy of Kant's assertion that 'appearances' are mere 'presentations,' an assertion which I used in my argument to prove that for him human volition was really a causation by 'appearances,' something should be said of it.

It is true, as Berkeley saw, that everything which we directly experience, may be regarded from one point of view as a state of our own mind but it is not true that everything is distinctly experienced, as such a state only. Kant pointed out that Berkeley's hypothesis would leave us no means of making a rational distinction between dreams and perceptions - between mere illusion (lauter Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung). He shews that we necessarily conceive *things extended in space* (the form of the outer sense) as forming a

causally connected series, of which the succession is objective, i.e. not existent merely as and when we perceive them. In fact we could not know a thing to be a state of ours, except by contrasting it with something not so dependent on us; since we can only know ourselves in contrast to other things or persons, and our knowledge of the existence of other persons depends upon inference from their manifestation in a would of things. Our 'ideas', therefore, in so far as they are states of ourselves, must be conceived as forming a causal series of their own, different in the order of its connections from that or the content of those ideas, considered as extended in space. The knowledge of the mental series, as such, involves the existence of the series of things in space; but the latter must be conceived as so far independent of the former that it might exist, without being represented in any mental series. Nevertheless it remains true that the spatial series can only be conceived as having identical elements with those which occur in the mental series. And this it is true, in a sense, that the spatial world is composed of mental elements; only these mental elements, in so far as they are conceived as existing in *one* space, and belonging to *one* series, of which the parts are in a relation of complete causal interdependence, must not be confused with the elements, whose content is partially the same, but which form part of the mental series. Kant's denomination of the elements of the spatial world as 'mere presentations' is justifiable, if it be clearly understood that these 'presentations' are the same in content only, with those which belong to the mental world, but not the same in respect of their causal relations with one another. And this, on the

whole, he makes plain enough by his distinction of the 'outer' from the 'inner' sense. But the ambiguity of the name nevertheless lends a handle to confusion, into which he sometimes seems to fall, as, for instance, when he speaks of spatial objects as being actually 'in our mind' (in unserem Gemüthe). A concrete instance will make the distinction plain. The 'presentation' of a cow munching grass, may in the mental series be cause of a feeling of pleasure, or of the recollection of the words 'cud' or 'ruminate' but the same munching will probably be cause, in the material series of digestion, and perhaps, of such movements in the cow's brain as correspond to her feeling of pleasure. Yet the latter munching is certainly composed of elements which can only be *known* as presentational. The difference is not between the 'states', between which, as Kant insists, the causal connection must always be conceived to hold, but between the substances, of which, as Kant also insists, they must be conceived as states. In the case of the material cow, the substance is conceived as extended in a unique space; but in the case of the presentation of her, the substance is mental - not extended in space, but also conceived as persisting through time. This difference of substance adds an element of content to the states of each series, which distinguishes a state conceived as belonging to the one from the same state conceived as belonging to the other.

Part of the content, then, of some mental states is necessarily conceived as forming a world by itself. But there are other mental states, as, when we are dreaming, imagining, feeling pleasure and pain, or engaged in abstract thinking, of which the content is not so

conceived. In these cases the content, in so far as it is conceived as existing, exists only as the form of mental states. The difference between such contents and those which are conceived as constituting the spatial world, is what is marked by the fact that Kant calls the latter contents themselves 'presentations'. For these latter are not mere content, i.e. merely what distinguishes one mental element from another, but appear to be given as existent and to be bound together in one context of experience, exactly in the same way as the presentations of them, along with the other mental elements, appear to be given as existing and to be bound togther in another context of experience. There is exactly the same reason for calling these contents themselves 'presentations,' as for giving that name to the mental states of which they are contents and to all other mental states. The first group are 'presentations' of 'the outer sense', the second of 'the inner'. When a pshychologist examines his mind, he has, to use Hume's terms, 'impressions' both of 'impressions' and of 'ideas'; and 'impression' is used in both these cases in the same sense, that of something both immediately given, as an object of 'intuition' (Kant's Anschauung), and as forming part of a unique series. But when his 'impression' is of an 'impression,' the latter impression necessarily appears as part of his mental series and it was *only* as such that Berkeley erroneously wished to consider it; whereas when his impression is of an 'idea,' the 'idea' is really a part of his mental series and nothing more. When Kant, therefore, speaks of the 'appearance' to which he confines our knowledge of the real world, as 'mere presentations,' he means what would be more properly termed

'contents of presentation,' since they need not always have actually been 'presented'; but still he means those contents, considered as having the character conferred by presentation, i.e. as absolutely particularised or individuated by the unique time-series, not in their abstract character. Anything whatever, which 'determines the will', i.e. which *causes* action, is a 'presentation' in this sense, since it must be an element in the mental series and an 'object' (Gegenstand) of the inner sense, either possible (if it be sub-conscious) or actual. But confusion is apt to arise, because some of these 'presentations' of the inner sense, are also 'presentations' of the outer. And a further confusion also occurs, because the 'presentations' of the inner sense, may be 'ideas' of other 'presentations' of the inner sense, e.g. the 'idea' of my future pleasure, or of 'presentations' of the outer, e.g. of some very good wine, not actually existent. And all these cases are different in respect of the content of the 'presentation', from those in which it is something abstract like the moral law. Nevertheless, what it is important to notices and what is too often left out of sight, is that in all cases alike what causes action is some 'presentation' of the inner sense, whether its content be the moral law, or the 'idea' of another presentation; and that thus in all cases the 'will' is subject to the 'natural' law of causality, and 'determined' by an 'appearance.'

Now it is characteristic of 'voluntary' action, i.e. of human volition, as opposed to conation in general and to some forms even of desire, not only that the presentation of the inner sense which is its cause, must always be an actual presentation, as opposed to one that is sub-conscious, but also that this presentation must have for content

a mere 'idea' of another presentation of the outer or inner sense, and not an actual presentation either of the one or the other. Thus it is possible to *desire* a pear, which you actually see, and this desire may be cause of your eating it; but, if this is all, the action will not be voluntary. To make it voluntary, the desire must be not of the pear, but of the taking and eating it, actions which are not yet actually presented. It is this which would seem to distinguish actions, which are automatic, as a result of habit, from those which are merely instinctive. Both alike are caused by 'presentations' of the inner sense which are not actually presented but sub-conscious; only in the first the sub-conscious 'presentation' must be of something itself not actual, whereas in the case of instinct, it may be of an actual presentation of the outer sense. For instance, there seems little doubt, that a dog may be directly moved by the sight of a man whom he hates, to attack him. In which case the presentation of the man, is a sub-conscious presentation from the point of view of the inner sense (for the dog probably does not perceive that he sees the man); but it is not a sun-conscious presentation *of the attack*, as it might be in a man who had consciously formed the habit of caning a certain person, whenever he met him.

These distinctions are all of them important in considering Kant's account of volition, as with regard to all of them he uses, at time, ambiguous language ; and we shall have to take account of them later in considering his treatment of Hedonism. What we are concerned with now, however, is their bearing on Kant's view of practical freedom, as belonging only to man. And I think they serve to explain another

confusion in the passage quoted above (R.V.p.379). It is not only that 'conception' is there used as equivalent to 'presentation of conception', or conception as psychical existent; but there seems also to be an ambiguity in the sense in which he speaks of man's action as characterised by the fact that it 'cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility'. This description is opposed to that of 'lifeless or merely animal' nature, in which we have no reason to 'think of any power, as other than sensuously conditioned (sinnlich bedingt)'[1]. Now by this latter expression it seems plain that what Kant means, is that the actions of all other parts of nature have sensible objects for their causes. It is in this sense that it forms a true antithesis to what immediately follows: 'Man, who knows the whole of nature besides solely through senses, gets knowledge of himself also through mere apperception'; i.e. other animals and inanimate nature are mere objects of the senses, and therefore their actions can only be caused by objects of the senses, which is the type of natural causality; whereas man is something more. But when Kant goes on to speak of man as recognising actions of his own 'which he cannot ascribe to the impression of the senses', it is hard to believe that those 'actions which *can* be ascribed to sense impressions' are not actions of man's will, under the aspect in which he calls it 'sensual' (sinnlich) a term which he explains as meaning that it is affected 'pathologically (through motives (Bewegursachen) of sense)' (p.371). Now, if this be so, Kant would seem to be treating three totally distinct notions as

(1) R.V. p.379

all equally relevant for his purpose. Man is *sensual* (1) in so far as his actions may be regarded as sensible objects, belonging to a context of experience (2) in so far as he receives impressions of the senses, i.e. in so far as he is capable of perceiving sensible objects (3) in so far as the 'idea' of sensible objects is the cause of his actions. And again, in all these divisions, an ambiguity remains because the 'sensible objects' may be objects either of the outer or of the inner sense. Now, when Kant speaks of 'heteronomy' of the will, that is a distinction based upon the third sense in which man is 'sensual.' The will is heteronomous, when that which causes the action is either the 'idea' of some sensible object, either of outer or inner sense, or the actual presentation of some object of outer sense.

Even here, however, Kant is ambiguous, since he sometimes speaks as if the actual presentation of an object of outer sense, were necessary to constitute heteronomy - such a case as that given above of the desire of a seen pear; and, where he does not appear to limit the conception so narrowly as this, he seems always to be thinking of the 'idea' of some object of the outer sense, e.g. the taking of the pear, and hardly ever of the 'idea' of some object of the inner sense, e.g. the sensations of touch and taste that accompany the eating of the pear, or the pleasure they excite. Yet it is plain that where the cause of action is the 'idea' of some future state of the agent's mind, the action is fully heteronomous. But the confusion which bears on 'practical freedom' is that Kant's language encourages the notion that where action is not heteronomous, i.e. does not fall under (3), it is therefore not naturally caused, i.e. does not fall under (1), which is

by no means the case, although all action which is heteronomous, must fall under (1).

Man's sensuousness under (2) is irrelevant both to heteronomy and to practical freedom. Kant is here committing the error of regarding the relation of subject and object, in *experience*, as the relation of ordinary causality which holds only between objects. He traces the possiblility of heteronomy quite rightly to the fact that our experience is sensuous, that we do not know objects *a priori* in virtue of an intellectual intuition. But he seems to regard the effect of objects upon us, whereby we know them, as the same thing as their effect in determining the will; whereas the knowledge of objects cannot be rightly regarded as an effect upon our sensibility at all, and, if it were, it would not be the same thing with the effect which the actual presentation of objects or the 'idea' of them, regarded as pshychical existents, produces in subsequent states of mind. Yet Kant seems to regard the undoubted fact of sense-perception as a confirmation of the reality of heteronomy, and, through that, of his misleading description of 'practical freedom' as something empirically knowable.

It is in man's sensuousness under (1) that we reach what is really relevant to freedom. When this aspect of his nature is clearly distinguished from (2) and (3) it become plain that all his actions fall simply under 'natural laws'. They are all mere 'appearances' of the inner sense, and are completely caused by previous appearances of the inner sense. It is true, that, where the cause of an action is the presentation of a law, the law which is presented is not itself a sensuous object, and herein there lies a real distinction between the

actions of men and beasts. But what is important is that the law must be presented to the inner sense, before it can be conceived as causing the action; and as a presentation of the inner sense, it is as truly a sensuous object as any other, though only of the inner sense. Thus we might truly say of man, what Kant says of beasts, that we have no reason to think of any of his faculties as 'other than sensuously conditioned'. The difference between men and beasts is only that beasts are apparently incapable of forming abstractions, i.e. the content of the presentation which causes their action must always be itself a presentation; in other words, because they know nothing but sensible objects, their action is always heteronomous. But this difference between man and beasts only proves him to be a different sort of natural object from them; it is by no means sufficient to entitle us to ascribe 'practical freedom' to him. Man does not, when he acts morally, exhibit any 'pure activity' (G.p.299) This 'pure activity', in so far as it can be ascribed to him at all, consists only in his being able to conceive the Ideas of Reason (G.p.300); that, when they have been conceived, they should influence his action, cannot be regarded as an instance of the same activity. And this power of conception itself cannot without danger of misleading, be called a 'pure activity'. That is an expression which suggests that the Ego to which Kant attributes it, may, from the cognitive point of view, at all events, be regarded as itself an uncaused cause of its pure notions, e.g. the Ideas of Reason. But, as has been pointed out at length above, Kant could not maintain that the Ding an Sich or the Transcendental Ego really stood in a *causal* relation to experience:

their relation to it is rather that of reason and consequence. To maintain the opposite is to identify the 'synthesis' of the Transcendental Ego, with the actual process of judging, and to make the Transcedental Ego itself the psychological subject. If the relation of the premises of a syllogism to the conclusion could be called 'activity', there might be nothing misleading in the notion of a 'pure activity'. But as a matter of fact, it is rather the relation of the recognition of the premises to the recognition of the conclusion as conditioned by them, that seems to correspond to our notion of cognitive activity; and such a process Kant enables us to set aside, as not what he means by 'pure activity' since it involves time.

Indeed, Kant himself, sufficiently prevents mis-apprehension by the rigour with which he rejects the attempt to conceive as prior in time, that which, if it determine the will, shews that will to be 'practically free.' In this rejection he is quite consistent. 'The action' he says (R.V.p.381) 'so far as it is to be imputed to thought' (Denkungsart, identified just before with 'intelligible character') 'as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it at all according to empirical laws, that is, so that the conditions of pure reason, but only so that the effects of pure reason in the appearance of the inner sense *precede*.' In other words that which is to be regarded as the condition, or, as Kant calls it, cause, of the action, in so far as that action exhibits practical freedom, *does not precede the action in time*. The action is only preceded by the consequence, or, as Kant calls it, effect, or this 'intelligible' condition; and hence the action itself may be said to 'follow from' the condition as a conclusion follows from premises, but

not to follow it in the time-order (cf. above p.106). Now, in the case of moral action, this 'effect', which produces the action, is just the presentation of the moral law; and the intelligible condition of that effect is the moral law itself. Kant himself allow that this effect or presentation, must always be present in human volition; and, what I wish to maintain, is that this is all that the analysis or human volition, as such, can ever shew to be present. I have examined the confusions upon which Kant's contrary view that the law itself is somehow to be obtained by analysis of volition, that it is given by a 'pure Will' or 'practical Reason', seems to be based; and those confusions seem sufficient to explain the view and to shew that, for Kant at any rate, it was baseless. It only remains to give a positive summary of the reasons against the legitimacy of any such view; and then to shew what is the real meaning of 'practical freedom' and how it is universal.

The point at issue is this: Whether 'will' can be understood at all as other than a form of 'activity'; and whether, if it be an activity, it must not be conceived as essentially conditioned by time, and therefore, in Kant's language a mere 'appearance'. If it be a mere 'appearance,' the conception of a 'pure Will' is nonsense; and 'will' cannot be ascribed as an attribute to anything real - either to God or to the Transcendental Ego.

That 'will' is a form of 'activity' has, I suppose, never been disputed. Kant himself, as we have seen, refers us, for our notion of pure Will, to the pure activity of the Ego. What is disputed is whether psychical activity, /

My conclusion, then, is this: That that 'will' is only a special form of natural causality, or rather, a natural causal process, where the cause is of one definite sort. It is a special form of natural causality, just as explosion of gunpowder by a match is one special form of natural causality, and explosion of gunpowder by percussion is another. And, that on which I wish to insist, is that voluntary action, of whatever sort, whether autonomous or heteronomous, exhibits 'freedom,' in the sense which I have hitherto explained as essential to Kant's notion, no more and no less than gunpowder explosions or any other natural process whatever. It seems, indeed, strange that this conclusion from his doctrine should have escaped the notice, both of himself and others, to the extent to which it has. For he repeatedly asserts that for every 'appearance' we must suppose an intelligible ground (that Ding an Sich), and it is just this dependence of the cause of his actions on an intelligible ground (the Transcendental Ego), which he describes as constituting man's 'practical freedom'. Moreover, even the identity of the Ding an Sich and the Transcendental Ego has been suggested by him and accepted by others; though this would not be necessary to justify the inference, since the dependence on an intelligible ground is by itself sufficient for practical freedom. When this is acknowledged, 'practical' freedom disappears altogether as something intermediate between natural causality and transcendental freedom. For, as Kant himself says, nothing intermediate is possible; only two sorts of causality can be conceived at all. 'Freedom,' then, for Kant means only 'transcendental freedom', and 'transcendental freedom' is not 'practical', in the sense

that it is inseparably connected with 'action' alone. It is true that actions are dependent on 'transcendental freedom', but *that is only* because it is the relation which holds between the empirical causes of those actions and the transcendental ground of such causes: whether sensible objects produced effects, and so vindicated their right to be considered practical (as they always must), or not, they would equally be results of 'transcendental freedom'.

The degree to which Kant himself was forced to recognise the unpractical nature of his conception of Freedom, is singularly illustrated by a passage in the 'Metaphysic of Morals' to which I have referred above (p.105; M.p.23). He here declares that 'Will', which he has hitherto regarded as identical with 'pure practical Reason', and as that which is *alone* endowed with 'Freedom' in his special sense, cannot be called either 'free' or the reverse, because it is not 'susceptible of compulsion'. This 'susceptibility of compulsion' implies subjection to natural law and as so subject, he declares that human 'choice' (Willkühr) may be called 'free'. He would seem, therefore, here to recognise that 'action' can only be conceived as a time-process; indeed he says that 'Will' does not refer to 'actions' (Handlungen); and it is only because he sees that he would be departing too far from the ordinary use of 'freedom', if he disconnected it from action, that he now denies freedom to 'Will'. The fact is that his previous doctrine has already departed from the ordinary usage, further than he himself was fully aware; and hence the inconsistency, with which he now tries to patch up the discrepancy. The true way of meeting the difficulty would have been, as has been pointed out, to insist on his

meaning of Freedom as the true one, and to give up the special connection which he had hitherto asserted between it and human volition; to recognise that 'Willkühr' was a mere 'appearance', and therefore not 'free,' and that; that which was free, had not even so much connection with volition, as to deserve the name of 'Will'. There would, then, have stood out clearly the problem, which must be next discussed - the appreciation of his use of 'Freedom' and of the importance which he assigns to it in relation to Ethics.

Once justification has already been pointed out - namely that Kant's view recognises that other element in the causal process, neglected by a Determinism or pure relativity, which I have called 'form', and have tried to exhibit as the only basis of 'Freedom' for those who take the causal process as the ultimate reality. Kant's notion includes this element, but it also includes much move, since he sees that finite things, though things and not mere relations, are yet, as finite, partly defined by their relations, and therefore not self-subsistent or capable of being regarded as complete real grounds. But there is, I think, another justification in so for as 'transcendental Freedom' can be shewn to have an essential connection with Ethics.

It is , in Aristotelian language, if transcendental Freedom can be shewn to supplement the notion of a mere efficient cause, not only by that of a formal, but also of a final cause.

Now for Kant 'Freedom' undoubtedly has this significance. He deduces the reality of Freedom from the reality of the moral law; and the moral law is what determines the only objective 'end' (Zweck). Our reason tells us that we 'ought' to do so and so; and it is merely

because we know that we 'ought,' that we are able to conclude that we 'can,' i.e. that we are free. 'If I ought, I can' does not mean for him, as for Professor Sidgwick(p66), that only actions, which *will* follow upon my choice of them, can be reasonably included in my notion of duty. Kant fully recognises, what I have tried to shew above, that the fundamental sense of 'ought' is that in which it prescribes an ideal, which need not be physically or psychologically possible(1). The connection of 'ought' with 'can,' is one of complete dependence of the latter on the former. What I ought to do, or what ought to be, is 'morally possible' (P.V.p.61), even if, according to natural laws, and so far as experience enables me to predict, it never will happen. This is what Kant means by the 'Primacy of the Practical Reason.' It is not that 'Will,' as equivalent to Practical Reason, is to be regarded as the fundamental reality; but that the Practical Reason, as prescribing the moral law, enables us to enlarge our knowledge of reality in a way that the Speculative Reason alone could not do. From the fact that a 'kingdom of ends' 'ought to be,' we can conclude that a 'kingdom of ends' is not only possible but necessary, although, if our knowledge were confined to experience alone, we should be bound to conclude that it was neither actual nor possible.

Now when Kant takes the moral Imperative, as such, for the primary 'fact' in the metaphysics of ethics, he seems to have been influenced by his theory that will is more than a psychological

(1) Cf. R.V. p.101

faculty. Will is no doubt the source of the imperative mood as distinguished from the indicative. But, if the above analysis of will has been correct, it cannot possibly be the source of the universality, which distinguishes the moral imperative from every other. The will is capable of commanding, as of doing, what is wrong as well as what is right; and so far as it, and therefore the imperative form is concerned, an injunction to wash your hands is precisely the same thing as an injunction to pursue what is good. The question what ought to be willed, cannot be answered by an analysis of will itself; for such analysis can never tell you more than what *is* willed, which differs with different times and different persons. Kant rejects the theory that 'the good' is the foundation of ethics, precisely because he thinks it can only be directly determined by an appeal to the feelings, which vary subjectively with individuals; and it is the similar subjectivity of the will, which seems to me to condemn his own 'imperative'. He was perhaps misled by his desire to explain the ambiguity of the term 'law,' into thinking that the only possible way of distinguishing 'moral' from 'natural' laws, was the implication of command in the former. What he meant by his conception of a 'pure' will, was a will which should command consistency in your view of what ought to be done - a consistency, which is necessary to 'reason,' as such. But all that a 'pure' will could really mean, would be, a will which was consistent with itself in the fact that it always commanded, not in respect of that which it commanded. We may admit that the former notion can be obtained by an analysis of will; but it would be by no means sufficient to give a moral principle. It

is true that will cannot but be consistent with itself in that it always command; but, what Kant did not see, was that it was a consistency in *the object commanded*(1) that he was after all requiring. It is true that this consistency is directly given as no more than a formal condition of good willing, but it is a formal condition of *good* willing, and not of willing in general. Thus, what really distinguishes the moral law from laws of natures, is that it expresses the connection of natural objects, not with one another, but with the notion of 'end' or 'goodness'. Its primary form is 'This is good' or 'this is an end-in-itself' or 'this ought to be;' the command, 'do this' is no more than a corollary from such a judgment. It is a 'law', because such a judgment, if true at all, expresses a universal truth; whereas subjective maxims, cannot be interpreted into more than a particular statement of fact - 'I mean to do this' or at most 'I think you ought to do it.' To try to obtain this objective validity out of 'Will' - 'this ought to be willed' out of 'I or you or all the world, do, or can, or must will this' - is a procedure similar to that of trying to prove that 'this it true' from the fact that all the world believe it. The assertion of 'goodness' claims rationality in the sense explained above, precisely as does the assertion of truth; the first has no more connection with volition, than the latter with cognition; both rest on the same 'Theoretic Reason' - if we are to adhere to the custom of ascribing them to 'reason' at all.

(1) Cf. P.V. p.114. He does not see that the mere notion of 'ought' is an object or matter of a special sort, though, indeed, not an object of intuition.

If, therefore, we examine Kant's first expression of the moral law 'Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law', we get the following results. The significance of the expression rests on the words 'thou canst will'. But there seem no limits to the empirical possibilities of willing. It is possible to will one thing one day, and the opposite the next. It is only, if the question has been begged, by a previous assumption that will cannot be inconsistent with itself, *with regard to the objects willed*, (in respect of always being will, it must, certainly, be consistent) that this expression will serve for what Kant means. Kant assumes that I cannot will a thing to be a universal law, to which I might afterwards wish an exception. Perhaps, I cannot rationally; but what is to compel me to will rationally? It is admitted that most of us very seldom do. To set up this as the fundamental principle of morals is as if one were to find the basis of epistemology in the principle 'Think that only to be true, which you can at the same time think to be universally true'; whereby it would be assumed that no one can think otherwise than rationally. The insertion of 'at the same time' only makes matters worse, by involving the theory (which has sometimes been held) that the principle of contradiction means no more and no less than that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true *at the same time*. Moreover our epistemological principle would have just as much right to the imperative form, as the moral one. That form is in each case totally irrelevant to the substance of the principle. The reason why Kant uses it is precisely the same fallacy, which he betrays in 'thou canst will'. He imagines that the

objective validity of the principle, proceeds from the nature of will itself, and hence represents it as so proceeding. In fact, however, this reference to will merely conceals the fact that he is dealing with the notion 'ought'; and the only other essential element in the expression is that of universality. Its whole significance can, therefore, be rendered in the proposition 'You ought to do that only which ought universally to be done'.

Now, if in this way we reject the theory that the principle of Ethics has essential reference to will, we thereby give up the precise connection, which Kant found, between ethics and freedom. Their connection, for him, was that the moral law, necessarily implying will, yet obviously not identical with the law which governs the natural course of human volitions, could have no meaning unless we suppose it to be the guiding principle of another or pure will, which is hence possessed of that 'intelligible causality,' which he calls freedom. Unless therefore such a free being were theoretically possible, the moral law would be actually contradictory to the course of nature, and we could not say it was reasonable to obey it. The 'Critique of Pure Reason', however, shewed it to be possible; and there being therefore nothing against the conclusion to which the moral law would lead us, we can accept its validity unconditionally and along with it the reality of that freedom, which could alone make it valid. It is, thus, only because there is a free will, that there is a moral imperative. But if, as I have tried to shew, the principle of ethics is not an imperative, there might seem no need for 'free will' or 'freedom' to ground it. That principle amounts merely to this, that there is an

objective 'end', something which ought unconditionally to be, an absolute good. And Kant, though he does also express the moral law in terms of these notions yet thinks them to be merely derivative from that primary imperative, and connected with 'Freedom' only through it. There is an unconditional prescription; there must therefore be something unconditionally prescribed, and again an unconditional prescriber. The former is that which is absolutely good, or the sole objective 'end', and the latter is pure will. But, says Kant, there is none among the objects of experience which will answer to the former notion, since none is fit to be a universal object of pursuit. The only objective end must therefore be the only object, which has such universality, and whose reality at the same time is vouched by the moral law itself - namely the prescriber or pure will. Hence pure will and its object are the same; as is expressed in the famous saying with which Kant opens his 'Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals: 'There is nothing anywhere in the world, nay, nothing at all that is conceivable even outside it, that could be considered good without limitation, except only a *good Will*'. Thus 'good' or 'end' is for Kant nothing but the necessary object of a necessary 'will', which object can be none other than that 'will' itself.