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Between the “*Ummah*” and “China” : The Qing Dynasty’s Rule over Xinjiang Uyghur Society

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Of all China’s historic dynasties, the Qing Dynasty governed the largest number of ethnic groups. After the collapse of China’s traditional dynastic system, the domain of the Qing Dynasty was inherited by the Republic of China. However, a lingering question remains: why did the border regions once ruled by the Qing Dynasty, in particular Mongolia, Tibet, and the Uyghur regions of Xinjiang, persistently experience ethnic independence movements during the era of the Republic of China? Exploring the relationship between “state” and “ethnicity” in China since the early modern era and analyzing the policies adopted by the Qing Dynasty in these regions bear important significance with respect to this issue.

The Qing Dynasty gained direct control of the Islamic communities residing near the oases of the Tarim Basin through conquest: this area is known today as the Uyghur region, and some scholars believe that it is contextually defined by a sense of old borders inherited from previous dynasties. The region was once under the rule of the Dzungar Khanate, which paid tribute as a vassal of the Qing Dynasty.¹ This paper will chiefly examine the policies through which the Qing Dynasty governed Uyghur society and the Uyghur’s response, as well as analyzing the policy objectives of the Qing Dynasty in its rule over Uyghur society, to gain perspective on the ethnic and state structures built by the Qing Dynasty, and the ethnic, religious and national identities that these accorded to the Uyghur people. It must first be clarified that, although the unified ethnonym “Uyghur” did not come into use among the inhabitants of this region until the 1930s, this paper will use the term “Uyghur” for the sake of narrative convenience.²

I. The “New Borderland” (新疆 *Xinjiang*) of the Qing Dynasty

From Vassalage to Subjugation

In 1755 (20th Year of the Qianlong Reign) , the nomadic empire of the Dzungar Khanate located in the northern Tianshan Mountains fell into civil unrest, and the Qing Dynasty seized this opportunity to dispatch troops to eliminate the Khanate. Although the Dzungar had long paid tribute as a vassal of the Qing Dynasty, the Khanate had also repeatedly invaded the Khalkha Mongols, an important ally of the Qing Dynasty: thus, eradicating the Dzungar Khanate had been a long-cherished desire of the Qing Dynasty since the Kangxi era (1661-1722) . The territorial expansion was at first limited to the direct results of subjugating the Dzungar: however, as the Qianlong Emperor expressed in his poem, “The Western Frontier” (*Xichui*) , “The affair strayed far from our intentions.” The Qing Dynasty’s original objective had been merely to “recruit vassals” among the other ethnic groups in neighboring regions once governed by the Dzungar, simply allowing them to acknowledge the Qing Dynasty as their suzerain.

The Qing Dynasty apparently had no intention at first of directly occupying regions other than the Dzungar. This is clearly evidenced in the Qianlong Emperor’s appointment of the commander of the Dzungar Expeditionary Force as the “General for Border Determination” (定边将军 *dingbian jiangjun*) . “Only the two tribes of the Kazakhs and the Bulut shield the territories for us” : the Qing Dynasty referred to the Kazakhs and the Bulut (Kyrghyz) , who “requested to serve as vassals and sent envoys to pay tribute,” as “protective screens outside the borders,” or extraterritorial vassal states.³ Similarly, in the region of the southern

Tianshan Mountains inhabited by the Turkic Muslim Uyghurs,⁴ although the Qing Dynasty ultimately captured the region directly through military subjugation, it should be noted that this was not the Qing Dynasty's original intention.

Prior to the Qing occupation, the Uyghur community was in fact controlled by the White Mountain and Black Mountain factions under the Naqshbandi Sufi order of Islam (*al-Tariqah al-Naqshiban-diyah*). The Naqshbandi order is a Sufi order that emerged in the Central Asian region of Samarkand. The founder of the Naqshbandi order, Makhdumi Azam, died in 1542, and his sons experienced a schism due to a dispute over control of the order. His eldest son Ishan-i-Kalan and his followers founded the "White Mountain" (*Aq-taghlyq*) sect, while his seventh son Ishaq (a younger half-brother of Ishan-i-Kalan) and his followers founded the "Black Mountain" (*Qara-taghlyq*) sect. In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the Black Mountaineers spread from Samarkand into the southern Tianshan mountains, and, with the support of the then-ruler of the Yarkent Khanate, gradually became a powerful force centered on the Yarkent region with influence over the regime of the Yarkent Khanate as well as Uyghur society. In the mid-17th century, the eldest son of Ishan-i-Kalan, Yusup Khoja, also left Samarkand and made his way through the southern Tianshan Mountains to the Kashgar region, where he established a base to build up his own forces. The Black Mountaineers and the White Mountaineers not only wielded enormous influence over the populace, but also collaborated with political powers, sparking intense conflict. Since both sects were led by self-professed "Khoja" (*Hoja, Khwaja*, "descendants of the prophet," referring to the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), and were both active in the region centering on Kashgar, they are generally referred to as the "Kashgar Khoja."

Due to their disadvantaged position in arriving late to the region, the

leader of the White Mountaineers, Afaq Khoja, reached out through the Dalai Lama of Tibet to request support from Galdan Khan of the Dzungar Khanate. In 1678, Galdan sent soldiers to the southern Tianshan Mountains to eliminate the Yarkent Khanate, supporting Afaq Khoja as a puppet ruler over Uyghur society. After Galdan's death, his nephew Tsewang Rabtan (also written Tsewang Araptan) succeeded him to the throne. Tsewang Rabtan attempted to use the Black Mountain Khoja to rule over Uyghur society, whilst capturing all the White Mountain Khojas and detaining them in Qulja, the capital of the Dzungar Khanate (modern-day Yining) .

When the Qing Dynasty launched its assault against the Dzungar Khanate, the White Mountain Khojas detained in Qulja, including Mahmat Khoja, the grandson of Afaq Khoja, as well as his two sons born in captivity, Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jihan, sought out the Qing armies to express their allegiance.⁵ Since the Qing Dynasty originally had no intention of directly ruling over Uyghur society, Burhan al-Din was released in the southern Tianshan Mountains as part of a ploy to “recruit vassals” among the Uyghurs.⁶ Zhao Hui, the General for Border Determination, dispatched Deputy Governor-General Amindao to accompany Burhan al-Din southward on a mission of “offering amnesty and recruitment”⁷; according to the “Imperial College Inscription by Gaozong, Emperor Chun, on Achieving the Pacification of the Muslim Regions” (*Gaozong Chun huangdi pingding Huibu gaocheng Taixue beiwen*) , the mission was also referred to as “official negotiations.” In sum, it is quite clear that the Qing Dynasty initially sought only to exercise indirect control over Uyghur society via the Khoja brothers.

Burhan al-Din's younger brother Khoja Jihan was held in Qulja for some time to assist the Qing Dynasty in pacifying the local Muslim community. However, Jihan's aim was complete independence for Uyghur society, and he instead joined the armed rebellion led by the Dzungar prince Amursana.

After the rebellion was suppressed, he fled to the southern Tianshan, where he convinced his brother Burhan al-Din to assassinate Amindao and his entourage of one hundred Qing soldiers in 1757 (22nd Year of the Qianlong Reign) , and openly raise the banner of rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. The Khoja brothers, who had suffered under the tyranny of the Dzungar until being liberated from their long imprisonment by the Qing Dynasty, which recognized their status and released them into the Uyghur community, thus met kindness with enmity, inciting the wrath of the Qianlong Emperor. The “Engraved Yarkent Inscription by Gaozong, Emperor Chun, on the Pacification of the Muslim Regions” (*Gaozong Chun huangdi pingding Huibu leiming Ye'erqiang beiwen*) states: “The Dzungar barbarians... ravaged their people and brutalized the populace, treating the Muslims as sheep... Two tribal chieftains were detained on the shores of the Ili. The four great Muslim cities conveyed *tangge* as contributions for the land tax, to provide for the defenses. The dreaded levies could not be endured by the valleys; how was this to be borne in facing one’s inner heart? The Dzungar have now been pacified, and all the Muslims can see the heavens. It was said that from this day forth, they could be well-fed and sleep in comfort. Their chieftain was sent to nurture the lands and his kindred; how could any change have been suspected? His mind suddenly turned to enmity, and he aided our rebel borderlands in killing the envoy’s retinue; for this reason, troops were dispatched in a punitive expedition to condemn their misdeeds.”⁸ The Qianlong Emperor therefore appointed the “General for Quelling of Rebellions” (靖逆將軍 *jingni jiangjun*) in May 1758, and dispatched troops to handle the armed “rebels” and quash resistance by the Khoja forces. The Uyghur community of the southern Tianshan Mountains was conquered in August 1759.⁹

The above transition from “recruiting vassals” to subjugation had an enormous impact on the policies later formulated by the Qing Dynasty to

rule over its new borderland (新疆 *xinjiang*) , particularly with respect to governance over the Uyghur community.

Divide and Conquer: The Beg System of Uyghur Society

After gaining sovereignty over the Dzungar region in the northern Tianshan Mountains and the Uyghur region in the southern Tianshan Mountains, the Qing Dynasty renamed the area Xinjiang, in keeping with its significance of “new borderland.” It is worth noting that the Qing Dynasty had also bestowed the name “new borderland” upon other regions it had conquered in the past, even though these were regions that historically fell under the domain of the Chinese empire.¹⁰ In other words, the term *xinjiang* or “new borderland” did not signify “new territories,” but rather the area most recently acquired by the Qing Dynasty. Since the Qing Dynasty did not acquire sovereignty over any other new regions after gaining control over the Tianshan Mountains, the term *xinjiang* became set as the exclusive name of this region. In official documents, the Qing Dynasty continued to refer to the Dzungar region as Ili, the Dzungar tribal region (准部 *zhunbu*) , or the Northern Circuit (北路 *beilu*) , while referring to the Uyghur people as “Muslims” (回子 *Huizi*) or else as “turbaned Muslims” (纏頭回 *chantou Hui*: Muslims who wrapped their heads in turbans) , to distinguish them from other Islamic peoples. With respect to the Uyghur region of the southern Tianshan Mountains, the term “Muslim borderland” (回疆 *Huijiang*) was used in a regional sense; the term “Muslim tribal region” (回部 *Huibu*) was used in an ethnonational sense; and the term “Southern Circuit” (南路 *nanlu*) was used in a geographical sense.

In 1762 (27th Year of the Qianlong Reign) , the Qianlong Emperor appointed the “Governor-General of Ili and Other Areas” (總統伊犁等處將軍 *zongtong Ili deng chu jiangjun*, generally referred to as 伊犁將軍 *Ili jiangjun*, the Ili General) to begin gradually establishing a “military protectorate

system,” transforming Xinjiang into a military colony. The Ili General had command over all Qing troops stationed across the Northern Circuit, Southern Circuit, and Eastern Circuit (the Kumul and Turpan regions of eastern Xinjiang, which were already under the rule of the Qing Dynasty) , and was also the highest-ranking civil official in the Xinjiang region. Below this rank, ministerial attachés, ministers of affairs, or ministerial leaders were installed at each of the major cities in the Northern and Southern circuits, depending on their size, while a governor-general was installed at Dihua (modern-day Urumqi) : these figures commanded the garrisoned troops, and were responsible for regional defenses. The Qing Dynasty stationed 39,726 soldiers in Xinjiang in total, though only 5,185 were stationed in the Southern Circuit: the majority of the forces were sent to the Northern Circuit and the Urumqi region.¹¹ The differing size of the garrisons may have been informed by the need to take precautions against Russia, or it may have been determined out of consideration for the former status of the Northern Circuit as the center of Dzungar influence, or to handle conflicts that could arise with the neighboring Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.¹² On this point, the Qing Dynasty clearly differed from the westward-oriented policies of previous Chinese dynasties, which had always been centered on the Southern Circuit.

In terms of its governing policies, the Qing government adopted three different administrative and bureaucratic systems in the Xinjiang region. First, the Eastern Circuit, including Urumqi, was incorporated into the county system used in China’s interior, and divided into precincts, protectorates, prefectures and counties in 1759 (24th Year of the Qianlong Reign) . There were three key reasons for implementing the county system in this region: 1) The county system had previously been implemented in that area under the auspices of the central government during the Tang Dynasty; 2) Geographically speaking, the region bordered

on China's interior provinces, and was inhabited by a large number of Han Chinese as well as Chinese-speaking followers of Islam, namely Hui Muslims; 3) In terms of military strategy, the region was a transportation hub between the Northern and Southern circuits and China's interior, and implementing direct governance would aid in controlling this region. In terms of the outcome, after being incorporated into the county system during the Qing Dynasty, this region experienced more lively immigration activities, predominated by Han Chinese and Hui Muslims, who accounted for approximately 70% of the region's total population by the early 20th century.

Second, the *jasagh* system was implemented among the nomadic Mongol herders of the Northern Circuit and the Uyghur communities in the Kumul and Turpan regions of the Eastern Circuit. After the Qing Dynasty, which was rooted in the Manchu people, formed an alliance with the Mongols, the Mongol people were divided and reorganized into "banner" units, with the *jasagh* as the "banner leader." The *jasaghs* formed a military protectorate system with the greatest autonomy ever granted to subjugated peoples in Chinese history. Because Abdullah Beg of the Kumul and Emin Khoja of the Turpan had professed their allegiance to the Qing Dynasty and had been granted the title of *jasagh* as early as the Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns (1662-1722, 1723-1735), and since their peoples actively aided the Qing Dynasty in conquering the Uyghur communities of the southern Tianshan Mountains (or the Southern Circuit), the Qianlong Emperor continued to recognize their special status in formulating the overall policy for governance of Xinjiang.

Third, the *beg* system was adopted amongst the Uyghur communities of the Southern Circuit—the "Muslim borderland." In the Turkic family of languages, "beg" or "bek" means "chief," and was once the title for the ruling class. The Qing Dynasty interpreted "beg" as "official," bestowing

this title upon the traditional leaders of the Uyghur communities and forming a hierarchy of official ranks (from Grade 3 to Grade 7) , thus transforming the Uyghur communities into a bureaucracy under Qing rule; the Qing Dynasty referred to this policy as “bringing order to customs without changing laws.”

The begs were divided into different categories: the Hakim beg was responsible for the civil administration of communities in a given region; the Ishihana beg served the Hakim beg in a position akin to a deputy; the Ghazanachi beg was responsible for taxation; the Mirab beg managed irrigation works; the Qazi beg served as an Islamic judge, and so on. Aside from external military affairs and defenses, which fell under the administration of the Qing military, the Uyghur begs represented the Qing government in managing local civil administration, public order, judgments, taxation, agriculture, industry and commerce, education and religious affairs in the Uyghur communities; in addition, each beg was assigned a troop of “Muslim soldiers” in order to maintain public order. The Qing Dynasty not only granted political privileges to the begs, but also bestowed emoluments upon them in the form of “official fields” (職分田 *zhifentian*) as well as *yanqi* (燕齊) , or exclusive tenant farmers. For instance, a Grade 3 beg received 200 *mu* of land and 100 households of *yanqi*; in addition, 800 *tangge* (騰格) in copper cash was disbursed by the National Treasury to the Hakim beg each year as an “official salary” (養廉 *yanglian*) , and 300 *tangge* was disbursed to the Ishihana beg.¹³

After conquering the “Muslim borderland,” the Qing Dynasty preferentially appointed members of the Uyghur community who had previously sworn allegiance on their own initiative, especially Uyghurs originating from Kumul and Turpan, as well as former begs and other members of the local social elite. There were initially only 20 categories of begs in the Muslim borderland;¹⁴ later, this number gradually increased to

32. The Qing Dynasty divided the Muslim borderland into a total of 31 regions including 4 metropolitan cities, 4 medium cities, and 23 small cities, appointing between 5 and 30 begs to each region depending on its size.¹⁵

As the Qing Dynasty's conquest of the Muslim region did not arise from economic considerations, it was initially determined that funding for the governance of this region would primarily be allocated from the interior provinces. Aside from stationing troops in Xinjiang, the Qing also appointed 1,400 administrative officials. Their salaries and administrative expenses amounted to 688,900 taels annually, including 610,000 taels disbursed by the central government. The remaining 71,790 taels was collected locally, primarily through the operation of official inns and the sale of tea leaves to the soldiers.¹⁶ To be sure, the Qing Dynasty established a system of taxies and levies immediately after its conquest of the Muslim borderland, and among the various categories of begs, many had duties involving the collection of taxes. However, the levy of approximately 600,000 *dan* of grains collected from the land-owning Uyghur peasants each year merely served to fill the grain rations of the Qing armies stationed in the area. Even in its waning years, when the Qing Dynasty faced extreme financial straits, tax levies upon the Uyghurs were not significantly increased.¹⁷

There are few detailed historical records on the Uyghur population: one source places the population at 262,078 in 1766 (31st Year of the Qianlong Reign),¹⁸ while another gives the population as 200,277 in the 1770s, and 282,619 in the 1840s.¹⁹ Aside from trade and the handicrafts industry, the primary source of income for Uyghur communities in that era was traditional oasis agriculture. After the Qing conquest, Uyghur farming villages contained at least three types of farmers: land-owning peasants who tilled their own land; hired farmhands who cultivated "expropriated lands" (入官地 *ruguan di*) owned by the Qing government (lands belonging to Khojas or fugitives, which were confiscated by the Qing government); and the

yanqi, who were bestowed upon the begs along with the “official fields” by the Qing government as a form of salary. The Qing government did not collect taxes from the *yanqi*, but a tax in the amount of one tenth of crop yields was levied upon hired farmhands, and one half of crop yields was collected from the farmhands tilling “expropriated lands.”²⁰ The governing policies adopted by the Qing Dynasty not only allowed many begs to acquire a degree of power and influence, but also led some to develop a sense of “indebtedness” (恩義 *enyi*) toward the Qing Dynasty. This sense of “indebtedness” and gratitude induced at least some of the Uyghur elite to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Qing Dynasty’s rule.²¹

II. The People of the Manchu Emperor under Segregated Rule

The Uyghur Community in Isolation from the Dominant Chinese Culture

One important characteristic of the Qing Dynasty’s policies for governance of the Uyghur community was the segregation of the different races, in particular the severing of all contact between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, to prevent the Uyghurs from being influenced by Chinese culture.

The Qing Dynasty implemented a garrison system in the Tianshan Northern Circuit, while adopting a relief garrison system in the Southern Circuit. The garrison troops were allowed to bring their families, and were not transferred between different stations; the relief garrison troops could not bring their dependents, and were regularly transferred from station to station. In each region of the Tianshan Southern Circuit, the Qing Dynasty prohibited soldiers from interacting or intermarrying with Uyghurs.²² Apart from the “Muslim cities” (回城 *Huicheng*) inhabited by the Uyghurs, the Qing Dynasty also established eighteen “Han cities” (漢城 *Hancheng*) scattered across the region, to provide quarters for the ministers and troops

stationed in the area. This policy did indeed have the effect of preventing the troops from harassing the local populace, as well as preventing local residents from assaulting or harming the stationed troops. However, given that the Qing garrison in the Tianshan Southern Circuit was primarily composed of ethnic Han Chinese under the Green Banner (*with only 349 soldiers under the Eight Manchu Banners*), all of whom were relief troops, it is clear that the Qing Dynasty had formulated careful arrangements to prevent interaction between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese in the “Muslim borderland.”²³

Han Chinese from the interior provinces were prohibited from entering the Muslim borderland, and severe restrictions in the form of a permit system were implemented for Han merchants requesting entry into the region. In 1764 (29th Year of the Qianlong Reign), they were “all ordered to conduct trade at the garrisons”; thereafter, merchants were permitted to establish bazaars midway between the “Han cities” and “Muslim cities” to engage in trade.²⁴ To subsidize the expenses of the garrisoned troops, the Qing Dynasty organized a number of *tuntian* (屯田) or “station fields” across Xinjiang. The *tuntian* were divided into different categories, including *bingtun* (兵屯 “soldier stations,” composed of Qing troops); *huitun* (回屯 “Muslim stations,” composed of Uyghur Muslims migrating from Ili); *hutun* (户屯 “household stations,” composed of immigrants from the interior provinces); *qitun* (旗屯 “banner stations,” composed of Eight Banners troops and their families); and *fantun* (犯屯 “criminal stations,” also known as 遣屯 *qiantun*, “condemned stations,” composed of criminals primarily originating from the interior provinces). However, it is worth noting that, after the Qing Dynasty instituted its rule over Xinjiang in the Qianlong Reign, it began establishing “soldier stations” and “banner stations” on a massive scale in the Tianshan Northern Circuit, as well as “household stations” and “criminal stations” for the large numbers of farmers and criminals

migrating from the interior. Yet in the Southern Circuit, until the late Jiaqing Reign (1796-1820), there were very few “soldier stations,” and only one solitary *mintun* (民屯 “civilian station”), primarily composed of ethnic Han farmers, was established on the easternmost edge of the Southern Circuit in Karasahr.²⁵ “Civilian stations” did not begin appearing in the central regions of the Muslim borderland until after 1831.²⁶

In fact, in 1760 (25th Year of the Qianlong Reign), or the second year of the Qing Dynasty’s conquest of Xinjiang, the Qianlong Emperor had declared that, “Manchu generals and high officials shall be stationed here.” The Ili General and the Governor-General (部統) of Urumqi were designated as “banner vacancies” (旗缺 *qique*, referring to official positions that could only be held by members of the predominantly Manchu Eight Banners). Although there were 23 ministers in total stationed across the Tianshan Southern Circuit, these ministerial positions were all held by people of Manchu and Mongol ethnicity.²⁷ This system of governance, characterized by ethnic discrimination, arose not out of consideration for national border defenses, but rather from the Qing Dynasty’s need to maintain its own rule over China as a non-Han regime, thus carving out a special place for the Xinjiang region within the Qing’s overall governing policies.

The Qing Army was comprised more than 800,000 soldiers scattered across the empire, but the Eight Banners forces in fact numbered less than 200,000. Given the vast size of its territories, the Qing Dynasty was compelled to install defenses only at key points, assigning its most trusted Eight Banners armies to the regions with important military significance.²⁸ However, at the point when the Qing Dynasty extended its rule to Xinjiang, 115 years after its invasion of China, there were few Eight Banners forces at its disposal. Nevertheless, the Qing Dynasty still stationed 20,990 Eight Banners soldiers in Xinjiang, amounting to more than half of the total Qing military forces assigned to the area. This demonstrates that the Qing

Dynasty regarded Xinjiang as a military dominion under the rule of the Manchus. The Qing Dynasty installed 14 garrison generals in important regions across its empire, but compared to the other generals, the Ili General held jurisdiction over vaster territories and commanded greater numbers of soldiers, while also boasting an annual official salary of more than 1,000 taels.²⁹

As a dynasty founded by an ethnic minority, for the Qing to rule over China, the question of how to absorb non-Han ethnic forces into its own camp, so as to contain the massive population of Han Chinese, was in fact of supreme importance. It is clear that the Qing Dynasty's great efforts to prevent contact between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese were informed by this very motive. In 1761 (26th Year of the Qianlong Reign), the Qing central government uniformly manufactured official seals for the Hakim begs, the content of which was written "concurrently in Manchu script, Mongol script, and Muslim script" (namely in the Manchurian, Mongolian and Uyghur languages). The Chinese language was notably absent.³⁰ The Qing Dynasty also discouraged the Eight Banners troops stationed in Xinjiang from learning Chinese, yet the children of the Uyghur begs were actively encouraged to learn the Manchu language.³¹ In addition, while the Han Chinese had been forced to shave their heads and plait their hair in the Manchu-style queue, the Qing only allowed high-ranking begs to wear the queue, with an air of granting a favor. The Qing Dynasty's prohibition against contact between the Uyghur communities and the interior provinces was also reflected in the financial policies instituted in Xinjiang, where the Qing circulated a special currency known as *pul* (普爾) and cast with Uyghur script, which differed from currency of the same value circulated in China's interior.³² Even under circumstances such as court visits by the begs to pay their respects, the Qing often made careful arrangements to prevent them from entering ethnic Han regions in the interior, instead granting them

passage through the northern Mongol regions to pay court to the emperor at Chengde (承德), which still fell in Mongol territories at the time.³³ These court visits consisted of “interviews” (接見 *jiejian*) with the Uyghur begs and the Mongol jasaghs, for the purpose of affirming their political relationship with the Manchus, with strong overtones of forging an “alliance.”



A Uyghur beg wearing Qing court dress

The True Purpose of the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions

The Qing Dynasty’s policies for governance of China did not seek the homogenization of the border regions and the interior, but instead deliberately created a distinction between the interior provinces and the peripheral outlying regions of Mongolia, Tibet and the “Muslim borderland.” However, the “outlands” (藩 *fan*) of the Qing Dynasty differed from the “outlands” as understood under previous Chinese dynasties, and should more accurately be described as a political alliance between the Manchus and the various ethnic groups of the northwestern regions. The Qing Dynasty’s purpose in dividing its territories into the “interior” and the “outlands” was to institute the

segregation of the Han Chinese and other ethnic groups. The implementation of the *jasagh* system in the Mongol territories, the establishment of a theocratic system in Tibet led by the Dalai lama, and the importation of the *beg* system into the Muslim borderland allowed the Qing Dynasty to lean on elite figures in local ethnic communities to exert indirect rule over local regions, while also evoking a sense of national kinship with the Manchus. The Qing's ultimate objective was to make the ethnic groups of the outlying regions the allies of the Manchus, and use them to contain the massive population of Han Chinese in the interior provinces. Thus, structurally speaking, the Qing Dynasty's rule over China was not simply divided in two territorially, but in fact exhibited a dual nature: in a national sense, the Qing Dynasty was a Chinese empire, but from the perspective of its relationships with other ethnic minorities, it was an ethnic regime that remained perpetually on guard against the Han Chinese, while seeking political alliances with other ethnic groups.³⁴

The management of these ethnic political alliances fell under the province of the Mongol Yamen, established in 1636 (Founding Year of the Shunde Reign) and later renamed as the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions (理藩院 *Lifan yuan*), which was a central organ of the government with status equal to the Six Ministries of Personnel, Revenue, Rites, War, Justice, and Works. As the Kangxi Emperor once declared, "The Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions holds sole charge for the affairs of outlying regions, and bears heavy responsibilities."³⁵ The existence of the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions had extremely important significance within the framework of Qing rule over China.

Chinese history contains several examples of diplomatic positions or institutions for the reception of envoys from neighboring ethnic groups, such as the "Commissioner for State Visits" (大鴻臚 *Dahonglu*) of the Han Dynasty and the "Court of State Receptions" (鴻臚寺 *Honglusi*) of the Tang

Dynasty; the Yuan Dynasty featured the “Court for the Spread of Governance” (宣政院 *Xuanzheng yuan*) , an organ of the central government which handled relations with Tibet. However, the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions of the Qing Dynasty was the first central institution that directly managed plural minority ethnic groups. Aside from one position for adjunct assistant minister (an auxiliary deputy outside the normal complement of personnel) reserved for the appointment of Mongols, the other leading positions (minister, assistant minister) at the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions were designated as “banner vacancies,” and were filled by Manchus. After the reforms of the Shunzhi (1644-1661) , Kangxi, and Qianlong reigns, in 1761 (26th Year of the Qianlong Reign) , the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions established the Border Reception Bureau for exclusive management of the “Muslim borderland,” transforming itself into a central institution composed of six departments, including the Border Reception Bureau, the Inner Mongolian Bureau, the Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau, the Outer Mongolian Bureau, Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau, and the Judicial Bureau, bolstered by the promulgation of corresponding laws, such as *the Imperial Legal Code of Mongolia (Qinding Menggu Lüli, 1741, 6th Year of the Qianlong Reign)* , *the Imperial Code of the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions (Qinding Lifanyuan Zeli, 1814, 19th Year of the Jiaqing Reign)* , and *the Imperial Code of the Muslim Borderland (Qinding Huibu Zeli, 1814)* .

In order to contain the Han Chinese populace in the interior provinces, the Qing Dynasty felt it necessary to retain the “Muslim borderland” as the dominion of the Manchu people. However, the thorough ban on interactions and exchanges between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs and the governing policies allowing their direct submission to the Manchu Qing emperor did not signify that the Qing Dynasty trusted the Uyghurs. The

Qing government carefully crafted its policies to forestall opposition among the Uyghurs. Two of the most important elements involved the stationing of senior ministers to supervise the begs, and the implementation of a policy for thorough separation of religion and government.

In 1758 (23rd Year of the Qianlong Reign) , the Qianlong Emperor, who had already made the determination to conquer the “Muslim borderland,” declared: “We believe it unnecessary to appoint Muslims as garrison commanders, but shall continue to follow the old system, whereby a chief is installed in each city, and united under the general stationed in Ili.”³⁶ In other words, even in the very early stages, the Qing Dynasty had already decided not to establish an integrated administrative system for the Uyghur communities, leaving each region mutually unaffiliated, and rendering the Hakim begs directly subordinate to the Ili General. Although the ministers stationed in each region did not directly interfere in local administration, the system for supervision of the local begs by the ministers appointed to a given region imposed a certain degree of restriction on the begs’ authority.

To prevent the begs from exploiting the populace, the Qing Dynasty adopted the following measures to limit their local influence: 1) The traditional system of hereditary begs was abolished, and a new system was installed whereby the appointed ministers determined the candidates for a beg’s replacement, to be appointed by the Qing court; 2) A system of avoidance was established, whereby high-ranking begs of Grade 3 or 4 were not selected from among the local populace, and it was not permitted for begs of Grade 5, 6, or 7 to be appointed to local positions; 3) The power of the Hakim begs was diluted by the Ishihana begs; 4) A system was established for begs to visit court for imperial audiences; 5) Untrusted begs and Khojas were taken to reside in Beijing.³⁷

After the conquest of Xinjiang, the Qing Dynasty sought to “accommodate the religion without changing the customs,” acknowledging the *akhund* (阿

旬) , or religious scholars, as the spiritual leaders as well as the arbiters of culture and education for the Uyghur people, allowing the local Muslims to engage in their daily religious activities, and renovating the Khojas' tombs (*mazar*, 麻札) . However, the Qing Dynasty believed that the existence of the Khoja clan was the fundamental cause of political unrest among the Uyghur communities, thus its first thought was to restrict the clan's power and influence. Aside from those among the White Mountain Khojas who fled to the Khanate of Kokand, the Qing Dynasty relocated the remaining White Mountain Khojas to Beijing, isolating them from the Uyghur community. The Black Mountain Khojas were treated in similar fashion: although the Qing Dynasty appointed them as begs and granted them special privileges, they were also separated from their ancestral homes and thus removed from their traditional power base, and the order was prohibited from conducting group worship activities. In order to weaken the economic strength of Islam, the Qing Dynasty deliberately refused to recognize the legality of the religious taxes levied by mosques, *mazars*, and religious schools (*madrasa*) , and incorporated the *yanqi* tilling *waqf* lands (瓦哈甫地, lands donated by the faithful to mosques and religious schools) into the general household registration system, thus converting them into taxpayers of the Qing Dynasty. The Qing government also instituted a system whereby the begs recommended and sponsored new candidates for *akhund* at the mosques, for appointment by the stationed ministers.



An Islamic religious teacher (*mullah*)

The Qing Dynasty implemented a principle of thorough separation of religion and government in the “Muslim borderland.” In 1760 (25th Year of the Qianlong Reign) , the Qianlong Emperor gave instruction that the begs appointed by the Qing government were to be held accountable only to the Qing Dynasty; the Khojas and *akhund* were strictly prohibited from interfering in administrative governance, and stripped of their rights to criticize the begs. The Qing government repeatedly emphasized its prohibitions against the appointment of *akhund* as begs, and against begs concurrently serving as *akhund*, and even banned private interactions between the stationed Qing ministers and the *akhund*. One Hakim beg was put under investigation for tacitly allowing his wife to “read forbidden canons” —that is, participate in the activities of the Sufi order.³⁸ Although the Qing Dynasty recognized the authority of Islamic judges (Qazi beg) in civil judgements—mediating civil disputes, determining inheritance shares, officiating over marriage procedures, and so on, handling criminal cases under Islamic (Sharia) law was strictly prohibited to. During the Xianfeng

Reign (1850-1861) , Imperial Clansman Yingyun (1810-1881) , the ministerial attaché to Yarkent, was convicted under Sharia law, but instead was subjected to banishment.

The Qing government also prohibited contact between the Uyghurs and neighboring states. The primary reason was that the White Mountaineers, namely the Kashgar Khoja clan, were utilizing the Khanate of Kokand as a base for their anti-Qing, restorationist activities. The Naqshbandi order also wielded great influence in the Kokand region. Due to the congruency between their religious beliefs and lifestyles, contemporary Uyghurs recognized little distinction between themselves and the people of Kokand, and the peoples of the two regions had long enjoyed unfettered interactions as well as economic exchanges. However, because the Kashgar Khojas who fled to the Khanate of Kokand after the conquest of Xinjiang continued to exert great influence over their followers, the Qing Dynasty had to constantly remain on guard against their restorationist activities. The once unfettered interactions between the Uyghurs and the Khanate of Kokand were therefore banned beginning in the Qianlong era; by the Jiaqing era, even correspondence between the Hakim begs and other states (including Kokand) was prohibited.³⁹

In order to support their claim to being an orthodox Chinese dynasty and maintain their rule over the Chinese people, the Manchu rulers of the Qing Dynasty granted political and economic privileges to the Uyghur people, especially the elite of Uyghur society; however, they also instituted a policy of ethnic segregation, thoroughly isolating them from the Han Chinese populace. Moreover, the Qing Dynasty perpetually remained on the alert against the emergence of separatist ideas among the Uyghurs, in particular imposing a variety of restrictions on various Islamic activities, and preventing Uyghur society from functioning as a purely Islamic community, or *Ummah* (烏瑪) . Under the Qing Dynasty's rule, the Uyghur communities were

neither a part of “China,” nor fully a part of the “Mohammedan *Ummah*.”

III. From “Jihad” by the Kashgar Khoja Clan to “Founding the Province of Xinjiang”

A Challenge from Islam

In 1765 (30th Year of the Qianlong Reign) , only six years after the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, the Uyghur inhabitants of the Uqturpan region staged a large-scale rebellion in reaction against their oppression at the hands of Hakim beg Abdullah and the Qing minister Sucheng. A major flaw in the Qing Dynasty’s policies for governing the “Muslim borderland” thus came to light: namely, the begs had created conditions of severe class antagonism in Uyghur society.

The *Imperial Code of the Muslim Borderland* (1814) imposed a number of prohibitions on the begs. The detailed content tells us that these provisions were formulated by the Qing Dynasty in response to the begs’ repeated misuse of their authority to exploit the Uyghur populace. Other Qing texts reveal that the begs frequently seized their subjects’ wives, daughters and lands, monopolized agricultural water, and wantonly conscripted additional *yanqi*. Although the Qing Dynasty reduced taxes after its conquest of the “Muslim borderland,” exploitation by the begs rendered the financial burdens on the Uyghur people even heavier than before. Despite the saying that “The people should respect not officials but rather those who rule over them,”⁴⁰ the ministers stationed in Xinjiang, who were of Manchu origin and wielded the great power of the Qing government to select, promote and supervise begs and *akhund*, also sought to exploit the Uyghur people via the begs, and even perpetrated the rape of Uyghur women.

In the 19th century, the Qing Dynasty gradually became more careless in

the selection and appointment of high ministers: increasing numbers of ministers whose sole aim was to exploit the region for material wealth were stationed in the “Muslim borderland,” and incidents of unlawful conduct among the ministers grew more severe. Under such conditions, the Qing Dynasty’s rule over the Uyghur communities began to suffer challenges from *jihads* (holy wars) incited by the Kashgar Khoja clan from their base in the Kokand region.

The Kashgar Khojas’ ability to incite *Jihad* was inseparable from the support granted to them by the Khanate of Kokand. After the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, the Kokand regime formed a tributary relationship with the Qing Dynasty, and nominally became a vassal of the Qing. During this period, the Qing Dynasty allocated a certain amount of funds each year to the Kokand regime: in return, Kokand was to monitor the Kashgar Khoja clan. However, after the turn of the century, Kokand gradually grew more powerful, and in 1817, the khanate began issuing ceaseless demands to the Qing Dynasty, insisting that the Qing agree to exempt Kokand merchants from customs duties on entering Xinjiang, and allow the khanate to install *Aq-saqal* (elders) in Xinjiang to independently levy taxes on Kokand merchants and exercise other trading privileges; if the Qing were to refuse, Kokand threatened to release the Kashgar Khojas. When its demands were rejected by the Qing Dynasty, the Khanate of Kokand adopted a new approach, and began supporting the return of the Kashgar Khojas to the Kashgar region. The Kashgar Khojas incited eight *jihads*, in 1820, 1824, 1826, 1828, 1830, 1847, 1852, and 1857, with the aim of restoring their rule over Xinjiang. The four jihads incited by Jahangir Khoja (the grandson of Burhan al-Din) between 1820 and 1828, which became known as the “Jahangir Rebellion” (張格爾之亂 *Zhangge'er zhi luan*), spanned the longest period of time, and were the most widespread. The Qing Dynasty spent a total of ten million silver taels and invested 36,000 troops in seven years of conflict

before finally stamping out the armed rebellion; Jahangir Khoja was ultimately captured and sent to Beijing for execution.⁴¹

It should be noted that, in 1826, Jahangir Khoja led a force of only five hundred from Kokand, but upon entering the Kashgar region, his troops immediately swelled to ten thousand with the addition of the local Uyghur inhabitants. This demonstrates that, although the Qing Dynasty had imposed severe restrictions on every aspect of Islam, within the Uyghur communities, Islam still retained immense power and influence. Of course, the reason why the *jihads* attracted the support of the local Uyghurs, aside from their faith in the Khoja clan, was the dip in prestige suffered by the Qing Dynasty due to corruption among the stationed ministers and the Hakim begs.

The series of *jihads* incited by the Kashgar Khojas were ultimately unsuccessful, due not only to the absolute superiority of the Qing forces, but also to the fact that, upon entering the Uyghur regions, the Kashgar Khojas abused and massacred local Black Mountain followers, thereby losing the support of the local Uyghur inhabitants; this was an important factor in their defeat. However, after the failure of each *jihad*, many White Mountain followers among the Uyghurs retreated alongside the Khojas to the Khanate of Kokand. By the 1850s, approximately fifty thousand Uyghur households had already resettled in Kokand, thus forming a base of support for the Kashgar Khoja forces.⁴²

In 1828, Nayancheng (1764-1833), the Governor-General of Zhili, who was sent to the “Muslim borderland” in the office of Imperial Commissioner to formulate policies in the aftermath of the “Jahangir Rebellion,” returned to Beijing to report to the Qing central government on the many unlawful practices of the stationed ministers and the begs. Based on his recommendations, the Qing government decided to strengthen supervision over the ministers, while also increasing their official salaries to reduce the

temptation for exploitation. However, the unlawful practices of the ministers were, by and large, perpetrated via the hands of the Uyghur begs, and in comparing the exploitative actions committed by these rulers of two different ethnicities, the begs in fact exhibited more cruelty toward the Uyghur populace.⁴³ Nevertheless, the Qing Dynasty did not adopt any particularly severe punishments or supervisory measures with respect to the begs. After the “Jahangir Rebellion,” the Qing government instead adjusted the division of tasks amongst the begs to strengthen their rule over rural Uyghur areas. Rural areas were first partitioned into sections, and then the official powers of low- and mid-ranking begs in a given section were ascribed to a single individual, who would oversee tax collection, irrigation works, and other matters for a given area rather than sharing these tasks amongst other begs.⁴⁴ In other words, in an era of intensifying class antagonism, the Qing Dynasty perversely concentrated more power in the hands of the begs.

However, the *jihads* of the Kashgar Khojas also caused the Qing Dynasty to reconsider the policy of ethnic segregation that had been implemented in the “Muslim borderland.” The Qing came to the conclusion that the relief garrison system of the Southern Circuit, which had been adopted out of consideration for ethnic segregation, was one reason for its failure to prevent the uprisings. After the “Rebellion of Yusup Khoja” (玉素普和卓叛亂 *Yusupu hezhuo panluan*) in 1830, the Qing Dynasty transferred 3,000 cavalry from Ili and 4,000 foot soldiers from the interior provinces to supplement the forces in the “Muslim borderland,” thus forming a new military system.⁴⁵

Although the Qing government had reduced military expenditure in all provinces to raise the funds needed to suppress the “Jahangir Rebellion,” this was ultimately only a stopgap measure. As other parts of the empire were also experiencing financial difficulties, in an attempt to increase local

fiscal revenue, the Qing confiscated the family property of *jihad* supporters, increased taxes on trade, and minted a new batch of *pul* currency. However, the above measures had no significant effects due to the erosion of the local population. The Qing Dynasty therefore granted permission for farmers from the interior provinces to migrate into southern Xinjiang, and in 1832, a “household station” (*hutun*) was established at Barchuk. The Qing later decided to abandon the station fields out of consideration for the interests of the Uyghur population; however, due to financial difficulties, this decision was reversed two years later, and “household stations” for inland farmers (of Han Chinese and Hui ethnicity) were established across the “Muslim borderland.”

Rebuilding the System of Governance for Uyghur Society

On June 4, 1864, Hui soldiers among the Qing forces stationed in Kuqa, Xinjiang, incited a preemptive rebellion in the belief that the Qing Dynasty planned to massacre them to prevent the “Northwestern Muslim rebellion” (西北回乱 *Xibei Hui luan*) from slowly spreading across Xinjiang. The Uyghur inhabitants of Kuqa seized this opportunity to stage their own rebellion, electing an Islamic cleric as “Khoja” to serve as their leader. The event rapidly evolved into a *jihad* targeting *kafir* (non-believers) : within a few days’ time, they had stormed the walls of Sayram Town and Bay Town, followed by the capture of two of the larger cities in the Muslim borderland: Aksu and Uqturpan.

The incidents in Kuqa were the flashpoint for a series of Muslim revolts across Xinjiang. Unlike in Kuqa, the participants began targeting *kafir* from the outset, giving their rebellions overtones of an Islamic *jihad*. In terms of their organizational characteristics, the *jihads* that arose across Xinjiang can be divided into three categories: (1) Rebellions launched by the Hui; (2) Uprisings led by the begs; (3) Uprisings led by Islamic

clerics. By November, in the Ili region of the Northern Circuit, where the Ili General was stationed, the Uyghur inhabitants had already risen up and captured Qulja. The Qing Dynasty's system of governance in Xinjiang thus experienced utter collapse.

The class oppression and exploitation fomented by the beg system was another motivation for the Uyghur populace to participate in the 1864 uprisings.⁴⁶ However, the Uyghurs were not a simple class group: in that era, only Islam could unite all of Uyghur society, and the value system, ethics, and identity of the Uyghur people were inseparable from the influence of Islam. It was for this very reason that each of the uprisings across Xinjiang evolved into a *jihad* or holy war; and it was in the name of *jihad* that the 1864 uprisings were able to gather so many supporters so quickly, and achieve such immense victories in such a short period of time. This was an inescapable reality of Uyghur society in the mid-19th century.

However, it was also woven into the nature of these uprisings that, once the Qing system of governance collapsed and the object of the *jihad*s evaporated, Uyghur society began to fracture into different factions. After a series of internecine struggles amongst the different factions, the Khoja regime of Kuqa captured the Kuqa, Aksu and Yarkent regions, Sidik Beg gained control over the Kashgar region, and Habib Ghaji seized the Hotan region, establishing their rule over these respective regions. This point demonstrates that the Uyghur communities, which resided around the different oases and followed different Islamic orders, had no independent, unified system of administration, and had not yet formed a national consciousness that could unify all the Uyghur peoples.

In January 1865, Buzurg Khan Khoja of the Kashgar Khoja clan returned from Kokand to Xinjiang; one theory is that he was coerced into making this journey by the Kokand general Yaqub Beg.⁴⁷ Yaqub Beg, who combined the titles of commander and Khoja in one, had always been a

figure of strong political ambitions. Taking advantage of the chaos to invade Kashgar, Yaqub Beg made use of his unique military skills and diabolical knack for politics to first thoroughly exterminate the residual Qing forces in Xinjiang, and then massacre or drive out all remaining members of the Kashgar Khojas, led by Buzurg Khan. By December 1866, Yaqub Beg had destroyed the regime of Habib Ghaji in Hotan; and by June 1867, he had crushed the Khoja regime in Kuqa and massacred its leaders, finally establishing his own regime (*Yette Xeher*) to rule over the seven cities and regions.⁴⁸



Yaqub Beg

Yaqub Beg himself was not Uyghur: the main reason why he was able to rule over Uyghur society for ten years rested in his policies on Islam.

Yaqub Beg often feigned to be a devout Muslim, and it was said that he “did not take a step without making an obeisance.” When visiting different regions, he was sure to donate cash or clothing to the students at Islamic schools or the *akhund* at mosques, and even during an invasion, he would not forget to worship at the *mazar* (tomb) of the local saint; he even

renovated the *mazar* of the Kashgar Khoja clan, whom he had destroyed. In addition, Yaqub Beg established religious tribunals across the land, improving the social status of the *akhund*.⁴⁹ The purpose of these actions was to use Islam as a conduit to erase the Uyghurs' distrust and antipathy towards him. His methods achieved a certain degree of success, and some *akhund* in the Uyghur communities ultimately became zealous supporters of the Yaqub Beg regime. However, Yaqub Beg had employed despicable methods during his war of conquest, eliminating the Khoja clan, which had been active in Uyghur society for three hundred years, and brutally slaughtering the local Uyghur people.⁵⁰ Moreover, nearly all the important positions in his regime were filled by his own people from the Khanate of Kokand, all of which provoked intense resentment amongst the local Uyghur populace.

Yaqub Beg's rule over Uyghur society also coincided with the period when imperial Russian and British forces began encroaching upon Xinjiang. In fact, when Xinjiang had been under the rule of the Qing Dynasty, the region had served as a buffer zone between these two great imperial powers. However, after the Muslim uprisings of 1864 caused Xinjiang to revert to an independent political entity, Russia and Britain both seized the opportunity to make strides into the region. To gain legitimacy for his rule over the Uyghur communities, Yaqub Beg sought support from the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and attempted to approach British forces in northern India on the other. In 1870 and 1873, the British colonial government in India sent diplomatic missions led by T. D. Forsyth to Kashgar, and agreed to provide military aid to Yaqub Beg; Britain was consequently able to sign a treaty with the Yaqub Beg regime in 1874, acquiring free trade rights, settlement rights, most-favored-nation status and extraterritoriality in the southern Tianshan region. In the meantime, Russia destroyed the Muslim regime in the Ili region in May 1871 in the

name of “restoring the rule of the Qing Dynasty.” After capturing the Ili River Valley, in 1872, Russia sent a diplomatic mission led by Baron Alexander Vasilyevich Kaulbars to sign a treaty with Yaqub Beg, finally acquiring free trade rights in the southern Tianshan region, which had been Russia’s long-cherished wish, as well as low customs duties and the right to station trade representatives.⁵¹

On one occasion, the British even attempted to use diplomatic channels to force the Qing Dynasty to recognize the Yaqub Beg regime.⁵² During this same period, the Qing Dynasty was also dealing with the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1874. The encroachment by the Western powers and the aggression of its smaller neighbor to the east, Japan, dealt a great blow to the Qing Dynasty, and many voices within the government began calling for China’s southeastern coastal defenses to be strengthened. However, due to the need to pay wartime reparations to the foreign powers, as well as frequent domestic military skirmishes, the Qing Dynasty had sunk deep into a financial crisis. In the midst of this predicament, the inner circle of the Qing government stirred up a great controversy over whether or not Xinjiang should be reconquered, in what was known as the “Debate of Coastal Defenses versus Border Pass Defenses” (海防·塞防論争 *Haifang saifang lunzheng*) .

It is worth noting that this debate revolved almost wholly around the threat that the invasion and penetration of Xinjiang by the European powers could pose to China. Li Hongzhang, the Governor-General of Zhili, argued that it was geographically impossible for Xinjiang to escape imperilment by Russia and Britain, therefore it was not worthwhile for the Qing government to annually spend several million taels of silver to defend this vast desert region. Li maintained that, “If Xinjiang is not recovered, the vitality of the body and limbs shall be unaffected; if the coast is not defended, the harm to the vital organs shall grow ever more dire.”⁵³

In response to such opinions, Zuo Zongtang, Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu, and other figures argued that the land defenses in the northwestern border region should be equally as valued as the coastal defenses: they stressed that, in China's relations with Russia, Britain, or other, even more perilous countries, "If we withdraw from the line of defense, retreating an inch will allow the enemy to advance a mile... only by retaking Xinjiang can Mongolia be protected, and only by protecting Mongolia can the capital be defended."⁵⁴ The Qing Emperor ultimately acceded to the recommendations of Zuo Zongtang and his cohort, and in 1876 (2nd Year of the Guangxu Reign) , the Qing armies entered the battle to retake Xinjiang, under the command of Zuo Zongtang. By December 1877, the Qing forces had already recaptured all of Xinjiang apart from the Ili region, and Yaqub Beg had committed suicide.⁵⁵ Once the military action to retake the territories of the Yaqub Beg regime had concluded, the Qing government entered into lengthy negotiations with Russia to recover the Ili River Valley, which it achieved in 1881 after paying reparations.

After reviewing its earlier failed policies for the governance of Xinjiang, in 1884, the Qing Dynasty introduced the provincial system used in the interior to the Xinjiang region. Alongside the implementation of this system, as the territories of Xinjiang were carved up into the same precincts, protectorates, prefectures and counties seen in the interior provinces, the Qing Dynasty abolished the traditional governing systems, including the beg system. However, the significance of "founding the province of Xinjiang" was not limited to the above, but also demonstrated that, given the grim global circumstances and international environment, the Qing Dynasty could no longer afford to regard Xinjiang as merely a domestic matter. The Qing government was therefore compelled to abandon its old system of thought and the political systems derived therefrom, including the dual ethnic and national political structure that had been instituted in

Xinjiang, the segregation of the Han Chinese and the border ethnic groups, and the policy of mutual containment by the Han Chinese residents of the interior provinces and the ethnic peoples of the border regions, so that the dynasty could better rule the whole of China.

IV. Conclusion

The system of governance established by the Qing Dynasty in Xinjiang was designed not only to rule over Xinjiang, but also to cater to the practical circumstances of a non-Han ethnic group ruling over all of China. Its most fundamental characteristic was thus a prohibition against interaction between the local Uyghurs, who were regarded as the subjects of the Manchu rulers, and Han society; the home of the Uyghur population, the “Muslim borderland,” was treated as the sovereign territory of the Manchus, and Han Chinese were forbidden to migrate to the area, with the intention of incorporating the Uyghur populace into an outlands system established to contain the Han Chinese population of the interior provinces. The Qing Dynasty therefore instituted provisions expressly forbidding local residents from learning Chinese, and strictly prohibiting the spread of Chinese civilization into the region. Its every institution was designed to suggest or declare to the local ethnic groups that they were not like the Han Chinese, and were instead part of a community of interest alongside the Manchus. Although the complex collection of policies and systems instituted by the Qing Dynasty to contain the Han Chinese populace of the interior provinces was an important factor enabling it to rule over China for nearly 270 years, it is undeniable that these same systems and policies left the Uyghur population caught in the interstices between the Islamic “*Ummah*” and “China,” while also firmly preventing the Uyghur people from developing a Chinese identity or sense of Chinese nationalism.

The establishment of “Xinjiang Province” redefined Xinjiang, formerly

the military dominion of the Manchus, as part of Chinese national territories. Han Chinese bureaucrats were thereafter permitted to serve as the highest-ranking civil and military leaders of Xinjiang, and the Qing Dynasty dispatched many Han bureaucrats to the area; the government also actively encouraged Han Chinese farmers from the interior to resettle in regions across Xinjiang, including the “Muslim borderland.” The nature of the Uyghurs and other local ethnic groups in Xinjiang thus shifted from “subjects of the Manchu emperor,” to people of the Chinese state. In order to cultivate a sense of Chinese identity among the local ethnic groups, the Qing Dynasty established free government-run schools, while also mandating that the Uyghurs learn Chinese; thus began the process of Xinjiang’s transformation into a heartland province, and the Uyghur population’s transformation into Chinese citizens.

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- 29 Song Yun, *Qinding Xinjiang shilüe*, Vol. 8.
- 30 Su-er-de, *Huijiang zhi* (Treatise on the Muslim borderland) , Vol. 3 (written in the 37th Year of the Qianlong Reign [1772]) .
- 31 Lin Enxian, *Qingchao zai Xinjiang de Han Hui geli zhengce*, p. 302.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 228.
- 33 *Da Qing Gaozong Chun (Qianlong) huangdi shilu*, Vol. 983.
- 34 The Qing Dynasty implemented a “fiefdom system” in southwestern China, which resembled the “beg system” in that the local elite were employed to govern over the ethnic communities. However, the regions in which the fiefdom system was instituted fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel and the Ministry of War, while the “Muslim borderland,” where the beg system was implemented, fell under the jurisdiction of the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions and the Ministry of War, giving the two systems completely different positions within the national political framework.
- 35 *Da Qing Shengzu Ren (Kangxi) huangdi shilu* (Veritable Records of the Great Qing Emperor Shengzu Ren [Kangxi]) , Vol. 2 (Taipei: Hualian Publishing House, 1964) . Zhao Yuntian, *Zhongguo bianjiang minzu guanli jigou yanji shi* (Evolutionary history of the institutions for the administration of China’s borderland ethnic groups) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993) , p. 301.
- 36 *Da Qing Gaozong Chun (Qianlong) huangdi shilu*, Vol. 571.
- 37 Lin Enxian, *Qingchao zai Xinjiang de Han Hui geli zhengce*, pp. 71-85.
- 38 Song Yun, *Qinding Xinjiang shilüe*, Vol. 3.
- 39 *Ibid.*: Chinese Border History and Geography Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (ed.) , *Qinding Huijiang zeli*, Vol. 8.
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- 41 John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (eds.) , *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10: Late Ch’ing 1800–1911*, Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) , p. 366.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 359.
- 43 Feng Jiasheng, Cheng Suluo, Mu Guangwen (eds.) , *Nawenyi gong zouyi* (Memorials of Nawenyi) [Nayancheng], Vol. 77, *Weiwu’ erzu shiliao jianbian* (Selected materials on the Uyghurs) , Part II (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1981) .
- 44 堀直, “Shinchō-teki kaikyō tōchi ni tsuite no ni, san mondai - yārukando no ichi shiryō no kentō o tsūjite” (Two or three questions regarding the Qing Dynasty’s rule over the Muslim borderland: a thorough examination of historical materials on Yarkent [清

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- 45 Fairbank and Liu, *Late Ch'ing*, p. 374.
- 46 Ethnic Research Institute of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences (ed.) , *Xinjiang jianshi* (A concise history of Xinjiang) , Book 2 (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1980) , p. 110.
- 47 Li Sheng, *Zhongguo Xinjiang lishi yu xianzhuang* (The history and current conditions of Xinjiang, China) (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006) , Japanese edition, p. 99.
- 48 Molla Musa Sayrami, *Tārīkh-ī Khāmīdī* (History of Hamidi) (Beijing: Millatla Nasriyati, 1988) , p. 362.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 497-503.
- 50 According to *Tārīkh-ī Khāmīdī* and other Uyghur sources, in an effort to put down the rebellion, Yaqub Beg slaughtered 50,000 Uyghurs in Hotan, poisoned 卡他汗 (Katti Torah) Khoja and 克其克汗 Khoja of the White Mountaineers, and threw Wali Khan Khoja down a well and buried him alive.
- 51 Demetrius C. Boulger, *The Life of Yakoob Beg: Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar* (London: Wm. H. Allen & CO., 1878) , pp. 212-232.
- 52 Guo Songtao, with selected annotations by Lu Yulin, *Shixi jicheng—Guo Songtao ji* (Diary of a diplomatic mission to the West—Collected works by Guo Songtao) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994) , p. 123.
- 53 Baoyun *et al*, *Choubian yiwu shimo* (Story of the debate on tribal affairs) (Tongzhi Reign) , Vol. 9 (photocopy of the Palace Museum manuscript, Taipei: Wenhai Press, 1971) .
- 54 Zuo Zongtang, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, draft memorial, Vol. 46.
- 55 Yuan Dahua, Wang Shuya and Wang Xueceng (eds.) , *Xinjiang tuzhi*, Vol. 116. However, *Tārīkh-ī Khāmīdī* (Molla Musa Sayrami, pp. 490-491) , cited above, and other Uyghur sources argue that Yaqub Beg was poisoned by the Uyghur Niyaz Beg.

「ウンマ」と「中華」との間 ——清朝治下の新疆ウイグル社会

王 柯

要旨

清朝の新疆統治策は、つまるところ、清朝という非漢族による中国支配の中で規定されたものであった。ウイグル社会の伝統的社会システムを基本的に維持し、その文化的伝統と宗教的伝統を継続させ、非搾取の経済制度を取り、ウイグル人の民族利益を漢族の侵害から守る清朝政策は、むしろウイグル人の漢族との交流、ウイグル人が中国文化圏に吸収されることを防ぐという目的から出発したものであった。

清朝は二重構造の中国支配体制を維持するために、ウイグル人勢力の拡大の防止にも気を配り、ウイグル社会における統一の行政システムを作らなかったことは、近代における統一のウイグル・アイデンティティの形成に大きな支障ともなった。清朝の統治は結局一部のウイグル人有力者に対する優遇することで実現されたものであり、清朝の「夷をもって夷を治める」との手法は、ウイグル人ベクの、およびベクを経由して起こった駐在の満洲族大臣の腐敗を抑制することができなかった。また清朝のイスラーム政策は宗教弾圧の性格が強く、ウイグル人のイスラーム感情に沿わなかった。この二点が、ウイグル人が清朝の回部支配に対して反抗を繰り返してきた基本的な原因でもあった。

Keywords : Uyghur, beg system, Ummah, Xinjiang, Qing Dynast

キーワード : ウイグル、伯克制、ウンマ、新疆、清朝

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