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The Role of Japan and Potential Cooperation with the GCC for the Stability and Prosperity of the Indian Ocean Rim Region (IORR)

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My friends, where exactly do we now stand historically and geographically? To answer this question, I would like to quote here the title of a book authored by the Mughal prince Dara Shikoh in 1655. We are now at a point at which the *Confluence of the Two Seas* is coming into being... The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity.

Shinzo Abe at the Parliament of the Republic of India on August 22, 2007 ¹

I Background

This paper aims to discuss the political, economic and security perceptions of Japan and its potential cooperation with the GCC (The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf) for the stability and prosperity of the Indian Ocean Rim Region (IORR). Japan is a financial world power that has sought opportunities for industrial and other invests in emerging states. This section will define the IORR. Then, the economic motivation of Japan to commit to the IORR will be analysed through a long-term forecast by evaluating Japan's latest economic strategy. IORR is regarded as a promising economic growth centre for Japan. A report issued by the Ministry of Economy and Industry (METI) (hereafter cited as the 'METI report') points out the sustainability of the economic growth in Indian Ocean Rim Association's (IORA), as the

region turned out to be independent and autonomous from the economies of advanced countries through the continuous growth of trade within developing countries in recent years ² . For example, 40% of global marine trade passes through the Indian Ocean today, and the population of IORA countries (2.25 billion, accounting for 9% of the global share) will reach 3 billion and a global share of 12% by 2040 ³ . The economic size of the IORA is already around the 66% projection made by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, ASEAN + 6 in 2013 ⁴ . The METI report further evaluates the potentiality of the IORA economy with confidence.

Is IORR exactly the same region with IORA? The METI report discussed with the concept of IORA since the definition by it is clear, and statistics is available for it. Concepts related to IORR will be listed up below. They are sub-regional concepts, inter-regional concepts, strategies of major powers, which all will demonstrate the political, economic and security cooperation and competition currently ongoing in the IORR.

The most frequently used definition of 'IORR' is probably the 21 member states of the IORA (Chart 1). Dennis Rumley defines the IORR as 51 states, which he classifies into three types. The first type is Indian Ocean Rim states, including 28 states. The second type is coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, including 10 states. The third type is Indian Ocean land-locked states, including 13 states. It can be pointed out that Rumley failed to include Iran among the coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Hence, this group should be corrected as including 11 states.

Out of 21 current member states of the IORA, 20 are included in Rumley's definition of IORR. Only Iran is a member of the IORA among the modified group of coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (none of his original 'coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf' are members of the IORA). Among the 28 states that share their coast along the Indian Ocean, nine are not members of the IORA. Pakistan, however, has applied to be a member

of the IORA. None of the 13 states of the Indian Ocean land-locked type are members of the IORA, and none have applied to join the IORA. Thus, a suitable definition of the IORR is the 39 states that share their coast along the Indian Ocean. The 52 states can be defined as 'extended IORR', including the 13 inland states. The 'dialogue partners' of the IORA are the 7 states of Japan, the US, China, France, the U.K., Egypt and Germany. Thus, the stakeholders and users of the IORR can be the states of Europe, Oceania, East Asia and the Americas.

The regional economic agreements of the IORR demonstrate that the IORR is a complex region with overlapping plural regional organizations and inter-regional frameworks (see Map 1 and Map 2). Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has referred to concepts of the India-Pacific and broader Asia since 2007. US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton is known to have mentioned the India-Pacific in 2010. In Japan, the regional concept of IORR is unknown to most intellectuals, though policymakers in charge are familiar with it. The concept of the India-Pacific can be interpreted as including the North and South American sides to its letter. The term 'India-Pacific' is not yet defined by policymakers in India and Japan. However, the term's connoted meaning is a region composed of South Asia, Southwest Asia, GCC states, Iran, East Africa, ASEAN states and East Asia. The Japanese government encouraged the Indian government to join ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in 2004 and 2005, which APT approved⁵. The Japanese government currently encourages India to be a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Regional strategies by major powers are pointed out and speculated in Map 3, including the diamond strategy of the US, the nuggets strategy of India, the necklace of pearl strategy of China and the Indian Ocean Commission (COI: Commission de l'Océan Indien) of France. Japan's strategy has not been identified in previous studies on the IORR. The IORR's regional stability is a strategic concern not only for IORA members, but also for non-members.

Stability has been achieved to secure economic growth and transportation for the IORR in the past, but a few experts have relaxed their guard. The goal, scope and strategy of Japan's commitment to the IORR should be discussed and analysed in this context.

Short-term and long-term economic forecasts have formed the motivation for Japan's public and private sectors to engage in the IORR and will be one of major factors to influence the course of Japan's strategy. The Japanese economy, for example, has forecast a long-term decline due to a steady population decrease. Japanese are not waiting for this predication without attempting to overcome the negative effects, however. For example, enterprises have launched new strategies and challenges to advance the economy in the overseas market and to create an inbound market. Japan has sufficient financial resources and technologies for such strategies.

Japan's current account balance is US\$ 138.7 billion in surplus (at the rate of US\$ 1 = ¥120), reaching the largest level in the past five years and surpassing the trade deficit in 2015, which accounted for only US\$ 5.4 billion (17% of the previous year). These figures clearly indicated that Japan recovered from the damage of the East Japan Great Earth Quake in the global finance and trade scene. The largest portion of surplus is transfer balance shared by the dividend from investment to affiliated companies in overseas and foreign stock. Japan's net external asset balance was US\$ 2,827 billion at the end of 2015 (leading the world for 25 straight years), followed by Germany and China. Japan's financial assets by household was the best in the world, reaching US\$ 14.6 trillion by the third quarter of 2016 (Bank of Japan). Japan's investment was US\$ 12.6 trillion worldwide, including US\$ 141 billion to India and US\$ 4.9 billion to Saudi Arabia by the end of 2015 (JETRO: Japan External Trade Organization).

In the fourth quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017, Japan's economy was on course for gradual recovery. The unemployment rate decreased to its margin, 2.8%, though the real wage grew only 0.4% on average in 2016⁶. In

April 2016, the Abe administration made a public commitment to increase Japan's GDP to 60 trillion Yen ⁷. Japan has unfolded new policies to sustain economic development and stability, such as the development of artificial intelligence, the entrance of more foreign labour ⁸ and new investments abroad. Recent investment targets by the Abe administration are said to include India, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

A larger number of Japanese enterprises began their businesses in India after 2000. Periodical inquiry on 'promising overseas investment outlet' by Kansai (Western Japan) Productivity Center indicated that India was the most popular country from 2006 to 2013 ⁹. During 2013 and 2015, nation-wide inquiry into industrial-sector enterprises by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation indicated that India was the most promising overseas investment outlet ¹⁰. The Japanese private sector is searching for new investments overseas, and India has been the most popular country for such opportunities in recent years.

II Research Goal and Framework

Dennis Rumley compared the concepts of the IORR and the India-Pacific, pointing out that the former is based on liberalism and regional cooperation with optimistic prediction while the latter is framed as being based on nationalism and US-centred concepts with more pessimistic prediction, even though China was taken into consideration. Rumley does not consider Japan's IORR policy with significance ¹¹.

Japanese policymakers have evaluated the potentiality and long-term outlook of the IORR and consider that Japan will be an excellent partner for the region. Japan introduced the concept of the India-Pacific in 2007 and framed it as an Asian concept. Japanese interests in the IORR are mainly related to economic and security issues. Research on the IORR by the Japanese government made significant progress through the outcome of a research contract assigned to Japan Research Institute Limited, which was issued in March 2014. This report

is the most comprehensive examination of the potentiality of region-wide industrial cooperation in the IORR. Japan's potentiality in the IORR is also discussed accordingly ¹².

This paper combines liberal and conservative perspectives. It expects the deepening interdependence and Japan's enhanced relations with IORR countries, including GCC countries, while Japan maintains excellent relations with Europe, the US and other Asian countries. Some Japanese insist that democratic countries are the best partners for Japan, but this paper respects the diversity of political history and the structure of each country in the IORR and understand the difficulties of democracy promotion in a uniform, rapid pace in some IORR countries.

III Vision for Regional Cooperation and Prosperity

Economic development in the IORA is driven by the growth of the Indian economy ¹³. However, 33% of the Indian population survives under poor living standards, spending less than US\$ 1.25 per day. Moreover, regional cooperation is still too weak to ensure sustainable economic growth based on the formation of several industrial bases.

Hereafter, this section relies on the METI report and introduces its view on the promotion of regional industrial cooperation. It will disclose their view to craft regional cooperation to enable autonomous economic growth and Japan's commitment to it. The vision regards the India-Japan bilateral economic cooperation as its pillar. It proposes that Japan can transfer its APEC regional cooperation experience to the IORA.

1. View of the IORR Economy

The economic significance of the IORA for Japan is outlined below:

- The IORA is now recognized as a region on course for sustainable economic growth, as previously mentioned.

- The IORA is a trade route for Japan. Of Japan's total exports and imports, 43% passes through the Indian Ocean in terms of weight. The IORA accounts for 48% of the nation's total imports and 14% of its total exports. Japan's trade with the Middle East accounts for 21% of its total trade (28% imports and 4% exports). The Indian Ocean is significant for Japan as a trade route to the Middle East¹⁴. These data also indicate the importance of security for Japan in the IORR.
- IORR's economy presents promising financial prospects. The IORA's economy grew 400% larger in terms of GDP between 2001 and 2012. Trade volume in the intra-IORA region reached 1.2 trillion Yen or US\$ 10 billion (one Yen = US\$ 120). In 2011, the share of IORA trade was 11.6% of all global trade. The IORA's GDP reached US\$ 9 trillion in 2016.
- India's economy presents potential growth for the IORA. India is the centre of the industrial sector in the IORA, but it still lacks the competitiveness needed to be a global industrial base. IORA's automobile industry, for example, is not significant in the global market, with an export share of only 11.9% (of which India accounts for 41.6%¹⁵). India's share for pharmaceutical products is 13.1% of the world total, ranking fourth largest worldwide. Its export value was 1.3 trillion Yen in 2012. The domestic market for pharmaceutical products will grow due to rapid population growth¹⁶. Regarding home electric appliances, Malaysia exports these goods to the IORA, and export by the IORA is small. Chinese and Korean enterprises are constructing factories for home electric appliances in India¹⁷.
- The Japanese import and export industry is significant for the IORA. Japan's economy is linked to China, North America and Europe, but the link to Indian and Middle East economies is far less, which indicates that the potential for Japan to develop economic links with them is high¹⁸. In reality, Japanese enterprises began their businesses in India. The METI

report regards IORR as the centre for economic growth and an outlet for Japan's exports and IORR regional industrial cooperation.

2. Regional Industrial Cooperation in the IORR

The METI report suggests a grand, efficient industrial cooperation design in the IORR that will enable growth for India and Africa. It points out that IORA trade with ASEAN states is active and that Indian industrial base exports to Africa are increasing (see Map 4).

(1) Export of Natural Resources Produced in Africa to India

Currently, the intra-IORR trade structure is marked by the export of natural resources to India from Africa, the Middle East and Australia. Then, the METI report notices that the trade of natural gas is not yet large scale. The report thus proposes an energy security option for India to diversify the types of natural resources and their supply sources. It points out the discovery of the world's largest class of natural gas reservation on the shores of Tanzania and Mozambique and that exports will start by the end of the 2010s¹⁹. These gas fields are close to the Indian market and will stabilize the resource supply.

The METI report then proposes an infrastructure building plot to promote the industrial sector to integrate African countries to international production networks. It suggests a model in which India will establish industry bases to produce machines and parts and export them to Africa, which will carry out the division of labour to assemble the parts into final products. The METI report proposes the establishment of industrial parks, reduction and abolition of customs to enhance incentives for the transfer of industrial function, human resource development to reduce production costs, the creation of a custom union to enlarge markets and the construction of infrastructures for logistics and transportation to fully utilise the market²⁰.

(2) Activation of African Economy

The METI report notes natural resource reservations such as manganese,

vanadium, zinc, nickel, tantalum and other rare earths, and it points out three types of trade patterns within the IORA. The first is exporters of low value-added resources and metals (i.e. Tanzania and Madagascar). The second type is exporters of high value-added resource and metals (i.e. South Africa and Mozambique). The third type is importers of resources and minerals (i.e. India, Thailand and Indonesia).

The METI report then proposes the establishment of a resource supply network to India from Africa. This is regarded to have impacts that promote the industrialization of India. It also takes note regarding the trade structure in which Africa exports natural resources that are refined externally and re-exported as value-added products. The cause of this is indicated to be a lack of electricity in Africa. Then, the METI report proposes the establishment of an electrical distribution network within the supply and consumption of electricity in Africa. This will strengthen the economic link among African sub-regions. It also proposes the package development of mineral mines with the construction of a transportation network, which will attract direct investments to Africa from within IORR countries²¹.

The METI reports estimate the potential GDP growth rate following the abolition of IORA customs. It states that exports will increase by 5.8% and that imports will increase by 5.9% in the IORA. The effect is estimated to be especially high for the South Indian region, in which exports will increase by 13.59%²².

(3) Support for Intra-Regional IORA Projects

The IORA lists the six fields for regional projects as sea lane security, fishery resource management, promotion of trade and investment, disaster risk management, promotion of tourism and cultural exchanges. However, a high proportion of projects initiated by the IORA are frequently under negotiation and are often cancelled. Among eight total projects in the past, one project was established; another is active; two are under negotiation; and four projects

were cancelled²³. In comparison, the APEC organizes more than 40 working groups under the organization of four committees (a financial committee, an economic committee, a trade and investment committee and an economic and technological working committee). In other words, activities at the IORA equate to only five working groups at the APEC²⁴. Thus, the METI report points out that Japan can work to transfer its APEC experience to the IORA.

The METI report also points out that IORA is troubled by an insufficient budget for joint projects. The APEC's budget was US\$ 9.4 million compared to US\$ 1 million for the IORA (the fiscal year was not mentioned). Thus, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization have already provided some support to the IORA. The METI report expects that Japan provides more support for the IORA²⁵. Japan's approach to the plot for regional industrial cooperation and support for the IORA is marked by intelligence gathering, analysis, proposal, utility of private sectors in the region and the involvement of Japan in the regional initiative.

3. Bilateral Economic Cooperation Between India and Japan

How does the METI report plan to realize the aforementioned regional industrial cooperation? The report does not mention any road map for this process. The bilateral relationship between India and Japan is thus examined here.

Japan's investment in India is ranked third, and it is growing every year. In September 2014, Japan and India announced together that their relation is a 'special strategic and global partnership', and the Japanese government later announced an action plan to double Japan's investment in India within five years²⁷. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has compared the trade volume of India and Japan with that of China and Japan. The trade volume of India and Japan was about 1.5 trillion Yen per year (Japan's exports were about 960 billion

Yen, and its imports were about 5.5 billion Yen), which addresses only 1/21 of the trade volume between China and Japan (about 32 trillion Yen)²⁸.

The economic complement between India and Japan is high in the industrial sector. India and Japan issued 'India Japan vision 2025' in 2015, which announced that the two countries would cooperate for peace and prosperity in the India-Pacific region²⁹. The vision targets the invitation of more Japanese investments and the establishment of more Japanese industrial bases in India. 'Quality infrastructure' is also set as a field of cooperation, which clearly matches Japan's strategy to export high-speed railway infrastructure. Japan also aims to export coal and nuclear-generated electric power plants.

After 2004, India was the largest recipient of Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance). Its cumulative amount was 4.9 trillion Yen by the end of 2015. This includes a Yen loan agreement, technical assistance and a gratis fund aid, of which 97% is allocated as a loan agreement³⁰. On March 31, 2017, JICA signed a new loan agreement for eight new projects with the Indian government, totalling 308.7 billion Yen. This agreement covered road network connectivity improvements, water sector livelihood improvements, forest management, investment promotion, etc.³¹. In April and September 2015, the two governments selected 12 proposed sites for Japanese Industrial Township in Northern, Central and Southern India³². On November 11, 2016, the summit of the two countries announced 78 areas of cooperation (ministerial dialogues, security, trade and economic, transportation, energy, culture, health, education and technology, agriculture, etc.)³³. A total of 4,700 industrial managers received skill training for management and entrepreneurship through the 'Visionary Leaders for Manufacturing Program' (2007–2013) and the 'Project on Champions for Societal Manufacturing' (2013–2018)³⁴.

Isuzu announced that it would transfer its automobile factory for exports from Thailand to India. The enterprise aims to export automobiles from India to Africa³⁵. This will enhance the competitiveness of the Indian car industry.

Panasonic and Daikin also aim to build their industrial bases in India³⁶. An example is Multi Suzuki Co. Lt., which has invested in India since 1982 and has maintained the largest share in the automobile sales market in India. The company announced a plan to build a Japan-India Institute for Manufacturing in November 2016³⁷. Panasonic, Honda and JFE engage in projects to promote technology³⁸. Japan's public and private investments in India will gain momentum. They will achieve the construction of industrial bases and the realization of 'Made in India'.

4. TICAD Initiative and IORR Regional Cooperation

The METI report regards the development of Africa, including the export of natural resources and intra-African economic linkages, as a pillar for the growth of the IORR. Japanese cooperation to Africa, TICAD, began in 1993, and phase TICAD VI began in 2016. This section will introduce some new directions of TICAD VI, which composes a part of Japan's IORR policy. TICAD was held every five years in Tokyo from 1993 to 2013, and they decided to hold one TICAD every three years, taking turns in Japan and in Africa, in 2013. TICAD VI was the first TICAD held in Africa (Kenya).

Prime Minister Abe stated at the opening of TICAD VI in August 2016 that the India-Pacific is a confluence of Africa and Asia. He frames Japan's engagement with Africa for the realization of 'Quality Africa', 'Quality and Empowerment' and 'Resilient Africa'³⁹. TICAD VI is strengthened its political framework to sustain Japan's commitment through the participation of parliament members. The Japan-African Parliamentarians' Dialogue for TICAD VI was held in February 2016 in Tokyo⁴⁰. The organizer was the Asian Population and Development Association. The chairman of the board of directors was former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda – again, a strong back to sustain Japan's political commitment to Africa.

TICAD VI committed to launch the 'Japan-Africa Public and Private

Economic Forum' as a permanent forum. It set a target for the total amount of Japan's investment in Africa as US\$ 30 billion. TICAD takes a stand to commit to the principle of local ownership and simultaneously declares the principle of international partnership. TICAD is currently co-organized by the Japanese government, World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations and the African Union Commission ⁴¹. The African Union was added to the list of co-organizers only after TICAD IV (2008). The initial co-organizers were the Office for Special Adjustment for Africa at UN (OSAA), UNDP, the Association of Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) and World Bank. They were all donor organizations.

This background explains the initial purpose of Japan in TICAD. Japan aimed to invite international donors to Africa to provide efficient, large-scale aid after the end of the Cold War. Another political motivation of Japan was to collect favours from African countries – namely, votes for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The TICAD has maintained the multilateral framework that opens a dialogue and adjustments for multiple stakeholders in Africa. This method has been suitable for preventing friction among international and regional stakeholders in a continent with frequent conflicts. Of course, Japan maintains bilateral channels with African states.

TICAD does not set specific numerical targets but provides support for Vision 2063 with an emphasis on human security and human resource development. TICAD shifted to be a channel for Japan to engage seriously in African aid independently after 2008. In TICAD V in May 2013, a public-private partnership dialogue scheme between the Japanese government and the private sector was initiated, and at TICAD VI, 73 memorandums of understanding were signed by 16 Japanese enterprises and six organizations. Out of the 73 memorandums of understanding, Kenya collected 15 projects. This was followed by Mozambique with eight projects and Angola with five projects.

JICA drives 10 'corridor development' projects (Trans Maghreb Corridor,

West Africa Growth Ring, Djibouti-Addis Ababa Corridor, the Forth Trans African Highway, Nacala Corridor, etc.) and one stop border post project (OSBP) ⁴². These are projects practical to promoting inter-African economic connectivity. Electric generating capacity is expected to increase by 2,000 megawatts. Japan has also committed to providing vocational training to 50,000 people over the next three years. It also committed to provide training for 30,000 people who are candidates to serve as factory managers.

The public sector is motivated to achieve long- and mid-term strategic goals, while the private sector is motivated to realize short-term business feasibility. Their cooperation is still at initial stage, but they are vigorously heading to the industrialization of the Africa.

IV Japanese Views Regarding IORR Security

This section compares the three trends of Japanese views on IORR security. These views are the balance of power held by security experts, the pacifist view and the view of liberal diplomacy. These three tendencies have emerged regarding Japan's relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ⁴³. The three tendencies are introduced here as more or less ideal models, as individual researchers have more subtle opinions and analyses. However, these three will be useful to distinguish trends among Japanese intellectuals and policymakers.

The Indian Ocean is the vital area for energy security in the global world, as 65% of oil consumption and 35% of gas consumption pass through it ⁴⁴. Piracy, drug and human trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism have been discussed as serious security agendas for the IORR. As the significance of sea lanes is always a point of focus, the management of ports and continental shelves has also been highlighted in recent years. In the IORR, the east coast side of Africa is a weak ring. Regional security can be constructed through a seamless chain of security in sovereign states, and the capacity building of a marine guard for the East African states is a solution.

Moreover, the Pakistan and Indian conflict is the most seriously concerned source of interstate conflict in the IORR since the end of the Cold War. These nations debate over counterterrorism strategies, the balance of nuclear arms and missile capacity, Kashmir issues, etc.. Pakistan is not permitted to be a member of the IORA.

Japan is a stakeholder of IORR security. Marine security to ensure freedom of navigation is a critical issue for Japan. The limited number of Japan's Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) overseas activities has been concentrated to the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Japan is committed to marine security in the IORR. The nation's first experience in this regard was the mine sweeping activity by the MSDF in the Gulf after the Kuwait Liberation War in 1991. Then, MSDF was dispatched to counter marine terrorism in the IORR after 2002 before switching its mission to countering piracy in the sea of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, which is still its goal today.

Hereafter, the issues of concern, threat perception and security policies raised by the three views are discussed.

(1) Perceptions Held by Security Experts Regarding the Balance of Power

Balance of power experts analyse regional affairs based on the concepts of power and threats, interest and public goods, alliances, etc.. They assert that certain states or political entities are threats and strategize to achieve security through alliances. Japanese security experts began to share an evaluation of India's peaceful rise and its security goal to achieve public goods in the IORR ⁴⁵.

In May 2007, the Indian Ministry of Defence published *Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Strategy* and clarified that India's strategic goal was consistent with that of navies outside the IORR. The Indian navy's performance was evaluated as serving to provide public goods for regional and global security through humanitarian assistance, such as that provided following the Tsunami disaster in 2004, rescue activities during the Lebanese crisis of 2006, marine escort activities against piracy after 2008, etc..

The main concerns of Japanese security experts are the global balance of power and European and East Asian issues, but in recent years, these experts have also been worried about China's so-called necklace of pearl. In April 2007, Japan joined the Malabar marine exercise, which was launched in 1992 by the US and Indian navies. This was a multinational exercise with Singapore and Australia, but China warned against the joint exercise. In response to this warning, the size of the joint exercise was reduced, though the Indian navy participated in exercises near Japan. A strategic shift was announced at the Indian-Japanese summit in 2014. It agreed with Japan's annual participation in the Malabar exercises. The Indian navy and Marine SDF share in joint exercises every year. Indian leadership is in favour of the balance of power experts and liberal diplomats, as the strategy outlined below presupposes Indian leadership.

The restraint of Indian unilateralism and expansionism is hoped for the prosperity of the IORR. Accordingly, Japan has tried to lead India in this direction. Japan welcomes India to participate in arms control regimes, for example. On June 27, 2016, the Japanese government welcomed Indian participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Japan did not pressure India but instead took a soft approach: Japan attached importance to the regime, shared the value in the joint declaration and promoted India to join it.

China opposed the alignment of the US, India, Japan and Australia in 2007. Japan did not initially challenge this opposition at face value⁴⁶. However, the views of Japanese experts diversified. The first perception was that trilateral partnership with India, Australia and Japan had been led by Australia since 2006⁴⁷. This partnership is said to have provided the idea for the second perception: the trilateral partnership of India, Japan and US, held since 2011⁴⁸. This scheme underlines marine security to ensure the freedom to navigate waters, including the South China Sea. This partnership promotes the India-Pacific convergence and trilateral cooperation. The third is the trilateral

partnership of Japan-Australia-India, which has held three trilateral dialogues via meetings with senior officials⁴⁹. Prime Minister Abe announced the 'Democratic Security Diamond' initiative in an Australian journal in 2012. He appealed to Australians that China was a threat in the South China Sea⁵⁰. A rare view in addition to these three states, however, is that South Africa should join in the leadership of the IORR⁵¹. Following many attempts, the four countries of India, the US, Japan and Australia now maintain dialogue, intelligence sharing and exercises, and their strategic assessment seems to be converging for further cooperation in the IORR⁵² (see Map 5).

The Modi administration and the Abe administration have agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation across all areas, including security. In 2014, the two Prime Ministers welcomed Japan's participation in the India-US Malabar Exercises on a regular basis⁵³. The India-Japan security cooperation will be enhanced at a steady pace, as vice-ministerial two-plus-two dialogue has been institutionalized⁵⁴. Moreover, disaster relief is an area that legitimizes bilateral security cooperation.

In December 2015, two agreements were concluded. The first agreement concerns the transfer of defense equipment and technology, and the second concerns security measures for the protection of classified military information, which will further strengthen the foundation of deep strategic ties. These agreements are framed as two-way collaborations on technology cooperation, co-development and the co-production of arms.

The perception held by security experts supposing the balance of power is gaining momentum over IORR security in Japan. However, it should be noted that this view is defensive realism. Professor Mataka Kamiya, one of Japan's exemplary scholars in security studies, asserts that the country's security policy behaviour after the Fifteen Years' War⁵⁵ is based on a different type of realism than that prevailing in the West. The 'realists' in Japan have comprehended the limited effect in use of weapons and consider non-militaristic tools, such

as economic interdependence, the sharing of common values, the provision of foreign aid and international organizations, to deter wars. Kamiya frames the Japanese realists as sharing the perspective of liberalists in the Western definition and even deems it fitting to call them ‘realistic liberals’⁵⁶. Japan does not have any ambitions for new territory and expansion. The Japanese view of the balance of power is based on defensive realism, which will conform with liberal order under the IORR.

(2) Pacifist View

It is not easy to specify certain intellectuals as ‘pacifists’ by their affiliation with a membership to a specific association, but it is a tendency of critical thinking. These intellectuals are against the concept of alliance, the balance of power and, respect international law, multilateral organizations, NGOs and equal relations among sovereign states and peoples in order to overcome power games among nations and prevent hegemony. They are against the possession of arms, the existence of armed forces, the use of arms, all wars and PKO operations. They tend to be against the US and its military bases. China and North Korea, for instance, are responding against aggressive US hegemony. These intellectuals also strongly oppose nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Indeed, they share certain ideological tendencies. Experts in the field of non-security share pacifist views.

Their conceptual tool is the development or so called ‘peace building’ in the post-conflict stage. They regard the solution to disparity, poverty and conflicts among nations as a citizen-centred approach and try to be critical regarding diplomacy and foreign aid managed by governments. The pacifist policy for the IORR is unclear, which is likely due to the fact that the multilateral cooperation framework is neither shaped nor shared among Japanese intellectuals. Thus, their claim has been to criticize nuclear tests, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the India-Japan agreement for nuclear cooperation.

(3) Liberal Diplomatic Perception

The liberal diplomatic view does not regard alliances as the only functional tool, but incorporates bilateral relations with multilateral cooperation as a tool to achieve national interests and indispensable interests among regional partners. They aim to build confidence through dialogue at plural frameworks that function without damaging bilateral relations. They assert that the sharing of intelligence on regional affairs and military prospects will ease tension and clarify the goal and strategy of Japan. The issue of concern is not only security, but also comprehensive relation building as a key tool for the security of Japan.

India and Japan are part of 'G4', which claims to be a permanent chair of the UNSC. This distinguishes these nations structurally from China, which maintains a permanent chair on the UNSC. The holders of liberal diplomacy comprehend the necessity of cooperation and friendship with China but also consider the nation a competitor. They do not define threats, however, and try to create common interests as much as possible. They are in favour of a balance of power approach as long as it does not raise tensions in regional affairs and bilateral relations.

The Tokyo Foundation, a Japanese think tank, published a report advocating the 'security architecture in Asia'⁵⁷. The report regards the security of Asia as being composed of multilateral dimensions, including the dimensions of alliance, low-intensity military response and confidence-building measures.

The SDF is a supporter of the concept of the balance of power, but its actions are constrained within a liberal diplomacy. It unfolds its activities on multilateralism and can respect the values of other nations. The SDF does not possess offensive weapons, such as carriers, long-range missiles or long-range aircrafts.

Prime Minister Abe has maintained that democracy, freedom and the rule of law are critical values for the security and prosperity in broader Asia and the India-Pacific region⁵⁸. He is a defensive realist who also utilizes liberal diplomacy. He is a strong leader but will never be hegemonic in Asia. The

perception of democratic peace is shared by the METI report⁵⁹, the supporters of the balance of power and liberal diplomats in Japan.

Japan's diplomacy in the ASEAN and ARF was a preceding example of the articulation of Japan's liberal diplomacy. Japan did not propose any integration in areas of politics and economy in Asia. ASEAN and ARF are regarded as multilateral organizations that adjust the interests and restrain the ambitions of major powers⁶⁰.

Japan's liberal diplomatic approach may be understood through the following considerations: Japan does not propose any integrational approach in the India-Pacific region and is not willing to take over the overstretched burden of leadership. Rather, Japan supports the formation of a loose network of leadership in the IORR. This is probably because an organization that can cover the India-Pacific region has not practically emerged.

The SDF aims to join international exercises in a multinational framework. Japan's participation in marine guard international scheme CTF151 against piracy in the sea of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden adopted an escort method during unilateral operations in its first years but has adopted a multilateral method of zone defense since December 2013⁶¹. Hirotake Ishiguro made interviews to policy makers and concluded that marine SDF activity would continue in the Gulf of Aden until 2023⁶².

The SDF is framed to mitigate regional conflict by avoiding taking one side of a regional conflict. The example is the SDF's participation in an Aman exercise in Pakistan. Aman is a large-scale marine and air joint exercise held in and around the territories of Pakistan. SDF joined the exercise in 2007 and 2009, as confirmed by an open source. The exercise is explained as not being based on any specific scenario; rather, the training of each participant is the main goal⁶³. SDF has also joined the Malabar exercise but is concerned with security and stability in Pakistan as well.

Japan's regional diplomacy prefers a quiet approach. It tries to be apolitical

and cooperative to avoid inciting over competition while also promoting sound security cooperation. However, in case of a true crisis (for example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), Japan will provide security cooperation. The new laws of peace and security enforced in 2015 guarantee that the Japanese SDF will assume suitable security cooperation (except direct involvement in battles).

In its operations in Iraq after 2004, the SDF demonstrated that it can cross cultural borders. Indeed, the SDF respects Arab and Islamic cultures.

The SDF has been attacked more than a dozen times by mortars and rockets⁶⁴ but has never fired back. A local Islamic scholar stated that he was impressed with the devoted activities of the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), and in 2004, another Islamic scholar issued a fatwa prohibiting any attack against the SDF on Fridays (the Islamic day of worship)⁶⁵. Moreover, the top second officer in the Qatar Army praised the international contributions of the Japanese government, which have been widely recognized among Middle East states. The humanitarian assistance conducted by Japan's SDF in Iraq also became a model for Arab armies due to the SDF's respect for local cultures and customs⁶⁶.

The Japanese constitution bans the SDF from solving international conflicts with the use of arms, and Japan passed legislation related to counterterrorism activities following the September 11th attacks. The SDF has also succeeded in executing missions without deploying weapons, which is a credit to its self-restriction acquired through intense training and local and international support.

Liberal diplomats combined with SDF operations is the current trend of Japan's involvement in the IORR. The SDF takes stands to operate in a multilateral framework and respects multiculturalism during its operations. The SDF deliberately tries to mitigate regional conflict and maintain stability in light of conflicting and sensitive issue with Pakistan.

(4) The Conformity of Japan's Security View With the IORR Regional Economy

The perceptions of a balance of power and of liberal diplomacy are different in their thinking, but they do currently share a preference for policy options. This can occur at the stage when regional tension is still restrained. If a security situation worsens, security experts will gain momentum and pacifists will have a chance for appeals. If the peaceful situation prevails, liberal diplomacy will maintain its momentum.

Japan's approach of defensive realism and liberal diplomacy supports the acceleration of private sector participation in the IORR. It is understood that deepening interdependence will promote common prosperity and security in the IORR with Japan. However, realists and diplomats are neglecting the opposition of pacifists against the nuclear agreement between India and Japan.

VI GCC and Japan

Japan's GCC strategy has not yet been publicly clarified. It has also not yet been integrated in Japan's debates on the India-Pacific strategy. The GCC has unique characters in regards to political, economic and cultural structures, but concerning the significance of the region, the lack of a clear strategy can be problematic.

China is GCC's largest trade partner, but its trade with India has rapidly increased since 2000. GCC exports energies to both countries. China exports machines to GCC countries, and India exports pearls and precious metals. Both countries are significant partners for the GCC.

The GCC represents a region with high income and maintains certain economic autonomy with its financial power. Thus, Japan cannot adopt ODA as a tool to engage in it (apart from its policies in other parts of Asia and Africa), and adopted new methods in recent years. The Abe administration enhanced Japan's relations with the GCC as a comprehensive partner in 2013 and in recent years has set a special priority to engage in Saudi Arabia. Japan's public and private sectors have refreshed and enhanced their commitment to Saudi

Arabia since the visit of vice crown prince Muhammad bin Salman Al Saud in 2016.

This section deals with the value of being included in the GCC, implications for the IORR's investment opportunities, the GCC's security role, recent developments in Saudi-Japan relations and Japan's unique security role against North Korea.

(1) Value for the Regional Prosperity of the IORR

Prime Minister Abe visited GCC countries in 2013 and secured a comprehensive partnership between Japan and GCC nations. On May 1, 2013, he made a policy speech at King Abdul Aziz University for Technology and Science. He greeted the audience along with *As-Salam Alaykom* and then stated that Islam and Japan share the common values of *Taaish* (co-living), *Taawun* (cooperation) and *Tasamuh* (tolerance). He concluded his speech with *Shukaran Jazilan*. He has joined *Futur* in every Ramadan along with ambassadors from Muslim countries in Tokyo in recent years. He approaches Muslim values in a symbolically multiculturalist manner.

Japan praises India as the largest democracy in the world⁶⁷. The praise of democracy is the central value to promoting cooperation between India, Australia, the US and Japan. Myanmar initiated steps for democratization, and all member states of the ASEAN are now institutional democratic states, though they will go through stage of democratic consolidation. Democracy is certainly a shared value in Asia, but the GCC has not adopted an electoral democracy.

The regime type of some IORR values is classified due to non-democracy. The democratization process is in a hazardous stage, however, and forceful democratization is risky. In many cases, such actions lead to severe repression, terrorist incidents and civil war. Japan has thus not adopted a forceful policy of democracy promotion. Japan's approach to democracy promotion is indirect support centred around an economic approach and institutional reform, supposing that economic growth and the rise of income levels per capita will

naturally set up conditions for democratization and that legal reforms related to the rule of law, constitutions, judiciary processes and policing will set up preconditions for democratization. Thus, Japan can promote friendly relations through non-Western democracy and maintain stable relations.

GCC states play significant security roles for the IORR. Oman, UAE and Bahrain provide naval bases in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Saudi Arabia plays a role as the last guarantor of oil supply, as it has the only large-scale excess capacity of crude oil export in the world. Qatar supported Japan during its sudden energy shortage by exporting a surplus of liquefied natural gas following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.

Japan has been expected to play special roles that differ than that of Western countries – a notion that Japan has willingly accepted. Japan was asked by Saudi Arabia, for example, to hold an oil concession twice in the 1950s⁶⁸ because Japan was regarded as a potential peaceful power in the region. This led to the establishment of the Arabian Oil company, which produces crude oil in the neutral zone of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Abu Dhabi assigned Japan a similar task: to develop the hardest marine oil field. Japanese companies succeeded in this effort in the 1970s⁶⁹. Isuzu, a Japanese automobile maker, opened its first GCC automobile factory in 2012 in East Saudi Arabia.

Japan is also often ‘assigned’ to play a quiet role for cultural change in Saudi Arabia. The first Saudi lady who participated in the Olympics, for instance, was a Judo player. In April 2017, the first orchestra concert was held in the capital of Saudi Arabia by a Japanese band. Muslim people are not upset by the cultural activities of Japanese artists. Japan can thus be a facilitator for change in the GCC without inciting social upheavals. Japan’s involvement could be compatible with gradual reform, achievement and stability.

Japan’s bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia drastically strengthened during the visit of the vice crown prince Muhammad bin Salman in September 2016, during which the joint working group for Saudi-Japan Vision 2030 was

established. The visit opened the discussion for industrial cooperation, large-scale finance, cooperation in the field of animation, etc.. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) also agreed to establish a joint private fund with SoftBank Group Co., Japan. The size of the fund is extraordinary, announced to be 10 trillion Yen. It is estimated that this fund will hedge the serious risk for Saudi investment in the US posed by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, enabling Saudi investment under the cover of Japan's private sector.

In March 2017, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, custodian of the two holy mosques, visited Japan for the first time after 46 years as Saudi king. They announced the Saudi-Japan Vision 2030, which aims at economic diversification and the creation of employment opportunities. Japan established this joint vision as a tool to grow Japan's GDP to 600 trillion Yen. The Saudi-Japan Vision 2030 office is opened. The bilateral cooperation has expanded to 41 ministries and organizations across two countries that are participating in the Vision 2030 project. In total, 31 leading projects (11 government-to-government cooperation projects and 20 private sector projects) were signed during this visit. A feasibility study of the joint project to establish a special economic zone for Japanese private sectors has also started, aiming at the construction of the industrial supply chain in Saudi Arabia, cooperation for Aramco IPO, energy conservation, quality infrastructure and human resources capability development. The bilateral relationships of Saudi Arabia and Japan and the GCC and Japan are excellent.

GCC countries can collect intelligence on projects in the IORR and will find investment opportunities in this growing region. They can maintain petroleum exports but do not have to lose valuable opportunities to join. Japan can offer to share intelligence and visions in the IORR with the Gulf countries. The mega fund initiated by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund and SoftBank may be a model for another opportunity.

(2) Security Cooperation

Intelligence sharing is the foundation for the maintenance of security communication, common stances and cooperation in a crisis. In recent years, sharing common political stances and threat perceptions has been confirmed; Japan has requested that the GCC share in the perceived threat of North Korea, and the GCC has requested that Japan share its issues with Palestine.

Around 2010, Saudi Arabia sent the director of its terrorist rehabilitation facility to Indonesia to transfer their experience to help rehabilitate former terrorists and suspects. Saudi Arabia should also support the terrorist rehabilitation facility in Pakistan, which will help mitigate the India-Pakistan conflict. In India, community policing was introduced in seven towns in which Hindu and Muslim inhabitants reside, preventing the spread of communal riots in the early 2000s⁷⁰. Saudi Arabia can invest in similar soft measures to prevent civil conflicts in which Muslims may be victimized.

States should also prevent the IORR from being a route for proliferation. Japan is a front state against North Korea, for example, and could impact the countermeasures against cooperation between North Korea and Iran on the Asian side. Of North Korea's trade from 1995 to 2004, 45% was done with Iran by an estimation. In September 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with Iranian President Hasan Rouhani and requested that he cut Iranian military relations with North Korea. Japan is one of the 11 founder states of the Proliferation Security Initiative, established in 2003, and joins their international exercise every year. Japan also organized a joint exercise, 'Pacific Shield 12', in July 2012, which included India and Australia from the IORR.

GCC countries and Japan can broaden their common concerns by sharing intelligence of national interest to inform the wider issues of the IORR. These countries will notice new opportunities and agendas for cooperation to invest in the IORR and new ways to promote its security.

VII Conclusion

Japan is currently committed to strengthening its cooperation in areas such as politics, security, aid, investment and technological transfer and education in the IORR. The METI report suggests a vision for regional cooperation in the IORR. The concept of India-Pacific is not yet shared among intellectuals in Japan. However, bilateral ties with India are a current priority for public and private sectors, and the trade scale is still in a growing stage.

At a glance, views among Japanese intellectuals seem to be fragmented. However, the public and private sectors' motivation to invest in India is gaining momentum, and the TICAD VI is focusing more on the invitation of the private sector to Africa. The vocational training, investment, and the distribution of aids by Japan will have significant impact in IORR in long term. The SDF and diplomats coordinate their commitment to the IORR through defensive realism and liberal regional order. GCC countries can acknowledge the emerging India-Pacific cooperation and note the quiet but powerful role taken by Japan in the IORR. Namely, Japan is committed to multilateral coordination, the loose network of leadership, regional security and industrialization and the regional network of trade and investment.

Japan's investment in the IORR will grow in coming years, and Japan can increase its engagement in areas such as disaster relief, investment, technological transfer, tourism, marine economy and security cooperation. GCC countries should find opportunities to invest in this growing region. The GCC has options for their partners in the IORR. Japan can offer intelligence on East Asia, the APEC and the IORR.


GCC states can direct their attention to the potentiality in IORR to uncover worth while projects, and invest in them. The Japan, India, Australia and US form loose network, but their comprehensive capacity is effective, and the US gradually has shifted its engagement in IORR. GCC states probably want to make diplomatic manipulation to hedge on competitions among major powers' politics in the region, but the security in IORR is critical for the GCC states

since IORR locates in the route from the Middle East to Asia. GCC can head for the multilateralism and cooperate for the maintenance of rule of law and good governance in IORR, which will sustain the growth and prosperity in the Middle East and IORR.


Chart 1: 52 States in the extended IORR (the 21 member states of the IORA are listed in italics)⁷¹

Indian Ocean Rim States (28)	<i>Australia, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Comoros, Djibouti, France, Kenya, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United Arab Emirates, UK and Yemen.</i>
Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf (11)	<i>Bahrain, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.</i>
Indian Ocean Land-Locked States (13)	<i>Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</i>


Map 1: Sub-regional organizations in the IORR ⁷²




Map 2: Inter-regional organizations in the IORR ⁷³



Map 3: Competition of major powers in the IORR ⁷⁴



Map 4: Potentiality of regional cooperation for industrial development⁷⁵



Map 5: Japan's 'Leadership in the Indian Ocean' (India, Japan, Australia and the US)



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The Role of Japan and Potential Cooperation with the GCC for the Stability and Prosperity of the Indian Ocean Rim Region (IORR)

Satoru Nakamura

環インド洋地域 (IORR) の安定と発展のための日本の役割と GCC による協力の可能性

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要旨

環インド洋地域 (IORR) は、グローバルな経済成長センターの一つである。日本の官民は、環インド洋地域との相互依存の深化により恩恵を受けることを期待しているが、日本が環インド洋地域に参加していくための政治的、経済的な枠組みは何だろうか。まだほとんどの日本人は、環インド洋地域やインド・太平洋といった概念を共有していないが、経済産業省の 2014 年の報告書は環インド洋地域において実現可能な産業協力の将来図を分析していた。他方、環インド洋地域の安全保障戦略をめぐり、勢力均衡、平和主義、リベラル外交という三つの視点が形成されつつある。日本の環インド洋地域政策は、多国間調整、インドのリーダーシップへの高い評価、インドとの二国間関係の最速での強化によって進展しそうである。アラビア湾岸諸国協力評議会 (GCC) の国々は、環インド洋地域の力学を理解することで、信頼できるパートナーやプロジェクトを選択して、この地域の成長と平和的台頭に投資することができる。

Keywords: Japan, Indian Ocean Rim Region, GCC