



# Ravaisson and Bergson on Habit, Nature and Life

Kim, Hyeseong

---

**(Citation)**

21世紀倫理創成研究, Special:85-96

**(Issue Date)**

2019-03

**(Resource Type)**

departmental bulletin paper

**(Version)**

Version of Record

**(JaLCD0I)**

<https://doi.org/10.24546/81011210>

**(URL)**

<https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14094/81011210>



# Ravaisson and Bergson on Habit, Nature and Life

Hyeseong KIM

## 1 Two Concepts of Habit - Spontaneity and Automatic mechanism

The point of departure of this paper is the two distinct perspectives on habit in Ravaisson and Bergson. How is it possible to have two opposing views on the same matter? In fact, these aspects are all testified by our daily experience. On the one hand, habit provides us with useful tools in our daily lives. Indeed, one of the most remarkable effects of it is that it makes our action more and more efficient and accurate by repetition. In this way, it is central to all kinds of physical exercise and moral cultivation; for instance, if we want to realize an ethical ideal, we need to rely on habit, since a moral person cannot be made by a one-time moral conduct but only by continuous and repetitive practice of it. On the other hand, we can think of its opposite side as well. Habit, as a useful tool, involves a lack of awareness; its usefulness is largely due to the fact that we don't have to be aware of every step of our habitual behavior because it works like an automatic machine. However, this can also be the reason of our unintentional mistakes. In fact, habit involves the displacement of flexibility by rigidity. From this perspective, it is an obstacle to overcome. If an individual and a society merely persist in an accustomed way of thinking, they probably face the risk of failure because they will not be able to adapt efficiently to change.

Habit thus exposes equally two different aspects; if Ravaisson's *Of Habit* (1837) highlights its positive aspect, Bergson, on the contrary, underlines the negative aspect of it. In general, Bergson has been considered as a successor of Ravaisson, in a philosophical tradition that Ravaisson called 'French positive spiritualism' in 19th century. Indeed, in this tradition, they expose common aspects. However, when it comes to the concept of habit, many former studies have focused on their difference; whereas Ravaisson describes habit as spontaneity, Bergson understands it as a mechanical automatism.

In fact, there is a point which has been continuously raised in the comparative study on them. Some scholars have pointed out the fact that Bergson had misinterpreted Ravaisson's thought. At the heart of these critiques is a famous study of Dominique

Janicaud.<sup>[1]</sup> According to him, Bergson wrongly suggests his own mechanical concept of habit in his explanation of Ravaisson's concept of it. "Habit, Bergson says, thus gives us the living demonstration of the truth that mechanism is not self-sufficient: it is, so to speak, only the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity (le résidu fossilisé d'une activité spirituelle)." This sentence of "*The Life and Works of Ravaisson*" does not represent Ravaisson's original viewpoint according to which habit, as a 'natural spontaneity', is different not only from 'reflective Freedom' but also from 'mechanical Fatality'. In addition, as Jacques Chevalier says, Bergson himself had acknowledged this 'bergsonification', but for him it was "the only way of clarifying the subject, by prolonging it".<sup>[2]</sup>

What brought Bergson to this bergsonification? In fact, what Bergson had seen in *Of Habit* was not a mere analysis of habit but a philosophy of nature: "this bears a modest title: *Of Habit*. But the author sets forth in it a whole philosophy of nature."<sup>[3]</sup> He didn't make a mistake at least on this point, since, for Ravaisson, habit has an ontological signification; "Habit, in the widest sense, is a general and permanent way of being."<sup>[4]</sup> So, if Bergson misinterpreted Ravaisson's concept of habit, this was probably due to his own way of thinking about nature. If Ravaisson's continuum is monistic, Bergson's philosophy is dualistic. And as Dominique Janicaud says, Bergson's negative evaluation of habit is closely related to his own mind-body dualism. Ravaisson's positive evaluation of habit is largely explained by its mediative position between the inorganic world and the human consciousness. Habit, as the 'middle term', is able to mediate the 'mechanical Fatality' and the 'reflective Freedom' so that all things in nature can be unified in order to constitute a continuum. On the contrary, in Bergson's dualism, habit is pushed out of such middle position toward the lowest extreme, the 'mechanical Fatality' so that there is no place for habit to play such mediative role. So, for both of them, the concept of habit is closely linked to the ontological view on nature.

---

1 Dominique Janicaud, *Ravaisson et la métaphysique: Une généalogie du spiritualisme français*, Librairie Philosophique J Vrin (January 1, 1998).

2 «*La vie et l'œuvre de Ravaisson*» ("*The Life and Works of Ravaisson*"), note 1 (en. translation : Mark Sinclair (2011) note 12) *La Pensée et le mouvant (The Creative mind)*, p. 253.

3 *ibid.*

4 *Of Habit* (en.), p. 25

## 2 Two Different Views of Nature

### 2.1 Ravaisson's continuism in philosophy of nature

#### 2.1.1 Spontaneity of Habit

In order to understand habit's spontaneity and its ontological meaning in Ravaissons, it is necessary to note what Ravaisson calls "the double law of habit" which is formulated as follows: "The continuity or the repetition of passion weakens it; the continuity or repetition of action exalts and strengthens it."<sup>[5]</sup> How can we understand passion and action? Ravaisson offers a definition that could remind us of Spinoza's one : "Passion is the manner of being that has its immediate cause in something other than the being to which it belongs. Action is the manner of being whose immediate cause is the being to which that manner of being belongs."<sup>[6]</sup> In this sense, habit refers to "the fundamental character of a being" that is "the tendency to persist in its way of being".<sup>[7]</sup>

This double law of habit explains how does it make possible improvements in our physical exercise or moral cultivation. According to Ravaisson, effort is an element of sensibility in the consciousness of movement. That's why an action becomes easier and effortless through habit. In the same manner, our passive sensations become gradually blurred and fade away by repetition, while our active perceptions become clearer and more accurate by repetition.<sup>[8]</sup>

#### 2.1.2 Naturalization of spirit and Spiritualization of nature

But more fundamentally, through the double law, habit becomes an ontological term which signifies at the same time the 'naturalization of spirit' and the 'spiritualization of nature'.

On the one hand, habit naturalizes spirit. When a person makes an idea in his or her mind as a goal and tries to put it into action, this action would be as unnatural as he is not yet accustomed to it; in this case, the discordance between thought and being would still be remarkable. As they are identified through habit, the action becomes more and more

---

5 *OfHabit* (en.), p. 49

6 *ibid.* p. 43

7 *ibid.* p. 27

8 "prolonged or repeated sensation diminishes gradually and eventually fades away. Prolonged or repeated movement becomes gradually easier, quicker and more assured. Perception, which is linked to movement, similarly becomes clearer, swifter and more certain." *ibid.* p. 49

natural so that it constitutes in the end a sort of 'second nature' inside personality. Indeed, the moral cultivation is essentially the process which goes from 'I ought to be a moral person.' to 'I am a moral person.' This identity of thought and being is accomplished by habit as a natural spontaneity. According to Ravaisson, the perfect identity of them belongs only to the Supreme Being, that is, God. Habit cannot reach it, despite its aspiration toward it; the gap between *Natura Naturans* (naturing nature) and *Natura Naturata* (natured nature) might eventually remain irreducible. However, habit as a *Natura Naturata* reveals *Natura Naturans* that produced it. In this consists its ontological meaning. Paradoxically, the intelligence of 'reflective Freedom', in spite of its ontological superior status, depends on habit's natural spontaneity. By habit, our intelligence becomes the 'immediate intelligence' where subject and object are no longer separated but unified; in the same way, the intuition becomes 'real intuition' through it. So, even though 'reflective Freedom' is ontologically above 'natural spontaneity', it remains imperfect unless it returns to nature. This is exactly what Ravaisson accentuated: "The history of Habit represents the return of Freedom to Nature, or rather the invasion of the domain of freedom by natural spontaneity."<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, we can also say that habit spiritualizes the nature, in the sense that it mediates necessity and freedom so that from the lowest limit to the highest limit, all things in nature could be connected and unified. It is true that the inorganic world is distinguished from the organic world. As Aristotle's classical example implies, throwing a stone up doesn't make the stone's habit to fly in the air, but only it reinforces the thrower's action to throw. A stone, despite its appearance of individuality, is infinitely divisible in reality, since it belongs to the inorganic realm where the homogeneity dominates absolutely. Habit, understood as the tendency to persist in 'its' way of being is thus possible only within the organic realm in which the heterogeneity and the individuality are more and more established so that one can say not only 'being in general' but also 'a being', 'a real unity'. But it doesn't follow from this that the inorganic realm is absolutely separated from the rest of nature. The term of nature, in its narrow sense, is different from the inorganic world; but in its broader sense, nature is distinguished from the super-nature, that is God. That's why Habit, in the widest sense,

---

9 *ibid.*, p. 77

can be a “general and permanent way of being.”<sup>10</sup>

In this way, Of Habit’s philosophy of nature seeks to make, from the beginning to the end, a sketch of the whole nature like Aristotelian one. It is the spontaneity of habit that carries out this reunification. And by this, nature comes to have a positive meaning as well as habit. “Nature is prevenient grace’. It is God within us.”<sup>11</sup>

## 2.2 Bergson’ dualism in philosophy of nature

In general, habit tends to be underestimated in dualistic perspective. As its typical example, one refers to Kantian philosophy where theoretical and practical philosophy are absolutely separated; in this perspective, habit is excluded from moral sphere, since its unreflective automatic action is far from moral autonomy.<sup>12</sup> That’s why Ravaisson attempts to overcome the dichotomy between freedom and necessity, established especially in modern western philosophy. Then, if Bergson remains within dualistic framework, what was at stake for his philosophy?

It is important that Bergson’s dualism, unlike its traditional forms, is not content to divide the phenomena into two entities; it tries to establish their reunification. For instance, *Matter and Memory* (1896) elucidates the relation of body and mind, and *The Creative Evolution* (1907) demonstrates a dialectic relation in which life uses matter as a tool in order to overcome its obstacle. However, before reintegration, the philosophy has to begin with dissociation in order to avoid losing the precision; when it came to the problem of freedom in his first Essay (*Time and Free will*, 1889), it was crucial to distinguish pure duration from spatial representation, since freedom consists in the former while the latter hides it : in the case of mind-body problem in *Matter and memory*, he had to begin by dissociating pure perception, sensation, and pure memory in order to reach his own explanation of concrete perception: in the same manner, the dualism of life and matter was at the heart of metaphysics in *Creative Evolution*, as well as the contrast between openness and closedness of human societies in his final work (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 1932). In this sense, his dualism is a philosophical method to reestablish the philosophical precision,

---

10 *ibid.*, p. 25, and see also, “In descending gradually from the clearest regions of consciousness, habit carries with it light from those regions into the depths and dark night of nature.” *ibid.*, p. 59 And about the double senses of the term of nature in Ravaisson, see Dominique Janicaud (1998), p. 44.

11 *Of Habit* (en.), p. 71

12 See Clare Carlisle (2010) p. 124

establishing the 'difference of kind' in the midst of the mixture.

Insofar as Bergson is a successor of French positive spiritualism, he also affirms the spontaneity of being in general. However, in his metaphysical dualism, the spontaneity belongs to spiritual activity while materiality is understood as interruption, that is, inversion of spirituality. That's why, in Bergson, there is no place for bodily habit to play the mediative role as Ravaisson describes. In addition, the philosophy of nature is not confined to describe a continuity of nature. His dualism which establishes the 'differences of nature' assigns some dynamic and discontinuous rhythms to the continuity of nature.

### 2.2.3 Critiques of Aristotelian Natural philosophy

It is notable that Bergson rejects thoroughly Aristotelian view of nature in *Creative Evolution* (1907). It is the case that his philosophy, in its biological aspect, is somewhat familiar with Aristotle's thought. However, at least in terms of philosophical methodology, his dualism as a method of establishing the 'difference of nature' in the middle of the mixtures, reminds us of Plato's skilful cook who carves the animal "by following the articulations marked out by nature."<sup>13</sup> As a result, one of his remarkable conclusions is the refusal of Aristotelian natural philosophy according to which the plant, the animal, and the mankind constitute together unilinear evolution. If evolution is unilinear, there would be only difference of degrees among those three modes of life. And just because there is no 'difference of nature', one and the same way of explaining intelligent beings should be applied to non-intelligent beings, like instinctive animals. Bergson thinks that such confusion is irrational and that the concept of unilinear evolution lacks the philosophical precision.<sup>14</sup> So, he stays away from this idea, classifying the three lives into three divergent directions of evolution, that is, 'torpor', 'instinct', and 'intelligence', in accordance with the biology of his time. It is true that, if life in general seeks to achievement of freedom, these three directions cannot be simply equal, since intelligence achieves the highest level of freedom in nature. That's why Bergson affirms eventually the privileged status of the mankind in nature. However, it doesn't follow from this

---

13 *L'évolution créatrice (The Creative Evolution)*, p. 157

14 "The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew. The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, but of nature." *ibid.*, p. 136

that instinct of bees and ants, for example, can be regarded as an imperfect intelligence. Between instinct and intelligence, there is the difference 'of nature', not 'of degree'. The beings who know end and move toward it and the beings who are incapable of it should be understood through different kinds of explanation.

## 2.2.4 The Overcoming of Nature

If life is essentially 'an effort to remount the incline that matter descends', instinct and intelligence represent two different kind of solutions of one and the same problem. However, if instinct remains as a natural tendency, intelligence moves toward the overcoming of nature. This overcoming involves a series of creations of 'difference of nature'. If one can affirm a privileged place of intelligence among the divergent directions of life, that's because intelligence, as a faculty of manufacturing unorganized and artificial instruments goes beyond the natural limit of instinct which is confined into organized instruments. In the same way, if the metaphysics of a human being can reach to grasp life as a whole, that could be possible only taking the reverse direction of nature; since, as Bergson puts it, metaphysics consists in the "effort to remount the natural slope of the work of thought."<sup>[15]</sup> And furthermore, if the humanity wants to move from 'closed morality' toward the 'open morality', it has to overcome the nature this time again.<sup>[16]</sup> If a theoretical enhancement needs to overcome the natural intelligence which tends to immobilize and analyze even life as well as matter, an ethical improvement requires us to overcome the natural instinct immanent in a human group which tends to instrumentalise others in its own interest.

Hence, the tension between nature/habit and philosophy is so striking in Bergson's philosophy, In Ravaisson's viewpoint, our enhancement could be explained by a principle of natural spontaneity which unifies the whole nature. On the contrary, in Bergson's perspective, an improvement is a result of the triumph of positive tendency over negative tendency. While Ravaisson emphasizes on positive aspect of natura naturata, that is "God

---

15 "un effort pour remonter la pente naturelle du travail de la pensée" ('An Introduction to Metaphysics') *La Pensée et le mouvant (The Creative mind)*, p. 206

16 "The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound, in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. Such is human society fresh from the hands of nature." *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion)* p. 283

within us.”<sup>[17]</sup>, Bergson says, “it is to get back to *natura naturans* that we break away from *natura naturata*.”<sup>[18]</sup>

### 3 Two Ways of Life

How can we understand these different opinions from the two philosophers categorized in the same tradition? It seems that they all expose a kind of moral optimism, but in different ways. Ravaisson is an optimist because he asserts that the possibility of moral cultivation is immanent within nature in a form of habit. In fact, he sees in habit the secret of education, which “consists in attracting someone towards the good by action, thus fixing the inclination for it. In this way a second nature is formed”.<sup>[19]</sup> On the contrary, if Bergson is optimist, that is because he affirms the possibility to overcome natural tendencies, in theory as well as in practice. In my opinion, they seem to lead us to two directions of life which might be different, but complementary: ‘perfection of self’ and ‘creation of self by self’.

#### 3.1 Habit as Perfection of Self

Indeed, habit, understood as a naturalization of spirit, can be considered as a principle of perfection. As we have seen above, thought and being, ideal and real, object and subject are getting identified as the process of habituation advances. Insofar as we are to remain within *Natura Naturata*, our natural spontaneity never reaches completely the divine spontaneity in which the identification would be absolutely perfect; however, habit gradually leads us toward it. Habit is a possibility to pass from ‘I hope to be a good person’ toward ‘I am a good person’, or from ‘I want to be a good pianist’ to ‘I am a good pianist.’

Therefore, even if life is creation as Bergson says, the role of habit would still be crucial, since habit engenders second natures in the primary nature. An idea made by a person becomes a new nature by habit. A new idea created by an intelligence of genius will be established in the community by means of proper social customs. Even if a moral ideal demands the overcoming of our natural tendencies, as Bergson says, it is nonetheless necessary to make the practice of it our second nature in order to perfectly achieve it. Life would remain imperfect

---

17 *Of Habit* (en.), p.71

18 *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*) p. 56

19 *Of Habit* (en.), p. 69

without habit. If “practice makes perfect”, we can rightly say “habit makes perfect” as well.

However, it is also true that some habits are evidently not preferable. How can we deal with our bad habits? But this problem doesn't seem to be discussed in detail in Ravaissan's *Of Habit* which is optimistic about habit.<sup>[20]</sup> Besides, another question could be raised: how can we adapt properly to changed environments? A habit which is preferable in a region can be unwanted somewhere else. But the problem is that a habit, once contracted, is so rigidified that it becomes difficult to flexibly modify it. This point is admitted even in Ravaissan's *Of Habit*. “A man accustomed to carrying out strong movements with the muscles of his hands and fingers writes less firmly than another.”<sup>[21]</sup> So taking this point into account, it seems that, apart from the perfection, another way of life would be necessary. That's the question that could be raised, in my opinion, on the part of Bergson.

### 3.2 Creation of Self by Self

First, how can we adapt to change? To make clear this point, we can refer to Bergson's concept of common sense (*bon sens*). In his mind-body dualism, mankind's adaptation that he calls ‘attention to life’ consists of maintaining equilibrium between memory and habit. As a matter of fact, it is really hard for a ‘dreamer’ (*rêveur*) to properly adapt to the reality because he contemplates his memory instead of using it. However, it is nonetheless true that a ‘man of impulse’ (*impulsif*) also cannot adjust to the situation because his action is accomplished only by habitual mechanism like an animal which behaves by instinct. If the former lives only in the past, the latter only in the present; between these two extremes lies what Bergson calls ‘common sense’. If we want to avoid being animal-like, we need to rely on our memory. But if we want to avoid being phantom-like <sup>[22]</sup>, we have to lead our thoughts to the present perception-action. In the common sense thus understood, there is evidently the role of habit. When we perceive an object, our bodily habit draws its schema which determines the selection out of uncountable memory-images. That is exactly habit's role what Bergson calls ‘motor

---

20 “Ravaissan does not address this question: curiously, he writes of grace but not of sin”, Claire Carlisle. (2010) p. 138

21 *Of Habit* (en.), p. 59

22 “The recollections that my memory thus retains in its darkest depths are in the state of invisible phantoms.” *«Le rêve» - Conférence faite à l'Institut général Psychologique, le 26 mars 1901, L'énergie spirituelle (Mind-energy)* p. 95

diagram (schème moteur). However, its role cannot be absolute. Although we can perceive an object more easily and precisely by means of habit, we can also make a mistake just because of it. We are used to see a new thing as if we already have seen it. In this way, the 'difference of nature' between an invention and a mere repetition is often reduced to the difference of degree.<sup>[23]</sup> Therefore, the 'attention to life', at its best, consists in the collaboration between mind and body, in other word, spiritual activity and its 'fossilized residue'.

Fundamentally, his metaphysics of duration emphasizes on the creation of change. If the immobility is spatial, the mobility is temporal. So, immobile forms, no matter how many they are, cannot be 'component parts' of the real mobility, but 'partial expressions' of it. That's why he argues that we can only move from mobility to immobility by way of diminution, but not vice versa. For him, in macrocosm as well as in microcosm, mobility is reality, while immobility is its mere appearance. This thesis is the challenge to the Ancient Greek philosophy like Plato's one. According to the 'two worlds' theory, the True being or the Idea is characterized by the immobility, while a sensible thing is neither being nor nothingness. Bergson reverses this ontological thesis, proclaiming that the mobility is superior to the immobility.

By this, his metaphysics of duration is the challenge to the classical idea "there is nothing new under the sun" (*Ecclesiastes* 1:9) which believes that history would be essentially repetition. For him, under the perspective of duration, reality is creation and freedom. Duration is creation because the survival of past into present do not allow us to "go through the same state twice."<sup>[24]</sup> And it is synonymous with freedom, since the more our acts become creative, the less they are predictable.

Of course, the spontaneity of duration is more or less limited by resistance of the matter. Although 'the profound self' (le moi profond) in 'pure duration' guarantees our freedom, we actually often behave 'by habit' as if our actions were determined in advance so that they can be anticipated by others. Even though the life itself is free, an organism in reality is manifested in many cases as necessity because of its materiality. A degree of realization of creation and freedom is thus up to us. Freedom manifests as more and more evidently as life manages to overcome the resistance of matter, using it as its instrument.

---

23 *L'évolution créatrice (The Creative Evolution)*, p. 185

24 *ibid.*, p. 5

The highest degree of its manifestation in nature is the human consciousness. The humanity actually dominates more and more the materiality of nature by the development of science and technology through intelligence. In addition, as Bergson wished in his last work, the humanity might be able to move from the 'closed morality' toward the 'open morality' by means of the philosophical intuition which reinterprets the materiality of nature from the 'élan vital' which continuously engenders it.

As philosophy of duration, Bergson's philosophy is distinguished from Ravaisson's one. In Ravaisson's *Of Habit* we can see the ontological hierarchy in which all things are distinguished by 'difference of degree'. Habit, as natural spontaneity, expresses the grace of God and the aspiration of beings toward it. Here, the supreme-being presents the pre-determined criteria of perfection. One can find in this perspective the influence of the Ancient Greek philosophy which defines perfection as permanence. On the contrary, Bergson says, "One cannot represent the perfection as something of ready made (tout fait), given once and for all. It is particularly on this point that I separate myself from Plotinus and even from Ravaisson."<sup>[25]</sup> For Ravaisson, God is represented at the summit of the hierarchy where all beings have "the tendency to persevere in the very actuality that constitutes being." In contrast, Bergson, apart from the fact that his more positivist attitude tends to avoid discussing problems of God, prefers to describe God as Creation rather than as Perfection. "God thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom"<sup>[26]</sup>

In conclusion, the difference that Ravaisson and Bergson exposes regarding the concept of habit leads us to the contrast between their philosophies of nature, and this eventually allows us to see the two ways of life in the end. At this third step, it seems that their different ways of thinking are rather complementary then merely different. To be perfect, we need to depend on habit because it is practice that makes perfect. But, on the other hand, we have to consider the novelty of the world. To adjust to change, we have to maintain equilibrium between mind and body; in addition, to create change itself we should live through creative mind which prolongs the movement of creative evolution.

---

25 Isaac Benrubi, « un entretien avec Isaac Benrubi » (Dominique Janicaud, *Ravaisson et la métaphysique: Une généalogie du spiritualisme français*, p. 183)

26 *L'évolution créatrice (The Creative Evolution)*, p. 249

## References

- Ravaissou, *De l'Habitude*, Fayard (21 novembre 1984) (*Of habit*; translated by Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair. 2008)
- Bergson, (Essai) *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, Paris, PUF, 2007 (1889) (*Time and Free will*)
- Bergson, (MM) *Matière et mémoire*, Paris PUF, 2008 (1896) (*Matter and Memory*)
- Bergson, (EC) *L'évolution créatrice*, Paris, PUF, 2007 (1907) (*The Creative Evolution*)
- Bergson, (DS) *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, Paris, PUF, 2008 (1932) (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*)
- Bergson, (ES) *L'énergie spirituelle*, Paris, PUF, 2009 (1919) (*Mind-energy*)
- Bergson, (PM) *La Pensée et le mouvant*, Paris, PUF, 2009 (1934). (*The Creative mind*)
- Dominique Janicaud, *Ravaissou et la métaphysique: Une généalogie du spiritualisme français*, Librairie Philosophique J Vrin (January 1, 1998)
- Mark Sinclair, 'Is Habit 'The Fossilised Residue of a Spiritual Activity'? Ravaissou, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty' (2011) *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 42:1, 33-52, (<https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2011.11006730>)
- Clare Carlisle, 'Between Freedom and Necessity: Félix Ravaissou on Habit and the Moral Life' (2010) *Inquiry*, 53:2, 123-145, (<https://doi.org/10.1080/00201741003612146>)

## Author Information

Kim Hyeseong (KyungHee University, South Korea)