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Running Multiple Candidates and Dividing the Vote under the Single Non-Transferable Vote

System: Evidence from Japan's Upper House Elections

Forthcoming in Asian Policy and Politics

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Abstract: Political parties seek to make optimal nominations of candidates to maximize the number

of seats they may win. In a multi-member district with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral

system, parties need to run the optimal number of candidates in each electoral district. If too many or

too few candidates are run, they may lose seats they might otherwise have won. In this situation,

district-level party organizations face a collective action problem: they do not have the incentive to

run multiple candidates for fear of losing all seats, despite needing to do so in order for the party to

win a majority of seats in a legislature. This study examines the factors that enable parties to run

multiple candidates in SNTV districts, and shows that parties undertake this action when they are able

to divide the vote between party candidates on the basis of geography in the case of Japan.

Keywords: Candidate Nomination; Electoral Coordination; Intraparty Competition; SNTV; Japan

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Introduction

The collective goals of political parties and the individual goals of party legislators are sometimes incompatible (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). Parties are typically faced with collective action problems in which the self-interested behavior of party legislators or subgroups can undermine the party's collective goals in the processes of elections, policymaking, and political management. Parties tend to be confronted with these problems when nominating candidates (Baker & Scheiner, 2004; Browne & Patterson, 1999; Cox & Rosenbluth, 1994, 1996; Nemoto, Pekkanen, & Krauss, 2014; Reed, 2009). The party leadership tries to nominate candidates in ways that will increase party membership; however, individual legislators or intra-party subgroups seek to secure their own seats or increase their own group membership, which may sometimes conflict with their parties' collective goals. In particular, parties encounter these types of nomination problems in multi-member districts under a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system.

Under an SNTV system, multiple members are elected per district, voters are able to cast a single vote for a candidate, and votes cannot be transferred or pooled among candidates from the same party. A party seeking majority status needs to field multiple candidates in many districts and run the optimal number of candidates to maximize the number of seats it wins. If a party runs too many candidates, it could lose a seat that might have been won, had the number of nominees been reduced. This outcome is known as *overnomination*. *Undernomination* occurs when a party runs too few candidates and potentially loses a seat that it might otherwise have won, had it run an additional candidate. Furthermore, even when a party runs the optimal number of candidates, if some party candidates receive too many votes, another candidate from the same party will not get the number of votes needed to win a seat; thus, the seat will be lost (*failure to equalize the vote*). The party leadership tries to run the optimal number of candidates in each SNTV district, but the self-interested behavior of party legislators or subgroups attempting to win their own votes and seats sometimes hinder this process.

SNTV is used in Afghanistan, Indonesia's Upper House, Japan's Upper House, Jordan, Kuwait, Puerto Rico's Upper House, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. It was once used in Japan's Lower House, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand's Upper House. Parties in Japan have long faced nomination problems under this system, so Japan provides an ideal case for discussing the nomination behaviors of parties under the SNTV system. In particular, in the process of nominating candidates in Upper House elections, parties seeking to win a majority of seats face incompatibilities between their collective organizational goal and individual legislators' personal goals. The central leadership seeks to run multiple candidates in several SNTV districts in order to win a majority of the seats in the Upper House. In contrast, the parties' local organizations in each district have an incentive to avoid running multiple candidates in case none of their candidates are able to win a seat. Therefore, analyzing party nominations under Japan's Upper House SNTV system will clarify parties' decision-making mechanisms for nominations at the electoral district level, intraparty dissension or coordination between leadership and local organizations, and overnominations.

This study examines how parties make optimal nominations. In particular, through a focused discussion of Japan's Upper House elections, this paper clarifies how parties are able to run multiple candidates in SNTV districts in order to win a majority of the seats in the legislature, and argues that parties run multiple candidates when they are able to divide the vote geographically between party candidates. This study finds that the two major parties in Japan—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—were more likely to run multiple candidates when they gathered votes intensively in particular regions or when they had run multiple candidates in the

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¹ The National Diet of Japan uses a bicameral system, which consists of the Lower House and the Upper House.

² From July 1989 to July 2016 in Japan, no party had secured a single-party majority in the Upper House. Winning multiple seats in SNTV districts, as well as winning one seat in SMDs and winning as many seats as possible in a PR seat, is required to garner a majority of seats in the Upper House. Indeed, a party can secure a majority through a coalition with other parties, but a coalition can restrict its ability to manage the government and make polices.

previous election.

This paper is organized into seven sections. The first section describes parties' nomination errors and failures to equalize the vote between party candidates. The second section reviews the literature on nominations under the SNTV system and explains this study's original contribution to the literature. The third section documents the parties' nomination processes in Japan's Upper House elections. The fourth section discusses the circumstances that enable a party to run multiple candidates and argues that a party is optimally able to run multiple candidates in an SNTV district when it can geographically divide the vote between the party's candidates. The fifth section introduces data that verify this argument. The sixth section tests the argument by examining the relationship between parties' vote-gathering structures and their nomination behavior. Finally, the conclusions and implications of this study are presented.

1 Overnomination, Undernomination, and Failure to Equalize the Vote under an SNTV System

As explained earlier, under the SNTV system in which multiple members are elected per district, parties need to make optimal nominations to maximize their opportunities to win seats. Nomination errors refer to situations in which a party cannot win the maximum number of seats possible, given the number of votes available in an electoral district. The maximum number of seats is the number of seats that a party can win with the allocated votes if it runs the optimal number of candidates and the party candidates receive an equal number of votes.³ There are two types of nomination errors: overnominations and undernominations.

Overnomination occurs when a party runs too many candidates. An illustrative example that demonstrates this error is the Tokyo District in Japan's 1998 Upper House election (Table 1-1). The LDP ran two candidates, Kiyoko Ono and Koji Tsukahara, in the four-member district. Ono received

³ Technically, the maximum number of seats that a party can win with the given votes is the number of seats allocated through the d'Hondt method (Cox, 1991).

620,536 votes and Tsukahara received 449,304 votes, but neither won a seat. If the LDP had run only one candidate, that candidate (in theory) would have received 1,069,840 votes, and won one seat.⁴ The party lost the seat it might have won because it ran too many candidates.

Second, undernomination occurs when a party runs too few candidates. Take, for example, the Tokyo District in the 2001 Upper House election (Table 1-2). The LDP ran only one candidate, Sanzo Hosaka, in the four-member district. Hosaka received 1,407,437 votes. If the LDP had added one more candidate and allocated those votes equally to two party candidates, each party candidate could have received 703,719 votes and the party would subsequently have won two seats. Instead, the party lost one seat that it could have won because it ran too few candidates.

In addition, even if a party runs the optimal number of candidates, it may not win a seat that it might otherwise have obtained. Failure to equalize the vote occurs when a party cannot allocate votes equally among party candidates, even though it runs the optimal number of candidates. Consider the Chiba district in the 2010 Upper House election (Table 1-3). The DPJ ran two candidates, Hiroyuki Konishi and Ayumi Michi, in the three-member district. Konishi received 535,632 votes and won a seat, while Michi received 463,648 votes—71,984 fewer votes than Konishi—and failed to win a seat. Michi lost the third seat to Kenichi Mizuno by only 12,611 votes. If slightly more than 12,611 votes had been transferred from Konishi to Michi, the latter would also have won a seat. The DPJ did not win this seat because it could not equalize the vote between party candidates, even though the party received enough votes in total to win two seats.

[Table 1 about here]

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⁴ Of course, if the LDP reduced two candidates to one, the party would lose votes derived from the personal reputation of the withdrawn candidate. The calculation here is a theoretical simulation, as are those of undernomination and failure to equalize the vote.

2 Literature Review

Party nomination strategies and behaviors under an SNTV electoral system have received extensive scholarly attention. Theories of nominations under SNTV have been developed and tested—particularly in Japan. LDP nominations under the former Lower House SNTV system have been the subject of intensive empirical research. The LDP has consistently held political office since 1955, except for two periods from 1993 to 1994 and 2009 to 2012. From 1947 to 1993, the LDP fielded around two to five candidates in each district; thus, LDP candidates competed against one another in the same district. Existing studies have dealt with two main topics of the LDP's nomination behavior, namely, whether the LDP made the optimal number of nominations in the elections and, if so, why the LDP had been successful in making the optimal number of nominations.

First, scholars have explored whether or not the LDP made the optimal number of nominations in the elections. In particular, they have detected party nomination errors by comparing the number of seats the party was expected to win if it had nominated the optimal number of candidate to the number of seats the party actually won (Browne & Patterson, 1999; Christensen & Johnson, 1995; Cox & Niou, 1994; Patterson, 2009). These scholars agree that the party made near-optimal nominations. On the other hand, Nemoto, Pekkanen, and Krauss (2014) argue that the party leadership could not have avoided instances of overnomination caused by ambitious intraparty factions that sought the office of prime minister and thus aimed to win more seats. They indicate that factions were more likely to nominate candidates when they themselves intended to run in the next prime ministerial race, especially in districts that had more candidates from rival factions who also sought the prime minister's office. In addition, Baker and Scheiner (2004) maintain that intraparty factionalism and informational uncertainty about future outcomes and opponent behavior hindered the capacity of parties to pursue their optimal nomination strategies.

Second, other scholars have discussed why the LDP were successful in making the optimal number of nominations. They have found that the party was able to reduce overnominations and run

the optimal number of candidates through rational calculations (Browne & Patterson, 1999), learning (Reed, 1990), intraparty factional competition (Cox & Rosenbluth, 1994, 1996), and competitions among candidates (Reed, 2009).⁵ Cox and Rosenbluth (1996) show that candidates from mainstream factions were more likely to be endorsed and that candidates were less likely to be endorsed in districts with too many party candidates. Reed (2009) finds that the party was more likely to nominate candidates who had won a seat or finished as runner-ups in the previous election and that the party was less likely to nominate candidates in districts where the party had run too many candidates in the previous election.

In spite of these theoretically and empirically significant findings, these studies leave three problems still unresolved. First, previous studies have not adequately clarified the decision-making mechanisms used by major political parties for nominations *at the level of each district*. Indeed, they argue that the LDP aggregately ran close to the optimal number of candidates at the national level under the former Lower House SNTV system (Browne & Patterson, 1999; Cox & Niou, 1994; Cox & Rosenbluth, 1994, 1996; Reed, 1990, 2009). However, the units of analysis used in these studies are individual candidates or intraparty factions at the national level and little attention is paid to the nominating strategies or behaviors of parties at the district level. As a result, the following questions remain unanswered: How does a party decide what number of candidates to run in each district? Why does a party succeed in making the optimal number of nominations in some districts, but fail to do so in other districts? What factors attributed to each electoral district enable a party to make the optimal number of nominations, or conversely, which factors disenable a party from making the optimal

⁵ Christensen and Johnson (1995) showed that the LDP enjoyed seat bonuses and that these came from institutional advantages in the SNTV system, such as small magnitudes of districts and malapportionment.

⁶ For an exception, Baker and Scheiner (2004) looked at the nomination behaviors of parties in each electoral district. They found that parties tended to run more candidates in districts where they expected to receive more votes or where they expected to divide the vote more equally between their candidates. This also occurred where opponent parties' nomination errors were expected.

number of nominations? This study addresses these gaps in the existing literature by examining nominations at the district level.

Second, previous studies have identified intraparty coordination or dissension with regard to nominations solely from the viewpoint of the relationship between leadership and factions (Cox & Rosenbluth, 1994, 1996; Nemoto, Pekkanen, & Krauss, 2014). In particular, they analyze how party leadership restrained factions from running too many candidates. However, intraparty coordination or dissensions with nominations will exist not only between leadership and factions, but also between leadership and the local organizations in each district. Since local organizations work at the forefront of nominations and electoral campaigns, an improved understanding of how their preferences differ from and interact with central leadership is essential for acquiring an understanding of the nomination preferences of political parties at the national level.

Third, existing studies have focused on overnominations, but do not fully examine undernominations. Scholars typically assume that numerous people wanted to be candidates and explore how the LDP limited the number of candidates being run in an election. They do not, however, discuss the question of how a party overcomes the problem of undernominations. In other words, they do not consider situations in which a party faces difficulties fielding more candidates. Such situations might be caused by circumstances in which a party's local district organizations are reluctant to add candidates for fear of losing a seat because of overnominations. Therefore, an explanation of how a party responds to undernominations is also required.

This study aims to explain all these considerations in order to better understand the nomination process. Japan's Upper House SNTV system, as described in the next section, is a suitable field to see the parties' nomination strategies and behaviors under the SNTV system and clarifies the three issues.

3 The Process of Nominating Candidates under Japan's Upper House SNTV System

The Upper House has had a combination of prefectural districts and a nationwide district since 1947. A member is elected to the Upper House for six years, excluding the possibility of dissolution. Since 2004, there have been 242 seats in the Upper House, and 121 members have been elected to these positions every three years. Among 242 members, 146 members (73 members every three years) are elected from 47 prefectural districts, while the remaining 96 members (48 members every three years) are elected through nationwide, open-list proportional representation (PR) elections. Candidates may run for either a prefectural district or for a PR seat. Voters cast two separate votes: one for a prefectural district and another for a PR seat. They write the name of a candidate on their prefectural district ballot and that of a candidate or a party on their PR ballot. Among the 47 total prefectural districts, about half consist of single-member districts (SMDs) and half consist of multi-member districts with SNTV.

Table 2 summarizes the number of seats in SNTV districts and the nomination behaviors and errors of the two parties from 1998 to 2016. The number of seats allocated to each prefectural district changes according to shifts in the number of people per prefecture. In 1998, there were 23 SNTV districts, including 19 two-member districts, 3 three-member districts, and one four-member district; in 2001 and 2004, there were 20 SNTV districts, including 15 two-member districts, 4 three-member districts, and one four-member district; in 2007 and 2010, there were 18 SNTV districts, including 12 two-member districts, 5 three-member districts, and one five-member district; in 2013, there were 10 two-member districts, 3 three-member districts, 2 four-member districts, and one five-member districts, 3 four-member districts, and one six-member districts, 3 four-member districts, and one six-member districts.

The LDP and the DPJ/DP have experienced nomination errors in SNTV districts in Upper House elections (the DPJ changed its name to the Democratic Party [DP] by merging with the Japan Innovation Party in March 2016). In the 1998 election, the LDP fell into overnomination in four districts (Saitama, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Aichi). In the 2001 election, in consideration of these

mistakes in the previous election, the LDP reduced the number of candidates that were run and, as a result, fell into undernomination. The party undernominated candidates in five districts (Ibaragi, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Niigata). The LDP succeeded in running the optimal number of candidates in the 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections, but then fell into undernominations in seven districts (Ibaragi, Saitama, Kanagawa, Niigata, Aichi, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka) in the 2013 election and in two districts (Tokyo and Hiroshima) in the 2016 election. The LDP failed to equalize the votes between party candidates in a single district in the 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2016 elections (Hiroshima, Gunma, Shizuoka, and Hokkaido, respectively). In contrast, the DPJ/DP has never fallen into overnomination or undernomination since it was formed in 1996, although it failed to equalize the vote between party candidates in a single district in the 2004, 2010, and 2016 elections (Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa, respectively). In summary, the LDP occasionally experienced nomination errors, while the DPJ/DP generally ran the optimal number of candidates in terms of the final results. However, this does not mean that the LDP and the DPJ/DP should be unconcerned about nomination errors. Rather, as will be discussed below, party leadership is strongly concerned with undernominations, while local party chapters are deeply concerned about overnominations.

[Table 2 about here]

Under the Upper House SNTV system, the party's local chapter (established by prefecture and known as a prefectural chapter) leads campaigns for both the LDP and the DPJ/DP. The number of seats in a prefectural district is small, as seen in Table 2, and only a few factions run candidates in every prefectural district. Instead, a prefectural chapter plays a pivotal role in nominating candidates and running election campaigns (Shiratori, 2011; Tsuruya, 2011). Each prefectural chapter for both the LDP and the DPJ/DP recommends candidates to the central leadership, and the central leadership makes final decisions on nominations.

In SMDs, both the central leadership and prefectural chapters have the same incentive for making nominations. Both aspire to run one promising candidate and win one seat. Thus, both usually coordinate their efforts so both can achieve their aims. In contrast, in SNTV districts, the central leadership and prefectural chapters have different nomination incentives. In situations where major parties compete for government office, the party needs to win multiple seats in several SNTV districts in order to win a majority of seats in the Upper House. Therefore, the party's central leadership has an incentive to run multiple candidates in several districts. On the other hand, most prefectural chapters are incentivized to avoid running multiple candidates for fear that neither candidate will win a seat (Shiratori, 2011; Tsuruya, 2011). If the party runs only one candidate, it has an adequate chance of securing one seat. However, if the party runs more than one candidate, it risks losing all of its seats. Indeed, in order for the party to win a majority of the seats in the Upper House, a prefectural chapter needs to run multiple candidates and win multiple seats. Despite this, when a party wins multiple seats in other districts and wins a majority of the seats in the Upper House, a prefectural chapter enjoys the benefits of having majority status without paying the associated costs—namely running multiple candidates. That is, in a competition between two parties for a majority of the seats, the party's prefectural chapters face a collective action problem in that they do not have an incentive to run multiple candidates since doing so may cause them to lose all their seats, yet they should run multiple candidates to enable the party to win a majority of the seats in the Upper House.

4 Theory and Hypotheses

The LDP and the DPJ/DP ran multiple candidates in some districts, as seen in Table 2. Why do parties run multiple candidates in some districts, while not doing so in other districts, when seeking a majority

⁷ When a party is in opposition, its first goal is to win a majority of seats and its second goal is to cause a ruling party (or ruling parties) to lose their majority, even if it cannot win a majority. If a ruling party loses a majority of the seats in the Upper House, the opposition party's influence on the political management or policymaking of the government increases drastically.

of seats in the Upper House?⁸ As already noted, in both the LDP and the DPJ/DP, the central leadership has the power to make final decisions about nominations. However, if the leadership forces a prefectural organization to run multiple candidate without regard for the latter's circumstances, the party might not be able to win a seat, which decreases the party's total seat count. Therefore, the leadership decides whether to run more than one candidate in view of each district's circumstances.

This study suggests that a party will run multiple candidates when party candidates in the same district can divide the vote between them. McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995) and Tatebayashi (2004) found that in the former SNTV districts of Japan's Lower House, LDP candidates in the same district separated territories in which they had intensively gathered votes and respected one another's territories (vote division) in order to coordinate vote-gathering and coexist harmoniously. According to Tatebayashi (2004), there were two types of vote divisions.⁹ First, there was *geographical vote*

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⁸ The centralization of party organization may allow the LDP and the DPJ to nominate multiple candidates. In Japan, because of electoral and administrative reforms in the late 1990s, and the establishment of a decision-making style based on strong support from the public, party leadership has increased its control over party members (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). This study found that the parties are better able to run multiple candidates in more districts as the centralization of the party's organization advances. It is natural that an increase in the power of a party leadership that is seeking to run more candidates leads to an increase in the probability of running multiple candidates. However, if the centralization of the party's organizational efforts were a sufficient condition for nominating multiple candidates, the parties should have run multiple candidates in all SNTV districts. In reality, however, the party only ran multiple candidates in some districts. In short, the centralization of party leadership cannot explain why the parties ran multiple candidates in some districts but not in others, or what enabled the party to run multiple candidates. In empirical analyses of the latter, I will include election-year dummy variables to control for the party organization's centralization.

⁹ There may be a third type of vote division in Upper House elections, namely a division between public support and organizational support. In some SNTV districts, parties run a celebrity candidate who is popular among the general public, such as a former announcer, TV personality, sports player, or professor, and a traditional candidate. A celebrity candidate seeks votes from independent voters, while a traditional candidate seeks votes from the party's support organizations, such as agriculture, construction, and commerce groups for the LDP and labor unions for the DPJ. The LDP and the DPJ, in this instance, mostly ran celebrity candidates in a nationwide PR seat, with the expectation that their nationwide popularity would increase the party's votes in a PR seat. In contrast, the parties ran only six celebrity candidates in total in SNTV districts between the 2004 and the 2010 elections. Furthermore, this type of vote division is part of geographical vote divisions. A celebrity candidate and a traditional candidate are able to geographically divide the vote between urban and rural regions.

division, in which legislators divided the vote on the basis of geographical regions. By building vote-gathering bases in different regions, legislators in the same district attempted to inhibit excessive competition for votes and avoid having candidates overlap one another's vote-gathering regions. Another way to divide the vote was through sectorial vote division, meaning they divided the vote on the basis of policy areas. By specializing in different policy areas, legislators from the same district aimed to represent the interests of different constituencies and thus avoid targeting the same constituencies. Under the LDP's long rule, policymaking in each policy area was delegated to 17 divisions (bukai) established in the party Policy Research Council (PRC) by policy areas that corresponded to Diet committees and government ministries. By belonging to different divisions, legislators could represent different constituencies.

In Upper House elections, candidates also divide the vote with each other in order to coexist cooperatively. However, sectorial vote division can only be conducted between incumbents, because only incumbents are eligible for membership in the divisions that allow members to represent interests in each area. This is the case for both the LDP and the DPJ/DP. As a result, it is difficult to implement sectorial vote divisions between an incumbent and a fresh candidate, or between fresh candidates exclusively, despite the fact that the parties nominate many fresh candidates in every election. On the other hand, a fresh candidate can also join a geographical vote division. Even when the party fields a fresh candidate, it can indicate to its voters in each region for whom they should vote. That is, fresh

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A celebrity candidate targets independent voters in urban regions, while a traditional candidate targets the party's support organizations in rural regions. Data are available upon request.

Furthermore, the higher vote shares that were required to win a seat also make sectorial vote divisions difficult in Upper House elections. The number of seats per district generally ranged from three to five in the former SNTV districts of the Lower House, while there were often two in the Upper House SNTV districts, as shown in Table 2. The average percentage of votes obtained by the last winners was 17.6 in 1983, 17.6 in 1986, 17.0 in 1990, and 16.5 in 1993 in Lower House SNTV districts, and 30.7 in 2004, 28.2 in 2007, 23.9 in 2010, and 23.9 in 2013 in Upper House SNTV districts. Votes from interest groups are not sufficient to enable candidates to win a seat in the SNTV districts of the Upper House. Candidates supported by interest groups are usually funded for a nationwide PR seat.

candidates are able to hold regions in which they intensively gather votes and coordinate vote gathering with another party candidate through geographical vote division. In summary, this study posits the following theory.

Theory: A party is able to run multiple candidates in an SNTV district when it can divide the vote geographically between party candidates.

Note that vote division is a mutually beneficial and stable arrangement between candidates from the same party. Once this electoral coordination mechanism has been built, candidates will have little incentive to invade others' territories and violate an arrangement. If one candidate encroaches on another's territory, by canvassing for votes in others' homes or approaching interest groups that support others, for instance, other candidates can also invade the first candidate's territory, which results in excessive competition for votes and overlapping in vote-gathering regions. If this occurs, both candidates will lose their votes.

When is a party best able to carry out geographical vote division? This paper argues that the possibility of vote division depends on the party's vote-gathering structure in two respects. First, a party can more easily divide the vote between party candidates when it has a concentration of votes in particular regions. In Upper House elections, as stated above, districts are prefecture-wide, and therefore a party's prefectural branch plays a central role in the electoral campaigns of each district. In particular, Lower House legislators elected from the prefecture and local politicians within the prefecture (prefectural assembly legislators and municipal assembly legislators) are directly engaged in collecting votes for party candidates in Upper House elections. The electoral districts of Lower House legislators or local politicians comprise a part of the prefecture, and they assume responsibility

Hijino (2013, 2015) offers a sophisticated account of the relationship between national and local party organizations in Japan.

for securing votes for party candidates in their own districts (Shiratori, 2011; Tsuruya, 2011). Horiuchi, Yamada, and Saito (2015) emphasize the role of local politicians in mobilizing voters in national elections, showing that the LDP's vote share in Upper House elections is lower in municipalities that experienced one of the municipal mergers of the 2000s that reduced the number of municipal assembly members. In these circumstances, if a party has several regions in which it can intensively gather votes, it is able to forecast how many votes a candidate will receive in each region and tell its voters for whom they should vote. On the other hand, if a party receives a relatively even number of votes in the prefecture (meaning that it does not have a particularly strong power base), it will have difficulty forecasting votes or indicating for which candidate each region should vote.

Table 3 provides empirical evidence that a party's vote concentration contributes to its geographical vote division. I tested the correlation between a party's vote share in a PR seat and the difference in vote share between two party candidates in a prefectural district at the municipality level in each prefecture. A party's vote share in a PR seat measures the degree of a party's vote concentration, and the difference in vote share between two party candidates measures the degree of a party's geographical vote division. As shown in Table 3, the correlation is significant (p < 0.1) and positive in 11 of 13 districts where the LDP ran two candidates, and in 17 of 32 districts where the LDP ran two candidates. That is, there is generally a positive relationship between the two variables, with the exception of the DPJ in the 2010 election. Both the LDP and the DPJ effectively divided the vote in municipalities where they intensively gathered votes. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: A party is more likely to run multiple candidates in an SNTV district in which it has intensively collected votes from particular regions.

Regarding Hypothesis 1, the existence of reverse causality may be a possibility. That is, running multiple candidates in a prefectural district may lead to geographical concentrations of the

party's vote share in PR. However, under the Upper House's combination of prefectural districts and open-list PR, as stated before, candidates may only run for either a prefectural district or a PR seat, and voters cast two separate votes—one for a prefectural district and one for PR. Electoral results in a prefectural district do not determine who is elected for a PR seat. Therefore, the number of party candidates in a prefectural district is considered to have little impact on the pattern of the party's vote share. There is little theoretical justification for the existence of reverse causality. In order to address the reverse causality in empirical terms, the regression analyses in the latter part of this study add a model with *RS Value* (*t-1*) instead of *RS Value*, because whether a party nominated multiple candidates in the current election did not affect vote concentration in the previous election.

<Table 3 about here>

Second, a party can more easily divide the vote in cases where it actually ran multiple candidates in the last election. In such cases, parties benefit from knowing how best to divide the vote to split party candidates' election campaign areas. This process also allocates votes to each candidate, allows party candidates to coordinate election campaigns with one another, tells voters for whom they should vote, and determines how accurate such voting assignments are for voters. Building on experience will enable a party to develop a better vote division strategy. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: A party is more likely to run multiple candidates in an SNTV district in which it successfully ran multiple candidates in the last election.

5 Research Design

In order to test the hypotheses, this study analyzes the nomination behaviors of the LDP and the DPJ

in Upper House elections. A unit of analysis is the LDP's and the DPJ's nomination behavior in prefectural district *k* in election *t*. The analysis focuses on the LDP in the 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016 elections, and the DPJ in the 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections, because the two major parties have tried to win a majority of seats in these elections by running multiple candidates in select SNTV districts. Figure 1 displays the number of seats that the LDP and the DPJ/DP won in Upper House elections after the DPJ was formed in 1996. After 2004, both parties were locked in a close contest. The LDP has consistently sought to win a majority of seats in the Upper House. In contrast, the DPJ tried to win a majority in the 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections, but the party virtually gave up in the 2013 and 2016 elections. That is, the LDP and the DPJ were forced to run multiple candidates in SNTV districts at the risk of losing all seats due to overnominations in the 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016 elections, and in the 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections, respectively.

[Figure 1 about here]

The dependent variable is whether or not a party ran multiple candidates in each prefectural district. I use $Multiple\ Candidates$, a dummy variable coded as 1 if a party ran multiple candidates in prefectural district k in election t, and 0 otherwise.

The independent variables are as follows. First, in order to validate Hypothesis 1, the geographical concentrations of the two parties' vote shares need to be measured. Importantly, I need to identify the vote structure of *a party*, rather than that of *a candidate*, because Hypothesis 1 posits that the vote structure of a *party* will determine the probability of vote division. Fortunately, as stated above, the Upper House has a combination of prefectural districts and open-list PR elections. Voters cast two separate votes for a prefectural district and PR, and candidates may only run for either a prefectural district or a PR seat. By focusing on the variations in a party's vote share by municipalities in a PR seat, the extent to which a party concentrates its vote shares can be confirmed. That is, I use

As previously mentioned, some may claim that running multiple candidates in a prefectural district may cause geographical concentrations of the party's vote share in PR (reverse causality). In order to address this problem, I also use RS Value (t-1), which is the RS values in the last election, instead of RS Value. RS values in the last election represent the degree of a party's vote concentration in the medium term and a party can decide whether to nominate multiple candidates on the basis of vote-gathering results in the last election. Of course, whether or not a party nominated multiple candidates in the current election does not affect vote concentrations in the last election (no reverse causality).

Second, in order to test Hypothesis 2, I specify a party's nomination behaviors and electoral results in the last election. SNTV districts for the Upper House have consisted of two- to five-member districts. No party has run three or more candidates in one district. Therefore, in theory, a party could run zero to two candidates and win zero to two seats. Eight types of electoral results can be achieved, as indicated in Table 4. First under consideration are those cases in which a party ran *one* candidate.

¹² I created the original dataset of RS scores using data from *the Yomiuri Shimbun Upper House Election Data*. I created all variables other than *Population Density* from these data.

In these cases, there is no possibility for overnominations or failure to divide the vote. If a party won no seats, only one result is possible—the party was defeated without nomination or vote division errors (Type a). This happened in three districts in 2001. If a party won one seat, two kinds of results are possible—a party received one seat without errors (Type b), or a party might have won two seats if it had run one more candidate (undernomination, Type c). The former was the most common result, while the latter occurred in five districts in 2001. Next are cases in which a party ran *two* candidates. In these cases, there is no possibility for undernomination. If a party obtained no seats, two kinds of results are possible—a party could have won no seats, even if it had reduced the number of candidates from two to one (Type d), or a party could have won one seat if it had reduced the two candidates to one candidate (Type e). However, instances of these two types have not occurred since 2001. If a party won one seat, two kinds of results were possible—a party received one seat without errors (Type f), or a party would have won two seats if it had allocated votes equally to two party candidates (Type g, and an example of failure to equalize the votes). The former appeared relatively commonly, while the latter occurred infrequently. Third, if a party won two seats, only one result was possible—the party won two seats without errors (Type h). This occurred in a few districts in 2004, 2007, and 2010.

Hypothesis 2 expects that a party is more likely to run multiple candidates when it has successfully run multiple candidates in the last election. I create indexes for running two candidates in the last election, which refer to Types f, g, and h. However, the LDP and DPJ ran two candidates in all the districts in which they had won two seats in the last election, which means that whether or not a party had won two seats in the last election perfectly predicts whether or not a party ran multiple candidates in subsequent elections. Therefore, a variable for Type h cannot be included in the analysis. As a result, I insert two indexes for having run two candidates in the last election: *Two Candidates, One Winner* (t-1), a dummy variable coded 1 if a party had run two candidates and won one seat without errors in district k in the last election (Type f), and 0 otherwise; and *Failure to Equalize the Vote* (t-1), a dummy variable coded 1 if a party had run two candidates and won one seat, although

it could have won two seats if it had equally allocated votes to two candidates in district k in the last election (Type g), and 0 otherwise. Hypothesis 2 expects that *Two Candidates, One Winner* (t-1) and *Failure to Equalize the Vote* (t-1) are positive.

[Table 4 about here]

I include ten control variables. First, we need to control for a party's nomination behavior and electoral results in each district in the last election. Among the eight types shown in Table 4, variables for Types f and g are included as key independent variables, a variable for Type h is excluded from the analysis, and Types d and e did not arise in reality. Type a happened only in 2001 and 2013 and thus the appearance of this type can be perfectly predicted by year-dummy variables. Cases with type a are excluded. Therefore, I put the following into variables for Type c. Undernomination (t-1)is a dummy variable coded 1 if a party had incurred undernomination in district k in the last election (Type c), and 0 otherwise. The reference category is Type b. Second, the number of seats elected from a district could influence the parties' nomination behaviors and electoral results. To account for this, I insert District Magnitude, which is the number of members elected from district k. Third, a party would be more likely to run multiple candidates in districts where it would be expected to win a larger vote share. In order to control for a party's electoral strength in a district, I include PR Vote Share (t-1), which expresses a vote share in a PR seat corresponding to prefectural district k in the last election. Fourth, a ruling party would have a greater incentive to run multiple candidates in order to maintain its majority status and pass bills in both Houses. I put in Office, a dummy variable coded 1 if a party held a ruling position in election t, and 0 otherwise. Office is anticipated to be positive. Fifth, in order to control for partisan attribution, I include DPJ, a dummy variable coded 1 if a party is the DPJ, and 0 otherwise. Recently, the DPJ was eager to run multiple candidates (Shiratori, 2011; Tsuruya, 2011). Consequently, DPJ will be positive. Sixth, to control for the characteristics of electoral districts, I include *Population Density*, which is the number of 1,000 people per square kilometer in a prefectural district.¹³ Finally, to control for the specific effects of the election year, such as the centralization of the party's organization, I enter four year dummy variables—2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016—which are coded 1 if the observation corresponds to the respective year, and 0 otherwise. The reference year is 2004. Table 5 displays the variables' descriptive statistics.

[Table 5 about here]

6 Results

As stated above, the LDP and DPJ ran two candidates in all the districts in which they had won two seats in the last election. In addition, the appearance of Type a can be perfectly predicted by year-dummy variables. Therefore, I ran two types of models. Models 1 and 2 include all cases, but exclude the variables for the party's nomination behavior in the last election. In contrast, Models 3 and 4 include these variables, but exclude eleven cases that fall into the categories of Types a and h. In order to estimate the causal effect of the geographical concentration of the party's vote shares on its decision to run multiple candidates, the party's nomination behaviors and electoral results in each district in the last election need to be controlled for. In addition, Models 1 and 3 use *RS Value*, while Models 2 and 4 use *RS Value* (t-1). Therefore, the main model is Model 3, which includes the variables for the party's nomination behavior in the last election and *RS Value*.

A binary probit regression model is used, since the dependent variable is binomial. In all models, a party prefectural chapter-fixed effect model is not appropriate, because some party prefectural chapters consistently ran only one candidate, while others consistently ran two candidates. This means that there is no within-individual variance in the dependent variable in some units of

¹³ The data on population density were provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/k-sugata/).

observation. In addition, I tested for random effects using a log-likelihood test. In all models, the null hypothesis that there is zero variance among party prefectural chapter-fixed effects could not be rejected. Therefore, a pooled model is better than both a fixed-effect model and a random-effect model. Standard errors are clustered by party prefectural chapter to account for corrections among the same party prefectural chapters.

The results are reported in Table 6. Regarding Hypothesis 1, RS Value is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in Models 1 and 3. In addition, RS Value (t-1) is also positive and significant at better than the 1% levels in Models 2 and 4. RS Value (t-1) has as large an impact as RS Value. This implies that the degree of vote concentration shapes a party's decision as to whether to nominate multiple candidates, and the possibility of reverse causality is low.

Figure 2 analyzes the substantive effects of key independent variables using Model 3. The probability that the dependent variable, *Multiple Candidates*, scores 1, that is, the probability that the party ran multiple candidates in each district, is simulated by the type of a party's nomination behavior and electoral results in the last election, and by changing the values in *RS Value* from 0.02 to 0.12 (approximately from minimum to maximum values), while holding all other variables at their means. The horizontal axis indicates the values of *RS Value* and the vertical axis indicates the probability that the party ran multiple candidates. A one standard deviation increase in *RS Value* from its mean (from 0.044 to 0.061) increases the probability of running multiple candidates from 3.4% to 16.3% for Type b, from 1.0% to 6.9% for Type c, from 11.0% to 35.1% for Type f, and from 79.2% to 95.1% for Type g. *RS Value* has large impacts on the party's decision to run multiple candidate nominations. These results indicate that the party was more likely to run multiple candidates in a district in which it had more intensively gathered votes from particular regions, and thus was better able to divide the vote between party candidates. Hypothesis 1 is firmly supported.

Regarding Hypothesis 2, in Model 4, *Failure to Equalize the Vote* (t-1) is positive and significant at the 1% level, while *Two Candidates, One Winner* (t-1) is not significant. The party was

more likely to run two candidates in a district in which it had run two candidates and received sufficient votes to win two seats in the last election. However, there is no clear evidence that the party tended to do so in a district in which it had not gained sufficient votes to win two seats. Figure 2 reveals that, while holding all other variables at their means, the party would run multiple candidates with a probability of 80.0% in a district in which it had experienced failure to equalize the vote in the last election (Type g). In short, running two candidates required the party to have run two candidates in the last election, and also required them getting a sufficient number of votes to have won two seats. Hypothesis 2 is generally supported. To be precise, the party was more likely to run multiple candidates in a district in which it had actually run multiple candidates, and could have won multiple seats if party votes had been equally divided between the party candidates in the last election.

Here, it is necessary to discuss optimal nominations. The empirical analyses have examined whether the LDP and the DPJ ran multiple candidates, but nominating multiple candidates is different from making optimal nominations. Nomination and electoral coordination errors resulting from running multiple candidates are overnominations and failure to equalize the vote. As Table 2 shows, the LDP and the DPJ/DP made no overnominations and failed to equalize the vote in only one district, and in only three districts, respectively, after 2004. That is, the LDP and the DPJ avoided overnominations and thus made optimal nominations once they decided to run multiple candidates. However, the LDP made undernominations, nomination errors resulting from not running multiple candidates, in nine districts after 2004, despite lacking a single-party majority. In summary, the LDP did not necessarily make optimal nominations in that it made undernominations. On the one hand, the DPJ/DP seemed to make optimal nominations until 2010. On the other hand, the major reason that the DPJ/DP made no undernominations after 2013 is that the party did not receive enough votes to win two seats in each district, rather than making optimal nominations. The findings of this study imply that a party's capacity to divide the vote can lead it to avoid overnominations and instead make optimal nominations.

[Table 6 and Figure 2 about here]

Conclusion and Implications

This study has identified the district-level mechanisms by which parties overcome undernomination errors and run multiple candidates in SNTV districts in order to win a majority of the seats in the legislature. This paper has argued that a party can run multiple candidates in an SNTV district when it can geographically divide the vote between party candidates. Empirical evidence from Japan's Upper House elections has supported this argument by indicating that the LDP and the DPJ were more likely to run multiple candidates in a district where they won a concentrated number of votes in particular regions, or they had run multiple candidates and received a sufficient number of votes to win multiple seats in the previous election. This article contributes to the literature on the nomination of candidates by explaining the decision-making mechanisms for nominations at the district level, intraparty dissensions, the coordination of efforts between leadership and local organizations, and undernomination problems.

An SNTV system is both an old and a new subject of study. Japan's Lower House changed its electoral system from an SNTV system to a combination of SMDs and PR in 1996. Both before and after the reform, a large number of studies have focused on an SNTV system, and especially its effect on party systems (Reed, 1990), party organizations (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1993; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011), elections (Ariga, 2015; Catalinac, 2016; McCubbins & Rosenbluth, 1995; Scheiner, 2006; Tatebayashi, 2004), and policy results (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Rosenbluth & Thies, 2010). Also, an SNTV system has been used in the Upper House of Japan. Recently (1991–1993, 1998–1999, 2007–2009, and 2010–2013), ruling parties have lost their majority in the Upper House, and have faced difficulties implementing policies and managing the political administration. Therefore, to win as many seats as possible, parties are increasingly being required to make optimal nomination

decisions in Upper House elections.

In addition, an SNTV system has also been used in elections of prefectural and municipal assemblies in Japan, and parties are being faced with nomination errors in local assemblies. For example, in the 2013 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, a total of 127 members were elected from 35 SNTV districts and 7 SMDs. The LDP and the Clean Government Party fell into undernomination in four and two districts, respectively. The DPJ experienced overnomination in five districts. Whether or not parties can make optimal nomination decisions affects the number of seats they win in local politics. Furthermore, as mentioned before, an SNTV electoral system is used in many countries. Despite the importance of candidate nominations under an SNTV system, and the extensive scholarly attention it has been given, many important issues remain unresolved, regarding how political actors such as parties, legislators, and voters behaved under the SNTV system, as well as how the SNTV system influenced politics, economies, and societies. These should be clarified both theoretically and empirically. In other words, the nomination strategies and behaviors of parties under the SNTV system are a subject of great importance to comparative and Japanese politics, and require further research.

This study's findings also suggest implications for how parties are able to behave optimally to achieve votes, office, and policy goals. In their pursuit of these goals, parties are sometimes faced with collective action problems in which the self-interested behavior of party legislators or subgroups can undermine the party's collective goals (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). Using an instance of party nominations, this study suggests that rational calculations and learning from past experiences can help parties overcome collective action problems, and make optimal decisions that will reconcile parties' collective goals and members' individual goals.

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Table 1 Examples of Nomination Errors and Failure to Equalize the Vote

1-1 Overnomination (Tokyo District in the 1998 Upper House Election)

	Candidate	Party	Votes
Won	Toshio Ogawa	DPJ	1,023,053
Won	Toshiko Hamayotsu	CGP	961,975
Won	Miyo Inoue	JCP	894,706
Won	Atsuo Nakamura	Independent	716,656
Lost	Kiyoko Ono	LDP	620,536
Lost	Koji Tsukahara	LDP	449,304
	(The rest is omitted.)		

1-2 Undernomination (Tokyo District in the 2001 Upper House Election)

	Candidate	Party	Votes
Won	Sanzo Hosaka	LDP	1,407,437
Won	Natsuo Yamaguchi	CGP	881,314
Won	Kan Suzuki	DPJ	759,110
Won	Yasuo Ogata	JCP	630,196
Lost	Nobuhiko Endo	LP	361,965
	(The rest is omitted.)		

1-3 Failure to Equalize the Vote (Chiba District in the 2010 Upper House Election)

	Candidate	Party	Votes
Won	Hiroyuki Konishi	DPJ	535,632
Won	Kuniko Inoguchi	LDP	513,772
Won	Kenichi Mizuno	YP	476,259
Lost	Ayumi Michi	DPJ	463,648
	(The rest is omitted.)		

CGP, JCP, LP, and YP refer to the Clean Government Party, the Japan Communist Party, the Liberal Party, and the Your Party, respectively.

Source: Author's calculations from the Yomiuri Shimbun Upper House Election Data.

Table 2 The Nomination Behavior and Electoral Results in Upper House SNTV Districts

			1998					2001					2004			2007				
	N of	N	of	N of	Seats	N of	N	of	N of	Seats	N of	N	of	N of	Seats	N of	N	of	N of	Seats
	Seats	Candi	dates	W	on	Seats	Cand	idates	W	on	Seats	Cand	idates	W	on	Seats	Cand	idates	W	on
Prefecture		LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ		LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ		LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ		LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ
Hokkaido	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Miyagi	2	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Fukushima	2	2	0	1	0		1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Ibaragi	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1*U	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Tochigi	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1					
Gunma	2	2	0	2	0	_	2	1	1*F	1	2	2	1	1	1					
Saitama	3	2	1	0*O	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	1*F	3	1	2	1	1
Chiba	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	1*U	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	1	2
Tokyo	4	2	1	0*O	1	4	1	1	1*U	1	4	1	2	1	2	5	2	2	1	2
Kanagawa	3	2	1	0*O	1	3	1	1	1*U	1	3	1	2	1	2	3	1	2	1	2
Niigata	2	1	0	0	0		1	1	1*U	0	2	2	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	1
Nagano	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Gifu	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	1
Shizuoka	2	2	0	1	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1*F	1	2	1	1	1	1
Aichi	2	2	2	0*O	2		1	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	2	3	1	2	1	2
Kyoto	2	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Osaka	3	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1
Hyogo	2	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Okayama	2	2	1	1	1															
Hiroshima	2	2	0	1*F	0	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Fukuoka	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Kumamoto	2	2	1	1	1															
Kagoshima	2	2	0	2	0															

Table 2 (continued) The Nomination Behavior and Electoral Results in Upper House SNTV Districts

		2010					2013					2016		
N of	N	of	N of	Seats	N of	N	of	N of	Seats	N of	N	N of		Seats
Seats	Cand	idates	W	on	Seats	Candi	idates	W	on	Seats	Candi	idates	Won	
	LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ		LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ		LDP	DP	LDP	DP
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	1*F	2
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	0					
2	1	2	1	1										
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1*U	1	2	1	1	1	1
3	1	2	1	1*F	3	1	1	1*U	0		1	1	1	1
3	2	2	1	1	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	2	2	1
5	2	2	1	2	5	2	1	2	0	6	2	2	2*U	2
3	1	2	1	1	4	1	1	1*U	1	4	2	2	2	1*F
2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1*U	1					
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1					
2	1	2	1	1										
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
3	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	1*U	1	4	1	2	1	2
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
3	1	2	1	1	4	1	1	1	0	4	1	1	1	0
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	3	1	1	1	0
2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1*U	1	2	1	1	1*U	1
2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1*U	1	3	1	1	1	1

O, U, and F refer to overnomination, undernomination, and failure to equalize the vote, respectively.


Source: Author's calculations from the Yomiuri Shimbun Upper House Election Data.

Table 3 Vote Concentration and Vote Division

				(Coefficie	nt			
	20	20.4	20	07		ralue)	20:	1.2	200	1.6
	LDP	004 DPJ	LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ
Hokkaido	LDP	0.360*** (0.000)		DFJ	LDP	-0.137† (0.061)	LDP	DFJ	0.154* (0.035)	0.171* (0.020)
Miyagi		(0.000)				0.314† (0.051)			(0.033)	(0.020)
Fukushima						0.023 (0.861)				
Ibaragi						0.227 (0.139)				
Tochigi						(0.137)				
Gunma	0.173 (0.154)									
Saitama	0.418***			0.173 (0.128)		-0.111 (0.350)				
Chiba	(0.000)		0.831*** (0.000)	0.242† (0.061)	0.358** (0.005)	(0.330)	0.736*** (0.000)		0.589*** (0.000)	0.401** (0.002)
Tokyo		0.112 (0.388)		0.454*** (0.000)		0.082† (0.053)	0.833***		0.773*** (0.000)	0.038 (0.771)
Kanagawa		-0.034 (0.797)	(0.000)	0.053 (0.695)	(0.000)	0.102 (0.448)	(0.000)		0.301* (0.022)	0.058 (0.666)
Niigata		0.212* (0.036)		-0.011 (0.947)		(0.440)			(0.022)	(0.000)
Nagano		(0.030)		(0.547)		0.091 (0.434)				
Gifu						0.138 (0.385)				
Shizuoka	0.016 (0.894)	0.426*** (0.000)				0.335* (0.028)				
Aichi	(0.094)	0.202* (0.042)		0.412*** (0.000)		0.158				0.339** (0.004)
Kyoto		(0.042)		(0.000)		(0.186) 0.674***				(0.004)
Osaka						(0.000) 0.664***				
Hyogo						(0.000) 0.371**				
Okayama						(0.009)				
Hiroshima										
Fukuoka						0.360† (0.050)				

^{***:} p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, †: p < 0.1

Figure 1 Results of Upper House Elections



Source: Author's calculations from the Yomiuri Shimbun, each issue.

Table 4 The Type of the Nomination Behavior and Electoral Result of the LDP and the DPJ

	Number of	Number of			Number of Cases						
Type	Candidates	Seats	Error	2001	2004	2007	2010	2013			
a		0	No Error	3	0	0	0	4			
b	1	1	No Error	29	30	27	18	19			
С		1	Undernomination	5	0	0	0	7			
d		0	No Error	0	0	0	0	0			
e		U	Overnomination	0	0	0	0	0			
f	2	1	No Error	2	4	4	15	0			
g		1	Failure to Equalize the Vote	1	2	0	1	0			
h		2	No Error	0	3	4	2	2			

Source: Author's calculations from the Yomiuri Shimbun Upper House Election Data.

Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

Discrete Variables

	Mean	S. D.	Minimum	Maximum
RS Value	0.0435	0.0172	0.0195	0.116
RS Value $(t-1)$	0.0493	0.0181	0.0195	0.116
PR Vote Share $(t-1)$	30.668	8.788	13.289	48.091
Population Density	1.360	1.687	0.0689	6.112

Dichotomous and Categorical Variables

				Value			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Multiple Candidates	98	39					
Two Candidates, One Winner $(t-1)$	126	11					
Failure to Equalize the Vote $(t-1)$	134	3					
Undernomination $(t-1)$	128	9					
District Magnitude	0	0	89	35	7	5	1
Office	53	84					
DPJ	83	54					
2007	103	34					
2010	102	35					
2013	121	16					
2016	124	13					

Table 6 Probit Regression Analysis of Nominating Multiple Candidates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
		Coeff		
		(Standar		
RS Value	38.900**		48.930**	
	(13.056)		(17.966)	
RS Value $(t-1)$		43.232***		47.144**
		(12.346)		(13.999)
Two Candidates, One Winner $(t-1)$			0.602	0.189
			(0.840)	(0.859)
Failure to Equalize the Vote $(t-1)$			2.637**	2.321**
			(0.886)	(0.757)
Undernomination $(t-1)$			-0.497	-0.773
			(0.914)	(0.872)
District Magnitude	3.099***	3.104***	3.679***	3.591***
	(0.767)	(0.805)	(0.818)	(0.889)
$PR\ Vote\ Share\ (t-1)$	0.0688*	0.105***	0.0417	0.0858***
	(0.0276)	(0.0288)	(0.0273)	(0.0239)
Office	0.816*	0.806**	1.535*	1.340**
	(0.347)	(0.296)	(0.617)	(0.412)
DPJ	3.547***	2.691***	4.227**	2.831***
	(0.684)	(0.517)	(0.971)	(0.577)
Population Density	-0.694*	-0.659*	-0.877**	-0.838**
	(0.280)	(0.291)	(0.292)	(0.315)
2007	-1.115	-1.041*	-1.314*	-1.438**
	(0.607)	(0.503)	(0.561)	(0.452)
2010	0.0667	0.650	-0.0483	0.647
	(0.428)	(0.497)	(0.426)	(0.541)
2013	-0.0828	-0.808	-0.737	-1.543*
	(0.637)	(0.516)	(0.789)	(0.687)
2016	-1.297	-1.492*	-2.265*	-2.504*
	(0.714)	(0.695)	(1.063)	(1.090)
(Constant)	-13.218***	-14.567***	-14.871***	-15.499***
	(2.488)	(2.640)	(2.978)	(2.888)
Log Likelihood	-36.343	-34.606	-28.419	-27.329
Pseudo R ²	0.556	0.577	0.589	0.605
Number of Observations	137	137	126	126
Trumoci di Observations	131	131	120	120

Standard errors are clustered by party prefectural chapter.

^{***:} p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05

Figure 2 The Probability That the Party Ran Multiple Candidates by the Type of Nomination Behavior and Electoral Results in the Last Election and by *RS Value*

