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Marx, and Marxism as method in Stuart Hall's thinking

Hiroki OGASAWARA

ABSTRACT The task here is to consider what I would call Stuart Hall's theoretical "legacy" in the field of social and cultural thoughts. As a materialist of articulation rather than of reductionism, Hall taught us how to profoundly understand and intensely describe the "concrete" in cultural and social fields. The "concrete," according to Hall, is a result of "non-necessary correspondence" between various forces, relations and situations, that is, the contingent and articulated determination in history. In my view, he was after all a Marxist in this sense. In the earlier stage of his thinking, Hall was very much indulged in reading and learning from Marx. This is characteristic in his "Marx's Notes on Method: A Reading of the 1857 'Introduction.'" His Marxism then showed a unique twist in later stage, which was explicitly expressed in his article "Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debate." Reading these two texts, the piece aims to comprehend the way Hall has read with Marx and the resonated thoughts. His lesson conducts us to tackling our on-going agendas in this half-dead Capitalist world, such as the crisis of culture, subjectivity and politics.

KEYWORDS: Marx, the concrete, articulation, no necessary correspondence

Introduction

I strictly assign myself here not to express personal reflection of late Stuart Hall, but to think seriously of what I've called elsewhere his theoretical "legacy" in the field of social thoughts. Hall was a teacher of moments and also a thinker of "conjuncture." These two faces beautifully coexisted in his life. He taught something always along with and in line with on-going situations. He taught us how to profoundly understand and intensely describe the "concrete" in cultural and social fields. The "concrete," according to Hall, is a result of "non-necessary correspondence" between various forces, relations and situations, that is, the contingent and articulated determination in history. This is what he had learnt by reading Marx and various Western Marxist thoughts most

notably Luis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci, and in addition, within a slightly different context, a prominent black Marxist C.L.R. James. In the earlier stage of his thinking, Hall was very much indulged in reading and learning from Marx. This is characteristic in his “Marx’s Notes on Method: A Reading of the 1857 ‘Introduction’”(1974). His Marxism then showed a unique twist in later stage, which was explicitly expressed in his article “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debate”(1985). I have to reluctantly leave Gramsci and James aside partly for the sake of the clear argument here. Also it is because these two particularly illuminating texts help us comprehend the way Hall has tackled with Marx and the resonated thoughts, and, in my view, conducts us to take on our on-going agendas in this half-dead Capitalist world, such as the crisis of culture, subjectivity and politics.

The concrete as a result of articulation, not of reduction

Hall has read Marx to know how to theorise the concrete. However, the way he did so was slightly different from a certain type of Marxists who are very much fond of getting indulged in abstracting the “law” of capitalism in order to universalize its process and power. Hall has been deeply engaged in thinking of the concrete as produced as a result of the opportunistic contingency and articulation. At the same time, he has been serious about describing and understanding ways in which the non-necessary correspondence between social forces, social relations and social situations, all of which produce that result, are determined, and also presenting those ways as non-necessary too. It is after all Hall’s method that he cared very much of this double concreteness. It is not to adapt or apply a specific theory to objects. Hall turned down such a formalist position as being a particular ‘ist’ in order for himself to be open to theories. Nevertheless, he is after all a Marxist in the sense that he learned from Marx that the concrete is a result of the articulated relations between forces and otherwise the historically specific situation would not have been realised in that way.¹

Being a Marxist in this way is strikingly different from those who take into the approach of political economy towards contemporary cultural politics, whose primal concern is with re-distribution of socio-economic resources. It emphasises on negotiation between public sphere or civil society, and the state, assuming that the

function of redistribution relies for their mutual negotiation or even compromise (by either sides) on ways in which capital is invested. In their view, class remains a vital main agency for this negotiation. Class is assumed as a dam into which all other social categories that could be at some moments more powerful factor of determination than class are sucked without substantial obstacles. In the end, class represents all other contradictions.

Race and gender, for example, are submerged into the metaphorical matrix of class formation. Race and gender are narrated as if their contradiction can be interpreted as metaphor of class friction. History of slavery in-between the Atlantic, issues of migrant labour in Western Europe or colonial legacy in the postcolonial world, whatever consequences these modern and contemporary phenomenon generated, the root of racism, according to the political economy approach, must be discovered empirically in the system of economic domination. It is extremely difficult to say otherwise at least in their views. They do, however, admit the significance of the cultural in recognising forms of struggle against that system although the cultural must transform itself in line with the economic. In short, even if we give a firm recognition to the declaration that “black is beautiful,” it rarely means to tackle with the uneven development of global economy, unfair trading system, global division of labour, the exclusive manipulation of labour market and marginalised existence of human resources. That recognition of blackness doesn’t change the dominant system.

Political economists of culture in Hall’s own generation, like Nicholas Garnham (1997) and Jim McGuigan (1992), stand firm with this approach. The instance of political economy is a practice whose source of power is ultimately reduced to relations of production. However, this version of reductionism dares to oversimplify black expressionism. It is as if “black is beautiful” represents all those contradictions racism is engaged with. We have already long known the history of the way this essentialist idea of “black is beautiful” even tentatively became super-effective in the sense that it cultivates some new horizons where structural changes in political and socio-economic relations that enforced racism occurred through cultural forms and styles of various artistic fields such as literature, music, film, sport, performing art, all of which were also spawned from long historical traces of slavery, migration and colonial exploitation.

Making cultural spheres subjected to the level of relations of production is not

just about the indulgence for economic reason. It is a theoretical issue too, particularly with reference to Marx's. Capitalism Marx got himself obsessed with was capitalism in the 19th Century. Facing to this simple fact, I wonder whether contemporary currents of capitalism are fundamentally same or different from the one in Marx's age. One possible answer can be found in David Harvey. Harvey has been recently remarkably active to revitalise formulations Marx had set up in mid 19th Century but denounces timeless universality of knowledge Marx manufactured (2010a, 2010b). Harvey's basic approach to capitalism, though, not to capital itself, shares certain affinity with political economy too. Although Harvey turns down monolithic categorization of knowledge Marx ever produced, and even seems very critical of general application of Marx to what is going on on the planet at the moment, he seems to agree with political economist that social relations are understood and analysed within the frame of reference of a unified organic system, that is, the totality of relations. Each relation is not internally coherent or unified, but they consist of a unified system even though internally conflictual elements endure the moment of implosion.

This is something intimately to do with what Marx called a "chaotic abstraction." That is a very high standard of generalisation and Hall took this intensely seriously when he and other left wing intellectuals gathering around journal of *Marxism Today* launched a campaign project known as "New Times."² They struggled to show how "chaotic" an abstracted idea such as class, capital or even Thatcherism would be. Their activity was political as well as academic, and aimed to overturn the perspective that had been held at the hand of the Left so long. Orthodoxy and rigor found among left intellectuals in the form of Marxist knowledge and vocabulary are regarded as a "cultural gap" because of which the crisis of capitalism in 1980s could not be fully grasped.

One of their basic interpretations under the lengthy period of Thatcher era was that the market force in consumer capitalism cannot totally determine how consumers make decision to choose alternatives and how post-Fordist mass production develops. If the practice of consumption merely piles up subjective activities in social life into the existing relations of production, the market system itself could be reduced to becoming an inevitably static model without any self-evolved transformation. Market, however, is maintained even partially by subjective activities and pleasure-producing practices

committed by the popular. Market is far more flexible and set itself more open-ended. Against this observation provided by Hall and others, the left has failed to value properly the contradictory ability of market, which successfully expanded its system of competition, and promoted and developed new product, and maximized novelty in public choice. It should be contradictory because although market is never tolerant, fair or socially responsible in favour of those who take part in its exclusive selection system of labour market, it is also recognized as a popular system of supplying opportunities of life and of holding a certain power of convincing them as it is. The left has not just failed to take it but also refused to understand it in that way.

The wrong kind of rigorousness prevent the left re-theorise and elaborately update concepts of class and, in a slightly different manner, proletariat. One of Hall's final public appearances was Issac Julien's "semi-docu" visual artwork in 2013, *Kapital*. In it, Hall put question once again, in front of Harvey himself, regarding the relevancy of the "architecture" Marx once designed. On proletariat, Hall touched upon Marx's "productivist focus," stating that;

The image is hardened around the image of the factory, the male breadwinner, the male earner. It doesn't deal, so much with consumption. It doesn't really deal with the reproduction; and which is, you know, those are some of the reasons why classical Marxism simply could not understand gender. Because it's absolutely critical to the production of labour and to surplus value (2013).³

In other words, Hall is herein introducing another layer of determination that determines another dimension of social relations. And this attempt is, as we will see later, understood as his trial to reproduce the concrete in thought. It is fundamentally important to note that Hall's strategy of dealing with race and gender did not necessarily stems from his empirical discovery of difficult social problems. It is in a way true that his life, his own experience and his face as an activist, all very much contributed to theorising race and gender in variously unique ways, but what brought Hall to realising the significant weight of race and gender among other social categories was a theoretical consideration as to the uneasy relationship between the concrete and the abstract which occupied much of his intellectual concern as a unique Marxist. Hall

continues to say that “there’s something in the theory – emphasis of the theory itself – which pushes us against really understanding and taking full account of what are, in fact, these contemporary developments” (2013). However, as he quickly points out, Marx’s “architecture” is indeed apparently all-purpose but in fact it is not generally all round. When Hall gave a warning that “you can’t simply go on saying, well, the proletariat is everybody; class struggle is everything, you know. In the end, race, gender, other social divisions, are inexplicable within the framework of Marx’s architecture” (2013). He reminds us that our task is to inherit Marx’s concern and then explore how they could become explicable, making sure how fragile and unnecessary the intertwining correspondence between the abstract and the concrete could be. Hall did not give it up. In fact, his never-ended effort of looking profoundly into the complex ways of developing the inter-relation between the abstract and the concrete dates back to much earlier days than he sacrificed himself for the “New Times” project.

In October 1974, when ten years had already passed since he joined the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, he contributed a lengthy reading note to the Centre’s journal, of which special issue was “Cultural Studies and Theory,” that is “Marx’s Notes on Method.” His contribution was, literally, the note of having read through Marx’s text and exposed Hall’s reading of the text to the readers. The “1857 Introduction” to *Grundrisse* was translated into English in 1973 and Hall used it for his seminar. Elsewhere, Antonio Negri gave a lecture on this text at *Ecole Normal Superior* in 1978, dictating that the text had to be read from the viewpoint of uncertainty rather than of certain methodological formulation. It could be possible for us now to set these two thinkers side by side and address the definite significance of the text for, on the one hand, a heavy weight giant of post-cold war Marxism and on the other a hipster of contemporary western socialism with postcolonial consciousness.

Anyway, Hall tried to learn something from the following passage of Marx in the “Introduction” in which Marx reflected upon the method of political economy;

The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for

observation and conception (1973, 101).

This is to say that the empirical real or the concrete should not be regarded as the reflection of something else. Take the example of “population” as Marx invited us to do so. “Population” is concrete and observable in that production is inconceivable without a population. It is the indispensable agent of production. Economics in the 17th Century depended on such a presupposition. Marx, however, denounced this as wrong because “the population is an abstraction if I (Marx) leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed” (1973, 100). Even what looks concrete would be nothing but merely a “hollow word” or “chaotic representation of the whole” if we miss out various moments that structure it.

The simple category, “population,” has to be reconstructed as contradictorily composed of the more concrete historical relations: “slave-owner/slave, lord/self, master/servant, capitalist/labourer” (Marx 1973, 100). This kind of reconstruction is to “reproduce the concrete-in-history in thought” (Hall 1974, 148). Although Marx posed a full stop here by describing those concrete relations, Hall read it as the moment of “conjuncture.” He took further historically specific divisions of labour and class frictions as “conjuncture” to succeed Marx’s trial of reproducing “the concrete-in-history in thought.” Theory is hereby required to perform upon history. Theory, for Hall, is a practical device by which a certain work is made possible to operate. The work is not to draw the simple unity from the abstract but to decompose the abstract into actual, contradictory, and sometimes antagonistic relations.

Theorising “no necessary correspondence”

Hall’s attitude towards, to use a very much 1970s’ and 1980s’ expression, “deconstructionism,” was exemplified when he said that “politics does not reflect majorities, it constructs them” in one of those seminal writings on Thatcherism, “Blue Election, Election Blues,” contributed to a Communist Party of Great Britain’s journal *Marxism Today* in 1987 when Margaret Thatcher was given her third term despite the pre-election verdict that the Labour would regain the power from the Tory. His analysis is apparently looks sketchy in compare to Ernest Laclau’s and Chantal Mouffe’s

(1985) more theoretically challenging contribution to the period. However, what was at stake in his analysis was that it was not those who actually voted or were able to express their political consciousness by voting but who made the “rational choice” of not voting that he tried to address as participants of what he called the “impression-management game” under Thatcherite spin system. Political decision-makings were both complex and remote while the big bureaucracies of state and market control a great deal of social life. Then, people became quite “rational” to believe that they can’t intervene with much hope or success into policy matters, nor can they affect the fine-tuning of the economic or policy machines. Voters are exposed to ceaseless massaging by the media and “disinformation” from the politicians. Consequently, the “choice” was counter-posed to democracy because whereas the latter is public and social, the former can be re-defined in wholly private and individual manners. This complexity found in “voting population” or “citizens” was concrete in the sense that it is not reducible to a totality of people, population or national citizens. What Hall tried to ask was whether the losing left could grasp the changing tide of the rule of the game, or whether they had managed to realize that the rule of the game was changed. In my view, Hall seems to have warned us not throw our expectation, anxiety or despair into someone else’s face because blues is a song that is always turned back towards your own face. This is what he meant by putting “blues” on the title of the article.

Hall had dropped a great hint well before 1987 on thinking about the concrete and complexity as if he foresaw the failure of the left in writing off Marx’s remark to the following quote;

The concrete is concrete, in history, in social production, and thus in conception, not because it is simple and empirical, but because it exhibits a certain kind of necessary complexity (1987, 148).

Here comes the next methodological question; in order to think of the historical complexity of the actual and concrete, is it necessary to reconstruct those determinations in thought, which compose the complexity and remain contradictory? What is over-determined and integrated at a certain historical stage, that is, “result,” only appears not as the point of departure for us but as something to be produced. Marx

called this appearance the “reproduction of the concrete by way of thought” (Marx, 1973, 101). We can herein find out codes of thinking, that is, the method. It is to be noted that at this stage the method is distinguished from the logic of history. In other words, “the-concrete-in-history,” in turn, reappears once again by way of the under-water channel called “thought.” “The concrete” prior to thinking is not the same as “the concrete” appearing through the process of thinking. Marx inserted his critique of Hegel whose intention was to integrate “the concrete” with the historical process that spawned it by assuming that thinking itself produced “the concrete” and that thinking is absolutely detached from the history. However, Marx too did not seem to generate the linking concept and even to recognize the necessity to produce it because he left untouched making connection between the system by which “the concrete” is produced in thought and the system in which “the concrete” itself comes out, presupposing the dichotomy of thinking and its outside.

Hall did not demand what he could not get. Noting that “though the concrete-in-history cannot be the point of departure for a theoretical demonstration, it is the absolute precondition for all the theoretical construction: it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation and conception” (Hall 1974, 151), he looked at the distinction and the interrelation concretely between two, different kinds of “the concrete.” This is a theoretical practice to articulate two factors. In order to do so, he surfed on the wave of the “linguistic turn” of thought by way of the likes of Bakhtin, Barthes, Derrida and Foucault. The very primal moment of this surfing was his seminal essay entitled “Encoding/Decoding,” which was written almost at the same time as he wrote this reading note about Marx.

In *Policing the Crisis* published in 1978, Hall and other co-authors provided an acute analysis of the situation in which “the concrete” phenomenon like labour movements, immigration and racism came out in the process for the post-war welfare state to be collapsed as reactions of social forces to the “total crisis of the post-war capitalism.” In it, they note that;

...contextualising is thus not the invocation of an inert “background” but involves treating these articulated process as a real movement through time and identifying, in their historical specificity, the links between the different levels of

abstraction (xiv).

This seems to be the manifesto of the under-lying method in “A Reading of the Introduction,” “Encoding/Decoding” and *Policing the Crisis*. From here, through the last one in particular, Hall drew another deadly difficult theoretical question, that is the question of “difference” or more accurately of “differentiation.” Here comes the stone-marking essay in his thought “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and Post-Structuralist Debate,” first appeared in the journal of *Cultural Studies in Mass Communication* in 1985.

In this essay, Hall made it clear that Althusser’s earlier book *For Marx* provides a far productive manner to understand “difference” than his later, more theoretically sophisticated work complied with his students, *Reading Capital*. “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in particular in the former book pulls us back to the earlier point of discussion about “population” and division of labour in early Marx’s thought, from where Hall took his preference to thinking of “difference” as he later admitted. Marx employed the concept of “mediation” by which each difference between either “master-slave” or “labourer-capitalist” is guaranteed as mutual difference by the relationality between differences themselves. The empirical perception of difference is made possible at the very moment when the relationality is exemplified. As no singular difference is constructed, no singular difference is thought nor recognized. This perspective is echoed by the earlier quote from *Policing the Crisis* and whether it is called “radical contextualism” or “relationsism,” difference doesn’t play at its free will.

This is obvious in the light of what Hall has been theorizing it but when his name is mentioned in the media, they often tagged him as the “godfather of multiculturalism.” It seems to be a two-sided evaluation of his intellectual life: on the one hand he’s been renowned for having lived through the difficult time of racial prejudice and his experience itself gave a huge intellectual influence and was well respected not only by the Caribbeans in Britain but among other ethnic minorities too. On the other hand, this tagging inevitably invited the name-calling of the “failure of multiculturalism” on the ground that the emergence of new style nationalism is spawned by the ghettoization of ethnic minorities and racial and ethnic tension is rejuvenated. It is a clear sign of the awareness of general crisis of the concerned society, which is set

alive against the current state that has been forced to lose its integrity by putting too much respect on living with “difference.” It is this idea of “difference” that has become the prime target of the critique of cultural studies by the left who would otherwise be supposed to stand together against the new mode of grass-rooted exclusive nationalism and the neo liberal strategy of global capitalism. To those who view cultural studies as scattering about a cliché that pays too much attention to “difference,” that is compelled to secure pluralism and that re-activates identity politics despite being labeled as cultural relativism, it seems as if the significance of “difference” is completely hijacked by, for instance, the race as skin colour, the nation as religion and language, or moreover by sexuality and gender.

Having read “On Contradiction and Over-determination” in *For Marx*, Hall has to come to terms with the way to think about the “necessity of thinking unity and difference: difference in complex unity, without this becoming a hostage to the privileging of difference as such” (Hall 1985, 93). This is the moment of inception of the concept of “articulation.” Hall’s eye shifted from his earlier concern with decomposing the abstract to the way that determinations take place in articulating otherwise differentiated various social forces at the concrete level. For Hall, the concept of “articulation” operates simultaneously at two different levels; although both practice and structure are concerned here, thinking of their dichotomous matrix itself and thinking of how to theorise the matrix are placed in mutually different levels. The former can be methodological, the latter epistemological. Althusser himself revealed in the article that his interest in Marx’s “theoretical labour” is developed by asking whether “theoretical labour” as a practice “has no need for verification from external practices to declare the knowledge they produce to be true” ([1968] 2010, 58). “Contradiction” is one of those principal knowledge and it needs be invited to a constant scrutiny. Here is how Althusser took this lesson. In order for a contradiction to become a ruptural principle in a social formation, as Althusser wrote, there must be “an accumulation of circumstances and currents so that whatever their origin and sense,” “they ‘fuse’ into a ruptural unity” (99). This “ruptural unity” should not be automatically replaced with the idea of “implosion” that I have marked earlier in this essay. Although at a first glance, Althusserian idea of “ruptural unity” may reflect closely on Harvey’s recognition of social relations and social forces as “internally

conflictual,” it is worth repeating that Althusser said “whatever origin and sense” of those accumulations and circumstances. Expressive causality is denied by Althusser while for Harvey, however revisionist he might be, the original position of certain classes are from the outset embedded in socio-economic relations.

Hall acknowledged this theoretical difference and turned his head to searching for a theoretical platform on which the concrete is produced as a result of “non-necessary correspondence.” Hall was very explicit in this point when he wrote that

It is impossible to bring classes or fractions of classes, or indeed other kinds of social movements, through a developing practice of struggle, into articulation with those forms of politics and ideology which allow them to become historically effective as collective social agents (Hall 1985, 95).

Hall went further onto saying that “the principal theoretical reversal accomplished by ‘no necessary correspondence’ is that determinacy is transferred from the generic origin of class or social forces in a structure to the effect or results of a practice” (95). Putting both levels of practice and structure in one perspective, Hall put a provisional ending to this theoretical examination by stating that;

Practice is how a structure is actively reproduced. Nevertheless, we need both terms, practice and structure, if we avoid the trap of treating history as nothing but the outcome of an internally self-producing structuralist machine (95-96).

As a result of avoiding the holy structuralist trap, or the eternal slippage or the never-ending indeterminacy, now how do a variety of social formations come together in non-necessary manners? According to Hall, “social forces” cannot simply be “a class in itself, positioned by some other relations over which it has no control, but also capable of intervening as a historical force, a class for itself, capable of establishing new collective projects” (96). One of most frequently quoted phrases he has ever produced, “race is a modality in which class operates,” is a sharp example of the mode of articulation Hall has struggled to theorise. Difference doesn’t stand alone as we know it.

Hall thought of “difference” by initially reading Marx to consider relations of production then proceeding to re-inventing the idea through reading Althusser while the same idea of “difference” has become regarded as a catch word of vulgar postmodern multiculturalism.

For further thinking

Instead of concluding this paper, I want to pose a question as to how much serious attention was paid in Cultural Studies to the theory, and to the method as well. How much have we been aware of them? The idea of “legacy” may be misleading because we might expect a sort of canonisation of what Hall has left for us. As for those “concrete works” he produced, we may need to unlearn them once we understood them. Are we ready to unlearn then? Have we fully digested what we should unlearn at the end of the day? I am asking this because what Hall has left for us in the form of those essays should not be underestimated.

In my view, it still has to be Stuart Hall with whom we’d need to overhaul new languages, new vocabularies, new social attitudes, new collective and creative intellectual endeavour of the project of cultural studies. “Conjuncture, by this I mean that the history of the present is always in process of changing at every moment of history,” once Hall told me, and therefore, he kept on saying that “it is necessary to change the way we intervene into it.” Having encountered theories and the method Hall took care of very much and having been convinced by his manner, it would certainly be impossible for us to understand, for example, cultural sociology of rock’n roll, reception studies of Korean TV drama and ethnological studies on contemporary manners and customs by “blue nose” intellectual aristocrats, as what Hall meant by cultural studies. Neither we would be unable to call as cultural studies a certain pseudo-intellectual gesture that pretends foreseeing what has already taken place as if it is on-going outside of public knowledge. Cultural Studies is not a public amplifier or interpreting machine which repercussions something that had been already known. Consequently, it is inevitably misleading to take the “result of thinking” as the point of departure. In that ways of thinking, primal concerns are with patterns of interpretation. Based on variety of patterns, they disclose the novelty, the plurality or the ethics of the interpretative

communities. It is hardly similar to Cultural Studies of Hall's sort because the order of thinking is exactly opposite to his idea. From popular culture, Thatcherism, identity, diaspora to visual culture, Hall dug deeper into the pantry of theories and thoughts when he found real social issues and political agendas to be debated as if a pantry boy looked for appropriate food stuff. Although his influence was spread around academy, art world and social movements, and is still immense, he was the first to be digging deeper into that pantry, to open the window and to cultivate the soil for further debate. His argument has been always in process, never fixed at any point, and looking for the next one. He kept on moving. He has never settled himself down neither in academia nor social movement. For Hall, there has never been the "place-to-be," which also resonates with his diasporic life. Is this a tragedy? And is it going to be repeated as a cheap comedy for the second time? I don't think that the old "black mole" has yet to come out of the tunnel. Therefore, the story has yet to be passed on, for the pantry boy never knows his place.

Notes

¹ Hall said that he took the concept of "conjuncture" not from Gramsci but from Marx (2009, 661).

² A collection of essays in this project can be found in Hall and Martin Jacques (1989).

³ From a personal transcript from Issac Julien's *Kapital* (2013). I thank Ken Kondo, curator at Mori Museum, Tokyo, for providing me the transcribed manuscript of the work.

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