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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14094/90009487
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2026-09-16
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90009487 (fulltext)
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90009487
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open access
出版タイプ
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タイトル
Optimal timing of acquisition price announcement for used products in a dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain
著者
著者ID
A0333
研究者ID
1000020345474
KUID
https://kuid-rm-web.ofc.kobe-u.ac.jp/search/detail?systemId=ca04979bc9981952520e17560c007669
著者名
Matsui, Kenji
松井, 建二
マツイ, ケンジ
所属機関名
経営学研究科
言語
English (英語)
収録物名
European Journal of Operational Research
巻(号)
300(2)
ページ
615-632
出版者
Elsevier
刊行日
2022-07-16
公開日
2022-07-12
抄録
The rapid development of information technologies enables recycling companies to purchase and collect used products from consumers through both traditional and Internet-based online channels. Because an online channel transmits price information instantly to consumers, choosing the best time to announce the recycling price (i.e., acquisition price) of used products to consumers has become a critical problem for recycling companies. This paper seeks to solve this problem by developing a game-theoretic model describing a dual-channel reverse supply chain consisting of a recycling company and a third-party collector in which the recycling company purchases products not only through a third-party collector, but also directly from consumers online. We derive two major results by solving the model. The first is that first-mover advantage arises, which indicates that each firm constituting a dual-channel reverse supply chain should announce its own recycling price before the other. This first result is notable because it is exactly opposite to conventional wisdom that the second-mover advantage of pricing usually emerges when price competition occurs among firms in a horizontal relationship, which is well known in noncooperative game theory. The second result is that the recycling company can maximize its own profit and consumers' surplus by announcing its recycling price in the online channel before or upon, but not after, determining the transfer price paid to the collector for products collected in the offline channel. Both results can be used as practical decision-making guidelines in dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain management.
キーワード
Supply chain management
Reverse supply chain
Online recycling channel
Dual recycling channel
Game theory
カテゴリ
経営学研究科
学術雑誌論文
権利
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
関連情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.010
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journal article
ISSN
0377-2217
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AA0017802X
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