



# DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN DOMESTIC ACTORS' FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES: THE CASE OF JAPAN'S OVERSEAS TROOP DEPLOYMENTS (1990-2010)

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博士学位論文

論文題目

**DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN DOMESTIC ACTORS' FOREIGN POLICY  
PREFERENCES: THE CASE OF JAPAN'S OVERSEAS TROOP  
DEPLOYMENTS (1990-2010)**

(国内アクターの対外政策に関する選好変化とその要因— 日本の自衛隊の  
海外派遣を事例に (1990-2010))

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## Introduction

### 1. Background and Research Questions

In Japan, overseas troop dispatches to international military operations, including UN PKOs and other operations outside of UN auspices, have been a controversial issue due to the firmly entrenched domestic norms opposed to the use of force in settling international disputes.<sup>1</sup> As explained by many constructivist scholars, such normative constraints include the famous Article 9 of the Japanese post-war constitution that prohibits “the use of force as means of settling international disputes” and the maintenance of “war potential” by Japan<sup>2</sup> and the 1954 Upper House Resolution that banned the overseas dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (hereafter SDF).<sup>3</sup> In addition to the legal constraints, Japanese society has been, in general, opposed to the SDF’s involvement in any kind of military operation that exceeds the defense of Japan from direct military attack.<sup>4</sup> Faced with these domestic restrictions the Japanese policy-making elite had not contributed troops to participate in international military operations for decades after the end of the Second World War.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies,” *International Security* 17, no.4 (Spring 1993): 98.

<sup>2</sup> Constitution of Japan, Chapter II Renunciation of War, Article 9. The English translation of the Constitution is available online at [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution\\_and\\_government\\_of\\_japan/constitution\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html) accessed March 14, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Kazumi Kenmochi, *PKO Hahei Bunseki to Shiryō* (Tokyo: Rokufu Shuppan, 1992), 234.

<sup>4</sup> Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011): 30-31.

<sup>5</sup> There had been exceptions to that policy, however. The SDF personnel had been sent overseas for civilian duties. For details see Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 79. Also, during the Korean War minesweepers were secretly dispatched. For details about Japan’s involvement in the Korean War see Tomohiko Satake “Chapter 5: Korean Peninsula Division/Unification: From the Security Perspective of Japan,” in *Korean Peninsula Division/Unification: From the International Perspective*, ed. Kyuryoon Kim and Jae-Jeok Park (Seoul: Korean Institute for National Unification, 2012), 121.

However, since the end of the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), overseas troop dispatches to international military operations have increased, and the SDF's roles were expanded along with them. Three major turning points in Japan's policy on overseas troop dispatches can be identified. The first turning point was the enactment of the *Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations* (hereafter the UN PKO Law) in June 1992 which authorized the SDF to engage in UN PKOs, humanitarian missions and election monitoring with a number of restrictions.<sup>6</sup> Based on this law, between 1990 and 2000, the SDF members were dispatched to UN PKOs in Angola, Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), El Salvador, Golan Heights (UNDOF), Zaire and Tanzania (as part of the mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR).<sup>7</sup>

In 2000s the expansion of the SDF's overseas military roles continued both within and outside of the UN framework. The largest SDF unit was dispatched to a UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor in March 2002. More importantly, a second turning point occurred during the Koizumi administration with the enactment of two special measures laws that authorized the SDF's support to United States-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the war in Afghanistan, the SDF was authorized to provide logistical support in the Indian Ocean to the US-led military coalition. During the war in Iraq, the SDF provided reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in the combat

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<sup>6</sup> Katsumi Ishizuka, "Japan's New Role in Peace-Building Missions," *East Asia* 23, no.3 (2006), 6. These restrictions are called the "Five Conditions" that need to be met before any SDF dispatch is made in the context of a UN PKO. These conditions include (1) a ceasefire agreement between the conflicting parties (2) the consent of the conflicting parties to the UN PKO mission and Japan's participation in that mission. (3) Impartiality of the mission (4) if the above conditions cease to be met, the Government of Japan can withdraw its forces (5) restrictions on the use of weapons.

<sup>7</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter II. Sectoral Analysis of the International Situation and Japan's Foreign Policy," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*, accessed March 15, 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/II-1-b.html#4>; Ishizuka, "Japan's New Role in Peace-Building Missions," 7.

zone.

In the years after Koizumi, there have been proposals from within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to establish a permanent law legalizing troop dispatches for international military operations outside the UN framework. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, during his first term (2006-2007) had sought to create such a permanent law. Even though Abe's early attempts failed, in 2007 the lesser goal of participating in *UN-led* PKOs was incorporated into the SDF Law<sup>8</sup> as one of the primary duties of the SDF alongside the defense of Japanese territory and its environs.<sup>9</sup> As of June 2014, Japan has contributed 10,600 personnel including SDF and police to UN PKO missions in 16 countries<sup>10</sup>

More recently, the third-term Abe Cabinet succeeded in further expanding the SDF's overseas roles with the enactment of an international peace assistance law (*kokusai heiwa shien hō*) on September 19, 2015. The law allows the SDF to provide logistical support to allies in international military operations, thereby institutionalizing what was a temporary initiative during the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Abe Cabinet changed the long-standing interpretation of the Constitution and acknowledged Japan's right to collective self-defense in a limited way.

With this in mind, three critical junctures of change in Japan's policy on overseas troop dispatches to international military operations can be identified. First, the enactment of the UN PKO Law which enabled the overseas troop dispatches to UN-led

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<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Chapter 2: Initiatives to Further Stabilize the International Security Environment," in *Defense of Japan 2013*, accessed October 27, 2014, [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/2013.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2013.html), 248.

<sup>9</sup> Article 3 of the Japanese Self Defense Forces Law states the main duties of the SDF Forces. The Japanese version of the Law is available online at <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html>

<sup>10</sup> For details of each missions see Japan's Cabinet Office, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, *Paths to Peace: History of Japan's International Peace Cooperation*, accessed January 15, 2015, [http://www.pko.go.jp/pko\\_j/info/other/pdf/michi\\_e2014/michi2014-e.pdf](http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_j/info/other/pdf/michi_e2014/michi2014-e.pdf)

peacekeeping operations (1992). Second, the enactment of the two Special Measures Laws which authorized troop dispatches in support of the United States-led “war on terror” in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Third, the creation of the International Peace Support Law (2015) which authorized the dispatch of the SDF in support of an ally under attack.

The present study limits the scope of analysis to two specific turning points: the enactment of the UN PKO Law, and the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that allowed troop deployments in support of the war in Afghanistan. In each case, this research attempts to explain how the laws were enacted in the face of domestic opposition, and how the government managed to convince the opposition parties to vote in favor of the laws. More specific research questions are in the following way.

*Research Question 1: During the Persian Gulf Crisis and the ensuing war, the Kaifu Cabinet was unable to deploy the SDF to provide logistical support to the US-led multinational military coalition, as such an act was regarded as unconstitutional by the government and the opposition parties. After the end of the war, a UN PKO law was established despite initial domestic opposition. How did the government succeed in convincing the opposition parties to approve the law? Did the opposition parties change their normative beliefs as a result of persuasion or material benefits?*

*Research Question 2: How was the Koizumi Cabinet able to deploy the SDF for logistical support during the “war on terror” in Afghanistan, given that such a response was regarded unconstitutional by the Kaifu and Miyazawa Cabinets a decade earlier? Moreover, how was it possible for the subsequent LDP-led coalition governments to extend the law a number of times despite domestic opposition?*

Before moving on to the main argument, it is important to explain the shortcomings in the existing body of work and outline the contribution of this research

## 2. Review of Previous Literature and Contribution of the Study

The establishment of a US-led military coalition<sup>11</sup> to oust the invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait at the beginning of 1990s and the mission's success have generated interest among scholars of international relations and military alliances. They problematized the issue of "burden-sharing." Researchers have become interested in why certain states contributed more than others, and why the nature of their contribution varied. Why do some states contribute troops to combat while others engage in humanitarian and civilian missions? Do domestic factors such as forms of government<sup>12</sup>, public opinion, bureaucratic politics<sup>13</sup>, election cycles<sup>14</sup> or legal norms on the use of force have more explanatory power than system-level factors such as alliance dependence<sup>15</sup>, level of threat<sup>16</sup>, or collective legitimization (the presence of a UN Security Council Resolution)<sup>17</sup>. The role of these variables were examined in both small-*n* and large-*n* case studies. Research on the determinants of participation in military coalitions deals with these questions.

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<sup>11</sup> Coalitions are "short-term, ad-hoc, and purpose-oriented, international security cooperation" with varying purposes depending on the mission including military intervention and peacekeeping. Atsushi Tago, "Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy," *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 7, no.2 (2007): 3.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon Nato's Mission in Afghanistan," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no.1 (2012): 71.

<sup>13</sup> Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48, no.1 (1994): 39-75.

<sup>14</sup> Atsushi Tago, "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the 'Coalition of the Willing'," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no.2 (2009): 219-234.

<sup>15</sup> Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48, no.1 (1994): 39-75.

<sup>16</sup> Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, "Comparing Caveats" : 67-84.

<sup>17</sup> Atsushi Tago, "Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: 179-202.

Research on participation in military coalitions takes into account cross-country variation where Japan is regarded as an outlier case as a result of its limited role in the “global war on terror” and fight against the Islamic State. Understanding Japan’s restrained contribution to international security has interested many scholars. The puzzle has been, why Japan not provided the level of contribution to international security that befits its status as a major economic power and US-ally in East Asia.

In 2001, the US called for another military “coalition of the willing”<sup>18</sup> to eradicate the Al-Qaida stronghold and Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Yet, once again, Japan’s contribution was considered limited compared to other countries. As explained earlier, the role of the Japanese armed forces have been expanded; however, compared to other US allies Japan is lagging behind. Japan has definitely not yet become a “Britain of East Asia,” instead Japan has carved out for itself the role of a “peacebuilder” or a “civilian contributor.” Nevertheless, even if Japanese armed forces have not participated in combat roles still, this marked a major turning point in that for the first time they provided logistical support to the US-led forces during an on-going conflict. Understanding such a change necessitates an in-depth single-case study of the evolution of Japan’s policy on overseas troop deployments.

Constructivist scholars have argued that anti-militarism/pacifism in Japan became institutionalized as a state identity after the end of the Second World War and shaped the external and internal security policies of the state.<sup>19</sup> However, despite firmly entrenched

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<sup>18</sup> Vucetic defines a US-led coalition of the willing as follows “a military operation in which at least one other state joins the US effort but where the US provides the largest portion of the coalition’s forces and/or the US commands the forces in the theatre of operations....From a much larger sample of US military interventions abroad in the post-World War period, 17 cases qualify as a US-led coalition of the willing.” Afghanistan is included in those cases. Srdjan Vucetic, “Bound to Follow? The Anglosphere and US-led coalitions of the willing, 1950-2001,” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no1. (2010): 33.

<sup>19</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1996); Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum, 1993; Hook,

institutions, the actual policies have changed over time. The Constructivist scholars have downplayed the scale of these changes by emphasizing their non-military and limited nature. For example, Oros argues that anti-militarist state identity continues to shape Japan's security policy.<sup>20</sup> This paper challenges their view and points out that in the policy making processes domestic actors' adherence to norms fluctuate when material interests necessitate.

Other scholars have examined the role of economic interests, public opinion, external pressures (both U.S. and Asian), "alliance consolidation" vis-à-vis the deteriorating regional security environment, and Koizumi's leadership skills. While all of these works have provided useful insight, none of them explored the changing stances of the opposition parties in Japan in favor of a more active role for the armed forces in support of international military operations. Here, contribution of other scholars is briefly reviewed before moving onto the main argument.

Heginbotham and Samuels, argued that Japan's "limited" support for U.S.-led military operations in the Middle East was due to the Japanese political elite's concern over jeopardizing oil imports from the region. They explain that during the war in Afghanistan, Japan did not engage in military combat in order to maintain amicable relations with oil exporting countries in the region.<sup>21</sup> Not only has Japan diversified its energy sources since the first oil shock in 1973, in the case of the war in Afghanistan, major oil exporting countries to Japan such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have explicitly or implicitly supported US intervention and there was no pressure on oil-importing countries

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*Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, 1998.

<sup>20</sup> Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008)

<sup>21</sup> Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2002): 114-115.

not to cooperate with the coalition forces.

Midford pointed out the influence of public opinion in constraining the political elite's move to assertive policies. He explains "...public opinion has molded and constrained the overseas deployment plans of hawkish elites."<sup>22</sup> There are number of problems with Midford's argument. First of all, it is very difficult to prove whether the opposition parties or factions within the LDP opposed the more hawkish elite's initiatives based on public opinion or on their own beliefs which may be similar to public opinion.

Second, it is not clear that the political elite in Japan are responsive to public opinion on foreign policy issues. In the case of the extensions of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, public opinion was largely against it, nevertheless the government passed the extension bills. More recently, when the Abe Cabinet proposed the security related laws in September 2015, there was very strong opposition from the public but again, the government passed the security bills. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* 51 percent of the respondents were against the ten security related laws passed by the Abe Cabinet.<sup>23</sup> Not all politicians in Japan are sensitive to public opinion.

External pressures exerted by either United States<sup>24</sup> (*U.S. pressure*) or Japan's neighbors in East Asia are put forward as factors that enabled Japan to make a greater contribution to both U.N. peacekeeping operations and U.S.-led military operations. As Midford noted, the Koizumi Cabinet faced less U.S. pressure after the

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<sup>22</sup> Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011): 3.

<sup>23</sup> "Asahi Poll: 51% oppose security laws, 74% criticize Cabinet's explanation to public," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 21, 2015. [http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind\\_news/politics/AJ201509210023](http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201509210023)

<sup>24</sup> Aurelia George, "Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?" *Asian Survey* 33, no.6. (1993): 560.

September 11 incidents, compared to the previous Japanese government experienced during the Persian Gulf War. Midford argued that a “demonstration effect” created by SDF’s non-combat roles in UN peacekeeping operation throughout the 1990s led to declining pressure from Japan’s Asian neighbors, which has eliminated the barriers for dispatching the SDF.<sup>25</sup>

Scholars such as Hughes and Calder, have attributed the SDF’s cooperation with U.S. forces, in the form of both bilateral defense cooperation and greater contribution to U.S.-led military campaign in the Middle East, as a response to the changing balance of power in East Asia. They explain at a time of rising military and economic capabilities in China and revelations about North Korea’s nuclear capability, Japan has been impelled to strengthen its alliance with the United States and support U.S.-led initiatives. Thus, according to Calder and Hughes, the driving force behind Japan’s unanticipated support to the U.S.-led war on terror was “alliance consolidation”<sup>26</sup> in the face of growing threat perceptions vis-à-vis China and North Korea.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, Shinoda’s research shows how the administrative reforms made in 1997-98 during the Hashimoto Cabinet (1996-98) expanded the powers of the executive branch vis-à-vis MOFA in initiating foreign policy related bills, which in turn enabled the Koizumi Cabinet to pass security-related bills (including the bills to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq) more speedily compared to the previously enacted UN PKO Law.<sup>28</sup> According to Shinoda, Prime Minister Koizumi took advantage of the reforms

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<sup>25</sup> Paul Midford, “Japan’s Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea,” *Asian Survey* 43, no.2 (March/April 2003): 330.

<sup>26</sup> Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 140 and 144.

<sup>27</sup> A similar view to Calder’s is expressed in Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Reemergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 46.

<sup>28</sup> Tomohito Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2007), 133.

and crafted the “Kantei diplomacy” a mechanism of policy coordination both within the LDP and the ruling coalition. Even though Shinoda’s work demonstrates how the decision-making process had become more efficient as a result of institutional changes, it does not account for how the LDP managed to convince the opposition parties to vote in favor of the law.

The literature referred above has touched on a number of factors which has either constrained or expanded Japan’s contribution to international security. This study deals with the issue of how it was possible for the ruling LDP to acquire approval of the opposition parties whose votes were essential to the passage of relevant laws?

### 3. Analytical Framework, Method and Data

This study tests the plausibility of two competing hypotheses about the mechanisms that change a political party’s foreign policy choices. Constructivist theory suggests that domestic actors’ normative beliefs change as a result of persuasion. They are convinced in the goodness or rightness of a particular policy or idea. This convinces them to replace their previously held opinions with new ones.

An alternative mechanism is suggested by rational choice theorists who believe that normative beliefs do not have an independent influence over behavior. Actors might act in accordance with newly learned norms or ideas only if they receive a material benefit in return for acting in accordance with them. The nature of material incentives changes depending on the status of the domestic actors. For example, a small political party can seek to enhance its political power by obtaining a role in the cabinet or ministry in a policy area important to that party. This would be a strong incentive for the party to compromise its policy views in other areas. The value of the material incentive is

important in the sense that accepting the offered incentive should be less costly than making adjustments in a foreign policy issues.

In order to test the plausibility of the competing hypotheses, the method of process tracing is used. This is an appropriate model to verify the absence or presence of a causal mechanism in a single case. Intra-party relations and the government's strategy to convince opposition parties in three distinct time periods are investigated. The first time period covers the enactment of the UN PKO Law (1991-92) which is explained in the first chapter. The second time period, is the enactment and extensions of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001-06). The final period covers the time between the 2007 Upper House election which produced the divided legislature to the 2009 general election which brought the DPJ-led coalition government in power.

In each time period, there was a high degree of internal division on state identity (i.e. Japan's role in international society) and the utility of the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. However, the cases differed in the government's ability to convince the opposition and value of the material incentives offered to the opposition parties. These differences produced different policy outcomes.

In the first time period, the government managed to persuade two opposition parties (Komeito and DSP) by incorporating their demands into the draft bill and through material incentives. Furthermore, when the talks on the passage of the UN PKO law reached at a stalemate, the Miyazawa Cabinet threatened to call simultaneous elections which would be critical for the smaller parties' political survival. In this way, the government manage succeeded in convincing the two smaller parties to vote in favor of the bill.

In the second time period, up until the 2007 Upper House election the LDP-led

cabinets were in coalition with Komeito. In the coalition formation process, they had already agreed on terms of cooperation. Komeito approved the idea of the SDF engaging in logistical support mission for a US-led coalition if the coalition's role was based on a UN resolution. In exchange Komeito was given the Ministry of Labor and Welfare as part of the coalition agreement. During the enactment and the extensions of the Anti-Terrorism Law, the main opposition party DPJ voted against the bills; however, as the ruling coalition held a majority in both houses up until the 2007 Upper House election, the bills were passed.

The third time period starts with the 2007 Upper House election which resulted in a victory for the DPJ with a divided legislature. The Lower House was controlled by the ruling coalition parties but the Upper House by the opposition. The DPJ's victory was also the predictor that the party had a good chances of winning the upcoming Lower House election to displace the LDP. Even if the ruling parties had the two thirds majority in the Lower House by which they could override an Upper House rejection, they initially sought to negotiate with the DPJ.

The then Prime Minister Fukuda made an offer to then head of both the DPJ and the largest faction within the party, Ichiro Ozawa, to join the LDP in return for his support to extension bills. However, this was rejected by Ozawa as the possibility of winning the next Lower House election was high for DPJ. Thus, in this case, the material incentives provided by the government were not sufficient to persuade the opposition became the party that had the opportunity to come into power in the upcoming election. Eventually the law expired, and the SDF's logistical support mission was briefly suspended. The Fukuda Cabinet proposed a new bill with similar content and it passed the Diet with a second vote in the Lower House, following a rejection in the Upper House.

In 2010, when the DPJ-led coalition government was established, the first task was to terminate the SDF's logistical support mission.

The results of this analysis demonstrates that normative persuasion alone is insufficient to produce change in political parties' foreign policy preferences and material incentives do matter.

#### 4. Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 explains the analytical framework, the methods and the data used in the research in detail. Here, two competing approaches on the changes in domestic actors' (political parties, in particular) views on foreign policy issues are discussed. These two approaches are constructivist and rational choice. Chapter 2 focuses on political process behind the enactment of the UN PKO Law (1990-1992). Chapter 3 focuses on the changes in the domestic distribution of power and ideational changes in the period from the 1993 to 2001. Chapter 4 deals with the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which authorized support for the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan (2001-2010). The final section is the conclusion.

## Chapter 1

### Dynamics of Change in Domestic Actors' Foreign Policy Preferences: Normative Persuasion or Material Incentives?

#### 1. Introduction

As previously stated in the introductory chapter, the reason for undertaking this study is the limitations in the existing constructivist explanations of Japanese foreign and security policy. Specifically, this study tries to explain how it was possible for “pacifist” Japan to contribute troops to the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. A decade before that the war started, contributing troops for logistical support to UN- sanctioned international military operations had been considered as a form of support for the use of force, and therefore deemed “unconstitutional” by the then Japanese government (Kaifu and Miyazawa Cabinets). So, how did it become possible for the Koizumi Cabinet to send troops for logistical support to the US-led military coalition during the war in Afghanistan?

Constructivist scholars have argued that “pacifist norms” have constrained Japan’s security policy and overseas troop contributions to international peacekeeping operations. However, since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the context of the US-led “war on terror” in the Middle East, the Japanese armed forces’ external roles have been expanded and the constructivist scholars have failed to provide a persuasive explanation of this policy change. This study seeks to understand how it was possible for successive LDP- led governments to expand the roles of the SDF in international military operations despite large-scale domestic opposition. What kind of strategies did the government use to acquire the approval of the opposing actors on the passage of the laws

governing troop dispatches and their duties?

At the theoretical level, the study aims to determine the mechanisms a ruling party uses to change the position of opposing actors' when their approval is indispensable. Is such change induced by "normative persuasion" or "material incentives"? Another question addressed here is: do norms have any independent influence over policy, in other words, are they divorced from political interests?

The first section of this chapter re-visits the earlier constructivist works on Japan's security policy and explains their limitations. The second section then discusses the sources of change in actors' preferences in the constructivist literature. The third section looks at the alternative view, namely the rationalist explanations for change in preferences. The final section explains the methods and data used and the study's limitations.

## 2. Limitations of the Extant Constructivist Analysis of Japan's Security Policy

Constructivist analysis of Japan's security policy has been considered persuasive by many; however, the main argument of constructivists that "pacifist norms" continue to shape Japan's security policy seems to no longer capture the reality of policy change. In particular, constructivist literature has ignored the causes of change in the stance of one of the most ardent supporters of pacifism in Japan, the Komeito. This study does not focus on Komeito's stance. Instead it analyzes the reasons behind the fluctuating views of the opposition parties including Komeito, throughout the policy-making process. Furthermore, it addresses what mechanisms the government used to induce such change. Nonetheless, some insight into Komeito's motives can be revealed. However, a future

study to examine the factors underlying the evolution of the party's security policy in detail would be illuminating as the party has been the key pacifist actor in Japan.

Constructivist scholars Katzenstein and Berger, argue that pacifist/antimilitarist norms have constrained Japan's security policy. Katzenstein argued that both the institutionalized legal norms (Article 9) and social norms (public opinion) have generated a security policy which eschewed the use of force. Institutionalized in the political system and society in various ways, pacifist norms have induced limited defense spending, a stance opposed to overseas troop deployments for combat role and the use of military technology in civilian areas, and the refusal to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>29</sup> He also argued that in post-war Japan, a security policy that focused on economic and social aspects rather than the military has evolved. Economic growth and technological innovation and "reliance on peaceful means" such as economic aid have been the defining features of Japan's security policy.<sup>30</sup> Berger made a similar argument to that of Katzenstein by arguing that Germany and Japan's unique experiences with militarism, aggressive war and their ensuing defeat generated the development of unique "cultures of anti-militarism."<sup>31</sup>

Both Katzenstein and Berger's analyses is until the mid-1990s, and they did not take into account the following period. Therefore, the validity of their claims need to be investigated. Singh believed that the fact that the constructivist analysis of Japan's security policy needs an "update." He argued that the expansion of the overseas roles of

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<sup>29</sup> Peter, J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996): 121-130.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 2-3 and 10.

<sup>31</sup> Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 317-245.

the SDF can be attributed to a shift in the identity of the state from a “peace state” to an “international state”. Singh observes that under the “peace-state identity”, the SDF’s main mandate was confined to self-defense and domestic disaster relief. However, with the adoption of the international state identity, its mandate was expanded to contribute to regional and international security. Consequently, the SDF has increasingly participated in peacekeeping, humanitarian and overseas disaster relief operations.<sup>32</sup>

Research using constructivist frame of analysis by Oros does not explain these changes either. He defined Japan’s anti-militarist state identity as having three core features:

- I. No traditional armed forces involved in domestic policy-making,
- II. No use of force by Japan to resolve international disputes, except in self-defense and
- III. No Japanese participation in foreign wars.<sup>33</sup>

Even though Oros conceded that the SDF’s participation in the “war on terror” has “violated” the third feature of its security identity, he still argued that antimilitarist norms limited the SDF’s roles in the sense that the SDF did not participate in actual combat.<sup>34</sup> Even though the SDF did not participate in actual combat, its roles have been expanded to include logistical support to military operations, an act considered unconstitutional by the government and the opposition a decade ago.

This means, an important question remains unanswered. How did the LDP-led government manage to obtain the approval of opposing actors whose votes were

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<sup>32</sup> Bhubhinder Singh, *Japan’s Security Identity: From a Peace State to an international state*, (New York: Routledge, 2013): 96-115.

<sup>33</sup> Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 45.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 182.

essential to enact the laws on troop dispatches and their duties on the ground? Furthermore, why do opposition parties normative beliefs fluctuate? This research attempts to fill this gap in our understanding of Japanese security policy.

### 3. Constructivism and Change in Domestic Actors' Foreign Policy Preferences: Norms, Identity and Persuasion

From the constructivist perspective, the political world is essentially made up of ideas. Ideational structures such as norms or scientific knowledge are the main sources of political practices and their changes. Norm is the core concept in constructivist analysis. A norm can be defined as a standard of appropriate behavior or common expectations of how to behave. They are prescriptive and make behavioral claims.

The behavioral implication is that actors act in accordance with a given norm and policy preferences are shaped by that norm. In such a case, the actors adopt a “logic of appropriateness.” This logic suggests that actors are motivated to act in accordance with rules and norms<sup>35</sup> because they consider such action appropriate, socially acceptable or morally right and not because they derive some material benefit from so doing. This is in contrast to the “logic of consequences”. Actors behaving in accordance with the logic of consequences are interested in utility maximization through choosing the best option with the highest utility and the lowest cost. They choose a course of action because they derive some benefit from so doing. Sikkink and Finnemore explain this difference in the following way:

The behavioral logic underlying the economistic and rational choice approaches to norm analysis is utility maximization. Actors

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<sup>35</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” *International Organization* 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998): 951-952.

construct and conform to norms because norms help them get what they want. An alternative approach to understanding norm conformance is what March and Olsen call the “logic of appropriateness,” in which actors internalize roles and rules as scripts to which they conform, not for instrumental reasons— to get what they want— but because they understand the behavior to be good, desirable, and appropriate. Habit, duty, sense of obligation and responsibility as well as principled belief may all be powerful motivators for people and underpin significant episodes of world politics.<sup>36</sup>

Norms can have external or internal sources in relation to the state. Externally, they can be postulated and promoted by, for example, international organizations and international non-governmental organizations which may change individual states’ policies when they reach the status of salient international standards of acceptable behavior. Norms can also be created by actors (or *agents* in constructivist parlance) within a state and can shape the state’s external (or foreign) policies. Finally, this external-internal divide may not always be useful in understanding the life cycle of the norm and how it shapes policy, since “mutual constitution” is the essential mechanism by which agents and international structures interact. Agents constitute international structures (international standards of acceptable behavior) and structures constitute agents’ identities and practices.<sup>37</sup>

One example of a domestic norm is state identity. Identity can be defined as “the agent’s understanding of self, its place in the social world, and its relationship with

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<sup>36</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998): 912.

<sup>37</sup> Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (Summer, 1987): 339.

others.”<sup>38</sup> A state identity is a collectively held view by a state’s foreign policy makers about what their state represents and what kind of a role the state should fulfill in the international context.<sup>39</sup> State identity is not an individual’s peculiar views on the role of the state but is based on “intersubjective understandings” shared by a group of people<sup>40</sup> which are irreducible to the individual level.<sup>41</sup>

How does identity shape foreign policy? One group of constructivist scholars suggest that identities both generate and shape ideas on national interests which in turn determines foreign policy. These scholars argue that identities are usually contextual and defined in relation to other states through social interaction, which in return shape interests. For example, a U.S.-ally state identity may generate an interest in supporting United States-led initiatives. Here the assumption is that actors do not know what they want prior to social interaction. Through social interaction they define others and themselves and come to know what they want. As Jepperson *et al* explain:

Many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. Actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what

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<sup>38</sup> Trine Flockhart, “Constructivism and Foreign Policy,” in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. Steve Smith and others, 78-109. (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2012), 85.

<sup>39</sup> Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no.3 (1999): 260; Yong Wook Lee, “Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund: An identity-Intention Approach,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (2006): 343; Kuniko Ashizawa, “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution Building, and Japanese Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Review* 10, no.3 (2008): 573 and 575.

<sup>40</sup> Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (Summer 1998): 174. Adler defines intersubjective knowledge or inter-subjectivity as follows: “Collective knowledge [that] persists beyond the lives of the individual social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings.” In Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (1997): 322.

<sup>41</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no.1. (2001): 391.

they are representing— “who they are”— which in turn depends on their social relationships.”<sup>42</sup>

Also, Hopf explains the relationship between identity and interest conceptions:

Given that interests are the product of identity, that is, having the identity of a “great power” implies a particular set of interests different from those implied by the identity of a “European Union member,” and that identities are multiple, constructivist logic precludes acceptance of pre-given interests.<sup>43</sup>

Moreover, constructivists argue that identities can be multiple and fluid. There can be various views on identity in a given domestic context. The contested nature of identity is one of its essential features. Even if identities are based on shared understandings among a group of people, in a given society there are usually diverse and contrasting views on state identity.<sup>44</sup> For example, what Japan represents in the international context and the roles it should play can be envisioned differently by different groups of people. Identities can be contested both horizontally among the political elite and vertically between the political elite and the wider society.<sup>45</sup>

The degree of contestation can have a significant impact over policy-making especially when there is a wide gap between the identity conceptions of the political elite

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<sup>42</sup> Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 60.

<sup>43</sup> Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (Summer 1998): 176.

<sup>44</sup> Michael N. Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable,” in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett (Cornell University Press, 2002), 62.

<sup>45</sup> Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (2012): 5-24.

and the public as well as within the political elite. When a certain conception of state identity reaches a dominant status within a society, the foreign policy outcomes should be in line with the policy preferences specified by that identity<sup>46</sup> However, when identities are contested to a high degree, the foreign policy making process becomes a competition among actors who want to impose their own views.<sup>47</sup>

Constructivist scholars have also pointed out that identities are subject to change over time. They are neither fixed nor static. The conditions that ignite major change can be external shock such as a military invasion or a defeat in war,<sup>48</sup> or “critical situations” which generate anxiety caused by “challenges to self-identity”<sup>49</sup> or at times when the existing conception of identity is no longer relevant under new conditions.<sup>50</sup> Singh mentions that identity changes are most common in structural transformation and in crisis situations.<sup>51</sup> A number of scholars view the criticism that Japan endured in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf Crisis as a challenge to Japan’s peace state identity.<sup>52</sup>

An alternative to the “identity constitutes interests” mechanism one is where actors’ material interests come first and identities are used as a tool to serve certain political interests. As Saidemann points out “politicians seek to justify their policies with

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<sup>46</sup> Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 9.

<sup>47</sup> Michael N. Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable,” in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett (Cornell University Press, 2002), 62; Rawi Abdelal et al. “Identity as a Variable,” in *Measuring Identity: A Guide For Social Scientists*, ed. Rawi Abdelal et al., 1-13. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27.

<sup>48</sup> Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 318.

<sup>49</sup> Brent J. Steele, “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War,” *Review of International Studies* 31, no.3 (July 2005): 526.

<sup>50</sup> Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “In search of a theory of national identity”, in *China’s Quest for National Identity* (eds.) Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993):6-7

<sup>51</sup> Bhubhindar Singh, *Japan’s Security Identity: From a peace state to an international state* (London: Routledge, 2013): 44.

<sup>52</sup> Lindsay Black, “Debating Japan’s intervention to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Aden: beyond mainstream paradigms,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12, no.2 (2012): 266

reference to a particular identity even if more material interests drive these policies.”<sup>53</sup> He further adds “by invoking identity the politician can minimize opposition or even mobilize support from those who do not benefit from the policy change.”<sup>54</sup> This second point is very important in that it shows how actors instrumentally use norms to serve their own interests. In this scenario, the actor adopts a logic of consequences and a given identity is invoked only when it serves actors’ material interests. This motive is clearly different from logic of appropriateness. If actors use norms are used to enhance material interests, then norms do not have independent influence over policy.

In an attempt to “bridge the gap across the constructivist-rationalist divide,” Checkel has identified three distinct types of mechanism behind policy change; in other words, three different pathways to changes in actors’ behavior at the state or individual levels.<sup>55</sup> Checkel and his colleagues derived their model from an analysis of how participation in international organizations such as the European Union could create policy changes in member states in accordance with EU’s norms and institutions. They refer to this change as socialization which is “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.”<sup>56</sup> The result of socialization is compliance with the rules and norms of the international organization.

The three mechanisms of socialization/internalization are *strategic calculation*, *role playing*, and *normative persuasion*. In strategic calculation, actors respond to the demands of change with a cost and benefit analysis and their goal is to

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<sup>53</sup> Stephen Saideman, “Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign Policy,” in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (eds.) Michael N. Barnett and Shibley Telhami (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (Autumn, 2005): 801-826.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* 804.

maximize benefits. The actors are expected to comply with normative demands if the benefit of compliance exceeds the cost. Thus, material incentives such as “social status,” financial rewards, or punishments can convince actors to change their behavior.<sup>57</sup>

The second mechanism is role playing, wherein actors understand the kind of role demanded of them and fulfill that role without considering if it is right or wrong. Compliance has become a habit for them. Checkel adds that the existence of a role playing mechanism suggests that actors have started to internalize external norms and rules. Role playing can be seen as an intermediary step between strategic calculation and full-fledged internalization.<sup>58</sup>

The final mechanism proposed by Checkel is persuasion. Checkel point out that in persuasion, actors change their preferences because the power of ideas appeal to recipient actors. They adopt a given norm because they are convinced in the rightness or correctness of that particular norm. Checkel defines persuasion in the following way. “...argumentative persuasion is a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion. It is thus a mechanism through which preference change may occur.”<sup>59</sup> He further adds that unlike coercion in persuasion actors have freedom of choice.<sup>60</sup> Checkel identifies a number of conditions under which actors are more likely to change their preferences as a result of persuasion:

- I. The target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information.
- II. The target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* 809.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 810.

<sup>59</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,” *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (July 2001): 562.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

with the socializing agency's message.

- III. The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the ingroup to which the target belongs or wants to belong.
- IV. The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.
- V. The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings.<sup>61</sup>

Even though Checkel separates the three types of mechanism, the difference between role play and persuasion does seem to be clear-cut and it is extremely difficult to demonstrate empirically whether actors change their behavior as a result of persuasion through argumentation or role play. For empirical evidence, we can only rely on what the actors say, in other words, how they justify the change in their behavior in political speeches. If they justify their actions by referring to the need of fulfilling a certain role rather than to the appropriateness of the ideas they adopt, then, perhaps it can be said that the role playing mechanism is at work rather than normative persuasion. Examining speeches helps to understand what kind of logic is emphasized. Still, speeches alone are not sufficient evidence to claim that one mechanism prevails over the other.

On the other hand, the distinction between the mechanisms of strategic calculation and persuasion seems to be clearer. If persuasion is the mechanism behind behavioral change, then there should be no material gains acquired as a result of a change in the actor's position on a given policy area. The next section explains the nature of material incentives that can be used to change actors' preferences, in particular those of political parties within the state.

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<sup>61</sup> Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe," 813.

#### 4. Rational Choice Approach: Material Incentives and Change in Domestic Actors' Foreign Policy Preferences

Both Neo-realist and Neo-liberal scholars who have adopted the rational choice approach have been mostly skeptical of norms as independent sources of policy change, but Neo-liberals acknowledge the constraining effect of norms.<sup>62</sup> According to Neoliberals, states create rules to make cooperation possible which, in turn, work in the common interest of actors. When the initial rule creation phase is over, the rules, or the organizations which are in charge of implementing those rules, take on a life of their own. In this phase, the rules function as constraints on state behavior. This is the main mechanism through which international regimes shape state policy. Nevertheless, both Neo-realists and Neo-liberals believe that states act in accordance with norms only if it is in the states' interest. Both groups reject the constitutive effect of norms meaning that norm-abiding behavior can change actors' identity.<sup>63</sup>

In the rational-choice model, actors make decisions based on strategic calculation. Actors change their preferences if material incentives arise that could disrupt the cost and benefit balance. What kind of material incentives could disrupt such balance? Checkel listed social status, financial rewards and punishment as material incentives that can change actors' preference.

Rational-choice theorists have argued that the nature of political interaction among actors in a given domestic setting depends on the type of actors who have the authority to make decisions and the rules that are required to make decisions. In short, according to rational-choice theorists, two elements are crucial in understanding the dynamics of interaction at the state-level: actors (decision units) and institutions (rules).

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<sup>62</sup> Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, 27.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

According to Hermann, in any given state, the actors involved in the decision making process, or what she calls, the “authoritative decision unit,” can take three forms. The authoritative decision unit is “an individual or a set of individuals with the ability to commit the resources of the society and, when faced with a problem, the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed.”<sup>64</sup> The three different kinds of decision-making unit defined by Hermann are the predominant leader, single group or a coalition of multiple actors.

- I. Predominant leader: a single individual who has the ability to stifle all opposition and dissent as well as the power to make a decision alone, if necessary.
- II. Single group: A set of individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, who collectively select a course of action in consultation with each other.
- III. Coalition of autonomous actors: The necessary actors are separate individuals, groups, or representatives of institutions which, if some or all concur, can act for the government, but no one of which by itself has the ability to decide and force compliance on others; moreover, no overarching authoritative body exists in which all these actors are members.<sup>65</sup>

A predominant leader exists in political systems wherein a single individual has the authority to make a decision. Examples of such systems include, monarchies, authoritarian regimes or dictatorships or presidential systems, none of which apply to Japan.

A single group can be a designated special group, in or outside of the

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<sup>64</sup> Margaret G. Herman, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” *International Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 56.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*: 56-57.

government, especially formed to deal with a policy problem. It can also be a key group in the bureaucracy or the cabinet.

A coalition decision unit is where the political authority to make a decision is dispersed among multiple autonomous actors. Furthermore, the coalition decision unit does not only apply in the case of coalition governments, in fact there are four distinct types:

- I. Parliamentary democracies with multiparty cabinets,
- II. Presidential democracies with opposing legislative and executive branches,
- III. Authoritarian regimes in which power is dispersed across factions and/or institutions
- IV. Decentralized settings in which bureaucratic actors gain authority in collectively dealing with major policy issues.<sup>66</sup>

In case of Japan's overseas troop deployments, the coalition unit seems to best describe the decision unit due to the formal decision-making rules on overseas troop dispatches. Furthermore, in the three specific time periods under examination— 1990-92, 2001-07, and 2007-10 — either the government was a coalition or the Diet was divided. Between 1990 and 1992, the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet were dominated by different parties. Between 2001 and 2005, coalition governments ruled, and as a result of the 2007 Upper House election, once again the Diet was divided.

The main characteristic of the coalition decision unit is that any actor has the power to block the initiatives of others and thereby hinder the conclusion of a decision. This power to block might be stated in laws or based on unwritten norms. According to

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<sup>66</sup> Joe D. Hagan et al. "Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy," *International Studies Review* 3, no.2 (Summer 2001): 169.

Hagan *et al* the actors can block the decisions in three ways:

- I. Executing a veto
- II. Threatening to terminate the ruling coalition
- III. Withholding the resources necessary for action or the approval needed for their use<sup>67</sup>

Institutions or the rules defining decision-making process affect political interactions among the actors. They shape actors' maneuvering capacity and the nature of the material incentives that could be offered to change the opposing actors' preferences. Tsebelis explains the effect of decision-making rules in the following way: "rules of the game [define] the set of players, the set of permissible moves, the sequence of these moves, and the information available before each move is made."<sup>68</sup>

In addition, the recent scholarship on role theory and foreign policy analysis suggests that when state-level actors' role conceptions are contested, foreign policy outcomes depend on the rules of decision-making in a given area and the structure of the government (such as a coalition, single party rule or a powerful individual). Actors with more powerful status in the domestic institutional setting are more likely to have their views or "role conceptions" translated into foreign policy.<sup>69</sup>

Based on earlier coalition formation theory, Hagan et al., developed a "coalition decision model" in which factors affecting agreement between actors are dependent on the decision-making rules, meaning "number of votes required to win a debate." These rules can take three forms: unanimity, majority and anarchy (the lack of

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.: 170

<sup>68</sup> George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990): 90.

<sup>69</sup> Cristian Cantir, and Juliet Kaarbo (eds.), *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations*. (New York: Routledge, 2016).

clearly defined rules).

If unanimity is required for voting then we are dealing with a “unit veto model”<sup>70</sup>. In such cases, the outcome depends on two factors: “the existence of a shared policy orientation” and/or “the possibility of side payments”. If there is similarity in the actors’ positions on a given policy issue, they are more likely to reach at an agreement. While this is similar to the constructivist assumption that actors with similar normative beliefs are more likely to cooperate, the second factor is a material incentive which has nothing to do with actors’ beliefs or ideas. This material incentive which could also be provided to a political party opposing a decision is “side-payments.”

Material side payments can help convince actors to approve a decision. These are incentives offered to a “veto player” in exchange for approval of a decision. “Advocates of policy may be able to buy off a strong dissenter with concessions critical to them on another issue, something that is especially likely in the case of a smaller, single-issue party with critical votes.”<sup>71</sup> For small, issue-oriented political parties these side payments can be in the form of the control of a single ministry or policy issue. In return, the small party would lend its support to the initiative proposed by a major coalition partner.<sup>72</sup> Another form of material incentive can be political logrolling. Snyder has pointed out that foreign policy issues can also be used in logrolling.<sup>73</sup> Putnam also

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<sup>70</sup> The concept of “veto players” in different government types is developed by George Tsebelis, “Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multiparty System,” *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no.3 (July, 1995): 289-325.

<sup>71</sup> Joe D. Hagan et al. “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy,” *International Studies Review* 3, no.2 (Summer 2001): 176.

<sup>72</sup> Barbara Hinckley, *Coalition and Politics* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Eric C. Brownie and John P. Frendreis, “Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations,” *American Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 4: 753-768.

<sup>73</sup> Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Policies and International Ambition* (Ithaca, Cornell University Pres, 1991)

argued that side-payments are often resorted to in “two-level games” to buy off domestic veto players’ approval for the ratification of international treaties.<sup>74</sup> Thus, in rational-choice approach, side-payments have been used as a tool to change opposing actors’ preferences.

Two other types of rules discussed by Hagan et al. are majority voting and anarchy. If a majority vote is required, then two different set of factors come into play: “the presence of a pivotal actor” or “the willingness to bargain among groups”. When there are no clear rules for decision-making, the ‘anarchy’ type, the outcome is determined by the “existence of a predominant actor within the regime” or “any actor with exclusive control of implementing resources.”<sup>75</sup> The model is summarized in figure 1, in the Appendices.

In Japan, decisions about overseas troop dispatches are, in principle, made through the creation of laws in which the legislature plays a significant role through approval. This is because in the basic law governing the duties and actions of the Japanese armed forces (the SDF Law), there is no relevant clause related to overseas dispatch. Moreover, when a mission needs to be extended beyond its original time frame, or when the nature of the activities or tasks change, Diet approval is necessary.

Until the 1990s, the SDF’s sole duty had been defined as the defense of Japan from direct external aggression. Overseas deployments, for whatever purpose, were considered against the constitution until the 1990s. With enactment of the UN PKO Law in 1992, the SDF were dispatched to peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions,

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<sup>74</sup> Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42, no.3 (Summer 1988): 427-460.

<sup>75</sup> This part is a summary of Joe D. Hagan et al. “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy,” *International Studies Review* 3, no.2 (Summer 2001): 176-79.

and election observations. This law not only restricts the duties of the SDF but also requires prior Diet approval before each deployment. For missions other than those covered by the UN PKO Law, it is necessary to enact a separate law is necessary. In this sense, the Diet, the legislative organ in Japan, plays an important role in the decision-making process for dispatching the SDF abroad.

It is important to understand how the law-making process works in Japan and the actors involved. In Japan, the Cabinet delegates the task of drafting bills to the relevant ministry— in the case of security issues, this is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MOFA). However, in the case of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, it was the Cabinet who created the initial draft bill in consultation with MOFA.

Once a draft is approved by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and accepted by the Cabinet members, it is submitted to either one of the two chambers of the Diet: the House of Representatives (HoR) or the House of Councilors (HoC). The President of the Chamber (or the House) refers the bill to an appropriate committee for examination. Depending on the need, this can be a standing committee or a temporary special committee. After deliberations, a vote is held. If the law passes through both the special committee and the plenary session of that Chamber with a simple majority, then, it is sent to the other Chamber. Here, the same procedure applies; namely, a vote at the committee and plenary sessions. If the bill passes through both chambers, then, it becomes a law.<sup>76</sup>

At the Diet, the government members put the case for the necessity of the dispatch and the opposition parties can question the views presented by the government, as in other parliamentary systems. During this process, the opposition parties' views and

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<sup>76</sup> Official website of the Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau, The Law Making Process, accessed November 8, 2015 <http://www.clb.go.jp/english/process.html>

public scrutiny become important factors. A number of actors are involved including the Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry (previously Defense Agency) through their connections with the Cabinet and the Diet (including the opposition parties).

In the time periods under examination, two of the coalition types described by Hagan *et al.* were present, plus a combination of the two. First, during the first time period (T 1 = 1990-92), there was LDP dominated single party rule, without a majority in the Upper House, creating a situation similar to a divided government. The divided government occurs in the United States when the Congressional and the Presidential positions are controlled by opposing parties.<sup>77</sup>

In Japan, a similar situation occurs when there is a divided legislature (*nejire kokkai* in Japanese meaning twisted Diet) that is the Lower House is controlled by the ruling party or parties and the Upper House by the opposition party or parties. In such a case, the bill approved in the Lower House could be rejected in the Upper House; however, Article 59 of the Japanese Constitution states that a bill rejected in the Upper House could be passed by a second vote in the Lower House, by a two thirds majority of members present.<sup>78</sup>

The second period covers a longer time period (2001-2007) because it includes the enactment and all the extensions of the special measures law authorizing the overseas dispatch. Between 2001 and 2006, the Koizumi administration was in power in a multi-party coalition government including initially the LDP and the Conservative Party

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<sup>77</sup> James Meernik, "Congress, the President and the Commitment of the U.S. Military," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20, no.3 (August, 1995): 377-392.

<sup>78</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, "The Constitution of Japan" (English version), accessed August 1, 2015.  
[http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution\\_and\\_government\\_of\\_japan/constitution\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html)

(Hoshūtō). In 2003, the Conservative Party had joined the LDP, thereafter the coalition government had included only the two parties rendering the Kōmeitō as the only veto player. In that context only the consent of Komeito was sufficient to pass a bill.

In September 2006, Shinzo Abe replaced Koizumi as the Prime Minister. Following the 2007 Upper House elections, the DPJ attained the majority of the seats which once again produced a divided legislature. However, the DPJ was only able to attain a with the other two opposition parties (People's New Party and the Social Democratic Party of Japan) was able to attain a two thirds majority. Thus, it is helpful to consider the time periods separately as T-2 = 2001-2007, and T-3 = 2007-2010. In T-2, the decision-making rules were based on a unanimity vote. The consent of the members of the coalition are required. Under T-3, decision-making still requires unanimity within the ruling coalition but a majority in the Diet. Even if the Constitution allows a second vote in the Lower House when a bill is rejected in the Upper House, politicians rarely follow this path and initially seek dialogue and negotiations with the opposition parties. If the dialogue is unfruitful, then they will resort to a second vote.

In conclusion, there are two competing perspectives on changes in domestic actors' preferences about foreign policy issues. A constructivist perspective considers persuasion as the main mechanism behind change in actors' preferences whereas a rational-choice approach points to material incentives such as side-payments, punishments and threats.

## 5. Description of Method and Data

The purpose of this research is to understand how it was possible for successive LDP-led governments to change the preferences of the opposition parties and

to understand the conditions under which domestic veto-players are more-likely to change their preferences. The study is a single case study of Japan; and, the case is divided into three separate time periods. The enactment period of the UN PKO Law is in the first time period (T-1=1990-1992). The second time period covers the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and its extensions until the 2007 Upper House election (T-2 =2001-2007). Finally, the third time period starts in 2007 with the enactment of a law replacing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and ends with that law's termination in 2010 (T-3= 2007-2010).

The main method used in this study is process tracing which is an appropriate tool to investigate causal mechanisms in a single case. According to George and Bennet, “the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanisms— between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”<sup>79</sup>

Before explaining the method in detail, the concept of causal mechanism needs to be clarified. Beach and Pedersen distinguish between causal mechanism and causality. Their explanation can be summarized in the following way. Causality in large-*n* statistical analysis and comparative case study research is understood as “a regular association between X and Y, controlled for other relevant possible causes.”<sup>80</sup> In order to establish a causality, Hume's three conditions on the relationship between X and Y need to be proved: “(1) X and Y must be contiguous in space and time; (2) X occurs before Y (temporal succession); and (3) a regular conjunction exists between X and Y.”<sup>81</sup> A

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<sup>79</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005): 206.

<sup>80</sup> Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2013): 24

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 25. This quote is based on Paul W. Holland, “Statistics and Causal Inference,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81, no: 396: 945-960.

causal mechanism is ontologically different from causality. It is not about a relationship of regularity pattern. It is the mechanism linking X to Y.

Another distinction made by Beach and Petersen, between causality as understood in statistical analysis, and causal mechanism in qualitative case studies is about whether they are probabilistic or deterministic. Statistical, large-*n* studies postulate probabilistic causal relations between X and Y. They test their theories across a wide range of cases to understand the probability of X producing Y. These theories also accept both systematic (patterned, non-random) and nonsystematic (random) relations. X may not always produce Y. In contrast, case study researchers, think that there is no sense in understanding probabilistic relations in small-*n* case studies, their purpose is rather to find out necessary and sufficient conditions by comparing a small number of cases. In Beach and Pedersen's words:

...what we are examining is not whether a given X tends to covary with Y in a population but whether X is either a necessary and/or sufficient cause of Y in an individual case...A condition is necessary if the absence of it prevents an outcome, regardless of the values of other variables, whereas if a sufficient condition is present, the outcome will always take place. <sup>82</sup>

In case studies, be they small-*n* or single case, the main goal is to clarify the causal mechanism. To further explain the causal mechanism concept, Beach and Pedersen use the "toothed wheel" analogy. Their explanation is that, an entire causal mechanism can be thought of as a toothed wheel in which each wheel represents a part of the causal mechanism. Parts of the mechanism can be considered as "entities engaging in activities"

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.: 27

that transfer the causal energy to the next component.<sup>83</sup> Beach and Pedersen explain, notion of causal mechanism in the following way:

Each part of a mechanism can be illustrated as  $(n_n \rightarrow)$ , where the  $n_n$  refers to the entity (n) and the arrow to the activity transmitting causal energy through the mechanism to produce an outcome. \* is used to refer to the logical *and*.

$X \rightarrow [(n_1 \rightarrow) * (n_2 \rightarrow)] Y$

This should be read as X transmits causal forces through the mechanism composed of part 1 (entity 1 and an activity) and part 2 (entity 2 and an activity) that together contribute to producing outcome Y.

...

Each part of the mechanism is by itself insufficient to produce an outcome Y, as it only functions together with the rest of the “machine.” Second, explicit in a mechanistic ontology is a view that the parts that we include in our conceptualization of a given causal mechanism are absolutely vital (necessary) for the machine to work, and in the absence of one part, the mechanism itself cannot be said to exist.<sup>84</sup>

Having clarified the notion of a causal mechanism adopted in this study, the next task is to clarify the type of process tracing method used. In George and Bennett, process-tracing can be used for two different purposes: theory testing or theory building. In this study, a theory-testing process tracing is used. Theory testing process tracing is used “to see whether causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid.: 29

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.: 30.

the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”<sup>85</sup> Thus, the analyst investigates whether a causal process—the steps by which an independent variable is linked to a dependent variable—exists in a given case or not. Here, identifying the order in which the events unfold (sequence) is very important in determining the intermediary steps.

Consequently, theory-testing is based on deductive logic in which the observable implications of a theory are tested in a single case or in a small-n study. In other words, we move down from theory to the particular case, instead of going up from case to theory. However, in this research, instead of using induction in its purest sense, an abductive approach is used by looking at the case and the available theories of foreign policy analysis and uses an iterative process between case and theory. Abduction can be explained as follows:

...social scientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomenon that interests us for some reason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we do not know for certain, that the observed class of phenomenon is not random. We therefore start collecting pertinent observations, and at the same time, applying concepts from existing fields of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or “simply” inferring propositions from facts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction).<sup>86</sup>

According to Beach and Pedersen, George and Bennett’s understanding of

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<sup>85</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005): 6.

<sup>86</sup> Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology,” *International Organization* 63, no.4 (Fall, 2009): 709.

causal relationships as “intermediary steps” or “a series of intervening variables” is different from their own view of causal mechanisms. They argue that a causal mechanism should not merely state the presence of an intervening variable between X and Y but demonstrate how that variable produces a causal force in the form of entities engaging in activities.

In order to test the validity of the causal mechanism we need to derive “predictions” or “observable implications” for each part of the hypothesized mechanism. In other words, we need to specify the kind of evidence we expect to find in the case at hand if the causal mechanism tested holds true. Beach and Pedersen indicate that four different kinds of evidence is required for a satisfactory application of the process tracing method: pattern, sequence, trace, and account.

Beach and Pedersen define each type in the following way. “Pattern evidence relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence.”<sup>87</sup> However, this evidence type would be appropriate for testing parts of the mechanism, not the whole. Sequence is understood in the same way as in George and Bennett, which is defined above. Next, they distinguish between trace and account evidence in the following way:

“Trace evidence is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of hypothesized mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the official minutes of a meeting, if authentic, provides strong proof that a meeting took place. Finally, account evidence deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place.”<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Beach and Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods*: 99

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*: 100

Going back to the two competing hypotheses and the observable implications that could be drawn from them; material incentives and persuasion. If persuasion is the sole mechanism behind preference change, then a change in actors' normative beliefs as a result of argumentation. Furthermore, no material gains made by the domestic opposing actors/veto players are expected. If material incentives, are the mechanism, then a change in stance following a material gain is expected. Any kind of material gain should precede the change of stance. These material incentives could be side-payments or logrolling. Types of coercion including punishing, blackmailing or shaming could be considered as material factors as they are clearer in nature to losses on the part of domestic actors, than ideational changes.

In order to test the predicted implications, three types of evidence are looked at: sequence and account and in some cases trace. In both time frames, the events are in chronological order mostly based on newspaper articles. In each this showed that veto players changed their normative positions after an opportunity to enhance their political power arose, or in the presence of a material incentive. Even though normative persuasion took place, this was not automatically followed by a change in veto players' normative beliefs. Consequently, the normative persuasion mechanism was rendered redundant. Account evidence was used to show certain meetings took place between the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties and how their views on policy changed following those meetings were indicated. However, in most cases, the trace evidence is not given as I did not have access to the content of those meetings via sources alternative to newspaper articles. Therefore, information gathered from newspaper articles can be triangulated with interviews with the political elite in a future study.

## 6. Limitations of This Study and Research Tasks Ahead

One of the main limitations of this study revolves around the data used. This study relies on publicly available sources such as newspaper articles, Diet speeches and books or articles written by other scholars in order to give chronological order to the events that took place. In order to increase the validity of this papers' claims, interviews with key politicians/members of parliament who took part in the processes of enacting the laws or negotiations as well as key internal documents of the "veto players" such as Komeito and the DPJ should be conducted. Evidence from such interviews would add another dimension to the main arguments.

Another limitation of the study is the time span covered. Japanese troops were sent to participate in reconstruction activities in Iraq while the war was still continuing. This was considered to be a violation of traditional pacifist norms that forbade Japan to send troops to a combat zone. Furthermore in 2015, the overseas roles of the armed forces were further expanded with the enactment of new security legislation. These episodes should also be examined to provide an updated analysis of the issue. As Beach and Pedersen note "A longer-term mechanism will look very different from a short-term mechanism; in particular, these differences manifest themselves in the types of observable implications that an incremental, long-term mechanism will be expected to have in comparison to a short-term mechanism."<sup>89</sup>

Finally, the study is limited in the sense that two competing theories on domestic actors' preference are tested with the evidence from Japan only. Additional cases from other states which have institutionalized pacifist state identities similar to Japan can be investigated to increase the plausibility of the main argument.

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.: 56

## 7. Conclusion

The purpose of this research is to provide an understanding of how it was possible for successive LDP governments to expand the overseas military roles of the SDF despite strong domestic opposition. In particular, the main focus of the study is to understand how the ruling LDP succeeded in convincing the opposition parties whose votes were indispensable for the approval of the laws authorizing dispatches.

Two competing hypotheses with respect to the change in state level actors' views on foreign policy are derived, one from the constructivist approach and the other from rational choice theory. Constructivism emphasizes persuasion as a way of changing actors' stance. Constructivist scholars believe that actors are persuaded through arguments in the goodness or rightness of normative beliefs. On the other hand, rational choice theorists argue that material incentives such as side payments, opportunities to enhance social status or political logrolling are important mechanisms behind changes in actors' stances on foreign policy issues.

The following chapters will investigate the absence/presence of these two rival mechanisms in the case of Japan's overseas troop deployments. Three sub-periods are examined. The next chapter will examine the enactment process of the UN PKO Law which authorized troop dispatches in support of UN PKOs. The third chapter examines the period from the enactment of the UN PKO Law up until the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The purpose of the third chapter is to explain the changes in the domestic political power distribution and views on state identity. The fourth chapter investigates the second and third sub-cases. The second sub-case is the enactment and extensions of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Finally, the third sub-case is the termination

of the Anti-Terrorism Law and the enactment of a replacement law in the context of divided legislature.

The study is limited in three aspects. Firstly, the data excludes important primary sources such as accounts of politicians who participated in the political process. Such data could be acquired through interviews. Secondly, the time span covered is limited and excludes the more recent developments and thirdly, the plausibility of the arguments could be improved by analyzing additional cases other than Japan. In view of these limitations, we cannot say that the presence of the causal mechanism is demonstrated at a satisfactory level. Future research could be conducted to ameliorate these limitations.

## Chapter 2

### The Enactment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Law (1990-1992)

#### Normative Shift or Political Survival?

##### 1. Introduction

In Japan, the first law which allowed overseas troop dispatches in support of international military operations was the UN PKO law. The law was established in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.<sup>90</sup> Faced with immense US-pressure, the Japanese government decided to prepare a legal framework to authorize troop contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

This chapter focuses on the legislative process behind the enactment of that law in order to understand how it was possible for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to overcome enormous political opposition. The majority of the opposition parties of that time considered the SDF members' participation in UN PKOs as a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution. In their first trial, the LDP executives failed to pass the law but in their second attempt they succeeded and the law was enacted in June 1992, almost two years after the outbreak of the Persian Gulf Crisis. In order to pass the law, the LDP had to cooperate with the opposition parties as the structure of the Diet—namely, divided legislature—did not allow the LDP to act alone. The LDP lacked a two-thirds majority

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<sup>90</sup> Here, it is significant to note that prior to the Persian Gulf Crisis, within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs ideas about how Japan could participate in UN peacekeeping operations were discussed and the also the establishment of such a law were considered. For more information about the history of such attempts see: Akihiko Tanaka, "The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and U.N. Peacekeeping," in *UN Peacekeeping Japanese and American Perspectives* (eds.) Selig S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995): 89-105; Milton Leitenberg, "The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *Asian Perspective* 20, no.1 (Spring-Summer 1996): 5-50; L. William Heinrich, Jr., Akiho Shibata and Yoshihide Soeya L. (eds.) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Politics* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999)

in the Lower House and the Upper House was dominated by the opposition parties; therefore for an approval in the Upper House, the LDP depended on the votes from the opposition. Consequently, the LDP was forced to cooperate with opposition parties.

The LDP chose to cooperate with the Komeito and DSP, two smaller opposition parties. How did the government manage to convince these two parties? What made the parties change their stances in the second time around? Did the parties change their opinion as a result of normative persuasion or material benefits offered by the ruling LDP in return for their support?

The main argument of the chapter is that the ruling LDP's strategies to overcome the restrictions imposed by the structure of the Diet was a key factor behind the passage of the law. However, these strategies were not only limited to normative persuasion as previously pointed out by constructivist scholars. Material side-payments and political threats were key factors in securing two parties' cooperation with the LDP.

In particular, the LDP threatened the smaller opposition parties and groups in the Upper House with holding simultaneous elections. The simultaneous elections could have been detrimental to the survival of smaller parties' in the Upper House. This blackmailing strategy not only broke the deadlock between the Komeito and DSP over the talks on the bill and forced them to cooperate with the LDP, but also prevented smaller groups from blocking the voting in the Upper House. Thus, the smaller political parties' consideration of their political survival was the key factor in pushing them toward cooperation with LDP. The fact that the LDP strategically used both normative and material incentives to convince the opposition parties shows that normative factors alone were insufficient to produce policy change.

This chapter is organized in the following way. In the first section, the actors

involved in the legislative process are introduced, their powers are explained based on their presence in both Houses of the Diet, and the possible policy outcomes under divided legislature are discussed. In the second section, Japan's responses during Persian Gulf Crisis are examined up until the end of November 1990 when the first bill was aborted in the Diet. The next section provides an account of how the SDF minesweeper was dispatched to the Gulf after the end of combat. The final section examines the legislative process behind the UN PKO Law and particular attention given to the ways in which the LDP galvanized the support of two smaller opposition parties, namely, the Komeito and DSP.

## 2. Domestic Actors, Their Powers and Possible Policy Outcomes

Before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf Crisis how was the structure of the government and the Diet? Who were the actors involved in the law-making process for overseas troop dispatches? In other words, who were *the authoritative decision unit* at that time?

The major actors which dominated the Japanese political scene at that time were the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as the largest opposition party, the Komeito as the second largest opposition party, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Japan Communist Party (JCP), *Shaminren* and finally the *Rengo Sangiin*.

The biggest and longest-ruling party in Japan, the LDP is divided within itself into various factions. There are two different views as to whether the relation between factions and policy positions. The first and more widely accepted view among the scholars of Japanese politics suggests that factions are not formed based on differences in ideology and policy positions but based on material interests. The other views suggests

that factions have distinct policy positions. For the present analysis, the ideological differences within the LDP do not matter, only the party leaders' views and the official government position are taken into account throughout the political process. The relevant question for this analysis is that how the government manage to convince the opposition parties to pass the law rather than how LDP overcame its internal divisions.

The JSP also has factions, however, in national defense and security issues, the party had displayed a united and uniform stance throughout the 1980s and until 1994. This stance has been called the "unarmed neutrality" which was based on abrogating the US-Japan Security Treaty, preventing Japan's rearmament, preventing the revision of Article 9, and eliminating the SDF as they believed the organization to be unconstitutional.

Komeito as the only religious party in Japan has been mainly supported by the Soka Gakkai (the Value Creation Society), an organization that believes in the teachings of Nichiren Buddhism and remodeling of individual lifestyles and Japanese political system based on religious beliefs. In foreign policy, the party and its support base have emphasized pacifism. Similar to JSP, the Komeito had exhibited a stance against the presence of the SDF. However, as early as the 1980s, the party changed its stance. As Curtis indicated: "At the nineteenth [party] congress in December 1981, the party accepted the [US-Japan Security] treaty in its present form and dropped demands for its abrogation." (Curtis)

Finally, the *Rengo Sangiin* was not a political party but a political group backed by Japan's labor union federation *Rengo*, also known as the Japanese Trade Union Confederation. *Rengo* was rather young at that time, established only two years ago with the merger of the two biggest labor unions in Japan. As an election strategy before the 1989 Upper House election, smaller parties in constituencies where they did not have a

chance to beat the LDP candidate united their votes for a single candidate against LDP. In this way they succeeded in gaining twelve seats out of the 13 constituencies in which they run for election. The candidates belonged to various small parties including JSP, Komeito, DSP, and United Social Democratic Party.<sup>91</sup>

Thus, the *Rengo Sangiin* members did not have common views on policy issues. Nevertheless, Rengo, headed by Akira Yamagishi, was also involved in the public discussions on the UN PKO bill and was a major actor in trying to unite the opposition with various strategies throughout the two years of discussions on the law. The *Rengo* especially wanted a unity between the JSP and the DSP which were the parties closest to *Rengo*. Therefore, it tried to prevent the DSP from coalescing with the LDP and Komeito.

As a consequences of the February 18, 1990 Lower House election, the distribution of the seats were in the following way. First, in the Lower House the ruling LDP held 281 seats out of 512 which was sufficient to approve a bill but insufficient to override the Upper House. The largest opposition party, JSP had 136 seats in the Lower House. Komeito had 45, JCP held 16, and DSP 14. The distribution of the seats as a result of the Lower House election is demonstrated in the Table 2.1.

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<sup>91</sup> “Time Running Out // For Peacekeeping Bill // The Bickering in the Diet,” *Daily Yomiuri*, June 1, 1992, 2.

Table 2.1. Results of 18 February 1990 Lower House Election

Political Group	Number of Seats in the House
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	275
Socialist Party of Japan (JSP)	136
Komeito	45
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	16
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	14
United Socialist Democratic Party	4
Progressive Party	1
Independents	21

(Source: Interparliamentary Union)<sup>92</sup>

The opposition parties controlled the Upper House. LDP held 109 out of the 252 seats in the House. The JSP held 66. The second largest opposition was the Komeito which held 20 seats. Next, the JCP and DSP held 14 and 8 seats respectively. The Rengo had 10 in the Upper House which is counted within the group of “other parties” in the below table. The below table indicates the distribution of seats summarized above.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>92</sup> [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161\\_90.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_90.htm)

<sup>93</sup> Takashi Oka, *Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan: A Political Biography of Ozawa Ichiro* (London: Routledge, 2011): 36.

Table 2.2. Results of 23 July 1989 Upper House Election

Political Group	Number of Seats in the House
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	109
Socialist Party of Japan (JSP)	66
Komeito	20
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	14
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	8
Other Parties	22
Independents	21

(Source: Interparliamentary Union)<sup>94</sup>

Thus, while the LDP held the majority of seats in the Lower House, in the Upper House the opposition parties constituted the majority, which created the situation of the twisted Diet. As explained in the first chapter, in case of twisted Diet, Japan's Constitution allows a law to be passed with a two thirds majority vote in the Lower House upon rejection in the Upper House. However, the LDP lacked the two-thirds majority, thus it was forced by the structure of the Diet, to cooperate with the minor opposition parties to attain the "minimum required vote." Consequently, the opposition parties were given a great deal of leverage in negotiations; and thereby, became veto players as reaching a decision depended on their approval as well. Thus, the authoritative decision unit, in this case, resembled to the type two described by Hagan et al.: *Presidential democracies with opposing legislative and executive branches*. Even though the system of government is not presidential in Japan like that in the United State, the twisted Diet condition coupled with LDP's lack of sufficient seats in the Lower House to override the

<sup>94</sup> [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2162\\_89.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2162_89.htm)

Upper one created a situation similar to the one in United States.

As explained in the first chapter, under coalition decision units, the actors have various tools to block a decision. These are exercising the formal veto power, threats to end the coalition if the actors are partners in a coalition government, and exploiting other procedural rules. In this case, the two Houses of the Diet were controlled by different parties. In the Lower House the LDP had the majority of seats but lacked a two-thirds majority by which it could override a rejection in the Upper House. In the Upper House, the opposition parties as a whole constituted the majority. Therefore, the LDP needed to cooperate with some of the opposition parties to acquire the sufficient amount of votes to pass the legislation in the Upper House. LDP would settle for a “minimum required majority”

Against this backdrop, if we expect the rational choice explanation to be true, then the opposition parties which cooperated with the LDP should not have received any material gains before or after their cooperation. Alternatively, if we expect the Constructivist argument to be true, then we would expect to see a change in the stance of the opposition parties as a result of persuasion and there should be no material gains acquired. In order to test the plausibility of each predicted mechanism, the enactment process of the UN PKO law is examined from 1990 until 1992.

### 3. First Failed Attempt for a UN PKO Law: The Opposition Parties as Veto Players (August 1990- November 1991)

When the Persian Gulf crisis broke out on August 2 1990, the incumbent Kaifu Cabinet responded by imposing economic sanctions, extending financial

assistance,<sup>95</sup> and finally drafting a bill which would allow troop contributions to the US-led international military force deployed in the Persian Gulf.

As a response to Iraqi regime's aggression, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 which set a deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Kaifu Cabinet was among the first to impose sanctions against the Iraqi regime by risking its vested economic interests in Iraq and the lives of Japanese citizens which were held as hostages in the both Iraq and Kuwait.

Nevertheless, sanctions alone were not considered sufficient by the US-side and as the crisis ensued, the US administration exerted increasing pressure on the Kaifu Cabinet in various ways for more tangible support. By mid-August, dissatisfied with Japan's response, the U.S. administration called for a "direct contribution to the defense of the Gulf" from Japan which included:

- I. Financial assistance to the U.S.-led multinational forces in Saudi Arabia.
- II. Direct contribution to the defense of the Gulf region in various ways
- III. Financial assistance to surrounding countries
- IV. A detailed plan for sharing the costs of U.S. forces stationed in Japan over the next five years
- V. Commitments on buying major U.S.-made weapons systems, including airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) planes and aerial refueling tankers, during the next Japanese defense buildup.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> "Japan Considers Sanctions to Protest Iraqi Invasion," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 4, 1990, 1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter II, Section 2: Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991*, 12, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-2.htm>

<sup>96</sup> "Wangan Bōei Chokusetsu Kōken wo Bei ga Tainichi Yōkyū Yōin Haken ni Kitai," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 19, 1990, 1; Shinzo Yoshida, "Japan Asked to Contribute Directly To Gulf Defense," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 19, 1990, 1.

Moreover, the US administration initiated a full-fledged diplomatic assault against the Japanese government. Shinoda notes that the United States administration sent Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury to demand an increase in financial assistance<sup>97</sup>; however, this was rejected by the Japanese Minister of Finance Ryutaro Hashimoto. Later on, by September 12, the United States' Senate passed a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all US forces stationed in Japan had Japan not increased its financial assistance. As a result the financial assistance was increased in response to US pressure.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, Shinoda noted that then US ambassador in Japan, Michael Armacost, handed a letter to then Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama in a meeting held on August 15 which included demand both troop and financial contributions.<sup>99</sup> Dobson also revealed that a team of top US state officials who visited Japan by mid-August demanded troop contributions.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, he showed that suggestions for troop dispatches to Japan were made by Canadian and Australian governments.<sup>101</sup>

Faced with US pressure, within the LDP, the discussions on the possibility of troop dispatches and its legal basis began. Three proposals were considered. The first was to send SDF minesweepers to the Gulf as proposed by the chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, Michio Watanabe. This suggestion was based on a view expressed during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88). In a House of Representatives Cabinet Committee meeting, then Prime Minister Nakasone mentioned that sending SDF minesweepers to the Gulf did not breach the Constitution and could be considered as an act of self-defense as Japanese ships use that route for transportation of oil. This idea was considered

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<sup>97</sup> Tomohito Shinoda, *Sengo Nihon Gaiko: Anzen Hosho no Kokunai Seiji Katei* [Japan's Post-war Diplomacy: The Domestic Political Process of Security Policy] (Kyoto: Minerva Shobou, 2006): 26.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid: 27

<sup>99</sup> Ibid: 25 and 65

<sup>100</sup> Ibid: 65

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, 85.

legitimate as it did not involve the use of force.<sup>102</sup> Watanabe also suggested that Japan should send a medical team and assist the transportation of food and fuel for U.S. forces.<sup>103</sup>

Second, the former Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru expressed the necessity to change the Constitution in order to allow the SDF to participate in a possible international coalition to be sent to the Gulf region.<sup>104</sup>

Third, Ichiro Ozawa, the then LDP Secretary General, advocated the idea that sending the SDF to participate in a UN force did not violate the Constitution and could be justified based on the UN Charter.<sup>105</sup> Ozawa's argument was based on changing the interpretation of the Article 9 of the constitution. The new interpretation made a distinction between "collective security" and "collective defense" and suggested that UN peacekeeping activities fell under the category of collective security. According to him, SDF's participation in collective security missions did not breach Article 9. Participating in collective defense related arrangements, on the other hand, was considered as a violation of the Constitution.<sup>106</sup>

While the discussions were still in progress, finally on 29 August 1990, the Kaifu Administration announced the Government's six-point action plan which revealed

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<sup>102</sup> "Japan May Send Minesweepers," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 18, 1990, 1. In the same source it was also mentioned that during the Iran-Iraq War, the Foreign Ministry considered other measures as well in a possible "shipping crisis" including: "Sending Maritime Safety Agency patrol boats. Directly shouldering part of the cost of the U.S. forces. Indirectly shouldering part of the cost. Extending economic assistance to countries in the Gulf region."

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> "Ozawa: Constitution Allows SDF To Join U.N. Forces// Liberal," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 28, 1990, 1; "Ozawa-shi no [Jieitai Haken], Kanemaru-shi no [Kenpō Kaisei] Hatsugen Kokusai Kōken Rongī ni Isseki," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 28, 1990, 1.

<sup>105</sup> "Editorial//Inadequate Gulf Response," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 29, 1990, 6; "Wangan Kōkensaku Kenpō Minaoshi Fukume Hōseibi wo Kanemaru Moto-Fukusōri, Kokusai Kinkyū-ji Taiō Kyōchō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 28, 1990, 1.

<sup>106</sup> "Jieitai no Kokurengun Sanka wa Kenpō-jyō Mondai Kuniku no Hōseikyoku-chōkan Kenkai Jiminnai ni Hanpatsu mo," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 20, 1990, 3.

the government's intention to create a law that would authorize troop dispatches. The six-point action plan was in the following way:

- I. Provision of supplies and goods to the international military force such as food, water and medical supplies as well as provision of civilian aircraft and ships to be used for transportation activities
- II. Provision of funds for transportation of Egyptian laborers in Kuwait returning to their country
- III. Dispatching a team of medical personnel to Saudi Arabia in assistance for refugee relief
- IV. Extension of financial assistance to surrounding countries of Jordan, Egypt and Turkey
- V. Provision of around 1.5 billion yen worth of aid to the refugees in Jordan
- VI. Creation of a basic law for international cooperation<sup>107</sup>

The end result of the Kaifu Cabinet's studies was the "UN Peace Cooperation Bill" which aimed at the formation of a *Peace Cooperation Corps*— comprised of voluntary participants including civilians and members of the SDF. The government completed the draft bill on October 15 after changing its content for several times and submitted the final draft to the House of Representatives, the next day, during an extraordinary session of the Diet.

The discussions on the content of the law concentrated on four points: the participation of the SDF in the Corps, the type of activities which the Corps would be allowed to undertake, the command and control structure of the Corps, and finally the use of weapons by the Corps.

First, the Corps would be comprised of civil servants from various fields

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<sup>107</sup> "29 Nichi Happyō no Nihon no Chūtō Kōkensaku=Zenbun," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 30, 1990, 2.

(Article 32), the Japan Coast Guard (Article 20) and Self-Defense Forces (Article 22). The SDF members participating in the Corps would be able to maintain their status and identity as an SDF member and Peace Corps member (in Japanese this dual status is called *heinin*).<sup>108</sup> Second, the draft bill stated that the Peace Corps would be allowed to undertake *non-military tasks* including monitoring ceasefires, providing administrative advice to provisional governments, election monitoring and supervision in post-conflict stages, medical assistance, transportation of goods and other supplies, rescue of people affected by conflict, and repair of damage resulting from conflict. (Article 3, para. 2)<sup>109</sup> Third, the decision to dispatch the Corps was going to be made by the United Nations Peace Cooperation Council which would be established under the Cabinet Office (*Naikakufu*). By consulting the Prime Minister, that Council would decide the basic policy of peace cooperation on a case-by-case basis (Articles 4 and 5). The implementation plan of the cooperation activities, however, would be made by the “United Nations Peace Cooperation” Headquarters which would be established under the Prime Minister’s Office. (Article 15).<sup>110</sup>

The purpose in placing the Corps under the command of the Prime Minister’s Office and not under the Defense Agency was to ensure civilian control over the Corps. Fourth, the Corps members would be able to carry small weapons which were the types allowed and specified in the relevant domestic laws (Article 27). The Head of the Peace Cooperation Headquarters would decide on whether the Corps could carry weapons on a case-by-case basis. The Corps members could use weapons in self-defense under the

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> “15 Nichi Kettei shita [Kokusai Rengō Heiwa Kyōryoku Ho-an] no Zenbun,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 15, 1990.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

conditions specified by domestic criminal law.<sup>111</sup>

As the bill was being discussed in the Diet, the three largest opposition parties, JSP, JCP and the Kōmeitō were against the bill on the grounds that SDF's participation in UN peacekeeping operations violated the Constitution's pacifist principles. The three parties agreed on that Japan should provide non-military cooperation through UN but not participate in military operations in any form.<sup>112</sup> The JCP referred to the Upper House resolution adopted in 1954 which banned the overseas dispatch of SDF.<sup>113</sup> Also, the opposition parties were against arming the Peace Corps. With respect to material cooperation, the opposition parties demanded the exclusion of transportation of weapons and ammunitions from the materials that could be supplied by the SDF.<sup>114</sup> Komeito suggested that Japan could cooperate with UN mandated PKOs in non-military areas but not with other international military forces such as the US-led military force deployed in the Gulf.<sup>115</sup> In that sense, the Komeito exhibited a milder stance, compared to JSP and JCP by showing approving contributions to UN mandated PKOs.

Komeito set out a number of conditions before giving its consent to SDF's participation including making the law a special measures law limited to a certain period of time; limiting SDF's participation to members who left their job or retired; and limiting the Corps' duties to non-military tasks<sup>116</sup> The DSP's general stance was not against the

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> "Kokkai Ronsō no Shōhoku 16 Nichi ni Shūin Daihyō Shitsumon kara Shakaitō Doi Takako-shi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 17, 1990, 15; "Kokkai Ronsō no Shōhoku 16 Nichi ni Shūin Daihyō Shitsumon kara Kyōsan-tō Fuwa Testuzō-shi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 17, 1990, 15; "Kokkai Ronsō no Shōhoku 17 Nichi ni Shūin Daihyō Shitsumon kara Shakaitō Uehara Kōsuke-shi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 18, 1990, 2.

<sup>113</sup> "Kokkai Ripōto Kokuren Heiwa Kyōryoku-an Seifu-nai 'hidane' Hyōmenka," *Yatō ni Kenkai no sa*," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 19, 1990, 2.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> "Kokkai Ripōto Buryokufukōshi Kyōchō no Seifu Heiwa Kyōryoku Tokubetsu-in no Kaku-tō Shitsugi ga ichijyun," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 26, 1990, 2.

<sup>116</sup> "Kokuren Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan Shakō-ryōtō, Taian Katameru Jieitai Haken ni Kibishii Shisei," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 6, 1990, 3.

SDF's participation in the international military force but it requested revision of the bill in three points. (1) The SDF would be unarmed (2) The Corps would be placed under the command of the Prime Minister (3) *Diet approval* would be attained before each dispatch to ensure civilian control over SDF's overseas activities.<sup>117</sup>

Consequently, the ruling LDP sought to compromise with the more moderate Komeito and DSP in order to receive the sufficient amount of votes to pass the bill in the Upper House. As the DSP was not against SDF's participation but only asked for prior Diet approval before dispatches, the Komeito had to be convinced. In order to receive Komeito's support, former deputy Prime Minister proposed to revise the bill by making it a temporary law instead of a permanent one and excluding the SDF from the Corps. His proposals, however, were rejected by the LDP Secretary General Ozawa and also by Komeito.<sup>118</sup> Komeito members were against the idea of troop dispatches to US commanded military force. After almost a month long deliberations in the House of Representatives, the bill was aborted by early November<sup>119</sup> due to strong resistance from the opposition parties, especially from the JSP and Komeito.

On the same day, "a triparty agreement" was reached between the Secretary Generals of LDP Ichiro Ozawa, Yuichi Ichikawa of Komeito and Keigo Ouchi of DSP to discuss the contents of the new bill. According to various sources the key person who arranged the triparty conference was Ichiro Ozawa. LDP wanted to incorporate the views of the more moderate opposition parties for the creation of a new bill. Shinoda indicated

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<sup>117</sup> "Jeitai Haken Toki ni Kokkai Shōnin wo Ouchi Minshatō Inchō ga Kyōryoku Hōan no Shūsei wo Yōkyū," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 18, 1990, 3.

<sup>118</sup> "Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan Jigen Rippō no Kanemaru Hasshin Naigai Seron ni Hairyō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 31, 1990, 3; "Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan Shūsei de ha dame, Haian shika nai, Kōmeitō Shunō Kyōchō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 31, 1990, 3; "Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan no Shūsei Kangaezu/ Seifusetsu," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 31, 1990, 2.

<sup>119</sup> "Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan Haian Kokusai Kōken no Kadai Nokosu," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 9, 1990, 30.

that the text of the agreement was written by the Komeito Secretary General Ichikawa which was based on Doi Takako's idea of establishing a separate organization from the SDF from which personnel dispatches could be made.<sup>120</sup>

As a result of their meetings, the three parties agreed on the establishment of a new organization apart from the SDF which would participate in UN PKOs and humanitarian relief operations based on UN resolutions as well as international disaster and rescue operations.<sup>121</sup> Thus, according to the consensus achieved by the three parties at that time the SDF members on duty were not going to participate in the new organization that was going to be formed. This, however was going to change later on.

#### 4. Dispatching the SDF Minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (January 1991-April 1991)

The U.S.-led coalition's aerial and naval bombardments in Iraq started on 16 January 1991 with the passage of the UNSC set deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. The Kaifu administration started studying Japan's response to the war by early January and came up with a two-pillar plan: extending additional financial assistance for the multinational coalition and dispatching transport planes for transferring refugees from Iraq to neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

Initially commercial aircrafts were going to be used; however, considering the security situation, the government decided to use SDF planes. The government mentioned that a request from UN was received for such dispatch and strongly

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<sup>120</sup> Tomohito Shinoda, *Sengo Nihon Gaiko: Anzen Hoshō no Kokunai Seiji Katei* [Japan's Post-war Diplomacy: The Domestic Political Process of Security Policy] (Kyoto: Minerva Shobou, 2006): 69.

<sup>121</sup> "Kokusai Kōkensaku Jietai to Bekko no Shinsoshiki dzukuri Jikōmin ga Gōi, Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan ha Haihan Kakutei," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 9, 1990, 1.

emphasized that this act was based on humanitarian motives and did not involve the use of force; and therefore did not violate the Constitution. Article 100 of the SDF Law which allowed the SDF's dispatch for training purposes was considered as the legal basis for the dispatch.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau approved such legal interpretation.<sup>123</sup> All the opposition parties excluding the DSP were against the dispatch<sup>124</sup>; however, the government did not need to negotiate with them since the dispatch could be made with a cabinet resolution not with a Diet approval. For the approval of the financial assistance however, Komeito's support was necessary in the Upper House as the LDP did not hold a majority there.

The government then had to make concessions to Komeito and offer side-payments. According to Inoguchi, the Government offered three items to secure Komeito's support for passing the extended financial assistance at the Diet: The Government agreed not to raise taxes on tobacco, cut the defense budget and nominated a candidate acceptable to Komeito as the Metropolitan Tokyo governor.<sup>125</sup> By January 23, the government decided to change the enforcement ordinance of the relevant article of the SDF Law by including refugee transportation as one of the duties of SDF.<sup>126</sup> The government also announced the amount of the financial aid as 9 billion US dollars.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> "Wangan Nanmin Kyūsai no Jieitai Hakenki Matomo Tōshudō no Kecchaku, Jikkō ha Kaifu Shushō Ketsudan ni," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 18, 1991, 6; "Wangan Nanmin Kyūsai no Jieitai Hakenki Seifu ga Hōshin Kakunin Bōeichō Jyunbi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 18, 1991, 1.

<sup>123</sup> "Wangan Sensō ni Nanmin Yūsō no Jieitaiki Haken ha Genkōhō de mo Kanō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 19, 1991, 1; "Wangan no Nanmin Yūsō [Kinkyū sochi] de Jieitaiki Haken Seifu, Seiji Ketsudan wo Yūsen," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 20, 1991, 2.

<sup>124</sup> "Wangan Sensō ni momonau Nanmin Kyūsen ni Jieitaiki Haken Seifu no Hō Kaishaku ni Yatō ga Hanpatsu," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 20, 1991, 2.

<sup>125</sup> Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Response for the Gulf Crisis: An Analytical Overview," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 17, no.2 (Summer 1991): 259.

<sup>126</sup> "Takokusekigun he no Tsuika Shiensaku Kettei ha 24 Ka ni Mochikoshi he/ Seifu Seifu Jimin Shunō Kaigi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 24, 1991, 1.

<sup>127</sup> "Wangan Shien Jieitaiki Haken ha konkai dake no Tokurei 90 Oku Doru no Shichi Seigen sezu/Kanbō Chōkan" *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 24, 1991, 1.

The Gulf War ended on February 27, 1991 and the Kaifu administration later announced that the international organizations no longer needed the SDF transportation planes; thus, the revised ordinance for the purpose of dispatching the SDF transport planes was abolished.<sup>128</sup> With the end of the war, the clearance of mines which had been placed in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) became an urgent task for the international community. A number of countries had already sent minesweeping naval vessels to the region. By mid-March the Japanese government announced the necessity of dispatching SDF minesweepers instead of the transport planes. This idea was also supported by Keidanren which considered such operation useful to Japan's own energy security.<sup>129</sup> On 27 April 1991, a fleet of SDF minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf. The government legitimized this act by referring to Article 99 of the SDF Law which allowed the SDF to undertake mine clearance activities.<sup>130</sup> As the main reasons behind the dispatch, Prime Minister Kaifu referred to making an "international contribution" and the mission's necessity for Japan's own energy security.<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, the government also emphasized that the dispatch did not violate the Constitution and was compatible with Japan's peace state identity.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> "Wangan Teisen de Jieitaiki Haken no Tokurei Seirei wo 16 nichi ni Haishi/Seifu," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 13, 1991, 3.

<sup>129</sup> "Wangan Fukkō no Ichijyō ni Sōkaitei Haken wo Keidanren Kaichō ga Teigen," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 9, 1991, 2.

<sup>130</sup> "Fleet of Minesweepers Heads For Persian Gulf// The minesweepers," *Daily Yomiuri*, April 27, 1991, 1.

<sup>131</sup> "Sōkaitei, 26 Nichi ni Haken Seifu Yotō ga Icchi Kaifu Shushō [Kokusai Kōken to Kokueki] Kyōchō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 23, 1991, 1.

<sup>132</sup> "Sōkaitei Haken ni kansuru Seifu Seimei no Zenbun," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 25, 1991, 2.

## 5. Establishment of the UN PKO Law: Overcoming the Opposition with Side-Payments (September 1991-June 1992)

The government's second trial to pass a PKO law turned out to be a long journey which took almost nine months after the failed Peace Cooperation Corps bill (September 1990). It started in June 1991, after the end of the Gulf War. During the creation process of the draft bill the views of the opposition parties— Komeito and DSP— were incorporated into the bill in order to secure their support during the Diet voting. These actor's support were attained through both normative and material "side-payments" as well as through skillful political strategies that threatened the survival of the two opposition parties.

On the normative side, both Komeito and DSP managed to insert limitations on the SDF's activities in line with the pacifist norms they supported. The Komeito wanted to impose limits on the use of force and the DSP wanted to ensure civilian control over the SDF's overseas activities through prior Diet approval. The government agreed to change the content of the bill in accordance with the two parties' normative beliefs. On the material side, they managed to pave the way for political reform which was going to be in their advantage in the long-run as small parties. Another material gain was the prevention of early Upper House elections. When the talks between Komeito and DSP resulted in a deadlock as both sides did not want to compromise, Prime Minister Miyazawa strategically threatened the opposition parties with an early simultaneous election. If the elections were held, two smaller parties could have suffered a serious loss of seats. This solved the deadlock and the two party leaders agreed on accepting each other's proposals. Thus, besides normative and material side payments the government successful exploited the weaknesses of two minor opposition parties by threatening them

with early elections. Below is a detailed explanation of that process.

The end of the Gulf War triggered debates about Japan's role in the international society. After the return of the SDF minesweeper fleet, public views with respect to SDF's dispatch to peacekeeping operations changed in a positive way. However, it is rather difficult to say that change in public views was the main cause behind the creation of the PKO law as the ruling LDP was determined to create the law even with little public support. Politicians in the LDP especially worked hard to advocate the necessity to change the interpretation of Article 9 for various reasons such as fulfilling international responsibilities or for the benefit of Japan's own national interests. They promoted the idea that participation in peacekeeping operations were considered as "common sense" in international society and Japan's stance stood out as an exception. In that process, the government used external pressure to convince the public and opposition parties.

By early June, the government started laying the groundwork for a new bill. The government proposal—decided as a result of discussions between the Cabinet Office and MOFA—was completed by June 27, 1991. The proposal, in line with the consensus reached during the triparty conference, suggested the establishment of an *International Peace Cooperation Corps*. The Corps' duties would include participating in peacekeeping forces, monitoring ceasefires and elections in post-conflict stages, providing police and administrative tasks as well as rear-area support in medical services, construction of facilities, transportation, communication, refueling, and supplying equipment. An international peace cooperation headquarters would be established under the Prime Minister's office and the head of the headquarters would be the Prime Minister. The Corps would be composed of civil servants, volunteers and SDF members. Thus unlike in the

consensus reached during the triparty conference, now Komeito agreed on the participation of SDF members in the Corps. The SDF members would be able to retain their SDF identity while participating in peacekeeping activities. The maximum number of personnel dispatched would be limited to 1000 people. A Diet approval and a UN request would be required for participation in peacekeeping forces and ceasefire observations. Finally, the Corps would be under the command of the Prime Minister.<sup>133</sup>

However, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau did not accept the constitutionality of SDF's full participation in PKOs and Komeito came up with additional conditions. The head of the Bureau at that time Atsuo Kudō stated that the SDF could only participate in peacekeeping operations which did not contain the use of force.<sup>134</sup> Views within the LDP with respect to the extent which the SDF could participate were divided. Politicians such as Michio Watanabe, Ichiro Ozawa, and Kiichi Miyazaki regarded SDF's participation constitutional.<sup>135</sup> Watanabe even emphasized the possibility of constitutional revision to enable SDF's participation. This idea was also supported by some segments within the LDP. Also, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka and his faction within the LDP criticized the Bureau's position and even demanded Kudō's removal from his post, while the then LDP Secretary General Keizo Obuchi supported limited participation.<sup>136</sup> Komeito's views changed compared to its earlier stance during the discussions on the failed bill. Komeito accepted the constitutionality of the overseas dispatch of the SDF and the idea that the SDF members could retain a dual status (*heinin*) as members of the SDF and the Corps at the

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<sup>133</sup> "22 Nichi Katamatta PKO Seifuan no Kosshi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 23, 1991, 2; "PKO Seifu-an no Yōshi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 28, 1991, 3.

<sup>134</sup> "PKO Seifuan Kettei Ashifumi Heiwa Ijigun he no Jieitai Sanka ni Hōseikyoku nado no Iron," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 15, 1991, 2.

<sup>135</sup> "Jieitai no Heiwa Ijigun Sanka Kenpōjyō no Mondai nai Miyazawa moto Fukusōri ga Kenkai," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 25, 1991, 2.

<sup>136</sup> "PKO de Jimin ga Hōseikyoku Hihan Chōkan no Kōtetsu mo Mitsuzuka shi ha Kenpō Teishoku ha Saikō Saibandan," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 23, 1991, 2.

same time. However, they laid down additional conditions including Diet approval for dispatches, an upper limit on the SDF members allowed to be sent to PKOs, limited participation during peace time including missions such as monitoring ceasefires and rear-area support for the peacekeeping forces and finally reception of a request from the UN or an international organization.<sup>137</sup> Komeito's main support base a pacifist religious body known as the Sōka Gakkai was against the idea of SDF's full participation.

In response to the CLB and Komeito's apprehensions, Prime Minister Kaifu announced five conditions to be met before Japan's participation in a peacekeeping mission in order to avoid SDF members' participation in missions containing the use of force. These conditions were initially determined as follows:

- I. Conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between conflicting parties
- II. Consent of the conflicting parties to the UN peacekeeping activities and Japanese forces' participation
- III. Neutrality of the peacekeeping mission
- IV. If the above-mentioned conditions cease to exist Japan retains the right to withdraw from the mission
- V. In accordance with UN standards, the Corps members could use weapons for self-defense (minimum use of force) and could not use force against the conflicting parties.<sup>138</sup>

In order to finalize a bill based on the government's proposal and the views of the Komeito and DSP, a body (*jyunbi shitsu*) under the Cabinet Secretariat was established comprised of the heads of the relevant ministries and agencies such as the

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<sup>137</sup> "Komei Gōdō Bukai ga Jieitai Heinin Mitomeru PKO Sanka ha Betsu Soshiki de Katsuyō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 3, 1991, 3; "Jieitai no Kaigai Haken ha Gōken Kōmeitō ga Kokkai Shōnin nado Jyōken ni Hōshin," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 26, 1991, 3.

<sup>138</sup> "PKO Seifuan Jimintō ga ōsuji de Ryōshō Buki Shiyō nado de 5 gensoku ha sara ni Chōsei," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 1, 1991, 1.

MOFA, defense agency, and police department.<sup>139</sup> The government proposal was finalized on August 1, 1991<sup>140</sup> and submitted to the ruling LDP and the opposition parties.

<sup>141</sup> The next day, Chief Cabinet Secretariat Sakamoto Misoji and vice-Cabinet Secretariat Ishihara Nobuo announced the changes in the fifth principle related to the use of weapons due to Constitutional restrictions. As such, the change was made in the following way: “the weapons could be used for the defense of the lives of the personnel [members of the Corps] in the minimum level necessary”<sup>142</sup> which excluded the UN standards and more broad understanding of self-defense. The Cabinet was considering making the principles a Cabinet resolution rather than including them into the PKO law.

The government proposed bill differed from the previously failed bill in a number of ways. First, in the old bill that was aborted a year ago, the Corps were allowed to participate in PKOs and other types of multinational forces such as the one operated during the Gulf War. Under the new bill, the Corps could participate in UN-led PKOs and humanitarian missions. Second, in the old bill there was no limit imposed on the maximum number of personnel to be sent whereas in the new bill an upper limit was set which was later decided as 2000. Third, the use of weapons were allowed to protect the lives of dispatched personnel in the new bill, whereas the old bill only allowed the use of small arms for the protection of the personnel’s own life.

In the final intra-party dialogue, the Komeito executives set forth three conditions before giving the party’s consent: prior Diet approval for each dispatch, the

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<sup>139</sup> “PKO Hōan Honkaku Sakusei he Jyunbishitsu Seifu ga Naikaku Kanbō ni Secchi Hōshin,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 23, 1991, 1.

<sup>140</sup> “8 gatsu 1 Nichi Happyō sareta PKO Seifuan no Zenbun,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 2, 1991, 2.

<sup>141</sup> “PKO Seifuan Kōmei, Minsha ni Teiji,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 2, 1991, 1.

<sup>142</sup> “Jieitai no Kokuren Heiwa Ijigun Sanka Kokkai Tōben to Mujuun Sezu/ Ishihara Kanbō Fukuchōkan,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 3, 1991, 3.

inclusion of the government-announced five principles together with the upper limit on the personnel to be dispatched into the law.<sup>143</sup> Within the LDP, views with respect to the necessity of prior Diet approval was divided. Some members believed that at the Cabinet a sufficient level of civilian control existed. MOFA also claimed that prior Diet approval would usually take at least a month which would delay dispatches and Japan's response.<sup>144</sup> The DSP, on the other hand, only insisted on the prior Diet approval as the best way to ensure civilian control over the SDF.<sup>145</sup> There was also disagreement over the necessity of legalizing the five principles. LDP members were particularly wary of the idea of withdrawing the Japanese Corps in case of the break of the ceasefire (the first condition). They believed it would be inappropriate if only the Japanese forces withdrew in case of breakdown of a ceasefire.<sup>146</sup> The DSP did not consider the inclusion of the five principles into the draft as necessary.<sup>147</sup> The largest opposition party SDPJ was excluded from process of creating the bill. The JSP maintained its position with respect to the unconstitutionality of SDF's participation in PKOs and the party chairman Makoto Tanabe repeatedly mentioned that three principles should shape Japan's contribution "non-military, civilian contribution and civilian control over the military," (*higunji, minsei, bunmin*).<sup>148</sup>

In consideration of the views of the three parties the Cabinet adopted the

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<sup>143</sup> "PKO Kyōryoku Hōan Hadomesaku no Atsukai Shōten ni Kokkai Shōnin Meiki wo Kōmeitō ga Yōkyū," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 25, 1991, 2.

<sup>144</sup> "PKO Hadomesaku ni Kokkai Shōnin, Jimin de mo Tasū Yatō Sesshō no Kirifuda Sifu Kuryō," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 28, 1991, 2.

<sup>145</sup> "PKO he Jieitai Sanka ha Kokkai Shōnin Hitsuō Shakai ga Hōshin Kakunin," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 11, 1991, 2.

<sup>146</sup> "PKO Hōan Jikōmin no Chōsei ōzume Ijigun Naozure Ima Kokkai de no Yukue Futōmei," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 9, 1991, 2.

<sup>147</sup> "Kokusai Enjyotai-hō Kaisei ga Ima Kokkai Seiritsu he PKO ha monowakare Jikōmin Kanjichō Shoki Chōkaidan," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 30, 1991, 3.

<sup>148</sup> "Tanabe Shakaitō Inchō no Jikōmin Kyōgi he no Sanka Nerau?" *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 3, 1991, 3.

revised draft bill and immediately submitted it to the Diet on September 19, 1991. In line with Komeito's requests the five principles and an upper limit was incorporated into the law. Komeito gave up its request on the prior Diet approval before the adoption of the bill.

<sup>149</sup> Instead of prior Diet approval, a report to the Diet prior to a decision made by the Cabinet was stipulated in the bill. With respect to use of weapons the SDF members were allowed to use a wider range of small weapons than that of the civilian members. Nevertheless, they could only use weapons in self-defense. <sup>150</sup>

The ordinary session of the Diet was going to end on October 4. Thus, the deliberations on the bill was delayed to the extraordinary session of the Diet which was scheduled to be held between November 5 and December 10.<sup>151</sup> By the end of October, the minesweepers that had been dispatched to the Persian Gulf returned to Japan.<sup>152</sup> Also on October 27, as a result of the LDP presidential elections Kiichi Miyazawa became the new prime minister thanks to the support of the Takeshita faction headed by Ozawa.<sup>153</sup> In return, Ozawa requested from the Prime Minister the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Bill.

In his general policy, following the inauguration of his government Miyazawa declared that the passage of the UN peace cooperation law as one of his policy priorities.<sup>154</sup> On November 18, the draft bill was submitted to the Lower House for

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<sup>149</sup> "PKO Hōan Hadome wo Meikaku ni Kokkai Shōnin no Rongi Tsukuse (Keisetsu)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 15, 1991, 11.

<sup>150</sup> For the content of the draft bill see "Kokuren Heiwa Iji Katsudō Kyōryoku Hōan, Kokusai Kinkyū Enjyōtai Haken-hō Kaisai-an no Zenbun," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 18, 1991, 2.

<sup>151</sup> "Kokkai Ripōto PKO Hōan Keizoku Shingi he Haken no Kokkai Shōnin nao Shōten," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 3, 1991, 2.

<sup>152</sup> "Sōkai Butai Kikoku Jinteki Kōken wo Sekai ni Shimesu Gijyutsu mo Takai Hyōka (Kaisetsu)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 31, 1991, 13.

<sup>153</sup> "Matomo Shissoku PKO Hōan Chū Seiken Yusaburi no Megumu (Rensai)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 13, 1991, 4.

<sup>154</sup> "8 ka Miyazawa Shushō no Shoshin Hyōmei Enzetsu Zenbun," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 8, 1991, 2.

deliberations. Again one of the major points of contention between the DSP on one hand and the government, LDP and Komeitō on the other was the Diet approval. DSP insisted on prior Diet approval but Prime Minister Miyazawa argued that with the inclusion of the five conditions into the Law a sufficient level of civilian control was ensured. Even though the Komeito members' votes were sufficient for passing the Law at the Lower House, nevertheless the government did not want to antagonize the DSP as this could have led the DSP to move towards the JSP and the *Rengō no Kai* group which were much more powerful in the Upper House and had a united stance in opposing the government sponsored bill.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the LDP lost the by-elections in Nara and Migai prefectures to *Rengō no Kai* which fought the election by opposing the PKO bill. The government and Komeito tried to negotiate with the DSP by offering Diet approval within two years after a dispatch was made. The DSP insisted for six months. However, without reaching a consensus with DSP, the government called for a voting at the special committee where the bill was discussed. Even though there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, the opposition parties resorted to physical force to block the voting. Komeito cooperated with the LDP in railroading the bill at the special committee in the House of Representatives but did not show support during the voting at the plenary session due to the criticism the party leaders received from their supporters. The DSP, however, was excluded from that process.

The JSP and the JCP were strongly against passing the bill. The JSP chairman Makoto Tanabe requested the withdrawal of the bill from Prime Minister Miyazawa which he rejected. During the deliberations in the special committee, the JSP members tried to slow down the deliberations. They requested the release of UN internal documents

related to the use of force which Japan's MOFA acquired. It was made public by Yomiuri newspaper that these documents suggested that the military personnel were allowed to use force in cases where there was a forceful attempt to disarm them or a forceful entry into their area of operation. This exceeded the Japanese government's official view which only allowed the use of weapons for self-defense and the defense of their fellow SDF members. Besides using delaying tactics, the JSP submitted their counter-bill both to the Lower and Upper houses.

The counter-bill emphasized the principles of non-military, civilian and civilian control over the military (*higunji, minsei, bunmin*) and proposed the establishment of a separate organization composed of volunteers and excluded SDF members. After the forceful passage of the bill in the special committee the JSP and JCP threatened the government with censure motions and snail walk (or ox walk) had the bill sent to the plenary session. Consequently, due to the opposition parties' pressures Prime Minister sent the bill back to the special committee of the Lower House. The bill finally passed the Lower House on December 3 with a minor modification of incorporation of Diet approval for the SDF's overseas activities exceeding two years.<sup>155</sup> The same day the bill was sent to the Upper House.<sup>156</sup>

However, the government decided to delay the discussions on the bill to the next ordinary session of the Diet as the two opposition parties the JSP and JCP did not agree on to extent the extraordinary Diet session for more than ten days. JSP put forward four conditions before agreeing on initiating the deliberations in the Upper House: clarifying the date when the supplementary government budget proposal would be

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<sup>155</sup> "PKO Hōan Kyō 3 Ka ni Shūin Tsūka Tokubetsuin de Kaketsu Kakunin," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 3, 1991, 1.

<sup>156</sup> "PKO Hōan Shingi Sanin de Jieitai Kaigai Shukkō Kinshi Ketsugi no Kaishaku Meguru Rongi Hisshi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 4, 1991, 3.

submitted to the Diet; at least twenty days of deliberations on the PKO draft bill in the Upper House; A promise from the LDP for not railroading the bill in the Upper House; and finally an explanation on the consistency of the PKO draft bill and the 1954 Diet resolution that banned the overseas dispatch of the SDF.<sup>157</sup> In relation to the fourth condition, Miyazawa provided the explanation that when the SDF was created in 1954, the government did not assume dispatching troops for UN PKOs therefore that resolution did not cause a problem. He further argued that what was banned in the Constitution was the overseas troop deployments with the purpose of use of force not troop dispatches for UN PKOs.<sup>158</sup> The extraordinary session of the Diet was extended for ten days only and as a result the deliberations were delayed to the next ordinary session which was scheduled to start on January 24, next year. According to one article published in the *Yomiuri* newspaper, the Miyazawa administration bowed to the opposition in exchange for them not calling on witnesses to the Diet to testify on Prime Minister Miyazawa's involvement in the recruit scandal.<sup>159</sup> Against these developments Ozawa and other LDP members severely criticized Miyazawa for his leadership skills and for the fall out with the DSP but nevertheless did not withdraw the Takeshita faction's support for Miyazawa.

The next ordinary session of the Diet was scheduled to end by mid-June 1992. Now the government had to convince the opposition parties. First and foremost the Miyazawa administration had to settle an agreement between the Komeito and DSP. DSP's support was important because if the DSP aligned itself with the JSP a more powerful opposition would be created against the LDP in the Upper House. The DSP and

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<sup>157</sup> "PKO Hōan, Shūin wo Tsūka Kyō 4ka kara Sanin de Shingi Kaiki Enchō to Saishūsei," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 4, 1991, 1.

<sup>158</sup> "PKO Hōan no Sanin Shingi Hajimaru Miyazawa Shushō 'Jieitai Kaigai Shutsudō, Kokkai Ketsugi ni Hansezu'" *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 4, 1991, 1.

<sup>159</sup> "Editorial// U.N. Peacekeeping Bill Stalled" *Daily Yomiuri*, December 12, 1991, 6.

JSP had common points both were non-communist left wing parties which depended on the support of the Rengo-kai (Japan Trade Union Confederation). Second, it had to negotiate with the JSP which was the most powerful party in the Upper House. Moreover, it was the last chance for the government and the LDP to pass the bill because according to the rules of the Upper House if a bill was not decided prior to an Upper House election then it would be automatically scrapped as the half of the members of the House would be elected. The Upper House elections were going to be held in July. The government and the ruling LDP had to come up with a deal that was acceptable at least to the Komeito and DSP to attain a simple majority needed to pass the bill in the Lower House. In order to negotiate with the opposition parties the government decided to make side payments. First side-payment was political reform which was about addressing corruption in political fund-raising, the redistribution of the Lower House Diet seats and election reform. The second one was the early approval of the fiscal 1992 budget which included a cut on defense spending.

The opposition parties including the JSP, DSP, Shaminren and Komeito agreed on the defense budget cuts. In exchange for these, the government got the opposition parties to accept a reconsideration of the draft bill. At that point, an agreement between the ruling LDP and the opposition was made on revising the draft bill.<sup>160</sup> However, how to revise that bill was not yet decided. In return Miyazawa accepted the opposition's requests for reductions in the defense expenditure.<sup>161</sup> The JSP continued to emphasize its motto on Japan's international contribution "non-military, civilian areas

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<sup>160</sup> "Kokkai Ronsen no Pointo Seiji Kaikaku Yosan PKO Kome ... Naigai de Nandai Haran Fukumi ni," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 27, 1992, 3.

<sup>161</sup> "PKO Hōan Miyazawa Shushō ga Shūsei ni Maemuki Bōei Taikō Minaoshi mo/ Sanin Daihyō Shitsumon," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 29, 1992, 2.

(public welfare), and civilian control over the military,”<sup>162</sup> and went on to press the government to discard the bill. By early February, The Komeito Secretary General Yūichi Ichikawa proposed a plan which included imposing a freeze on Japan’s participation in peacekeeping forces. An additional law would be necessary to lift the freeze. The SDF would be allowed to engage in monitoring ceasefires, transportation and medical activities. Second, the Komeito proposed to compromise with DSP on the adoption of Diet approval within six months after a dispatch.<sup>163</sup>

The views within the LDP with respect to the SDF’s overseas roles and the fate of the draft bill was diverse. Three viewpoints stood out. First, was to discard the bill. This group later argued that instead of a permanent UN PKO law, a special law with a limited time period should be created for the PKO in Cambodia. Second was to revise the bill in a way to limit the SDF’s participation to election monitoring only and exclude full participation. Third view was accepting full participation including the UN-led missions that involved the use of force by changing the interpretation of the Article 9. This third view was pioneered by Ozawa. Following the Gulf crisis, based on the then Prime Minister Kaifu’s request for advice a special research commission on the role of Japan in the international Community was formed under Ozawa’s leadership in June 1991. The commission is also known as the Ozawa Commission. The Commission met twenty-one times since then and its final report was finished by February 1992. Ozawa talked about the views presented in the draft report to *Yomiuri Shimbun*. He not only clearly made a distinction between collective self-defense and collective security but also suggested that the use of force for the purpose of collective security was constitutional. A part of his

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<sup>162</sup> “PKO Hōan de Jyūnan Taiō wo Shisa/ Shakaitō Tanabe Iinchō,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 21, 1992, 2.

<sup>163</sup> “Kokuren Heiwa Iji Katsudō Kyōryoku an de PKF no Tōketsu Teian Kōmeitō ga Sonzaikan Apiru wo Nerai,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 5, 1992, 2.

interview was as follows:

Indeed, for Japan to play a more active role from any other country in peace keeping organizations centered on the United Nations, which every country in the world today is a member of, is the aim of the Constitution. I think we should use every possible means to make this our ideology.

About problems related to the Article 9, in my opinion, the Constitution is not an obstacle for our country to fulfill its UN-centered roles in the international society. [Participating in UN-centered peacekeeping organizations] suits the aims of the Constitution.

As the Ozawa Commission, basically if Japan must fulfill its roles in the international society based on the objectives and principles of international peace, peace state, pacifism which are the objectives of Constitution, then maintaining international peace and order becomes the ultimate aim. In order to maintain peace, of course many things can be done such as improving public welfare and technical cooperation; however, the act of using force to suppress the people who want to destroy those things by force should not be distinguished from cooperation in public welfare and such.

Not only the narrow-scoped PKOs [Peacekeeping operations] but also if we consider the fact that the United Nations is functioning for the world peace and if an army is established by the UN for the maintenance of order Japan should participate in that. Namely, if a UN reserve army is established participating in that army does not contradict [the Constitution].

...

The arguments related to the so-called collective self-defense and collective security are being examined. Moreover, we made the problem of one-sided nature of the US-Japan Security Treaty— this is also connected to collective self-defense and many arguments appeared about that — a future task to be examined.

Collective security receives support and understanding from many

people both internationally and internally. However, it is inconvenient that the words collective self-defense and collective security resemble each other. Since we clearly separate these two concepts I decided that I will not say collective security but use the word international security.<sup>164</sup>

Ozawa Commission's final report was submitted to the party members in the LDP general meeting on February 20. The report suggested to change the official state interpretation of the Constitution so as to allow the SDF members' participation in a United Nations reserve force besides full participation in UN peacekeeping forces. The report pointed out that the international order was not transparent and regional conflicts based on ethnic and religious antagonisms might be more frequently observed. In that context greater burden sharing is demanded from Japan for the purpose of maintaining world peace, order and economic prosperity. The report criticized Japan's conventional stance as "one country pacifism" and mentioned that "peace is not equal to anti-militarism." The report called for greater international cooperation based on the principle of "positive and active pacifism."<sup>165</sup>

Ozawa commission was not the only actor pushing for change in the common understandings of the politicians and the Japanese society. This idea was also supported by major opinion leaders in Japan (scholars, journalists, and international civil servants) and constantly communicated to the public via symposiums, publications of private study groups in newspapers. An example was the private commission investigating the problems with the Constitution (*Kenpō Mondai Chōsakai*) sponsored by the *Yomiuri*

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<sup>164</sup> For members and the discussions during the first meeting of the Commission see: "Yomiuri Shimbun Kenpō Mondai Chōsakai Dai 2 kai Anzenhoshō wa Kokuren-jiku ni Kōken Ozawa Ichirō-shi no Kenkai Kiku," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 13, 1992, 4.

<sup>165</sup> "Jieitai no Kokuren Sanka Kanō Kenpō Shinkaishaku wo Motomeru, Ozawa Jimin Tokubetsu Chōsakai ga Tōshin Genan Teiji," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February, 21, 1992, 1.

*Shimbun*. The commission members included many famous Japanese scholars. The Commission called for the re-interpretation of the Article 9 in light of Japan's international responsibilities and Japan's identity as an "international state" (*koksai kokka*).<sup>166</sup>

Also, at the party level, the LDP produced its own publications about peacekeeping operations which were intended to inform the public. Also various foreign politicians and scholars were invited to Japan to inform the public about UN PKO operations and argue for the necessity of Japan's participation. For example, after being appointed as the special envoy of the UN Secretary General to Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi called Japan to contribute to the PKO in Cambodia.<sup>167</sup> Also, Cambodia's Prime Minister of the Phnom Penh government, Hun Sen even visited Japan and met with the JSP chairman Makoto Tanabe and Komeito chairman Koshiro Ishida to convince the leaders on the necessity of Japan's participation in PKO in Cambodia. Some sources suggested that the LDP leaders invited the Cambodian Prime Minister.<sup>168</sup>

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Miyazawa mentioned that the government will not change its official interpretation of the Article 9.<sup>169</sup> Thus, the government opted for a limited participation went on with revising the bill according to the wishes of the minor opposition parties. However, while the Komeito insisted on a temporary freeze, the DSP rejected this idea on the grounds the SDF would not be able to properly contribute to PKOs and consequently Japan would lose the respect of the international society. Due to the deadlock between the Komeito and DSP, and in view of the upcoming by elections,

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<sup>166</sup> "Yomiuri Shimbunsha [Kenpō Mondai Chōsakai] Shokaigō no Naiō Kenpō to Kōken no Michi wo Saguru = Tokushū," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 31, 1992, 16.

<sup>167</sup> "Shasetsu: PKO Kōshin-koku kara Dappi suru toki," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 12, 1992, 3.

<sup>168</sup> Koichi Fuwa, "'Political Pulse,'" *Daily Yomiuri*, April 6, 1992, 2.

<sup>169</sup> "Jieitai no Kokurengun Sanka Teigen Miyazawa Shushō, Kyori Okitsutsu Sonchō Ozawa-shi ni Hairyō mo," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 22, 1992, 3.

Prime Minister decided to prioritize the early passage of the 1992 Fiscal budget and political reform.<sup>170</sup> On April 9, the fiscal 1992 budget passed the Diet<sup>171</sup>

On April 12, a major breakthrough happened when the DSP Chairman Keigo Ouchi announced that his party was ready to accept Komeito's proposal of temporary freeze provided that a prior Diet approval was inserted in the bill.<sup>172</sup> In return, Komeito secretary general Ichikawa expressed his willingness to discuss the prior Diet approval issue. Finally, a consensus was reached between the LDP and the two opposition parties by late April on resuming the deliberations. Thus, after a four month break, the deliberations started in the special committee of the Upper House on April 28.

What helped to overcome this stalemate between the two opposition parties? It was the ruling LDP members' warnings to smaller opposition parties. The government threatened the opposition with dissolving the Upper House and holding simultaneous elections for both Houses which was considered more advantageous for the ruling party. In the past, simultaneous elections were held twice in Japan, in 1980 and in 1986. In both cases, the opposition bloc as a whole suffered significant loss of seats and LDP won a two-thirds majority.

Hori's research revealed that simultaneous elections are more advantageous for bigger parties than smaller ones. His analysis found that the increase in the voter turnout in the past two simultaneous elections was a factor behind LDP's decisive victory in both elections.<sup>173</sup> LDP's victory can be attributed to the fact that Lower House

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<sup>170</sup> "PKO Hōan, Haian Tsuyomaru [Seij Kaikaku] wo Yūsen Saninsen Nirami Jimin ga Hōshin," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 3, 1992, 1; "Seiji Kaikaku Yūsen Hōshin Jimin, Senkyo Taisaku wo Jyūshi PKO Hōan wa [Kōmin to Chōsei Konnan," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 4, 1992, 2.

<sup>171</sup> "Editorial: PKO Bill Reform Now Top Agenda," *Daily Yomiuri*, April 10, 1992, 6.

<sup>172</sup> "PKF Sanka Tōketsu no Ukeire mo Kokkai Shōnin Meiki Jyōken ni," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 13, 1992, 2.

<sup>173</sup> Yukio Hori, "Dai Ni-kai Shusan Dohi Senkyo no Bunseki," *Senkyo Kenkyu* 2 (1987): 5-25.

elections determine the government and draw more voters than an election for the less powerful Upper House. Qualified voters may be less interested in an Upper House election and may choose not to vote. In contrast, as the Lower House election determines the government, more electors are expected to vote in a simultaneous election than in a single Upper House election. We can expect the voter turnout to be higher in simultaneous elections than a single Upper House election. Consequently, a simultaneous election would be less advantageous for smaller parties as it may undermine their overall strength in the Diet.

The fact that a simultaneous election could be less advantageous for smaller parties had been proved in the past by the results of two simultaneous elections held in 1980 and 1986. The first postwar simultaneous election was held in 22 June 1980. If the results of this election are compared to the results of the two previous elections for both Houses, then the declining strength of the smaller parties can be understood. The previous election for the Lower House was held in 1979. Table 2.4 compares the results of the number of seats obtained in the Lower House as a result of the elections held in 1979 and 1980. While LDP seats increased from 248 in 1979 to 284 in 1980, Komeito's seats declined from 57 to 33. DSP also lost 3 seats and JCP lost 10 seats<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/JAPAN\\_1979\\_1980\\_E.PDF](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/JAPAN_1979_1980_E.PDF)

Table 2.4. Number of Seats won across Political Groups in the Lower House Elections of 1979 and 1980

Political Group	1979 election	1980 election
Liberal Democratic Party	248	284
Japan Socialist Party	107	107
Komeito	57	33
Democratic Socialist Party	35	32
Japan Communist Party	39	29
New Liberal Club	4	12
Social Democratic Federation	2	3
Independents	19	4

(Source: Interparliamentary Union)

The 1986 simultaneous election repeated this pattern even though the decline of seats for smaller parties were fewer than in 1980. The Table 2.5 compares the results of the 1986 election to that of 1983. The LDP increased its seats by 50, while the opposition parties lost seats. The JSP lost 27 seats, Komeito lost 2 and DSP lost 12.<sup>175</sup>

<sup>175</sup> [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/JAPAN\\_1986\\_E.PDF](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/JAPAN_1986_E.PDF)

Table 2.5. Comparison of the Number of Seats won across Political Groups in the Lower House Elections of 1983 and 1986.

Political Group	1983 election	1986 election
Liberal Democratic Party	250	300
Japan Socialist Party	112	85
Komeito	58	56
Democratic Socialist Party	38	26
Japan Communist Party	26	26
New Liberal Club	8	6
United Social Democratic Party	3	4
Independents	16	7

(Source: Interparliamentary Union)

The Miyazawa Cabinet's threats of holding simultaneous elections worked as catalyst in the negotiations between the DSP and Komeito. The DSP and Komeito leaders started to think that they had to reach on a consensus and help pass the bill in the current Diet session. Holding simultaneous elections could be detrimental to the survival of small parties. Thus, the side payment made by the Miyazawa Cabinet was not holding simultaneous elections in return for both parties' support for the passage of the bill.

The opposition parties were very wary of the progress in negotiations between the Komeito and the DSP and to be excluded from the discussions on amendments to the bill. JSP was being criticized for the lack of its capacity to propose an alternative policy to the government sponsored bill. As a result, the party submitted its

counter-bill to the Upper House. The bill suggested the dispatch of personnel to UN peacekeeping activities excluding military ones and to disaster relief operations. Also, the bill banned the participation of the SDF members. The bill also required prior Diet approval of the basic plans of the dispatches decided by the Cabinet.<sup>176</sup>

By mid-May, the Komeito and DSP reached a consensus on the concrete amendments to be made. Komeito also specified the activities on which a temporary freeze would be imposed. These activities were monitoring disarmament, stationing at and patrolling of areas for preventing the recurrence of conflict. Inspecting the export and import of weapons, collecting, administering and disposing of abandoned weapons, assisting the establishment of ceasefire zones, assisting the exchange of captives and prisoners of war between conflicting parties. These activities would be on temporary freeze until a new law was enacted to lift the freeze.<sup>177</sup> On May 21, both Komeito and DSP agreed on the insertion of both prior Diet approval and the temporary into the draft bill.<sup>178</sup>

On May 25 finally the parties agreed on expanding the areas on which both the freeze and the prior Diet approval would be applied. Two additional activities would be put on freeze. These were transportation of weapons and ammunitions and observation of ceasefires. The prior Diet approval was expanded to all areas of operations. The basic plan of mission decided by the Cabinet would be subject to prior Diet approval in line with the demands of the Rengo Sangiin. Another condition that was the review of the law

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<sup>176</sup> “PKO Shingi Saikai Gōi Shakaitō ga Koritsu Kaihi Hakaru Kōmin Sekkin, Shiji Rōgumi mo Hihan,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 23, 1992, 3.

<sup>177</sup> “Tōketsu PKF no Hani Reiji Busō Kaijyō Kanshi nado/ Ishida Kōmeito Inchō,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 13, 1992, 3.

<sup>178</sup> “PKO Kyōryoku Hōan Kokkai Jizen Shōnin to PKF Tōketsu Kōmin Shunō ga Owaku de Gōi,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 21, 1992, 3.

after three years was also inserted in the draft bill.<sup>179</sup>

On June 1, the revised UN PKO bill was jointly submitted by the LDP, Komeito and DSP to the special committee of the Upper House.<sup>180</sup> The JSP and JCP threatened to use physical force and engage in delaying tactics such as the “ox-walk” and submitting censure motions against the members of the Miyazawa Cabinet to block a voting on the bill. Despite the obstructive efforts of the JSP and JCP, the bill passed the Upper House on and sent back once again to the Lower House for another voting as it underwent revisions in the Upper House. The bill was enacted on June 15, marking an end of 9 months long journey.

## 6. Conclusion

The Japanese government’s attempt to create a UN PKO Law which would allow the dispatch of the SDF members was a long journey with many hurdles. The Gulf War was starting point. During the Gulf Crisis, the LDP-led government drafted a bill that would enable the SDF and other civilian personnel to provide logistical support to the US-led military coalition stationed in the Middle East. However, due to the opposition parties, the bill had to be aborted before passing the Upper House. While the LDP held a majority in the Lower House (275/512), in the Upper House it was the opposition parties that held the majority which produced a divided legislature. As a result, the LDP could not pass the bill. However, under the leadership of Ichiro Ozawa a former LDP Secretary General the three parties (LDP, Komeito and DSP) agreed on to create a new draft bill. The government was able to convince the two opposition parties in two ways. First, by incorporating the views of the two opposition parties into the Law, and second by

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<sup>179</sup> “PKO Hōan Saishūsei Tōketsu Hani Kakudai mo, Rengō Sanin Torikomi Nerau,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 25, 1992, 2.

<sup>180</sup> “PKO Kyōryoku Hōan Gekitotsu Kaihi he Fukuzatsuna Kakehiki Jimin ha Rengō wo Hikikomu,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 2, 1992, 2.

threatening to hold early simultaneous elections. Thus, the government employed both normative persuasion and political threats to convince the opposition parties to cooperate with the government in enacting the bill. The employment of this dual strategy demonstrated that normative persuasion alone was insufficient to bring forth policy change.

## Chapter 3

### Changes in the Domestic Political Power Distribution and Perspectives on State Identity (1993-2001)

#### 1. Introduction

Before examining the situation in 2000s, the changes that occurred in the domestic political scene in the aftermath of 1992 should be explained, as they affected Japan's policy on overseas troop dispatches in the 2000s. Two types of changes are explained here. The first is about the change in domestic distribution of power. Three major developments are relevant to understand this change, namely, the start of the LDP-Komeito coalition, the decline of the JSP, and finally the rise of the DPJ as the major opposition party. All of these developments had a significant impact on the powers of actors involved in the legislative process and their relations with one another.

The second type of change is normative which involves the actors' (or political elite's) views on state identity—namely, beliefs pertaining to the kind of roles Japan should play in the international realm. As many scholars have observed, this ideational change has been brought about by the severe international criticism of Japan's response to the Gulf crisis and the following war. In particular, the political elite in Japan understood the wide gap between the international community's expectations of Japan and the Japanese people's views on the roles their country should play internationally. As a result, two distinct discourses on Japan's state identity emerged — Japan as a “normal state” and Japan as a “global civilian power” and consolidates throughout the 1990s. These new identity conceptions were later used for legitimizing certain policy courses during the debates on how Japan should respond to the war on terror in Afghanistan (see

chapter 4).

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes the power-related changes in the domestic political scene. It mainly focuses on the parties' strength in the Diet by examining election results and secondary sources. The second section focuses on changes in political elites' views on state identity by referring to secondary sources, official party documents and opinion leaders' writings. It will elaborate on the dominant discourses of state identity in Japan.

## 2. Changes in the Domestic Political Distribution of Power

Scholars of Japanese domestic politics described the 1990s as the “chaotic years” for political parties; for example, Hyde commented “throughout the 1990s, Japanese political parties were in a state of mayhem; many parties were created and dissolved and approximately 35 were in existence for such a brief period that they are now virtually forgotten.”<sup>181</sup> Also, Schoppa contributed to the argument with “Japan’s party system in the period after 1993 was a picture of instability. Parties were splitting, forming, merging, and dissolving in such rapid succession that the game of musical chairs seemed to describe what was going on better than any known theory of political science.”<sup>182</sup>

As both imply, it is not an easy task to explain all the events that transpired in detail as it was the most turbulent time in Japanese domestic politics. For the present analysis, however, three developments are particularly relevant for understanding the implications of power changes over security policy. These developments were the

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<sup>181</sup> Sarah Hyde, *The Transformation of the Japanese Left: From Old Socialists to New Democrats* (London: Routledge, 2009): 1.

<sup>182</sup> Leonard J. Schoppa, “Path Dependence in the Evolution of Japan’s Party System since 1993,” in *The Evolution of Japan’s Party System: Politics and Policy in an Era of Institutional Change* ed. Leonard J. Schoppa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011): 14.

formation of the LDP-Komeito coalition, the decline of the JSP, and finally the rise of DPJ as the biggest opposition party. These three developments had significant impact over the future direction of Japan's contribution to international security and overseas troop deployments to international military operations.

### 2.1. The Formation of the LDP-Komeito Coalition

The explanation of one of the biggest changes that occurred in the 1990's Japanese political scene begins with the formation of the coalition between the LDP and Komeito. How was the coalition formed and how did it affect foreign policy? The political jolts that took place between the collapse of the Miyazawa Cabinet (June 1993) and the rise of Prime Minister Koizumi (April 2001) revealed that the LDP was no longer able to maintain a majority in the Diet without a reliable coalition partner.

The first incident that weakened the LDP was the large scale defections from the party. On 18 June 1993, the opposition parties submitted a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Miyazawa to protest against his backtracking on his promise to implement electoral and political reform. A group of members within the LDP— mainly the Ozawa-Hata group— voted in favor of this motion alongside the opposition parties. As a response, Miyazawa dissolved the Lower House. On the same day of the vote against the prime minister, two groups defected from the LDP to establish their own independent parties. These were New Party Harbinger (*Shinto Sakigake*) established by Takemura Masayoshi and Japan Renewal Party (*Shinseito*) established by Ichiro Ozawa and Tsutomu Hata. A year earlier, another small party, Japan New Party (*Nihon Shinto*) had already been established by a former LDP member, Morihiro Hosokawa.

A Lower House election was held on 18 July 1993 a month after the

dissolution of the House. As a result, eight small parties, including the above-mentioned three, formed the first non-LDP coalition government with Hosokawa as the Prime Minister. The result of the 1993 election is shown in the Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Results of 18 July 1993 Lower House Election

Political Group	Seats in the House
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	223
Japan Socialist Party (JSP)	70
Japan Renewal Party (JRP)	55
Komeito	51
Japan New Party (JNP)	35
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	15
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	15
New Party Harbinger	13
United Socialist Democratic Party	4
Independents	30

(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)<sup>183</sup>

The parties were united by a common goal; to realize political and electoral reform. Many politicians believed that the LDP was able to stay in power for as long as fifty years only because of the electoral system. Thus, implementing political and electoral reform became a common goal for the parties. The coalition managed to pass the required legislation for reform but was dissolved in April 1994 soon after fulfilling its mission when internal disagreements over other policy areas surfaced. Two months later, a new coalition government was formed between the LDP, JSP and New Party Harbinger in June 1994 with a JSP member Tomiichi Murayama as the Prime Minister.<sup>184</sup>

<sup>183</sup> [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161\\_93.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_93.htm)

<sup>184</sup> Takashi Oka, *Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan: A Political Biography of Ozawa Ichiro* (London: Routledge, 2011): 62-80

Following the electoral reform, two elections, 1996 in the Lower House and 1998 in the Upper House, revealed that the LDP could no longer maintain a majority in the Diet under the new system. In the 1996 Lower House election, the LDP clashed with Ozawa's New Frontier Party (NFP: *Shinshintō*). Following the dissolution of the first non-LDP coalition, in December 1994, NFP was established under the leadership of Ichiro Ozawa through the merger of Ozawa's former Japan Renewal Party, Japan New Party, Komeito, DSP and other small groups that broke from the LDP and became the largest opposition party. According interviews with Oka, Ozawa's aim was to form a party that was strong enough to displace the LDP. Ozawa had high hopes of winning the election, and finally hoped to reap the benefits of the electoral reform he had so carefully built.<sup>185</sup> However, contrary to Ozawa's expectations, the party failed to defeat the LDP. Not only for Ozawa, was the election a failure for the LDP because the results proved that the LDP could not attain the majority required to pass laws. The party won only 239 seats of 500. The results of the election are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Results of 20 October 1996 Lower House Election

Political Group	Total Seats in the House
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	239
New Frontier Party (NFP)	156
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	52
Japan Communist Party (JCP)	26
Social Democratic Party (SDPJ)	15
New Party Sakigake (NPS)	2
Democratic Reform Party	1
Independents	9

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<sup>185</sup> Oka, *Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan*: 86-87.

(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)<sup>186</sup>

The results of the election showed that the LDP needed a reliable coalition partner. Shinoda indicated that the LDP executives initially wanted to maintain the old coalition with JSP and New Party Harbinger. However, the two parties declined the offer of coalition but promised to cooperate with LDP in passing laws if a majority was needed in the Diet. Shinoda surmised that the reason why these two parties rejected a formal coalition with the LDP was probably their fear of alienating their supporters. The LDP formed the government without a coalition partner, under Ryutaro Hashimoto as the Prime Minister.<sup>187</sup> Had the party formed a coalition with the SDPJ and the New Party Harbinger, they would have held 256 seats barely a majority sufficient to pass a law but still insufficient to override an Upper House rejection. As previously mentioned, overriding an Upper House rejection requires a two-thirds majority of the members present in the Lower House. Consequently, the results of the next Upper House election would be crucial in determining the fate of the LDP-led government.

On the opposition front, shortly after its defeat in the Lower House election, Ozawa's New Frontier Party dissolved in December 1997. Soon after the dissolution, in January 1998, Ozawa once again formed a new party, this time the Liberal Party (*Jiyuto*). Four groups from the New Frontier Party joined the newly established DPJ. The Komeito group was briefly divided into two groups but soon they united and reestablished an independent political party under the name of New Komeito in 1998. Hereafter, New Komeito will be referred as simply Komeito to follow the established usage in English.

The results of the 1998 Upper House election was interpreted as a huge failure by

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<sup>186</sup> Interparliamentary Union [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161\\_96.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_96.htm)

<sup>187</sup> Tomohito Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts* (New York: Columbia University Press: 2013): 62-71

the LDP and Prime Minister Hashimoto resigned in response.

The episode proved that the party would not be able to maintain a majority in the Diet, and that it needed a reliable coalition partner in order to pass legislation. LDP itself lost 5 seats. The seats of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, the JSP change its name in 1998) dropped from 38 to 14 and New Party Harbinger had only 3 seats. This meant that even if the LDP formed a coalition with the SDPJ and New Party Harbinger, they would have only 122 seats— four seats short of a bare majority.<sup>188</sup> As the LDP did not have two thirds majority in the Lower House, it would be too small to override an Upper House decision. The results of the election are shown in Table 3.3. Thus, the LDP needed a stable and reliable coalition partner for the smooth passage of legislation. That partner would ultimately be Komeito.

Table 3.3. Distribution of Seats by Political Group Following the 12 July 1998 Upper House Election

Political Group	Seats in the House
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	105
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	54
Komeito	24
Japan Communist Party (JCP)	23
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)	14
Liberal Party	12
Niin Club- Liberal Leagues	4
New Party Harbinger	3
Reformers' Network Party	3
Independents	10

(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)

<sup>188</sup> At that time the Upper House had 252 seats in total. In 2001, the total amount of seats were decreased to 242.

Following the resignation of Prime Minister Hashimoto, the LDP elected Keizo Obuchi. Obuchi's first task was to establish a new coalition government. In search of a partner, Obuchi first approached Ozawa's Liberal Party. According to a number of observers, LDP's real "target" was Komeito; however, they believed that Komeito would not join alone unless another party was in.<sup>189</sup>

The coalition talks between Ozawa's Liberal Party and LDP officially began with the meeting held on 19 November 1998, at which both parties signed an agreement<sup>190</sup> For the LDP, Prime Minister Obuchi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka and LDP Secretary General Yoshiro Mori led the talks. According to Oka's interviews, in that meeting, as a condition for joining the coalition, Ozawa asked LDP executives to accept his party's proposals in various policy areas from taxation to national security policy.<sup>191</sup>

The first of these condition was to abolish the system by which the ministers spoke at Diet sessions on behalf of their ministries. The second was a reduction in the number of cabinet ministers and civil servants over the next few years. The third was to reduce 50 seats in each house of the Diet.<sup>192</sup> This condition required revising the Public Offices Election Law. In the Lower House the reduction proposed in the seats elected by proportional representation. The fourth condition was on tax policy which included the usage of consumption tax revenue for public welfare programs. Finally, in matters of security, Ozawa asked for the removal of the freeze imposed on the SDF's activities in

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<sup>189</sup> Oka, *Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan*: 96. Also, based on his interviews with Komeito members, Metraux claims that Prime Minister Obuchi approached the Komeito as early as late 1998. Daniel A. Metraux, "Japan's Search for Political Stability: The LDP-New Komeito Alliance" *Asian Survey* 39, no. 6 (1999): 931.

<sup>190</sup> "Editorial: Step toward political stability" *Daily Yomiuri*, November 20, 1998, 8.

<sup>191</sup> Oka, *Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan*: 92-93.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.* 94.

UN PKO Law thereby authorizing SDF's full participation in UN PKOs and other multinational military operations that were based on UN resolutions. In response, in the talks on 19 November Prime Minister Obuchi maintained that his government would only allow SDF's participation in activities that did not involve the use of force, and Ozawa accepted this position.<sup>193</sup>

Later, by January of the following year, soon after establishing the coalition government, the two parties reached an agreement with respect to security issues. The discussion involved the roles of SDF members in the context of multinational military operations and in US-Japan defense cooperation. Based on the agreement, first, the SDF could provide logistical support to multinational forces with a UN resolution; however, such support could not be directly linked to the use of force.<sup>194</sup> Thus, Ozawa had to back down on full-participation. After reaching an agreement on major policy issues, the coalition government was formally established on 14 January 1999, where a member of the Liberal Party, Takeshi Noda, was given a post in the cabinet as the Minister of Home Affairs.

The two party coalition was still 10 seats short of a majority in the Upper House and in the Lower House they did not hold the two-thirds majority required to override an Upper House rejection. They needed Komeito's votes to pass legislation. The first issue on which the coalition government and the Komeito cooperated involved the enactment of three bills required for the implementation of the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. Fouse summarized the content of the bills in the following way:

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<sup>193</sup> "Jieitai no Kokuren Katsudo Koho Shien de Kyoryoku Kenpo no Wakunai Obuchi Shusho ga Hoshin," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 26, 1998, 1; "Security Issue Hanging over Coalition Talks," *Daily Yomiuri*, December 27, 1998, 2.

<sup>194</sup> "Security Focus of the Coalition Agreement," *Daily Yomiuri*, January 15, 1999, 2.

- (1) a bill to ensure safety in situations surrounding Japan, which defines the kind of rear-area support offered to be offered to US forces;
- (2) a bill to revise the Self Defense Force (SDF) Law so that, in rescuing Japanese nationals abroad, it would be possible to use SDF transport ships and destroyers in addition to transport planes, which are permitted now; and
- (3) a bill to revise the ACSA [Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement] to enable Japan to provide logistical support for contingencies in “areas surrounding Japan that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”<sup>195</sup>

The most controversial one was the first bill specifying the conditions for, and the extent of the SDF’s logistical support for US forces in emergencies near Japan. The government had submitted the bills to the Diet on 28 April 1998 and since then they had been pending. The LDP and the Liberal Party had already reached an agreement on the content of the bill in January<sup>196</sup>. Only with Komeito’s support could the bill be passed.

The content of the bill was significantly changed in accordance with Komeito’s policy preferences in the following way. First, the requirement of prior Diet approval for all types of logistical support activities, search and rescue operations was inserted into the law, while ex-post facto approval was only allowed in cases of emergencies. Second, a statement that the SDF’s activities would be allowed only if they “contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-US Security Treaty.”<sup>197</sup> Third, the definition of “emergencies surrounding Japan” was clarified. In this respect both the Komeito and other opposition parties as well as Liberal Party members demanded a

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<sup>195</sup> David Fouse, “Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?” in *Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges* ed. Yoichiro Sato and Satu P. Limaye (New York: Lexington Books, 2006): 141

<sup>196</sup> “Coalition Agrees to Revise Defense Guideline Bills,” *Daily Yomiuri*, January 17, 1999, 1.

<sup>197</sup> “3 Parties in Accord on Defense Guidelines Bills,” *Daily Yomiuri*, April 16, 1999, 1.

change in draft bill's original statement which was "situations that could seriously affect Japan's peace and security." This statement was replaced with "situations that could develop into a direct attack on the country if no countermeasures were taken." Komeito members also urged the government to come up with concrete possible scenarios of emergency situations.<sup>198</sup> Finally, in accordance with Komeito's request, conducting ship inspections was removed from the SDF's duties. Initially, the Liberal Party had argued that the SDF could conduct ship inspections and use weapons if necessary as long as such inspections were based on a UN Resolution. However, during the Upper House deliberations Otohiko Endo of Komeito argued that, "to fire a warning shot on a vessel sailing on the open seas would contradict the spirit of the Constitution." The LDP made significant concessions to Komeito by changing the bill in accordance with Komeito's policy preferences,

The guideline related bills passed through the Diet on 25 May 1999 and by late June both Komeito and LDP leaders announced that they would soon start the formal talks to add Komeito to the coalition. As soon as the talks started the major point of contention between the parties was neither security nor economic policy but electoral reform, a crucial issue for the political parties' survival. Komeito members were strongly opposed to the Liberal Party's proposal to reduce the number of Lower House seats elected by proportional representation. This was the part of the electoral reform policy agreement made by the LDP and Liberal Party earlier as part of the coalition deal. Komeito members and policy analysts believed that such a decision would be detrimental to Komeito's survival as most of its members had been elected by proportional representation. Komeito president Takenori Kanzaki told Obuchi that the party would not

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<sup>198</sup> "Govt, LDP to define 'emergencies near Japan'" *Daily Yomiuri*, April 19, 1999, 1; "Lower house committee approves defense bills," *Daily Yomiuri*, April 27, 1999, 1;

join the coalition if the bill to reduce the seats were passed in the Diet.<sup>199</sup>

On the other hand the Liberal Party executives were pressuring the LDP to enact the electoral reform bill. The Liberal Party Secretary General, Hirohisa Fuji, mentioned the following in one of his interviews with the press:

The LDP and Jiyuto [Liberal Party] jointly submitted a bill [to reduce the seats], but the bill has not yet passed into law. The passage of proposed legislation on cutting the 50 seats in the House of Representatives chosen by proportional representation, which had been agreed upon with the LDP, should be assured before the proposed formation of a tripartite alliance goes ahead.<sup>200</sup>

Also, Ozawa threatened to leave the coalition a number of times unless the bill was voted in the Diet.<sup>201</sup>

By late August the parties reached partial agreement when Komeito proposed a 30 seat reduction in the 300 single-constituency seats and a 20 seat reduction in the 200 proportional representation seats.<sup>202</sup> The Liberal Party accepted.<sup>203</sup> The tri-party coalition was formally established on 5 October, 1999 following LDP presidential elections. The three parties reached an agreement on various policy issues. In the security field, they agreed to enact a law that would authorize the SDF to cooperate with multinational forces based on a UN resolution, to lift the freeze imposed on SDF's activities in the UN PKO

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<sup>199</sup> "Obuchi asks New Komeito to join ruling coalition," *Daily Yomiuri*, July 8, 1999.

<sup>200</sup> "Obuchi tells Mori to pave way for tripartite coalition govt Premier to meet Jiyuto Chief Ozawa before New Komeito chief," *Daily Yomiuri*, June 27, 1999, 2.

<sup>201</sup> "Obuchi confirms move to form 3-way coalition," *Daily Yomiuri*, June 29, 1999, 1; "Ozawa hints at quitting coalition," *Daily Yomiuri*, July 23, 1999, 1; "Jiyuto threatens to leave the coalition over seats bill," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 5, 1999, 1; "Future of the 3-party coalition unclear," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 6, 1999, 3.

<sup>202</sup> "New Komeito proposes shelving Diet seat issue," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 20, 1999, 1. "3 parties seek compromise on cutting Diet seats," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 22, 1999, 1; "Trouble seen for coalition over reduction in Diet seats," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 23, 1999, 2.

<sup>203</sup> "Trouble seen for coalition over reduction in Diet seats," *Daily Yomiuri*, August 23, 1999, 2.

law, to revise the national defense policy and to enact contingency laws in response to an armed attack<sup>204</sup> Under the Obuchi Cabinet, Kunihiro Tsuzuki of Komeito was appointed to the post of Director General of Coordination Agency.<sup>205</sup>

The formal coalition talks between LDP, Liberal Party and Komeito lasted for three months and the focal point of negotiations was not foreign or economic policy but electoral reform which was crucial to Komeito's political survival. The electoral reform bill which involved a cut in the Lower House seats was passed into a law in February 2000. It reduced the number of proportional representation seats from 200 to 180.<sup>206</sup> By entering the coalition, Komeito managed to limit the reduction of seats, to obtain a post in the Cabinet, and to incorporate the party's views in various policies. In return, Komeito made significant concessions on security policy by agreeing to lift the freeze on SDF's activities which was initially inserted in the UN PKO law by the party itself. The party was forced to make these concessions in its policy preferences on overseas troop dispatches to ensure its political survival.

The Liberal Party's presence in the tri-party coalition was short-lived, as approximately six months after the coalition's inception, Ozawa and his followers in the Liberal Party left the coalition. Ozawa had been vocal about his party's disappointment in the lack of progress implementing these reforms that were part of the coalition deal between the LDP and Liberal Party. Furthermore, Ozawa had been negotiating to form a new party by way of merging his party and the LDP prior to the elections. When Prime Minister Obuchi declined, Ozawa and his group left, while a small group of Liberal Party defectors established the Conservative Party (*Hoshuto*) led by Takeshi Noda and they

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<sup>204</sup> "Parties meet to thrash out coalition policy," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 30, 1; "New coalition set for launch," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 5, 1999, 1.

<sup>205</sup> "Profiles of ministers in new coalition Cabinet," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 6, 1999, 3.

<sup>206</sup> "Ruling camp unilaterally enacts seat-reduction bill," *Daily Yomiuri*, February 3, 2000, 1.

replaced the Liberal Party in the coalition.<sup>207</sup> With Keizo Obuchi's sudden hospitalization on 5 May, 2000, Yoshiro Mori was elected as the Prime Minister by the Diet and formed a new coalition government with three parties, the LDP- Komeito and the Conservative Party.

The 25 June Lower House election once again proved the importance of Komeito to the LDP. The LDP could not secure a majority on its own. Of 480 seats, the LDP won only 233, 7 seats short of an absolute majority. Komeito won 31 and the Conservative Party 7. The distribution of seats are indicated in Table 3.4. The tripartite coalition was maintained in the second Mori Cabinet in which both junior partners got a single post. Chikage Ogi of the Conservative Party was appointed as the Construction Minister and National Land Agency Director, and Kunihiro Tsuzuki of Komeito continued his post as the Director General of the Coordination Agency. Later, in December 2000, during the reorganization of government offices and ministries, the Ministries of Health and Welfare were merged and Chikara Sakaguchi from Komeito became the first Minister of Labor and Welfare.<sup>208</sup> This was a major achievement for Komeito as welfare and labor were the most important policy issues for the party.

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<sup>207</sup> "Defectors from Jiyuto join coalition," *Daily Yomiuri*, April 4, 2000, 1.

<sup>208</sup> "Naikaku Kaizo, Shuyo Kakuryo Katamaru Tsusan Hironuma Noshou Yatsu-shi, No Rodo wa Komei Sakaguchi-shi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 4, 2001, 1.

Table 3.4. Distribution of Seats as a Result of 25 June 2000 Lower House Election

Political Group	Number of Seats
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	233
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	127
Komeito	31
Liberal Party	22
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	20
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)	19
Conservative Party	7
Mushozoku-no-kai	5
Liberal League	1
Others	15

(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)<sup>209</sup>

The Mori Cabinet did not last long, as Mori himself proved to be an unpopular Prime Minister due to his political gaffes, but the incident that led to his resignation was his response to the collision of a US submarine and a Japanese fishing vessel that resulted in the death of nine Japanese citizens. The fact that he continued to play golf after hearing about the incident ruined his reputation in the public eye. His cabinet's approval ratings dropped significantly. Under LDP pressure, Mori to resigned on March 10.

On 26 April, 2001, one of the most popular post-war prime ministers of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi came into power, namely, Koizumi Junichiro. He was hoping to become the man who changed the course of Japan's policy on overseas troop deployments. Had the LDP been in power alone in a majoritarian government, he would have made drastic changes. Koizumi wanted to reform Japan in many ways. Even though,

<sup>209</sup> [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161\\_00.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_00.htm)

privatization of the postal services topped his reform agenda, in the security field, he belonged to a group of Japanese politicians who wanted to strengthen the US-Japan alliance and revise the Article 9 of the Constitution so as to allow Japan to exercise its right of collective defense. However, the changes he made were modest compared to his ambitions. The major obstacle, as hinted at by the Japanese media was Komeito.

Koizumi and the other coalition partners did not get off to a good start. During the LDP presidential election campaign, Koizumi suggested that he would form a coalition with the DPJ if he won. Needless to say, this annoyed Komeito and Conservative Party executives. The major point of contention between the LDP and the Komeito was the issue of collective self-defense rights. Koizumi strongly believed that Japan should be able to exercise its right to collective self-defense, a right that would allow Japan to contribute troops to international military operations to assist an ally under threat. The accepted state interpretation of that right, up to this point was that although Japan already had the right under international law as a sovereign state, Article 9 of the Constitution prevented the country to exercise that right. Koizumi believed that Article 9 should be revised to acknowledge the right, and his views were shared by other LDP members. In March 2001, LDP's defense specialists issued a policy recommendation titled "Our Country's Security Policy and the US-Japan Alliance." The report stated the following:

"Our current position on our country's right to exercise collective self-defense has the potential to weaken the deterrence effect of the US-Japan alliance. We request to change the government interpretation and start investigating the establishment of a basic law on national security, and to clarify to what extent we can exercise our right to collective self-defense and participate in UN collective security initiatives."<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> "Sosaisen Seisaku wo tou Anzenhoshou Shudanteki Jieiken," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 22, 2001, 4.

Moreover all four candidates running for the LDP presidency— namely, Shizuka Kamei, Ryutaro Hashimoto, Taro Aso and Junichiro Koizumi—proposed strengthening the US-Japan alliance and Kamei explicitly declared that accepting Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense was crucial for that purpose.<sup>211</sup> Koizumi, in a television program on NHK, stated:

It is impossible for Japan to do nothing if the United States forces are attacked while conducting joint activities with Japan on Japanese coastal waters in the high seas. If we regard the US-Japan alliance as our own national interest, then the public would understand even if we change the interpretation of the Constitution.<sup>212</sup>

These views clashed with Komeito’s “pacifist” posture and the party executives indicated their opposition not only to Koizumi’s radical views on collective self-defense right, but also to education reform and Prime Minister’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki urged Koizumi not to rush into constitutional revision. On 25 April, the three parties reached an agreement on basic policy issues and decided to maintain the tri-party coalition.<sup>213</sup> In the coalition agreement, Chikara Sakaguchi from Komeito retained his position as the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare.

The coalition formation process was significant in two respects. First, it revealed that the actors could adjust their normative views on policy to enhance political power. By joining the coalition Komeito not only ensured its political survival but also

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<sup>211</sup> “Shasetsu Jimin Sousaisen Gaiko Anpo no Ronsen mo Kikitai,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 22, 2001, 3.

<sup>212</sup> “Shudanteki Jieiken Jimin Koizumi-shi, Kenpou Kaishaku no Henkou Kentou wo Shisa,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 23, 2001, 1.

<sup>213</sup> “Coalition stresses unity, dodges tough issues,” *Daily Yomiuri*, April 27, 2001, 2.

acquired a small share of power in the most important area to the party, welfare and labor. In return, Komeito agreed that the SDF members could cooperate with international military operations provided that they were based on a UN resolution. It also accepted legal changes necessary for the SDF to fully participate in UN PKOs. Finally, by joining the coalition, Komeito gained the power to influence future policies in accordance with its own policy preferences. In other words, Komeito emerged as “a major veto player” that could reject any proposal that was not in line with its own policy preferences by simply threatening to break from the coalition. As for the LDP, by entering into a coalition with Komeito, the party managed to attain the majority it lacked since the 1993 Lower House election. On the other hand, the cost of the coalition for the LDP was compromising to satisfy Komeito.

What were the effects of this coalition formation process on the policy of overseas troop deployments? The major implication was that, even before the September 11 incidents, the boundaries of the security policy including overseas troop deployments were already delineated by Komeito’s veto. The Komeito executives were clear about to what extent overseas troop dispatches were acceptable. Thus, an understanding was reached on the possibility of SDF’s provision of logistical support to multinational military forces if such a military act was based on a UN Resolution.

## 2.2. The Decline of the JSP

After the Gulf War, the JSP rapidly lost power as its presence in the Diet declined. The party’s seats number of seats dropped from 140 to 70 in the 1993 Lower House election, and then to 15 in 1996.<sup>214</sup> In 2000, the party had only 19 seats in the

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<sup>214</sup> Akitoshi Miyashita, “Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism,” in *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (New York:

Lower House.<sup>215</sup> The declining trend was also visible in the Upper House. Even though in the 1992 election the party managed to add 3 more seats and become 69, in the following elections the party's presence in the Upper House sharply declined. In 1995, the total number of seats dropped to 38, in 1998 to 14, and finally in 2001 the party had only 8 seats.<sup>216</sup>

Why did the party lose support? Hyde's analysis of public opinion polls, suggests that the decline of JSP's power was due to the loss of two different types of supporters. Firstly the "moderate supporters" withdrew their support as a result of JSP's rigid stance during the Persian Gulf War. These supporters believed that the party's policy of pacifism could not respond to the changes in the international realm in which Japan was expected to play a more active role. The second group of lost supporters were "hardline pacifists" who were dissatisfied with JSP leaders' renouncement of traditional pacifist principles in exchange for political power.<sup>217</sup> Looking back to 1994, when the JSP entered into a coalition with the LDP and New Party Harbinger, for the first time a Socialist Party leader Tomiichi Murayama became the Prime Minister. As a concession, the Prime Minister publicly declared that the party accepted the constitutionality of the SDF and recognized the necessity of the US-Japan Security Treaty.<sup>218</sup> Hyde indicates that while this caused some people to stop supporting the party, Murayama cabinet's achievements in obtaining a cabinet statement which apologized for Japan's acts during the Second World War brought back some of its lost supporters. Nevertheless, she finds

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Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 37.

<sup>215</sup> International Parliamentary Union, [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161\\_00.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_00.htm)

<sup>216</sup> International Parliamentary Union, [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2162\\_arc.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2162_arc.htm)

<sup>217</sup> Sarah Hyde, *The Transformation of the Japanese Left: From Old Socialists to New Democrats* (London: Routledge, 2009): 77.

<sup>218</sup> Akitoshi Miyashita, "Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan's Postwar Pacifism," in *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 38.

that the party lost more supporters than it gained. As a consequence, the JSP, once the second biggest party in Japan, fell to a minor and insignificant opposition party by early 2000s.<sup>219</sup>

Miyashita also indicated that the public came to regard the party's stance on security policy and Constitutional issues as "unrealistic." For this reason, many of its supporters abandoned the party.<sup>220</sup> In 2001, the party reverted back to its traditional pacifist stance by adopting a new guideline on security.<sup>221</sup> Nevertheless, this could not save the party and it could not regain its former strength. Consequently, the biggest defender of pacifism in Japan was lost.

### 2.3. The Rise of the DPJ as the Main Opposition Party

While the JSP had gradually lost popularity and political power, a new party formed in the mid-1990s and became the largest opposition party by 2000. This, the last major development of the 1990s, was the emergence of the DPJ as the major opposition party to challenge the LDP. The DPJ was established by the formation of an anti-LDP alliance between conservative politicians and a group of socialists. Initially, the socialists constituted the majority in the party with 35 out of the party's 57 Diet members; however, the presence of the socialists weakened as the party grew to include more and more Conservative politicians. In 1998, the DPJ grew further after absorbing four groups which left the New Frontier Party. One of these groups consisted of former DSP members.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Sarah Hyde, *The Transformation of the Japanese Left: From Old Socialists to New Democrats* (London: Routledge, 2009): 92-93.

<sup>220</sup> Akitoshi Miyashita, "Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan's Postwar Pacifism," in *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 37.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.* 38

<sup>222</sup> Patrick Kollner, "Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the LDP and DPJ differ?" *Japan Forum* 16, no.1 (2004): 98

By 2000, the DPJ became the second major party in the Diet; however, its unity was often questioned by political analysts as intraparty divisions based on former party affiliations were already evident. Kollner indicated that by 2002 the party was already divided into five major factions. According to Kollner's classification, there were five distinct groups:

- I. *Yuai Kurabu* consisted of former DSP members.
- II. *Shinseikyoku Kondankai* was the group of former JSP members.
- III. *Kuni no Katachi Kenkyukai* was a group defined by Kollner as "originating from citizen networks," thus the members did not have any former affiliation. The group's head was Naoto Kan.
- IV. *Seiken Senryaku Kenkyukai* consisted of former New Frontier Party members
- V. *Kohokai* mainly consisted of former New Party Harbinger members.

In 2003, prior to the Lower House election, the DPJ was further strengthened when Ichiro Ozawa's Liberal Party joined the DPJ. For Ozawa, joining the DPJ was a strategic choice to ensure political survival. Ozawa's small Liberal Party's prospects were no good in the upcoming Lower House election; however, as part of a bigger party, such as the DPJ, the Ozawa group had a greater chance of being part of the ruling party. Ultimately, this strategy produced the desired results, but not immediately, because the DPJ had to wait until 2009 to become the ruling party. Ozawa group's participation strengthened the DPJ. Prior to the 2009 Lower House election the faction headed by Ozawa *Isshinkai* (Political Reform Group), was the largest faction within the party and thanks to the Ozawa group, the DPJ increased its power in the Diet. Between April 2006 and May 2009, Ozawa served as the party president.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Carmen Schmidt, "The DPJ and Its Factions: Benefit or Threat," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 43, (2001): 5.

Owing to its diverse structure, the DPJ has contained many different viewpoints and voices on policy since its inception. This was confirmed by scholars such as Schmidt who conducted an analysis of policy positions based on factional affiliation. Her analysis is illuminating in two respects. First, she found that factionalism within the DPJ was based on material interests rather than ideological differences. In other words, what separated DPJ members into different factions was the politicians' material interests not normative beliefs. This finding supports the main argument made in this dissertation that material interests come before normative principles for politicians, and that normative principles can be modified to enhance material interests of actors. Schmidt's second finding indicated that variance in policy positions was the greater within the DPJ than in other parties. Moreover, in security related issues the divergence of opinion was the greatest. The security related issues contained the *revision of the constitution, the strengthening of defensive capacity, participation in UN's peacekeeping operations, use of the right of collective self-defense, and a tough stance towards North Korea*. Schmidt's analysis found that constitutional revision, strengthening Japan's defense capacity and support for collective self-defense were among the issues in which divergence among DPJ factions was the greatest.<sup>224</sup>

Even if diversity in policy positions on security-related issues were far greater within the DPJ compared to any other political party, these differences were strategically pushed into the background or negotiated at times when the party had the opportunity to bring down the LDP. This was most visible when Ozawa group's participated in the party. How Ozawa successfully used pacifist norms to oppose LDP policies will be explained in detail in the following chapter.

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<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.* 12-16.

### 3. Changes in the Actors' Views on State Identity

This section focuses on the changes in actors' views on state identity. As a number of scholars have pointed out the end of the Gulf War led to a shift in political elite's and wider public's views on Japan's role in the international society. The severe international criticism Japan faced vis-à-vis how the government responded to the crisis and the ensuing war have led to a "soul-searching" process on part of the political elite.<sup>225</sup> They understood the wide gap between their views on state identity and what was expected from them by the international society. The end result was the decline of pacifism or peace state identity which had been the traditional and most dominant conception of state identity until the end of the First Gulf War (1990-91).

As many scholars of Japanese foreign policy have observed, in the post-Cold War period, two divergent views on Japan's state identity have risen to a dominant status in the Japanese political discourse— Japan as "a normal state" (*futsu no kuni*) and Japan as "a global civilian power" (*sekai minsei taikoku*).<sup>226</sup> Both groups' starting point was a critique of Japan's post-war "pacifist" posture which, according to them, have caused Japan's inadequate response to the crisis and attracted severe criticism from the international society. The below section will discuss the contents of those two divergent views on Japan's state identity and the kind of policy preferences they have posited.

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<sup>225</sup> Hugo Dobson, *Japan and the United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 61.

<sup>226</sup> These scholars use different names to categorize the two group. Keiko Hirata, "Who Shapes the National Security Debate?"; Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 109–32.

### 3.1. Japan as a Normal State

The idea that Japan should become a normal state was popularized by Ichiro Ozawa in the 1990s — a former LDP secretary general who later served as the President of Liberal party and then DPJ. During the creation of the International Peace Cooperation Law (1991-1992), he argued that the constitution allowed the SDF's full participation in UN peacekeeping activities.<sup>227</sup>

He later elaborated views on Japan's international roles in his famous book *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*, published in 1993. Ozawa argued that in order to become a true “international state” (*kokusai kokka*), Japan must first become a “normal state” which he defined as the one

...that willingly shoulders responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community. It does not refuse such burdens on account of domestic political difficulties. Nor does it take action unwillingly as a result of “international pressure.”<sup>228</sup>

...that it cooperates fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people.<sup>229</sup>

Ozawa argued that this cooperation was considered necessary for Japan's own survival and as a price to be paid as Japan had long benefitted from the international peace and stability and the free trade system created under the leadership of the United States during the Cold war.<sup>230</sup> In the post-Cold war period, it was time for Japan to

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<sup>227</sup> “Ozawa: Constitution Allows SDF To Join U.N. Forces// Liberal,” *Daily Yomiuri*, August 28, 1990, 1.

<sup>228</sup> Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*, trans. Louisa Rubinfiem (Tokyo: Kondansha International, 1994), 94.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>230</sup> Ichiro, Ozawa, *Nihon no Kaizō Keikaku [Blueprint for a New Japan]* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993): 105-108

contribute. Ozawa further argued that Japan's international cooperation in the security field must be UN-centered, while maintaining its alliance with the United States. SDF's participation in UN peacekeeping operations and working for the creation of a standing UN reserve force were considered two areas, to which Japan should contribute.<sup>231</sup>

Ozawa maintained that the SDF's participation in UN forces would not violate the constitution even if the SDF had entangled in a war since Article 9 prohibited the use of force "as a sovereign right of the nation" but the UN reserve forces deployment would be authorized by the Security Council and they would be under the command of the UN Secretary General not under the Japanese Prime Minister.<sup>232</sup> While an *International Peace Cooperation Law* (IPCL) was enacted in Japan (June 1992) to enable the SDF's participation in non-combat peacekeeping activities, certain conditions<sup>233</sup> were inserted in the law which Ozawa considered as "special treatment" for Japan, and by implication not normal.

Even though Ozawa was the pioneer of the normalist discourse, today most scholars equate normalism in Japan with the willingness to use force in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance. In Ozawa's views, SDF's use of force as part of UN military force did not contravene Article 9. Also, Ozawa accepted the dominant state interpretation on Japan's right to collective self-defense which suggested that Japan had the right like any other sovereign state under international law; however, its constitution prohibited the

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid: 115-135

<sup>232</sup> Ibid: 123-126

<sup>233</sup> These are the "Five Conditions" that need to be met before any SDF dispatch is made in the context of a UN PKO. They (1) a ceasefire agreement between the conflicting parties (2) the consent of the conflicting parties to the UN PKO mission and Japan's participation in that mission. (3) Impartiality of the mission (4) if the above conditions cease to be met, the Government of Japan can withdraw its forces (5) restrictions on the use of weapons. Katsumi Ishizuka, "Japan's New Role in Peace-Building Missions," *East Asia* 23, no.3 (2006), 6. While three of them (consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force) are UN's general principles on peacekeeping operations, the ceasefire agreement and additional restrictions put on SDF's use of weapons are conditions imposed by Japan.

implementation of that right.

By the late 1990s, views with respect to re-examining the mainstream view on collective self-defense became more vocal, especially within the LDP. For example, in January 2000 under LDP's initiative, a commission to investigate the revision of the constitution (*kenpō chōsakai*) was re-established in the Diet. Moreover, by late 1990s the number of LDP parliament members who were in favor of revising Article 9 were much higher than that in any other party.<sup>234</sup> Even prior to the September 2001 attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi personally expressed his view that Japan could undertake tasks in collective self-defense related arrangements as long as they were within the confines of the constitution.<sup>235</sup> His views did not particularly emphasize UN-centrism, whereas Ozawa's views did.

Today, politicians such as Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzō Abe and Tarō Asō are categorized as “U.S.-leaning normalists.”<sup>236</sup> Their views diverge from Ozawa's with respect to collective self-defense. While Ozawa accepts the constitutional limits on Japan's right to exercise that right, the others believe that either the Constitution or the interpretation of Article 9 should be changed in a way that Japan could exercise that right in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance.<sup>237</sup>

### 3.2. Japan as a Global Civilian Power

The idea that Japan would become a “global civilian power” in the post-Cold

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<sup>234</sup> See for example, “Kokkai Giin Kenpō Anketo, 9 Jyō Tabū Shi Usureru Wakai Sedai Hodo Kaiken Shikō,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 21, 1997, 2.

<sup>235</sup> “Seisaku Tairon Saninsen (4) Shūdanteki Jieiken Hashimoto Kōhei shi MaedaTetsuō (rensai),” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 23, 2001, 4.

<sup>236</sup> Keiko Hirata, “Who Shapes the National Security Debate? Divergent Interpretations of Japan's Security Role,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 35, 3 (2008): 142.

<sup>237</sup> Yoichiro Sato, “Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan's Overseas Troop Dispatches,” in *Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata. (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 93-95.

war period, together with Germany, was first introduced by a German political scientist, Hans W. Maull. He defined three characteristics of a “civilian power”:

- I. the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
- II. The concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction;
- III. A willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.<sup>238</sup>

With respect to the third characteristic, Maull predicted that while Germany would embrace a strong regional identity in the course of European integration, for Japan the core institutional framework would be the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty instead of a regional one. Nevertheless, he mentioned that Japan would become the first “global civilian power” that would tackle “global challenges such as Third World development and environmental reconstruction.”<sup>239</sup>

This idea that Japan should shape its foreign policy based on the civilian power identity was picked up and promoted by Japanese opinion leaders such as Yoichi Funabashi—a well-known Japanese journalist who served as a diplomatic correspondent in the United States and China and as editor-in-chief of the *Asahi Newspaper*. He played a key role in spreading this idea. In 1992, his article, which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* criticized Japan’s response to the Persian Gulf War. In the article, he stated that Japan was “an automatic teller machine—one that needed a kick before dispensing cash”<sup>240</sup> He

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<sup>238</sup> Hans W Maull, “Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers,” *Foreign Affairs* 69, no.5 (1990): 105.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no.1 (1991):58.

further mentioned that Japan should create “a new image of itself in the world,” and become “the prototype of a global civilian power”<sup>241</sup> which relies on economic means, not military, to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Funabashi pointed out four areas in which Japan should pursue a more active foreign policy in line with that identity: “to act as a model for, and lend assistance to, poorer countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development; international peacekeeping; promotion of human rights; and environmental protection.”<sup>242</sup> Moreover, Funabashi argued that this new image would be compatible with Japan’s post-war pacifist stance. Throughout the 1990s Funabashi published several articles and books promoting the “global civilian power” identity.<sup>243</sup> Another prominent Japanese political scientist who had similar views with Funabashi was Yoshihide Soeya who argued that post-war Japanese diplomacy exhibited the characteristics of a middle-power<sup>244</sup> and human security has become Japan’s niche diplomacy.<sup>245</sup>

Making civilian contributions to international security had been emphasized by Kōmeitō and the Social Democratic Party of Japan during the creation of the UN PKO Law (enacted in June 1992). During that process, the SDPJ’s motto was “*higunji, minsei, bunmin*,” which meant that Japan’s contribution should be guided by three principles: non-military, contribution in civilian areas and civilian control over the military. Kōmeitō has also been an ardent supporter of Japan’s non-military civilian

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<sup>241</sup> Ibid: 65.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid: 66

<sup>243</sup> See for example, *Japan’s International Agenda*, ed. Yoichi Funabashi (New York: New York University Press, 1994); “Kokusai Shakai no Ichi-in (Nihon no Tenkiten PKO Hōan: 4,” *Asahi Shimbun*, June 2, 1992; Yoichi Funabashi, “Nihon ni mo Yūjin ga iru (Funabashi Yoichi no Nippon Hansha kagami,” *Asahi Shimbun*, January 24, 1997, 4, “Ogata San wo Kokuren Jimu Sōchō ni (Funabashi Yoichi no Nippon Hansha Kagami),” *Asahi Shimbun*, May 31, 1996, 4.

<sup>244</sup> Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihon no Midoru Pawa- Gaiko: Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Kozo* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005).

<sup>245</sup> Ibid: 211–5.

contribution to international security. Initially together with the SDPJ, the party was against the SDF's overseas dispatches in the context of UN PKOs; however, with Kōmeitō's inclusion in the creation process of the UN PKO draft bill, the party members accepted SDF's participation as long as the missions they were involved in were non-military. The party played the main role in inserting the above-mentioned "5 conditions" in the UN PKO law.

However, a clear articulation of "global civilian power" as Japan's state identity became increasingly salient in the political discourse by the end of the 1990s under the Obuchi administration. In 1999, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi summoned a private commission with the purpose of advising about Japan's future trajectory. Among the members of the subcommittee responsible of the future of Japan's foreign policy and its place in the world were Yoichi Funabashi and Yoshihide Soeya. In the final report that was submitted in January 2000, Japan's identity as a "global civilian power" was acknowledged in the following way:

Although it is not possible for a state to exist with absolutely no military elements, a country that does not give primacy to military affairs but conducts itself primarily through civilian activities, based on the principle of civilian control, is a civilian power.<sup>246</sup>

Furthermore, it was argued that a foreign policy based on this identity will serve Japan's "enlightened national interest," which was described as:

...taking a long-term, indirect approach to satisfying a country's

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<sup>246</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, "Chapter 6," in *The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium*, 10, accessed November 26, 2013, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/>.

own needs by increasing the number of friendly countries and improving the international environment on the basis of “mutuality,” which also respects other countries’ interests. It is a way of benefiting both one’s own country and other countries by contributing to the international public good through maintaining and strengthening the international economic system and the international order and helping developing countries grow, as opposed to the rigid pursuit of national interest that forces both one’s own country and others constantly to make zero-sum, either/or choices.<sup>247</sup>

The commission’s understanding of the civilian power was based on three dimensions: prioritizing non-military activities in foreign policy, pursuing cooperative relations with other states (multilateralism) especially in the context of United Nations and respecting the principle of civilian control over the military. Furthermore, in the report, the non-military areas, in which Japan must become active as a global civilian power, were specified as international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, reconstruction, protection of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and tackling with human security related global issues such as environmental protection, antipersonnel landmines, disaster management, refugees, health care, food security and poverty reduction.

The three main characteristics of the global civilian power— non-military civilian contribution to international security, emphasis on multilateralism (or UN-centrism), and enhancing civilian control over the SDF’s overseas dispatches—became the key features of DPJ’s general policy stance put forward in manifestos and official documents. For example, the party’s basic policies on security in 1999 proposed how Japan could use its economic resources to tackle regional conflicts.

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<sup>247</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, “Chapter 6,” in *The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium*, 5, accessed November 26, 2013, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/>.

The ethnic and religious-based conflicts that have become so marked in recent years are frequently rooted in economic difficulties. Japan's diplomatic capacity which is backed by its economic power, needs to be further enhanced to contribute to the creation of peace.<sup>248</sup>

The Basic Policy also mentioned the importance of civilian control DPJ's general position that recognized the constitutional limitations on the exercise of collective self-defense right.<sup>249</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the DPJ became the largest opposition party following its merger with the Ozawa-led Liberal Party in 2003. One of the consequences of this merger was that both the DPJ and Ozawa had to reconcile their views about the use of force. Two months after the merger, Ozawa reached an agreement with Yokomichi Takahiro who was the head of DPJ faction comprised of former Socialist Party members. They agreed on proposing the formation of a UN stand-by force (a reserved force spate from the SDF) as opposed to the LDP's policy of establishing a permanent law that would allow the SDF to participate in multinational coalitions outside of the UN framework.<sup>250</sup> This was yet another adjustment to normative beliefs for political reasons. This time it was the Socialists who had to concede.

Thereafter, DPJ's election manifestos continued to emphasize autonomy and UN-centrism in foreign policy. For example, the 2004 manifesto emphasized DPJ's UN-centrist stance in the following way:

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<sup>248</sup> Official website of the Democratic Party of Japan, "Democratic Party of Japan's Basic Policies on Security (Provisional version)," (June 199), accessed, October 1, 2015.

<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/security.html>

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>250</sup> "Yokomichi Ozawa Kaidan Anpo Ashinami wo Soroeru Minshutō Shikkōbu he Seisaku Ittaika Unagasu," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 25, 2003, 4; "Minshu Kan Daihyō Kokuren Tokki Butai Teian he Jieitai to Betsu Soshiki," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 31, 2003, 2.

We will attach importance to international cooperation, and from that standpoint will participate vigorously in activities being undertaken by the United Nations...Japan will participate more positively in peace-building activities under UN auspices, and will study the specifics of the configuration of a possible UN standby force.

With respect to the U.S.-Japan alliance the manifesto stated the following:

As regards Japan-US relations we will do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with US wishes, replacing it with a mature alliance based on independence and equality.

For example, the 2005 election manifesto of the DPJ which was critical of SDF's deployment in Iraq stated the following:

The Democratic Party of Japan will possess its own autonomous vision in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the international community, emphasizing the aim of "an enlightened national interest" when pursuing the national interest of Japan. We will take the lead in strengthening international organizations and in international cooperative efforts, taking the creation of trust with neighboring nations, rather than power politics, as a touchstone; and work toward becoming a nation that uses soft power to create peace together with the world.<sup>251</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

Since the end of the first Gulf War, the domestic political environment in Japan underwent a number of changes which would have significant impact over the country's security policy and overseas troop contributions in the 2000s. Perhaps, the most

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<sup>251</sup> <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/manifesto5.html>

important of those was the formation of the LDP and Komeito alliance which resulted out of necessity for both parties. On the LDP side, the major benefit was to attain the votes necessary to maintain a majority in the Diet. On Komeito's side, with the alliance the party ensured its political survival by amending electoral reform law in favor of small parties like the Komeito. In the subsequent years of the coalition, the bonus for Komeito was to acquire the position to influence security, labor and welfare policy. Besides the coalition between the LDP and Komeito, another major development was the decline of JSP and the rise of DPJ as the main opposition party. The DPJ was an amalgam of various political groups with diverging views on policy and especially on security policy. The following chapter will show that the party managed to display a coherent and united view against the LDP when political interests dictated.

The final change examined in this chapter was the domestic actors' views on state identity or the kinds of roles Japan should fulfil in the international context. As the Japan received a severe criticism for its response to the Gulf War, the Japanese political elite have started to question the appropriateness of the existing notions on Japan's state identity. With the Gulf War experience, they understood that the existing "peace state identity" and the policy choices entailed by this identity were not considered sufficient or appropriate by international standards. Consequently, new discourses on Japan's state identity emerged. The most dominant ones were the "global civilian power" identity and the normal state identity. The former entailed UN internationalism and Japan to play a leading role in non-military global issues including full-participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations, global environmental and health problems, conflict resolution, and technological innovation. The normal state identity prioritized the consolidation of the US-Japan alliance and required Japan to be active in military areas for international

cooperation.

The following chapter empirically demonstrates how actors, with the above mentioned power structure and divergent policy preferences, have competed for shaping Japan's response to the U.S.-led "war on terror" in Afghanistan between the years 2001 and 2010. It also demonstrates how actors adjusted their normative views in times when their political interests necessitated.

## Chapter 4

### Japan's Policy toward the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan (2001-2010): The Divided Legislature, Uncompromising Opposition and Deadlock

#### 1. Introduction

This chapter examines Japan's policy toward the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Under successive governments led by the LDP between 2001 and 2008, Japan supported the war in two ways: logistical support given to the U.S.-led military campaign by the SDF and economic assistance provided for reconstruction in Afghanistan. In July 2007, the LDP lost its majority status in the House of Councilors to the opposition parties led by the DPJ. This had an impact on the extension of the law that enabled the logistical support to the US-led military forces. The opposition parties led by the DPJ rejected the government's proposals for a compromise and as a result the SDF's mission was briefly suspended. Following the 2009 House of Representatives election, the new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) terminated the SDF's mission while increasing reconstruction assistance, in spite of U.S. pressure on Japan to continue the SDF's mission and higher costs involved with the additional economic assistance. As such, the chapter examines the factors behind such change. It considers the simultaneous effects of two distinct factors: contested state identity and the failure of government to persuade the main opposition under divided legislature.

The chapter proceeds in the following way. First, the nature of Japan's policy toward the U.S.-led "war on terror" in Afghanistan will be discussed. Second, this chapter will trace the policy-making process of Japan's contribution to the "war on terror" in

Afghanistan between the years 2001 and 2010.

## 2. Japan's Policy toward the U.S.-led "War on Terror" in Afghanistan

Japan adopted an eclectic policy toward the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan by utilizing its SDF to provide logistical support to the U.S.-led military campaign (2001-2010) and economic assistance for the reconstruction in Afghanistan (since 2002 to date)

### 2.1. Logistical Support to the U.S.-led Military Coalition

As a response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States launched a military campaign, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 with the purpose of destroying the Al-Qaida stronghold in Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban regime which had refused to surrender the Al-Qaida leaders. At first, the coalition forces comprised of American and British troops but later other U.S.-allies also contributed troops including France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Denmark.<sup>252</sup> Under international law, the U.S.-led military intervention had its basis in Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognizes UN member states' right to use force in self-defence and collective self-defence in response to an armed attack.<sup>253</sup> On September 12, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1368 which recognized the United States' right of individual and collective self-defence.<sup>254</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members invoked the right of collective

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<sup>252</sup> J. Alexander Thier, "Afghanistan," in *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, ed. William J. Durch (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 476.

<sup>253</sup> Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51  
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>

<sup>254</sup> United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1368, "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist attacks," September 12, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm>

defence for the first time since the organization's inception to support the United States' fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.

In addition to the OEF, another military mission operating in Afghanistan was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Unlike the OEF, ISAF was a UN-mandated multinational force in charge of maintaining peace and security in Afghanistan. The deployment of ISAF was authorized with United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1386 passed on December 20, 2001. Later in August 2003, command of ISAF was transferred to NATO and its area of operation was expanded beyond Kabul.<sup>255</sup> 48 countries including NATO and non-NATO members contributed troops to ISAF until 2014.<sup>256</sup> Both ISAF's and OEF's mission ended in 2014 when the Afghan national forces took responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. Japan did not contribute any troops to ISAF.

Under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) which was enacted on 1 November 2001, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces were allowed to provide logistical support for the U.S-led military campaign and to participate in rescue and relief operations for the military coalition's wounded soldiers and Afghan refugees. The core of the SDF's activities, however, became the refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean<sup>257</sup> in the context of the OEF's Maritime Interdiction Operation.

As part of the OEF, the allied forces conducted a maritime interdiction operation in the Indian Ocean to cut terrorist groups' access to Afghanistan on sea, supply

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<sup>255</sup> J. Alexander Thier, "Afghanistan," in *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, ed. William J. Durch (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 541-545.

<sup>256</sup> Official website of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures," accessed October 9, 2015 [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2014\\_09/20140901\\_140903-ISAF-Placemat-final.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140903-ISAF-Placemat-final.pdf)

<sup>257</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter 1: The International Community and Japanese Diplomacy in 2001," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2002*, 12, accessed July 22, 2014, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-b.pdf>, 19.

of weapons and drug trafficking which has been the major source of funds for Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) were stationed in the Indian Ocean to supply fuel and water to the naval vessels of the United States and its allies.<sup>258</sup>

Originally, the ATSMML had two years duration; however, it was extended three times—in 2003,<sup>259</sup> 2005 and 2006 and its basic implementation plan was revised several times with Cabinet decisions. After the law's expiration in 2007, the SDF's activities were briefly suspended until a new law with a similar content was passed in January 2008 in spite of the opposition in the Upper House. With the replacing law—the *Act on Special Measures Concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities*—SDF's refuelling activities were resumed. Later, this law was also extended for a year (until January 2010), again, overcoming the opposition in the Upper House of the Diet. In August 2009, when a new government was formed under the leadership of DPJ, the new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared that the refuelling mission would be ended following the expiration of the law in January 2010.

According to the data provided by Japan's Ministry of Defence, between 2001 and 2007, Japan provided approximately 490 000 kilolitres of fuel and 6930 tons of water to 11 countries which costed approximately 61.2 billion yen. Under the law that replaced the ATSMML, Japan provided 9500 kilolitres of fuel and 1440 tons of water to 7 countries.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> Japan's Ministry of Defense, "Japan is playing an Important Role in the International Community's Fight Against Terrorism," accessed October 7, 2015, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/data/pdf/p2-3.pdf>

<sup>259</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter 3: Japan's Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2005*, 138, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2005/ch3-a.pdf>.

<sup>260</sup> Japan's Ministry of Defense, "Japan's Replenishment Support Activities in the Indian Ocean," *Japan Defense Focus* 11 (October 2008), accessed December 12, 2013, [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/pdf/jdf\\_no11.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/pdf/jdf_no11.pdf)

## 2.2. Economic assistance provided for the reconstruction in Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Japan's economic assistance for reconstruction in Afghanistan started with the Tokyo Conference in January 2002, where Japan pledged 500 million U.S. dollars' worth of assistance in non-military areas such as resettling refugees and internally displaced people, demining, education, health and medical care. Official Development Assistance (ODA) was used. The implementation of the assistance pledged during the first Tokyo Conference (January 2002) was finished by February 2004. Japan pledged additional assistance around 400 million U.S. dollars to be implemented until March 2006.<sup>261</sup> In January 2006, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, Japan further extended US\$450 million worth of assistance.<sup>262</sup>

As of March 2013, Japan has implemented US\$4.935 billion worth of post-conflict reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in six main sectors: (1) political process, (2) security sector, (3) infrastructure, (4) human resources development and humanitarian assistance, (5) agricultural development and (6) culture and higher education. Moreover, in the Tokyo Conference held on 8 July 2012, the government pledged up to US\$3 billion of assistance to Afghanistan for the following five years, and declared that its assistance would continue even after 2017.<sup>263</sup> Since 2006, to date, Japan ranks within the top five donors in bilateral assistance to Afghanistan, and, since 2011, Japan has become the

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<sup>261</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter 3: Japan's Foreign Policy in major Diplomatic Fields," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2005*, 15, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2005/ch3-a.pdf>.

<sup>262</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter 2: Regional Diplomacy," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2007*, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/chapter2.pdf>.

<sup>263</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Assistance in Afghanistan: Towards Self Reliance," (March 2013), accessed October 7, 2013, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/middle\\_e/afghanistan/pdfs/Japan\\_assistance.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/middle_e/afghanistan/pdfs/Japan_assistance.pdf)

second largest donor following the United States.<sup>264</sup>

### 3. The policy-making process behind Japan's response to the U.S.-led "War on Terror" in Afghanistan (2001-2010)

#### 3.1. The Koizumi Cabinets (2001-2006)

When Junichirō Koizumi was elected as the new president of the LDP, he became the Prime Minister of a three party coalition government comprised of the LDP, Kōmeitō and the Conservative Party (Hōshūtō). He was one of the most popular Prime Ministers in Japan with his Cabinet receiving an approval rate of 87 per cent.<sup>265</sup> As Shinoda observed, Prime Minister Koizumi also had strong leadership skills and he made the Cabinet Secretariat the center organ responsible for policy coordination among various actors in the government. Shinoda argued that due his leadership skills the Cabinet swiftly passed the ATSMML.<sup>266</sup> On security and defense related issues, Prime Minister Koizumi mentioned numerous times his intention to discuss the revision of the Constitution or the possible situations in which Japan could exercise its collective self-defense right. He also considered that Japan should exercise that right in the context of the US-Japan alliance. However; the New Komeito strictly opposed this idea and even threatened to break the coalition if Cabinet tried to realize the revision or changing the interpretation of the Article 9. <sup>267</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> On Japan's net ODA disbursements to Afghanistan and rankings among other donors see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Afghanistan," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/data/pdfs/afghanistan.pdf>; OECD DAC Statistics "Afghanistan" <http://www.oecd.org/stats/AFG.gif>

<sup>265</sup> "Cabinet gleans 87% approval Poll finds record-high support for new Koizumi administration," *Daily Yomiuri*, April 26, 2001, 1.

<sup>266</sup> Tomohito Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2007): 86-87.

<sup>267</sup> See For example: "Right to self-defense Splits Ruling Coalition," *Daily Yomiuri*, May 12, 2001, 3; "Editorial/Speed up studies on Constitution," *Daily Yomiuri*, June 24, 2001, 6.

Against this background, five months after Koizumi took office, the September 11 incidents happened which gave the Koizumi Cabinet an opportunity to make a decision on whether or not to send troops to the US-led multinational military force under formation. As mentioned above, Prime Minister Koizumi's personal views were in favor of military roles for the SDF. The Conservative Party was known for its endorsement of exercising the collective defense right. Then, how did the pacifist Komeito was convinced for the dispatch of the SDF to provide logistical support for a US-led military operation, a response which it opposed a decade ago during the Persian Gulf Crisis. The government made two concessions to the support of Kōmeitō: material concessions in the form of a ministry in the LDP coalition and normative concessions by imposing limitations into the law.

The material concessions were made with the continuation of the LDP-Komeito and Conservative Party coalition which was formed during the Obuchi Administration. The three parties agreed to remain as partners and the Kōmeitō continued to occupy one cabinet post— Health, Labor and Welfare Minister.<sup>268</sup> As to the normative concessions, the Komeito managed to impose a series of limitations on the Cabinet drafted bill that authorized troop dispatches which is explained below.

After the September 11 attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi and the Cabinet Secretariat Fukuda Yasuo repeatedly mentioned that Japan would give 'maximum support within the limits of its Constitution', if the US decided to take military action. After these verbal assurances, Prime Minister Koizumi announced his government's first official response on September 19. In this official statement, combating terrorism was regarded 'Japan's own security issue'. The government's official stance composed of seven

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<sup>268</sup> "3 Coalition Parties Agree to Maintain Cooperation," *Daily Yomiuri*, April 26, 2001, 1.

concrete measures. The seven-point action plan, which was formulated by the Cabinet Secretariat under the leadership of the Cabinet Director for Crisis Management, Kazuhiro Sugata, was as follows:

- I. The Government of Japan (GOJ) will promptly take the measures necessary to dispatch the SDF to provide support, including medical services, transportation and supply, to the US forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks that have been recognised as a threat to the international peace and security in the UNSC Resolution 1368.
- II. The GOJ will promptly take the measures necessary to further strengthen the protection of facilities and areas of the US forces and important facilities in Japan.
- III. The GOJ will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather information.
- IV. The GOJ will strengthen international cooperation, including information sharing, in areas such as immigration control.
- V. The GOJ will extend humanitarian, economic and other necessary assistance to surrounding and affected countries. As a part of this assistance, the GOJ will extend emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India, who are cooperating with the US in this emergency situation.
- VI. The GOJ will provide assistance to displaced persons as necessary. This will include the possibility of humanitarian assistance by SDF.
- VII. The GOJ, in cooperation with other countries, will take appropriate measures in response to the changing situation in order to avoid confusion in international and domestic economic systems.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, “Japan’s Measures in Response to the Simultaneous Terrorist Attacks in the United States—Press Conference Statement by the Prime Minister,” accessed November 26, 2013, [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0919terosoti\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0919terosoti_e.html).

The Cabinet Secretariat's aforementioned response gave priority to the dispatch of the SDF. The plan called for the dispatch of logistical support for a possible US-led military action, for humanitarian assistance, and for information-gathering activities. Even though emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India were promised, nowhere in the seven measures nor in the discussions leading up to those measures was post-conflict assistance to Afghanistan considered. As noted by one of the Prime Minister's private secretaries, the initial debates within the *Kantei* (the Prime Minister's official residence) on how to respond to the September 11 incidents mainly revolved around two points: providing rescue and relief assistance to the victims in the US, and dispatching the SDF and the legal basis of a possible dispatch.<sup>270</sup>

In searching for a legal basis for the dispatch, the government officials were considering using the law on emergencies surrounding Japan (*shuhen jitai hou*), using the existing UN PKO Law, or creating a new law. The former Defence Agency wanted to use the first option; however, the Foreign Ministry required the enactment of a new law on the grounds that it would be difficult to regard Afghanistan as an area surrounding Japan. In addition, the Ministry considered the dispatch constitutional as long as the SDF's missions were limited to non-combat activities, such as transportation of fuel, water and food,<sup>271</sup> while some members of the ruling coalition and Defence Agency wanted SDF to transform weapons and ammunitions as well.<sup>272</sup> The New Komeito requested a number of limitations to the law. These included that the law be a temporary legislation, effective for one or two years; be based on a UN resolution; and give importance to UN

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<sup>270</sup> Isao Iijima, *Koizumi Kantei Hiroku* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2006), 126.

<sup>271</sup> "Houfukuji no Beigun Shien, Shuhen Jitaihou no Tekiyou Kentou- Kaishaku Henkou wo Boueichou Giron," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 16, 2001, 4.

<sup>272</sup> "Taibei Shien de Tokureihou wo Kentou- Tero Houfuku no Gentei Seifu Yotou," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 2001, 1.

activities.<sup>273</sup> As a result, the ruling coalition managed to reach a consensus on enacting a new law that would enable the SDF to give rear-area support to US or any other multinational coalition force that would take part in a possible military operation. The mission would be restricted to non-combat activities and provision of logistic support. Hence, the Cabinet decided to legitimise the law based on UNSC Resolution 1368.

However, during the drafting process of the law, a number of points remained unclear and controversial. The Defence Agency wanted the government to ease the restrictions on the use of weapons. Based on the proposed legislation, the SDF was going to provide assistance to refugees in Pakistan. The UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law imposed strict restrictions on the use of force by SDF troops. The SDF members were only allowed to use weapons for self-defence or for the defence of another SDF member. In addition, they were not allowed to use weapons to protect field hospitals.<sup>274</sup> For this reason, some LDP members wanted to revise the PKO law; however, the New Komeito Chief Executives were against that idea. In the final draft, the SDF was authorised to use weapons to protect refugees and military personnel from other countries, in addition to self-defence. New Komeito wanted the removal of the restrictions as an exception only applicable in the scope of the new law.<sup>275</sup> The new draft bill also allowed the SDF to transport ammunitions and weapons to US forces. On 4 October, the ruling coalition came up with draft legislation for three bills: an anti-terrorism bill, a bill to revise the SDF Law and a bill to revise the Japan Coast Guard Law. Together with the main opposition parties, the establishment of a committee to discuss the bills was decided.

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<sup>273</sup> “Taibei Shien Shinpou, Yotou Naibu niwa Netsuyoi Shinchouron,” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 2001, 3.

<sup>274</sup> “Shinpou de Nanmin Shien, Buki Shiyo Kanwa ga Shouten ni- Bei Douji Tahatsu Tero Meguru Taiou,” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 26, 2001, 2.

<sup>275</sup> “Bei Tero Houfuku, Nanmin Shien mo Shinpou de Tokurei no Kitei, Yotou ga Goui,” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 26, 2001, 1.

The final draft bills were submitted to the Diet on 5 October 2001, as the U.S.-led coalition forces launched the airstrikes in Afghanistan. The key points of the draft bill were (1) the content of the SDF's assistance (2) the area of operation (3) the conditions under which the SDF personnel could use weapons (4) the creation and reporting of the basic plan of SDF's activities. Under the draft bill, the SDF would provide assistance to the United States and its allies in areas of transportation, communication, supply of goods, repair and maintenance, medical activities, assistance in airports, harbors and bases. A key point in the LDP draft bill was that the supply of weapons and ammunitions were not banned. The SDF would be allowed to assist the U.S. forces in search and rescue activities and provide relief and rescue activities for refugees. The area of operations for SDF were designated as the Indian Ocean— in the vicinity of a U.S. base located in the island of Diego Garcia— and Pakistan. The conditions under which the SDF was allowed to use weapons were expanded compared to the previously enacted International Peace Cooperation Law. Under the UN PKO Law, the SDF had been allowed to use weapons for individual protection and the protection of fellow SDF members and their equipment. Under the draft bill, SDF could use weapons to protect individuals falling under their administration, such as refugees and military personnel of other armed forces. Finally, the basic plan of SDF's activities would be decided by the Cabinet and reported to the Diet after the start of operations without delays.<sup>276</sup>

The largest opposition party DPJ requested amendments to the bill in four points. First, it demanded that the ruling parties clarify how the use of weapons clause did not contravene the constitutional principles against the use of force (Article 9). Second, DPJ wanted to ban the transportation of weapons and ammunitions completely. Third, the

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<sup>276</sup> “Tero Tokusō-hōan no Pointo Mokuteki, Jisshi Chiiki, Buki Shiyō, Shien Naiyō, Kokkai Kanyō,Kigen,”*Yomiuri Shimibun*, October 5, 2001, 10.

DPJ insisted on the need for prior Diet approval of the basic plan. Fourth, the DPJ tried to reduce the duration of the law to one year.<sup>277</sup> The points on which the opposition was most persistent were the prior Diet approval and exclusion of the transportation of weapons from the activities to be undertaken by the SDF.<sup>278</sup> Thus, the DPJ did not oppose the dispatch per se, but, was concerned with limiting SDF's activities to non-military areas by disallowing the transportation of weapons and ammunition and imposing strict civilian control. The final law, however, did not show major changes in line with the opposition's demands since the coalition government enjoyed a majority in both Houses of the Diet; and therefore, did not have to compromise with the opposition. The final law required *Diet approval within twenty days after* the start of SDF's activities. Also, the law banned the transportation of weapons and ammunitions *on land* into foreign territories and the supply of fuel to aircrafts taking off for military activities.<sup>279</sup> Nevertheless, the SDF's actual activities did not contain transportation of weapons or ammunitions on land or sea.<sup>280</sup>

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was extended three times, twice of which was during the Koizumi administration in October 2003<sup>281</sup> and October 2005.<sup>282</sup> During the discussions of extension at both times the DPJ was against the bill, requesting

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<sup>277</sup> "Tero Tokusō-hōan, Kyō Kokkai Teishutsu Yotō to Minshu, Shūsei Kyōgi Yotsu no Kadai," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 5, 2001, 3.

<sup>278</sup> "Tero Tokusō-hōan, Minshu Kokkai Shōnin Shūsei Jyōken de Sansei Katameru, 24 Nichi Zengo Seiritsu he," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 12, 2001, 1; "Tero Tokusō-hōan Buki Yūsō, Rikujō ha Jyogai Haken Keikaku, Kokkai Shōnin de/ Yotō Saishū Chōsei," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 11, 2001, 1; "Tero Tokusō-hōan Yatō Santō Shūsei Naiyō no Yōshi," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 16, 2001, 4;

<sup>279</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, "The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law," Tentative English Translation (October 2001), accessed 28 August, 2015.

<sup>280</sup> For more information regarding the content of the Basic Plans and actual SDF activities in support of the military coalition see Yoichiro Sato, "Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan's Overseas Troop Dispatches," in *Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata. (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 93-108.

<sup>281</sup> "Yusen Kadai, Seifu Norikiru Hitsuyōsei Rongi Sainen mo Tero Tokusohou Enchō," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 10, 2003, 2.

<sup>282</sup> "Kaisei Tero Tokusohou Seiritsu Enchō 2 Kaime, Ichi nen," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 26, 2005, 3.

a clause on *prior Diet approval* over SDF dispatches<sup>283</sup> to ensure civilian control over the SDF's overseas activities. However the opposition parties did not have the majority vote in the Diet to reject the bill.

Besides, logistical support given to the U.S.-led coalition, Japan's assistance for the reconstruction in Afghanistan was initiated during Koizumi administration. The idea to invest in Afghanistan's reconstruction surfaced during the early debates in the Diet on how to respond the attacks. In one of his speeches at the Diet, Yukio Hatoyoma, member of the largest opposition party DPJ, argued that international efforts to eradicate terrorism should not be limited to logistic support, and that Japan could pursue alternative paths of diplomacy or strategic use of ODA to cope with the underlying causes of terrorism.<sup>284</sup> DPJ members continuously emphasised non-military assistance as a way to support the eradication of terrorism. It was a DPJ member that first set forth the idea that the Japanese Government should provide post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan by reviving Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MOFA) previous policy on Afghanistan during the 1990s<sup>285</sup>

MOFA's policy toward the civil war in Afghanistan during the 1990s was based on supporting the UN-led efforts on reconciliation between Taliban and non-Taliban factions in the framework of "Intra-Afghan dialogue."<sup>286</sup> To support those efforts

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<sup>283</sup> "Jizen Shounin Nado, Minshu ga Shusei Youkyu Tero Tokusohou Kaiseian," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 1, 2003, 2; "Minshu, Saienchou Hantai he, Maehara Daihyou, Tounai ni Hairyou, Tero Tokusohou," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 18, 2005, 4.

<sup>284</sup> Japan's National Diet, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 October 2001 (statement by Yukio Hatoyama, MP).

<sup>285</sup> Japan's National Diet, Parliamentary Debates, House of Councilors, 3 October 2001 (statement by Tomiko Okazaki, MP). [http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk\\_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=56587&SAVED\\_RID=6&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV\\_ID=8&DOC\\_ID=5028&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=1&DPOS=1&SORT\\_DIR=1&SORT\\_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=58576](http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=56587&SAVED_RID=6&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=8&DOC_ID=5028&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=1&DPOS=1&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=58576)

<sup>286</sup> United Nations General Assembly, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: report of the Secretary-General, A/52/826 (17 March 1998), accessed August 5, 2014 <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3->

Japan, in 1998, proposed to host a meeting in Tokyo by bringing together various conflicting factions. Japan invited the Taliban leaders for a number of times until the summer of 2001.<sup>287</sup> However, a meeting could not be convened as the Taliban leaders did not want to come together with other factions. Besides reconciliation Japan also provided economic assistance as a member of the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG). By 1998, Japan's financial assistance peaked 400 million US dollars which was channeled through UN agencies. Part of that assistance was earmarked for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.<sup>288</sup>

The Koizumi administration, however, decided to involve Japan in the reconstruction assistance following the requests from the U.S. -side. On October 5, during an interview with a Japanese news agency, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage urged Japan to play an active role in the reconstruction in Afghanistan and designated education (including women's education), medical services, and agriculture and mine clearance as areas in which Japan could contribute.<sup>289</sup>

Following that request, by mid-October Koizumi announced that Japan would provide reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan and host an international conference in Tokyo for that purpose. On November 9, the government appointed Sadako Ogata as the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Afghan Affairs. Ogata and U.S. State Secretary of State Colin Powell co-chaired a meeting in Washington (November 20, 2001) on Afghanistan's reconstruction. Also, the plan of Japan's reconstruction assistance

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<sup>287</sup> Nobutaka Miyahara, "Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: A Japanese View of the Road Ahead," *Gaiko Forum* 45, (Fall 2003): 46.

<sup>288</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Fourth meeting of the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG IV) Keynote Speech by H.E. Mr. Nobutaka Machimura, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs December 7, 1998," accessed August 1, 2015.

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle\\_e/afghanistan/asg4.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/asg4.html)

<sup>289</sup> "Tero Tokusō- hō no Sōki Seiritsu wo Jieitai no Yakuwari Kitai/Armitage Beikokumu Fukuchōkan," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 6, 2001.

was created based on a report by Ogata.<sup>290</sup> In the Tokyo Conference held in January 2002, Japan pledged 500 million US dollars' worth of assistance and became one of the co-chairs of the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group, together with the United States, the European Union (EU) and Saudi Arabia.<sup>291</sup>

By late April 2002, MOFA declared that Japan would be involved in Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan<sup>292</sup> which was not included in Japan's assistance package declared in the Tokyo Conference. In the context of G-8 meeting, a lead donor approach was adopted for implementing the SSR programme in Afghanistan. Each country would be responsible for the implementation of reform in a certain sector<sup>293</sup>, the Japanese delegation volunteered to become the lead-donor for DDR (Disarmament, Demobilizations and Re-integration) of ex-combatants in cooperation with UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan). According to the accounts of the MOFA officials who were involved in the implementation of DDR projects in Afghanistan, the Japanese delegation to the G-8 meetings considered DDR as an appropriate area in which Japan could contribute by using its own post-war experiences with disarmament and reconstruction.<sup>294</sup>

In May 2002, then Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi announced

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<sup>290</sup> Nobutaka Miyahara, "Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: A Japanese View of the Road Ahead," *Gaiko Forum* 45, (Fall 2003): 46-47.

<sup>291</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chapter 1: Terrorist Attacks in the United States and the Fight against Terrorism," in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2002*, 26, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-b.pdf>.

<sup>292</sup> Yoriko Kawaguchi, "Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi on Her Upcoming Visit to Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran," Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (December 2, 2001), accessed August 1, 2013. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle\\_e/fmv0204/speech.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/fmv0204/speech.html).

<sup>293</sup> United Nations General Assembly, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: report of the Secretary-General, A/56/1000 (11 July 2002), accessed August 1, 2014 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/470/09/PDF/N0247009.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>294</sup> Shinichi Komanō, *Watashi no Afuganisutan: Chu Afuganisutan Nihon Taishi no Fukkō Shien Funtō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005), 98; Kenji Isezaki, *Busou Kaijyō: Funsouya ga Mita Sekai* (Tokyo: Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2004), 152.

the structure of Japan's aid to Afghanistan under the banner of "Consolidation of Peace," based on three pillars: support for peace process, domestic security and reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.<sup>295</sup> Later, in a report submitted by a private commission convened by the Koizumi Cabinet, using Japan's ODA for peacebuilding and conflict resolution was advised.<sup>296</sup> Following that, Prime Minister Koizumi announced that peacebuilding would become Japan's new approach to regional conflict resolution (Sydney speech). Japan adopted this approach for conflict resolution in Asia. The core of this approach is based on diplomacy for mediation between conflicting parties and economic assistance for reconstruction. In 2003, in the reformed ODA Charter peacebuilding became one of the "priority issues" for Japan's economic assistance<sup>297</sup> and thereby institutionalized in Japan's ODA policy.

### 3.2. The First Abe Cabinet (September 2006- September 2007)

One month after Shinzo Abe took office as Prime Minister, the Special Measures Law was extended for another year in October 2006.<sup>298</sup> However, the Abe administration failed to extend the law for the fourth time, and consequently the law expired in November 2007. Abe's failure to extend the law can be attributed to two reasons: the result of July 2007 Upper House election which produced a divided

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<sup>295</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Support for Afghanistan - One Year After the Peace Process Began-" (December 2002), accessed 28 August 2015

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle\\_e/afghanistan/support/0212-1.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/support/0212-1.html)

<sup>296</sup> The report was produced by the "Kokusai Heiwa Kyōryoku Kondankai," [Advisory Panel for International Peace Cooperation], chaired by Yasushi Akashi the head of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The summary of the report can be found in Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, "The Summary of the Report of the Advisory Panel on International peace Cooperation," (December 18, 2002), accessed August 28, 2015.

[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kokusai/kettei/021218houkoku\\_s.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kokusai/kettei/021218houkoku_s.html)

<sup>297</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter," (August 29, 2003), accessed August 28, 2015. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf>

<sup>298</sup> "Kaisei Tero Tokusohō, Seiritsu," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 27, 2006, 3.

legislature and the DPJ's uncompromising attitude on the extension of the SDF's mission.

In January 2007, Abe revealed his intention to create a permanent law for SDF's overseas dispatches in a speech given at the North Atlantic Council and to promote greater cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. He also mentioned that the Japanese government was considering to make personnel contributions to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) which were coalition's military forces in charge of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Abe later changed his view about contributing to PRTs which can be attributed to statements from within the LDP that such contribution would violate the constitution.

Establishing a permanent law that would legalize the SDF's overseas dispatch for military operations—in and out of UN framework—had been on the LDP's agenda since, at least, Koizumi administration.<sup>299</sup> In May 2007, Abe summoned an expert group to study the situations in which Japan could exercise its right of collective self-defence. The group designated certain hypothetical cases in which Japan could exercise that right.<sup>300</sup>

The July 2007 House of Councillors election resulted with LDP's defeat and the DPJ became the largest opposition party in the Upper House, while LDP lost its majority position.<sup>301</sup> This meant, if the DPJ cooperated with the other opposition parties it would have the two-thirds majority required to reject a bill in the Upper House. According to the constitution of Japan, a bill must be approved in both Houses of the Diet, but Article 59 stipulates that a bill rejected or not voted on at the House of Councillors

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<sup>299</sup> "Jieitai Kaigai Haken Koizumi Shushō, Kōkyū-hō ni Iyoku Heiwa Kyōryoku Shūninmuka mo/Tokubetsuin Tōben," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 25, 2003, 1.

<sup>300</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, "Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security," (May 15, 2014), 16, accessed May 2, 2015 [http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku\\_en.pdf](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf)

<sup>301</sup> "Editorial/ Despite LDP setback, show must go on," *Daily Yomiuri*, July 30, 2007, 4.

can still be turned into a law within sixty days, if it is approved for a second time in the House of Representatives by at least two-thirds of the members present.<sup>302</sup> Thus, ultimately, the Upper House cannot prevent the bill being turned into a law if the Lower House manages to pass the bill with a second vote. Nevertheless, that “sixty days” gave enough time for the opposition to engage in delaying tactics. The Abe administration, initially, did not immediately push the bill through the Diet with a second voting at the Lower House and sought to negotiate with the DPJ.

The DPJ Secretary-General Ozawa was not exactly responsive to Abe’s approach. Following DPJ’s victory in the elections, he mentioned that the DPJ, would not change its stance of opposing the extension of the refuelling mission.<sup>303</sup> Ozawa also declined Abe’s requests for a meeting outside of the Diet. Even pressure applied by various U.S. state department officials did not work. By early August, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer requested a meeting with Ozawa to convince him to support the extension of the bill, but Ozawa declined.<sup>304</sup> This was followed by President Bush’s statement at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in which he requested Japan to continue its support to the war on terror.<sup>305</sup> As a response, Prime Minister Abe promised that he would resign if he could not extend the Law. Moreover, on September 5, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing U.S. gratitude for Japan’s support for the war on terror.<sup>306</sup> Despite all these

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<sup>302</sup> Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan” (English version), accessed August 1, 2015.

[http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution\\_and\\_government\\_of\\_japan/constitution\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html)

<sup>303</sup> “Tero Tokusoho [Hantai suru] Minshuto Ozawa Daihyou, Saninsengo Youyaku Touba,” *Asahi Shimbun*, July 31, 2007, 1.

<sup>304</sup> “Abe asked to consider quitting/Prime minister rejects suggestion in election night row with bigwigs,” *Daily Yomiuri*, August 3, 2007, 3; “DPJ split over Ozawa’s rejection,” *Daily Yomiuri*, August 10, 2007, 3.

<sup>305</sup> “Bush signals hope over antiterror law/ Tells media U.S. pleased with Japan role,” *Daily Yomiuri*, September 1, 2007, 1.

<sup>306</sup> “CRS Report for Congress Japan- U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103704.pdf>, 24; “U.S. House thanks Japan for help in

pressures, Ozawa did not change his opinion.

By September 10, Prime Minister Abe declared that instead of extending the ATSMML he would create a new bill which would incorporate DPJ members' views.<sup>307</sup> However, DPJ strictly opposed the extension of the refuelling mission and was planning to submit a censure motion against Abe in the Upper House and pressure him for resignation.<sup>308</sup> The intention was to exceed the sixty days limit for a second voting. By late September, Abe resigned mentioning Ozawa's uncompromising attitude and his administration's failure to extend the bill as one of the reasons behind his resignation,<sup>309</sup> even if Abe's illness was widely acknowledged as the main reason behind his resignation.

Ozawa opposed the extension, on the ground that the SDF cooperated with the U.S.-led OEF which was not a UN -commanded mission. The coalition's activities were based on the U.S. right for self-defence.<sup>310</sup> Ozawa once mentioned that SDF should participate in the NATO-led but UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).<sup>311</sup> However, Ozawa's view on ISAF participation did not reflect the party's general stance as evidenced by the content of the counter-bill proposed to the Diet by DPJ in December 2007 which opposed participation in ISAF. Thus, we can say that Ozawa's individual preferences did not determine the general stance of the DPJ.

### 3.3. The Fukuda Cabinet (September 2007- August 2008)

The Fukuda administration succeeding Abe had two options in order to make

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Afghanistan, Iraq," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 7, 2007, 6.

<sup>307</sup> "Abe puts his job on line / Pledges to extend MSDF refueling mission in Indian Ocean," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 11, 2007, 1.

<sup>308</sup> "Abe ultimatum raises stakes in Diet/ Govt may use lower house revote to force through bill extending MSDF mission," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 12, 2007, 3.

<sup>309</sup> "Abe ultimatum raises stakes in Diet/ Govt may use lower house revote to force through bill extending MSDF mission," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 12, 2007, 3; "Editorial: Dealing with aftermath of Abe's abrupt resignation," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 13, 2007, 4.

<sup>310</sup> "Ozawa-shi, ōjū Ikō Tokusōhō Kyōgi," *Asahi Shimbun*, August 8, 2007, 1.

<sup>311</sup> "Editorial/ DPJ must offer viable refuelling bill alternative," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 6, 2007, 4.

the extension of the SDF's mission possible—to push Abe's bill in the Lower House; propose a new temporary bill or create a permanent law for the overseas deployment of the SDF.

The Fukuda cabinet did not follow Abe's more assertive path of creating a permanent law and proceeded with the second option. A new draft bill was submitted to the Diet on October 17, 2007. The new draft bill restricted the SDF's mission to only supplying fuel and water to the coalition vessels. The bill also excluded the clause on *ex post facto* Diet approval required in the ATSMML. Under the new draft bill, the government was only obliged to report the MSDF activities to the Diet every year<sup>312</sup> instead of seeking an approval in the Diet. Thus, SDF's assistance was limited to support the U.S.-led coalition. Under pressure from the New Komeitō, LDP's junior coalition partner, the LDP leaders decided to draft a temporary law effective for one year.<sup>313</sup>

The government initially, sought to compromise with the opposition as Abe did; however, as before, the DPJ continued their delaying tactics. This time the DPJ had acquired a strong leverage for that purpose. News that the fuel provided by the MSDF was diverted to U.S.-led operations in Iraq was revealed by a Japanese non-profit organization Peace Depot.<sup>314</sup> In connection to this, the government officials were accused of altering the records about the quantity of fuel transported by the MSDF.<sup>315</sup> The situation was worsened with corruption allegations targeting the Defence Ministry. The DPJ refused to start discussions before investigating those allegations,<sup>316</sup> which

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<sup>312</sup> "Jiji Kokkoku Kyuyu Ronsen Seikyoku Fukumi Shin Tero Tokuso Houan Kyou Kakugi Kettei," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 17, 2007, 2.

<sup>313</sup> "New antiterrorism law to last 1 year," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 16, 2007, 2.

<sup>314</sup> "End of use of fuel must be known/ Check could have prevented Antiterrorism Law controversy," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 10, 2007, 3.

<sup>315</sup> "Ishiba: U.S. vessel used fuel in 3 days," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 11, 2007, 1.

<sup>316</sup> On corruption allegations see: "Moriya scandal hits prospects for antiterror bill," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 21, 2007, 3; "Political Pulse/ Moriya row steals bill's thunder," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 24, 2007, 4; "Scandal hurts antiterror bill/ DPJ demands priority to be placed on examining Moriya scandal," *Daily*

prolonged the discussions on the government sponsored bill. Consequently by late October it became clear that passing the new bill would not be possible before November and the MSDF's mission would be suspended for a while.

The new DPJ leader, Yukio Hatoyama echoed Ozawa's view by suggesting that the U.S. war was not clearly sanctioned by a UN resolution.<sup>317</sup> Another reason for Hatoyama to oppose the new draft bill was that it further diluted civilian control over SDF activities. The DPJ submitted its counter-proposal to the Upper House in late December. DPJ's draft bill posited that the priority in Japan's efforts for eradication of terrorism should be supporting the reconciliation process between the Afghanistan government and anti-government Taliban forces. The DPJ proposal declared, after a ceasefire agreement was concluded between the warring parties, the SDF would be dispatched for providing post-conflict humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The bill also stated that the SDF would not participate in ISAF.<sup>318</sup> The DPJ President Ozawa mentioned that instead of providing logistical support for a military operation, Japan should provide "public welfare assistance to the people of Afghanistan."<sup>319</sup> The DPJ proposal also included the establishment of a human security centre in Afghanistan.<sup>320</sup>

The government sponsored bill passed the House of Representatives on 13 November 2007 but it was voted down in the Upper House. Instead, the DPJ sponsored

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*Yomiuri*, November 29, 2007, 4; "DPJ suffers 'majority vote' backlash/ Canceling of Nukaga's testimony in upper house reveal cracks in opposition front," *Daily Yomiuri*, December 2, 2007, 3.

<sup>317</sup> "DPJ divided on whether to submit own bill," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 19, 2007, 3.

<sup>318</sup> "Hokuyho Taian wo Teishutsu Minshu, Saigiketsu ni Taiketsu Shisei," *Asahi Shinbun*, December 22, 2007, 4.

<sup>319</sup> Official Website of the Democratic Party of Japan, "Ozawa stresses unchanged DPJ regarding new refueling legislation," (December 21, 2007), accessed August 28, 2015

<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/071225/01.html>

<sup>320</sup> Official Website of the Democratic Party of Japan, "Next Cabinet approves outline of Afghanistan reconstruction assistance proposal," (December 12, 2007), accessed August 28, 2015

<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/071217/02.html>

bill was approved by the Upper House on 11 January 2008.<sup>321</sup> The same day, the government sponsored bill was passed by acquiring two thirds majority in a second voting at the Lower House, and became a law. The LDP controlled Lower House did not vote on the DPJ sponsored bill.<sup>322</sup> The MSDF's mission was relaunched the next month. In 2009, during the tenure of Prime Minister Aso, the law was extended for another year, in a similar vein with a second voting at the House of Representatives.

### 3.4. The Hatoyama Cabinet (September 2009-June 2010)

DPJ's success in the 2009 Lower House election had given the party an opportunity to realize its policy proposals for the conflict in Afghanistan.<sup>323</sup> Even though terminating the refueling mission was not explicitly stated in DPJ's election manifesto<sup>324</sup>, during the election campaign, Hatoyama publicly stated that, if elected, his future government would discontinue the mission.<sup>325</sup> It was mentioned, however, in the manifesto that the DPJ would pursue a peacebuilding approach for the eradication of terrorism and economic assistance for poverty reduction, state-building, police and administrative reform, strengthening governance institutions, and providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> "Katsudō Saikai, Isogu Seifu Tenyō Bōshisaku Tettei he Hokyū Shienhō Seiritsu," *Asahi Shinbun*, January 12, 2008, 4.

<sup>322</sup> "Shin tero tokuso-ho: 57 nen buri ni Shuin Saikaketsu, Seiritsu Indoyo Kyoyu, Getsunai ni Jieikan Haken," *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 12, 2008, 1.

<sup>323</sup> The DPJ won 308 seats out of 480, acquiring the majority of the seats in the Lower House. "Transfer of Power/ DPJ settles on its frontline faces," *Daily Yomiuri*, September 7, 2009, 2.

<sup>324</sup> For the Diplomacy and Defense part of DPJ's Manifesto (Japanese version) see: Official Website of the Democratic Party of Japan, "Minshutō Seisakushū Index 2009" accessed August 3, 2015. <http://www2.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/08.html#ODAの活用、「人間の安全保障」などへの取り組み>

<sup>325</sup> "Election 2009—Battle for Power/ Hatoyama clarifies stance: 'No extension of refueling'," *Daily Yomiuri*, July 31, 3.

<sup>326</sup> <http://www2.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/08.html#ODAの活用、「人間の安全保障」などへの取り組み>

He repeatedly emphasized, before and after the election, that his government would prioritize “civilian assistance” for the eradication of terrorism in Afghanistan.<sup>327</sup> Consequently, the SDF’s mission was brought to an end in January 2010, in spite of the Obama Administration’s request to continue the mission and the higher costs involved with additional economic assistance. The extended reconstruction assistance was worth 5 billion U.S. dollars (about 450 billion yen), which was to be implemented in the following five years.<sup>328</sup> The amount was not only four times the total aid provided since 2002<sup>329</sup> but also seven times of the cost of the fuel supplied to coalition vessels since 2001.<sup>330</sup>

The DPJ had been working on a new policy for Afghanistan’s reconstruction since December 2007, under the initiative of Tadashi Inuzuka, a DPJ politician and a member of the House of Councillors at that time. He cooperated with Kenji Isezaki—who was the MOFA appointed official in charge of planning the first DDR programme in Afghanistan—to initiate a new policy of reconstruction assistance. After, visiting Afghanistan and various countries involved in the state building process, they came up with the proposal to focus Japan’s assistance on reconciliation with the former Taliban combatants and their re-integration into the Afghan society.<sup>331</sup> Based on that proposal, the DPJ-led government announced the content of their assistance package by early November 2009. Japan’s assistance would be based on three pillars: improvement of the

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<sup>327</sup> See for example; Official Website of the Democratic Party of Japan, “Hatoyama expresses regret on lower house approval of new anti-terror legislation, reiterates DPJ opposition,” (November 12, 2007), accessed August 28, 2015 <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/071119/03.html>; “Afugan Minsei Shien mo, Minshu Hatoyama Daihyō,” *Asahi Shimbun*, August 12, 2009, 4; “Jimin Asō Shushō Minshu Hatoyama Daihyō Tōshu Tōron no Omona Hatsugen,” *Asahi Shimbun*, August 13, 2009, 5.

<sup>328</sup> “Editorial/Is govt returning to ‘checkbox diplomacy’?” *Daily Yomiuri*, November 11, 2009, 4.

<sup>329</sup> “Hatoyama needs more prudent political creed,” *Daily Yomiuri*, December 13, 2009, 7.

<sup>330</sup> A *Daily Yomiuri* article mentions that the amount of fuel supplied to the coalition forces since 2001 reached 69 billion yen by July 2009. “Election 2009—Battle for Power/ Hatoyama clarifies stance: ‘No extension of refueling’,” *Daily Yomiuri*, 3.

<sup>331</sup> The details of the process can be found in: Kenji Isezaki, *Afugan Sensō wo Kenpō 9 Jyō to Hibusō Jieitai de Owaraseru* (Kyōto : Kamogawa Shuppan, 2010): 74-123

security sector, facilitating the reconciliation between government and anti-government forces, and civilian assistance for sustainable and independent development of Afghanistan in areas such as rural development, agriculture and job-training of ex-Taliban combatants.<sup>332</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

The September 11 incidents gave the Japanese government an opportunity to decide whether or not to send troops in support of the US-led military force fighting against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan. The Koizumi Cabinet was able to pass a law that authorized troop dispatches by receiving the approval of its pacifist coalition partner, the New Kōmeitō which had been against troop dispatches to military operations outside of a UN framework. Two factors helped the government to secure Komeito's support. First was the side payment in the form of offering a minister post. The second one was a normative concession in the sense that the LDP agreed on the imposition of limitations to the draft bill. As the Koizumi Cabinet was a coalition government which enjoyed majority in both Houses of the Diet, the draft bill was easily passed despite the rejection of the opposition parties. This was the same during the Abe administration until the July 2007 Upper House elections in which the LDP coalition lost its majority status to the DPJ-led opposition parties. This gave the opposition an upper hand in the Upper House and enabled them to exploit procedural rules for delaying the discussion of the bill. While both Abe and Fukuda administrations' offered to compromise with the DPJ—even Fukuda offered Ichiro Ozawa and his group to join his party—Ozawa rejected and went on to criticize the government for supporting a US war and

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<sup>332</sup> “Afugan Shien Kettei Minsei Chūshin, Kei 50 oku Doru,” *Asahi Shimbun*, November 10, 2009, 6.

going against Japan's Constitutional principles. The DPJ also came up with alternative policy plan in Afghanistan based on non-military and public welfare assistance for the civilians in Afghanistan. While Ozawa's uncompromising attitude can be attributed to his own personal interests as the chances for Ozawa and the DPJ to win the Upper House elections and replace the LDP were high and perhaps Ozawa chose to be a part of the winning side. However, the general party stance of the DPJ had been consistent since the 2001 which prioritized non-military civilian assistance.

## Conclusion

This study examined how it was possible for the ruling political elite in Japan to convince the opposition parties to approve the expansion of the SDF's roles in the context of international military operations. In the previous literature on Japan's overseas troop deployments this question has been largely ignored. The study covered legislative processes behind two laws. The UN PKO law and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and attempted to shed light on the strategies adopted by the ruling party to change the policy preferences of the opposition parties. This research attempted to clarify this question by tracing the intra-party interaction during the enactment of the above-mentioned laws.

In order to answer these questions, the study referred to two existing hypotheses, based on the constructivist and rational choice approaches, on how domestic actors' change their foreign policy preferences. Constructivist approach suggests that actors policy preferences are shaped by conceptions of state identity—the political elite's and wider society's beliefs about their states role in the international society. In domestic settings where identity conceptions are widely contested, actors' compete to influence the policy making process. This view also suggests that actors may also try to persuade one another to change their preferences by using the power of new ideas learned from the international context. As such, the study tried to address the question of whether such changes in policy preferences were induced by normative factors or material incentives by using the case of Japan's policy on overseas troop deployments.

The detailed findings of the research are in the following way. In the first case, the government sponsored UN PKO Law was based on the idea of internationalism and making a contribution in accordance with Japan's state identity as a major economic

power. The two opposition parties which cooperated with the LDP in drafting the bill accepted these ideas and had the opportunity to shape the content of the bill in accordance with their normative preferences. Nevertheless, when the discussions between the two opposition parties reached a stalemate, Prime Minister Miyazawa and other LDP executives offered a number of side-payments. These included threats to hold simultaneous elections which would adversely affect the presence of the smaller parties in the Diet, promises to initiate political reform on addressing corruption in political fundraising, electoral reform and cuts in the defense budget. These threats, promises and concessions, in other words “side-payments” expedited the enactment of the law. Thus, both normative and material concessions were made by the ruling LDP for winning the support of the opposition parties.

The September 11 terrorist attacks brought another opportunity for Japanese government to make a decision— whether or not to make troop contributions to the military coalition that was formed to eradicate the Al-Qaida and Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Thus, the second case involves the SDF’s deployment to support the US-led “war on terror” in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Under the laws that authorized the deployment, the SDF’s main mission was to provide logistical support to United States and allied forces. As the ruling LDP- Komeito and Conservative Party coalition held a majority in both Houses of the Diet (in the Lower House a two-thirds majority and in the Upper House they held a simple majority), the LDP did not have to adjust its policies in accordance with the opposition parties’ demands. The Conservative Party had similar policy preferences to that of the LDP; however, winning the approval of Komeito mattered as the LDP depended on Komeito’s votes in the Diet.

Komeito’s support was won by then Prime Minister Koizumi through material

and normative concessions during the coalition formation process which preceded the outbreak of the September 11 incidents. First, SDF's roles were limited to non-military logistical support and second, as part of the coalition deal between the Komeito and LDP, Komeito attained the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.

The successive Koizumi Cabinets succeeded in continuing the SDF's mission until July 2007 Upper House election which resulted in the DPJ's victory. The opposition block led by the DPJ held a majority in the Upper House. In order to extend the SDF's mission in 2007 and 2008, the Abe and Fukuda Cabinets, tried to negotiate with the DPJ leaders. The LDP executives offered a series of material concessions to DPJ leaders. The DPJ leaders refused to compromise as the prospects of winning the upcoming House of Representative election (2010) was higher for DPJ than it was for the LDP. As a result of DPJ leaders' uncompromising attitude, the SDF's mission was suspended briefly. However, as the ruling coalition held a two-thirds majority in the Lower House, they passed another law with a similar content in a second voting in the Lower House. When the DPJ-led government came into power in 2009, the SDF's mission was terminated.

In conclusion, in each case I found that opposition parties changed their positions on overseas troop deployments after an opportunity to enhance their political power or survival arose. If the material incentives provided by the LDP to the opposition or coalition parties had the potential to enhance the parties' political power, then these parties made adjustments to their policy preferences. However, when the material incentives offered by the ruling party to the opposition did not have the potential to maximize the opposition's political power then opposition parties stuck to their original policy preferences. Consequently, actors made adjustments to their policy preferences as a result of material incentives.

For future research, two issues could be further investigated. First, the case of Iraq— namely, the enactment process of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (July 2003)— and the creation of the International Peace Support Law need to be examined. Second, the question of why the Komeito, a traditionally pacifist political party consented to the expansion of the external military roles of the SDF could be further investigated.

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
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## Appendices

Figure 1. Coalition Decision Model



(Source: Joe D. Hagan, Philip Everts, Haruhiro Fukui, and John Stempel, "Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy," *International Studies Review* 3, no.2 (2001): 178.)