



Portugal's 'Estado Novo' Diplomatic Relations with Japan During the Second World War

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博士学位論文

論文題目

Portugal's 'Estado Novo' Diplomatic Relations with Japan
During the Second World War

(第二次世界大戦間のポルトガルの「エスタド・ノヴォ」と対日外交)

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Abstract

Portugal's strategic dogma to survive the war with its colonial empire intact was easy to explain, but strenuous to implement: to publicly maintain a strict neutrality, but when inevitable to collaborate to protect its interests, thus the term collaborating neutrality. In reality this demanded a cautious and skillful use of hedging. Juggling the interests of the several actors was complex and sometimes out of the control of Portuguese authorities. Portuguese and Japanese interests collide in the Asia theater in Macau and East Timor. Both territories of strategic importance to Japan: the former as a espionage center and the latter as a stepping stone to Australia.

In 1940, having Macau surrounded, Japan clearly states its intention to pressure Macau to obtain oil concessions in Timor. In turn, this precipitated a policy of appeasement on two fronts: in Macau, Portugal must cede part of its sovereignty in Macau, allowing Japanese a broad spectrum of freedoms; and in Timor, a technical agreement establishing an air service between Palao and Dilli is signed. The Allies get involved and preemptively attack Timor, breaching neutrality and giving a legal justification to the following Japanese invasion and occupation of the territory.

With Timor occupied by Japanese and Macau's supply line completely under their control too, Portugal did its best to resist Japanese demands. The fate of Macau and Timor was linked.

Key words: Portugal; Japan; Second World War; Macau; Timor; Diplomatic History

Table of Contents

Introduction	2
1) Salazar's 'Estado Novo' Foreign Policy Decision Making	8
António de Oliveira Salazar, the origins	9
Salazar's rise to power	10
'Estado Novo'	11
'Estado Novo's' Foreign Policy Decision Making	14
Salazar's Foreign Policy Priorities	15
Portuguese Neutrality	17
2) Macau	19
Macau in the Twentieth Century	29
The Islands	31
The Impact of the Taking of Canton in Macau	34
Captain Gorgulho visit to Japan	37
The built up for the crisis, 1939 and 1940	38
The 1941 Crisis	44
The Incident of Porta do Cerco	47
The dredgers	49
The year of being too busy elsewhere	49
The 'Sian' crisis	51
The Assassination of Japanese Citizens	51
3) Timor	54
Japanese Economic Penetration	59
The Palau-Timor Air Service Agreement	59
The Allied Invasion	66
The Japanese Invasion	69
The Aftermath of the Occupation	81
War Reparations	83
Conclusion	85
Appendix	92
Bibliography	137

Introduction

The history of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Japan is long and well documented. Having been the first Europeans to arrive in Japan in 1543 (at a time the Kingdom of Portugal was establishing trade outposts all over the globe) the countries initiated a fruitful period of technological and cultural exchanges known as the Nanban Period. This period would last almost 100 years until 1639 when the shogunate closes Japan's doors to the world.

During the 16th century European Christian countries were motivated by the riches of Asia, known to Europe through the Silk Road, as well as by a missionary spirit characterize by its purpose of taking Christendom everywhere. The clergy, at the time one of the most powerful and educated classes in Europe, developed and improved important technologies such as the astrolabe and cartography and became important scientists in the Chinese Imperial Court. In Japan Jesuits were not acquainted with the central powers, instead they played an important cultural role and were at the forefront of intense publishing activity. The cultural importance of Jesuit priests at the time is still visible in the Japanese language in which more than 200 words originate from Portuguese and some are used to this day.

Monuments marking the Portuguese arrival and presence in Japan can be found in Tanegashima, Kagoshima, and Nagasaki. These bounds have been cultivated by the two countries and every year the Portuguese Ambassador participates in the celebrations of the Teppō Festival in Tanegashima.

During the Nanban Period, from 1543 to 1637, Portugal and Japan traded mainly silk, Chinese porcelain, and some tea. A new art style named after the period evolved and art historians are still drawn to Portuguese and Japanese museums to appreciate and study its famous prints, religious and decorative pieces.

In a historical moment of cultural exchange from 1582 to 1586 an embassy constituted by four young Japanese men from Kyushuu - Nakaura Julião, Itō Mancio, Hara Martinho, and Chijiwa Miguel - was sent to Europe through Macau and Goa. The Tenshō embassy (天正の使節) visited several cities namely Lisbon, Madrid, Toledo, Talavera de la Reina, and Rome and were received by hugh figures of the Church including Pope Gregory XIII and Pope Sixtus V, as well as royalty such as the King of

Spain and Portugal (at the time both thrones belonged to Phillip II of Spain/Phillip I of Portugal), and prominent traders such as Francesco I de Medici.

In 1588 the Vice-King of Goa, at the time the center of the Portuguese territories in Asia, D. Duarte de Menezes wrote a salutation letter to Toyotomi Hideyoshi to which he received a reply of courtesy dated from 1592. The content of the documents is hardly important, but the acknowledgement of each other's existence and use of state protocol is worth mentioning.

Portuguese technology played an important role in the history of the bakufu, namely the musket. The grandfather of the rifle brought change to the war industry in Japan and was an important contributor to the unification of Japan in 1603 under the Tokugawa Shogunate system.

The relations were not always peaceful, the religious problems brought to Japan by the introduction of a new religion to a country until recently politically volatile, confrontations between Portuguese and Japanese sailors and pirates, and later the European fighting over commercial supremacy, mostly between Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch, originated lots of diplomatic nuisances of different degrees of seriousness.

The meddling of the Church in political affairs, and the intrigue caused by the political, economic, and religious rivalries between Europeans combined with the fear of colonialism strained the relations with the Japanese centers of political power.

In 1587 Hideyoshi bans Jesuits from the territory and thirty three years later, in 1620, Christianity is officially banned from Japan, having to hide in the shadows. The martyrdoms of groups of Christians is well documented. The plight of Christians in Japan during the 17th century was recently featured in pop culture in Martin Scorsese's movie "Silence" (2016).

In 1640, the Bakufu showing its determination to remove Christianity and foreign influence from the territory kills 61 members of a mission from Macau. Given the importance of the Japanese trade to Macau, Portugal sent an Embassy in 1647 hoping to mend relations to no avail.

After the period of 'Closed Country' or Sakoku, the relations were reestablished in 1860 with the "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce", signed after the US forced Japan to open its ports and in 2010 the 150th anniversary was celebrated by both embassies. Portugal was one of the many countries that signed an unequal treaty with Japan. Portugal did not participate in the Shimoda Convention of October 1864, but it participated in the Tariffs Agreement two years later.

It would take almost thirty years for the signing of a equal treatment treaty with a most favorite nation clause. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation is signed in 1897. Portugal decided to reopen its diplomatic representation in Japan and Wescelau de Moraes takes office as consul of Portugal in Kobe where his presence has been immortalized with a memorial. The consul was known for his love of Japanese culture and as a prolific writer of everything related to it, introducing Japan to a wide audience of Portuguese and English speakers. Atop of Mount Bizan in Tokushima, where he passed in 1929, a museum in his honour has been erected.

The fall of the Portuguese Monarchy and the birth of the Portuguese Republic in the beginning of the twentieth century was officially recognized by Japan on September 3, 1911.

The relevance given by Portugal to the diplomatic relations between the two countries leads to the creation of a permanent diplomatic post in Tokyo, the first official Portuguese Legation led by a Minister (not a Charge d' Affaires) in 1920.

On October 30, 1932, it is inaugurated a Japanese Legation in Lisbon, independent from the one in Madrid that up until that point was responsible for both countries. This Legation would remain in Lisbon until January 1946 when all members of the legation returned to Japan after the World War defeat. The Japanese Legation in Japan would play an important role in guiding the talks through the incidents and crisis of the Second World War.

The topic of this research "Portugal's 'Estado Novo' Diplomatic Relations with Japan during the Second World War" was selected in the hopes of contributing to a better understanding of this tumultuous period between the two countries. Portuguese historiography regarding the relations between Portugal and Japan focuses immensely on the sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen centuries relegating the last century to the back stove. Not only is there a gap regarding the last century, the topic of Macau has been altogether neglected. That can be explained by the difficulty of tracing its history through documentation. To study Macau one could spend decades analyzing documents from China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Portugal. Not only are these documents scattered, some - to what extend is impossible to tell - were destroyed during the Second World War due to lack of proper storage conditions. Some of the telegraphic communications stored at the Portuguese Diplomatic Archives has been eaten by bugs rendering them unreadable. The constant changes in Macau's status during the post war period and the dwindling

numbers of Macanese people and the lack of a cohesive Macanese identity has led to the lack of historiography.

This has been changing recently. In a groundbreaking collaborative work edited by Geoffrey C. Gunn “Wartime Macau: Under the Japanese Shadow”, published in 2017, a group of researchers came together to interpret documents in different languages and analyze the documentation in several archives: Portugal, England, China, Macau, Australia, and Japan. João Botas, journalist, one of the contributors to said volume also published a book on the topic in 2012 “Macau 1937-1945, Os Anos da Guerra” with testimonials of main actors and regular people alike. João Botas’s blog “Macau Antigo”¹, started in 2008 and updated frequently, has become the best online source for documents, photographs, and testimonials about the daily life and publications on the history of Macau between the 16th and 20th century.

There’s still a lot of work to be done. Many researchers have studied the Second World War and how Salazar conducted foreign policy in moments of crisis, but the Macau crisis, except for the works preciously noted, has been given a few pages in broad range monographs. With the transfer of sovereignty of Macau from the Portuguese Republic to the Popular Republic of China in 1999 an effort to collect memorabilia and Macanese accounts of the events has been undertaken from which the author would like to mention “Macau Entre Dois Mundos”² and the Centro Cientifico e Cultural de Macau, L.P. (CCCM) a research center, library, and publisher under the auspices of the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science which focuses on the relations between Portugal (and the rest of Europe) and China taking advantage of Macau as a bridge between East and West.

This effort at a better understanding of the relations between Portugal and Japan focuses on the Portuguese diplomatic communications and reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MNE). More than just understanding the outcome of the incidents and crisis, this work tries to understand what informed policy decision policy making and what informed the diplomatic actors. The course of negotiations can be influenced by so many factors: personal opinion of the leaders or actors involved, international pressures, miscommunication, miscalculation, etc, the MNE reports often give us a fragmented yet important view on the main concerns and priorities of the decision makers and what they

¹ <http://macauantigo.blogspot.com> (last visited January 25, 2019)

² Fernando Lima and Eduardo Cintra Torres, eds. *Macau Entre Dois Mundos*. (Lisbon: Editorial Inquerito, 2004)

perceived as possible obstacles to the negotiations. The relations between the Portuguese and Japanese authorities, perceptions, and the difference between the Japanese civil and military authorities also influenced the outcome of foreign policy and were studied through diplomatic communications and memoirs.

The Portuguese respectful attitude towards Japanese diplomatic staff at the end of the Second World War is often mentioned as a highlight of the long Portuguese – Japanese relationship. It is the author's firm belief that a better understanding of the history between these two countries, especially the relations during difficult times, can lead to a better understanding of today's relations and can open new paths of cooperation.

The sources consulted are mainly primary sources collected from the Portuguese Archives, namely Torre do Tombo, where all the documentation regarding Salazar is archived, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, where all the telegraphic and diplomatic correspondence is archived. For context, documents from the National Archives (England), the Magic Documents, JACAR resources online, and the Braga Collection located in Australia with a large online selection available were also consulted.

It is necessary to inform that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Portugal has been going through a restoration and re-cataloging process which means the same file can have two number's reference. Since documents were collected in 2015, 2017, and in 2018 it is possible that some documents are referred to using the old reference numbers and some with the new.

This dissertation is organized in three chapters:

Chapter 1: Salazar's 'Estado Novo' Foreign Policy Decision Making, introduces both the dictator and the regime since it is necessary to understand the forces behind the machine to understand its reaction to the crisis;

Chapter 2: Macau. It starts with the explanation of the Portuguese presence in the island and its vulnerability to the events in China. It tracks the diplomatic communications regarding the difficult years of Macau since the second Sino-Japanese War and details the gradual asphyxiation of the territory, the gradual fading of Portuguese sovereignty into Japanese hands, and how Macau was kept hostage of the situation in Timor.

Chapter 3: Timor. This chapter details the gradual penetration of Japanese in the island economic structure and foreign investment arrangements, as well as the reactions of the Allied forces to this encroachment. It connects the ever demanding Japanese requests with Macau's supply lane, and the Portuguese difficult negotiating position when

confronted with British demands. it explores the loss of sovereignty of east Timor, first to the Allies and then to Japan. Furthermore, it studies the documentation regarding the negotiations between Portugal and Japan and explains how the international powers and their interests influenced Salazar's decision making.

Chapter 1: Salazar's 'Estado Novo' Foreign Policy Decision Making

António de Oliveira Salazar was a man of his time. His rise to power in the late twenties and beginning of the thirties reflects both the international and national circumstances.

Established in 1139, one of the oldest European monarchies, the regime was struggling since the end of the 19th century. Its inability to modernize, combined with the royal family lavish expenses and lack of political legitimacy propelled mainly after the diplomatic crisis known as the 'Pink Map Ultimatum' - when Portugal was forced to give up its claims over the territories between Angola and Mozambique because they conflicted with British interests - encouraged republicans to organize a revolution that deposed the King on October 5, 1910.

The First Republic of Portugal was characterized by its internal struggles for power between the several factions of republicans. In its sixteen years, the First Republic produced a stunning 40 Chiefs of State – the equivalent of today's Prime Ministers - and eight Presidents. This instability created a national environment where anarcho-syndicalist activity and violent confrontations between the factions proliferated and made it impossible to put forward a coherent political agenda or even guidelines.

The anti-parliamentary movement grew stronger and on May 28, 1926 the military headed yet another revolution that established a temporary military dictatorship. This revolution was supported by ideologically different actors from republicans to monarchists to nationalists.

Without a political project, its first actions were to dissolve the parliament – seen as the source of instability - and to suspend the 1911 Constitution. However, the instability continued and in need of legitimacy, elections took place in 1928. The sole candidate Óscar Carmona won the election and one of his priorities was to balance the chaotic budget. For that enterprise he chose Salazar, an economics and finance teacher at the renowned Coimbra University.

In fact, Salazar had already been selected as the Minister of Finance twice by previous military governments from June 3, 1926 to June 17, 1926 (13 days) and from June 17, 1926 to June 19, 1926 (two days), to a total of 15 days. During this short period of time Salazar did not manage the Ministry. He initially accepted the position, realizing

soon enough that said governments were not stable and in those conditions, it would be impossible to succeed, Salazar quit claiming his health unable him to fulfill the job.

António de Oliveira Salazar, the origins

Born in 1889 in a small countryside town called Santa Comba Dão to a modest small land owner family, Salazar was raised in a catholic fashion and excelled in his studies. In a country with limited access to education³ - even elementary - it was financially difficult to pursue higher studies. Indeed, people who attended school at the time predominantly completed solely a primary education of four years.

Later in life Salazar would, for the sake of political narrative, exaggerate his modest upbringing claiming to be from a ‘poor’ family when in reality his family was in a much better financial situation than the average Portuguese. Even so, it would have been difficult for his family to support his studies further. Due to his academic success and his commitment to the catholic faith, he would continue his studies as a seminarist. The church provided secondary education to those who could not afford it, educating them in catholic ethics, doctrine, and theology paving the way to priesthood.

Salazar’s academic achievements at the seminary were impressive and even though he decided not to choose priesthood he became a teacher at a religious school. Furthermore, he kept a close, personal relation with important members of the institution through his life.

In 1910 he was admitted to Coimbra University and started his studies in law. With the implementation of the highly anti-clerical First Republic in 1910, Salazar’s world views were dismissed by the political power, but Salazar gained notoriety within the catholic audience through an organization called CADAC (Christian Democrat Academic Center). Proposing a renovation of the country through education and patriotism ‘Deus, Pátria e Família’ (God, Fatherland, and Family) which became his *motto*.

Graduating in 1914 with honors, Salazar focused his intellect on political economy producing two dissertations on the topic of how to reinvigorate Portuguese agriculture, Portugal’s most important sector. In 1916 he became the head of the Economic and Social Sciences department at Coimbra University.

In 1921 Salazar was elected for the first time to public office as a member of the CCP (Portuguese Catholic Center) a political party created in 1917 but marginalized in the

³ In the 1930’s the illiteracy rate in Portugal was 60%. Source: António Candeias et al., *Alfabetização e Escola em Portugal nos Séculos XIX e XX*. (Lisbon., Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2007), 40.

political sphere, with a small constituency. Salazar was chosen for several budget related commissions, a recognition of his fiscal knowledge and of his ascent within the Christian organizations. However, due to the political instability the parliament was dissolved mere three months later.

Salazar's rise to power

After 16 years of instability, worsened by World War I, there was a military *coup d'état* that initiated a period called Military Dictatorship (Ditadura Militar). It was during this period that Salazar started his political ascension. As previously stated, by 1926 Salazar was an established academic with little political experience, and even though he quickly resigned the position as Minister of Finance he accepted the presidency of a commission designed to assess the state's tax revenue and produce fiscal reform. He started going to Lisbon frequently using this opportunity to discretely network with political actors.

The Military Dictatorship could not bring political stability to the system. During this period, Salazar published several articles and gave a few interviews⁴ publicly heavily criticizing Sinel de Cordes, active Minister of Finances, for his inability to control public spending. Salazar was gaining support across different ideological spheres, not just the catholic circles, and became a proponent for national fiscal reform.

The reform proposed by Salazar was more than just a fiscal reform, it was a national moral reform, based on Christian values of respect for hierarchy, commendation of frugality, and simplicity.

In 1928 General Carmona was elected President and started a new period called National Dictatorship (Ditadura Nacional).

Salazar became the Minister of Finance and slowly consolidated his power through a process of politically controlling the budget and gradually becoming indispensable to the dictatorship. Salazar's ability to balance the budget led to international praise⁵ and Portugal's international image improved due to his fiscal policies based on autarky, protectionism, austerity, and investment in public infrastructure.

The Ministry of Finance, responsible for international legitimacy – much appreciated after decades of being consistently belittled due to its political instability – gradually became more powerful and so did Salazar.

⁴ Filipe Ribeiro De Meneses, *Salazar, A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009): 38-39.

⁵ *Ibid*, 51.

Salazar maintained his position despite internal struggles within the dictatorship. He asked complete control of the budget and in 1930 became Minister of Colonies, demanding a centralization of colonial fiscal policy in Lisbon and strengthening the Minister of Finance through the Colonial Act (Acto Colonial) of 1930.

At times unpopular within the military ranks, who saw their budgets cut and struggled with a gradual transfer of power to civilians, their support was important to the maintenance of his position, furthermore his relationship with President General Carmona was essential in order to maintain political power.

Fiscal and agricultural reform combined with investment in the infrastructure and the industrial investment that these reforms were enabling, created growth. This growth had to be subordinated to the national interest, thus economic activity was highly controlled by the state – corporatism -, the individual, working in the name of the *Pátria*, was to respect hierarchy and at the top of this hierarchy Salazar was to steer the country into moral correctness. Excessive individualism and communism were enemies of the nation. The nation needed education in order to create an elite capable of leading the country, but also to instill these principles in the population.

Censorship guaranteed information was framed within Salazar's idea of national interest; organizations such as National Union (União Nacional) provided public support and even legitimization through a constructed idea of public consensus and acceptance of the dictatorship. After 1934 Salazar would let the National Union fade away after it no longer served its purpose.

The creation of the National Political Council in 1932, organ responsible for advising President Carmona, further strengthened Salazar's position since Salazar used the appointment of the members strategically reinforcing his political control.

From 1926 to 1932 Salazar became indispensable and surrounded himself with allies strong enough to fight his opponent becoming President of the Council of Ministers in 1932.

'Estado Novo'

'Estado Novo' literally means New State and this nomenclature easily reflects Salazar's intentions and aspirations. As previously stated, Salazar wanted to bring the country together, revitalize the nation through morals and respect for traditional values. This endeavor could not be achieved over night and even though Salazar had substantial power during the National Dictatorship he believed he was the one who truly understood

national interest, thus being a powerful member and controlling the finances of the government was not enough. Salazar actively searched for control; he fought for power despite his narrative of accepting political responsibility as a personal sacrifice.

His ideological beliefs were hardly original, a profound disbelief in parliamentary democracy and distrust in the Wilsonian institutions was common place in the non anglo-saxonic world during the 1930s.

Salazar's source of power was the new Constitution of 1933. This constitution framed his action and its main objective was to support the government goals: to protect national interest. For that purpose - and because Europe was facing a complex situation with the rise of communist on the east and the proliferation of several forms of fascism - the constitution was malleable. If need be, the government could easily change or reinterpret it to fulfill its objectives.

The new constitution established the separation between Church and State, banned political parties and independent unions, only allowing the state-controlled syndicates to be the voice of the worker who, despite the improvement of the country's economy, continued to live in a difficult situation with limited access to services.

Central to the 'Estado Novo's' national interest, was the maintenance of the colonial system. Salazar was content with the territories currently under Portuguese authority, he was not looking to expand the colonial Empire, but to manage it properly having as priorities the political unity and financial solvency of the territories.

The decision-making process was highly centralized, especially during crisis, such as the Spanish Civil War. Prior to 1932, Salazar had been mostly interested in domestic politics, but when he took office in 1932, gradually started taking interest in this field. The Spanish Civil War marked a transition, Foreign Policy became essential for the survival of the state, thus in 1936 he took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to better control the Portuguese answer to the Spanish problem.

Also in 1936, Salazar took over, even if for a shorter period of time, of the Ministry of War, reforming the Portuguese military and attempting to modernize it the best he could while maintaining a balanced budget.⁶

At this stage, Salazar biggest threat were not the communists. He could control most communism threats through censorship and the action of the Political Police. The biggest threat came from the other side of the expectrum, namely fascist sympathizers who

⁶ See Appendix "Salazar's List of Functions".

wished Salazar would go further right, following Mussolini's footsteps. Eventually Salazar was capable of dealing with this National-Syndicalist movement by integrating some of the moderate members of the movement in the system and forcing the rest to exile or jail.

Just like other countries at the time, Portugal also created a youth movement - Portuguese Youth (Mocidade Portuguesa) - to instill loyalty and moral principles in children. However, the lack of infrastructures such as schools or recreational centers meant that not every child – far from it – belonged to their ranks. The Church was able to play a big role in this organization imposing its moral code. The institution was particularly relevant after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War with the main objective of preventing the Portuguese youth of sympathizing with leftist ideas.

Salazar's relations with the church after coming to power were not always easy. In the beginning of the 1930s and in order to appeal to a broader public he distanced himself from the institution on a political level, continuing to promote catholic morality as a fundamental basis of Portuguese culture and identity. Salazar, who had been a seminarist and was best friends with the soon to be Cardinal Cerejeira, did not want the Church to have political influence over him, he wanted the institution to be confined to the cultural, educational/moral, and social realm.

Also created in 1936, Portuguese Legion (Legião Portuguesa) was a grass-root movement against leftist ideas that Salazar simply allowed to exist, he did not come up with the idea, neither was he particularly interested in it and, like many other, eventually used economic power, namely lack of funding, to let it wither.

Portuguese people were mostly uneducated whose main concern was to make ends meet and most historians agree⁷ were not interested in politics. More than liking Salazar, most Portuguese seemed to tolerate him and be thankful for the political stability.

Nevertheless, the State was ruthless regarding the control of the population: free assembly was illegal and so was the publishing of propaganda without going through prior authorization. PVDE, the political police, would imprison, interrogate, and even torture; furthermore the population was encouraged to report suspicious activity. The most undesirable prisoners were sometimes sent to a prison camp in Cape Verde, called Tarrafal where a high percentage would die due to disease⁸.

⁷ Filipe Ribeiro De Meneses, *Salazar, A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books),124.

⁸ *Ibid*, 155.

Salazar believed in the use of violence in a limited way by the state. In fact, one of his main criticisms of fascism was the indiscriminated use of force with respect to no moral code or legal boundary⁹. That being said, he saw communism as a threat to not just his regime, but to civilization, and communist sympathizers were imprisoned and tortured under the radar, many other escaped to the colonial territories where the political police could not stretch its reach.

Salazar also criticized fascism's cult of personality refusing to participate in mass rallies. That does not mean he did not manipulate his public image. His narrative was carefully constructed to emphasize his humble upbringing, his Catholicism, and his meritocratic rise to power. He paid attention to his image abroad too, dealing carefully with foreign press, inviting journalists to visit Portugal and offering them translations of his speeches. The international society developed an interest in his character featuring articles in newspapers and magazines, curious about the men who had balanced the budget of a country known for turmoil and political instability.

'Estado Novo's' Foreign Policy Decision Making

Salazar, as previously stated, centralized most of the power in himself. He completely controlled FPD in between 1936 and 1947 when he was the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He monopolized the decision making, trusting a limited number of diplomats that he placed in the most important diplomatic positions.

He allowed the people he trusted to criticize his policy, but only in private. No displeasure should be made public or transmitted through official diplomatic correspondence.

Armindo Monteiro, one of Portugal's finest diplomats, anglophile accredited in London, nurtured magnificent relations with the British elite and was often frustrated with Salazar for his stubbornness and, at times, not fully committed alliance with Great Britain. In 1943, Salazar dragged the negotiations regarding the Azores' concessions to Great Britain trying to get as much as he could from the old ally. This back and forth, lead Monteiro to his limit and on July 1, 1943, Monteiro wrote a 17-page long letter criticizing Salazar's foreign policy and even his world view. Salazar and Monteiro had had their disagreements before, but they were never publicly known. Salazar was not accustomed to this sort of reaction and was absolutely furious with Monteiro, accused him of wanting

⁹ Ibid, 171,

“to write history”¹⁰ and even though Monteiro was incredibly well connected in Great Britain, Salazar fired him, in the most non-scandalous manner possible.

Aristides Sousa Mendes also met the end of his diplomatic career after disobeying Salazar. Portuguese consul in Bordeaux at the time of the German invasion of Paris, in 1940, and against Salazar’s orders, it is believed that, incapable of turning his back to the human drama of the time, he emitted thousands of visas (permitting safe entrance in Portugal) without Lisbon’s permission.¹¹ Salazar was fearful these actions would cause friction with Nazi Germany and prioritize national interest over his Christian principles of solidarity.

Salazar’s Foreign Policy Priorities

Salazar’s foreign policy priorities related to his idea of nation. The maintenance of the empire and maintenance of national independence was at the top of his list.

The alliance with Britain, the oldest in Europe and of great historical importance, was essential to Salazar particularly because it was the cornerstone of the maintenance of the colonial empire in Africa. Regardless Salazar did not always trust the British, fully aware that they had several times tried to negotiate peace with Germany at the expense of the Portuguese colonial jewel, Angola.

Neutrality was another important priority for the Salazar’s regime. Being neutral guaranteed, at least according to international law, that the colonies were protected. Portugal knew that in order to maintain its neutrality and avoid becoming a battlefield, Spain needed to be neutral too. Spain had, since the beginning of its existence, had members who dreamed of Iberian Spain, even within Franco’s regime some shared this opinion. It was vital for Portuguese survival that Spain was not fully militarized and actively engaging the war. Even if Spain did not attack Portugal for expansionist purposes, if Spain were dragged to the European war, the lack of geographical frontiers, meant that there was a high probability Portugal would too.

Furthermore, neutrality allowed Portugal to profit from the war. Salazar rejected claims that he was profiting from the war arguing that would go against his Christian world view, but if we look at the numbers it is obvious that Portugal was engaging in economic activities that contributed to the prolongation of the war for profit. By 1943 Portugal was Germany’s main supplier of wolfram.

¹⁰ Bernardo Futscher Pereira, *A Diplomacia De Salazar (1932-1949)*. (Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2013), 369.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 219.

England supported Portugal's neutrality because it was essential for the maintenance of Spanish neutrality and keeping Spain out of the war was a priority for the Allied. England relied on Salazar, who nurtured a friendship like relationship with Franco, to curb his war enthusiasm.

Portugal's neutrality came at a price for England, as a neutral country Portugal could not deny selling wolfram to Germany, at least not morally. England tried to buy as much wolfram as it could, selling to the highest bidder is not against neutrality policy, it can be easily explained as economics 101, but with the prolonged war effort England lost the ability to buy such amounts and by 1943 Germany's war industry depended on Portuguese wolfram¹². Portugal would agree to stop selling wolfram altogether after the tides of war make it obvious the Allies are going to win, and at a time Portugal needed the Allied support to regain control of East Timor.

Salazar believed internationalism and cosmopolitanism were based on wishful thinking, not the reality of international politics. He distrusted the League of Nations, participating in it solely to reap what he could, but truly skeptical of its importance. In fact, when Japan abandoned the League the reaction of the Portuguese Government was "the MNE refuses to comment on this topic. It is between the government of Tokyo and Geneva"¹³.

According to Salazar's world view, Portugal was a colonial and Atlantic oriented nation.

During the Second World War, Azores and Cape Verde, important strategic points in the Atlantic, became Portugal's bargaining chip, but at the same time a source of concern and dispute.

In May 1941, Roosevelt publicly stated that the US should and would if need be invade the Azores and Cape Verde. Salazar protested through Bianchi, the head of the Delegation in Washington.

Even though the US only entered the war in December of 1941, the US had been developing an interest in Portugal because it believed Germany was about to take over the Azores which would transform the Atlantic war theater and be highly problematic to England and the US not only because it would allow vessels, ships, and submarines to refuel, but also because it could jeopardize the access to the mediterranean.

¹³ Newspaper "O Século", edition 28th March 1933

Eden, in Lisbon, was also trying to negotiate an agreement with Portugal regarding the usage of Azores.

The situation changed, suddenly American and British intelligence asserted that Germany was not going to invade the Azores after all, it was going to focus its efforts fighting the soviet front. This strategic change gave Salazar one year and a half before Azores became, once again, a source of international contention.

During the Second World War, especially after the war theater started to tilt towards the allies, Great-Britain started to be more aggressive in its requests, namely authorization to use the Azores and the immediate halt of wolfram transactions with Germany. Salazar - surrounded by Japanese in Macau and with the lost of *de facto* sovereignty in East Timor – ended up agreeing, but not without getting as much as he could in return, namely support to the reoccupation of Timor, at least in paper.

In 1943, after postulating immensely, pushing British limits, and confronted with a totally different international theater, Salazar made concessions to the usage of the islands to Great Britain and, the next year, to the US.

Finally, Salazar believed democracies and liberal regimes belonged in the past. Having the world divided in two spheres of influence between democratic states and communist states was a terrible idea; furthermore, the complete destruction of Germany was a terrible idea because, Salazar believed, Germany was essential to fight Russian communism.

Portuguese Neutrality

As previously stated, Salazar's neutrality policy was rooted in his foreign policy priority: maintain the Empire. Not only that, mainting economic stability was essential to the survival of the regime. Portugal at the turn of he century was highly volitile and Salazar's policies were tolerated to great extent because the economy was improving and there was some investment in services such as schools, access to health care, etc.

Just like the constitution and its interpretation, the neutrality policy was flexible. It adapted, even when Salazar claimed it to be carried in a strict manner.

Salazar frequently addressed the inconvenience of neutrality publicly stating that the warring nations tend to ignore neutral's interests and often make requests impossible to fufill without breaching neutrality status. Additionally, Salazar pointed out that Portugal, as a Christian Nation, refused to make profit of the war (which was not precisely true) and refused to become an instrument of war, and due to the fact Portugal would have to

refuse business opportunities to refrain from colliding with great powers neutral policy was expensive. Once again, Salazar used the narrative of sacrifice, this time at a national level.

On his address to the public on June 25, Salazar stated “The concept of neutrality is up to constant revision and can never be definitive. It depends more in the facts than the objectives, it depends more on others’ disrespect than in our desire to maintain it. (...) The desire for neutrality cannot come above national interest.” As we will see, in February 1942, Portuguese sovereignty in Timor is disrespected by Japan and soon after Portugal starts negotiating an agreement with England that would allow Portugal to be involved in the process of retrieving the island.

He develops this idea of adaptable neutrality once again on his address to the country in April 27, 1943: “In the beginning of the conflict the Government could define its neutrality status as not unconditional. Obviously, it could never forget the dignity and interests of the Nation, as well as the existence of the alliance with Great Britain, that at such a dark, difficult moment we couldn’t but show loyalty to.”

Finally, the term ‘collaborative neutrality’ is not a term coined by historians. Salazar himself used the term.

Chapter 2: Macau

“The city-state’s role in international trade, as a beach-head for Christianity, as a filter for Western ideas, as a city of sanctuary for political reformers in China, as a neutral base during the war, and as a cultural avant garde on the coast of China deserves to be better told.” [on Macau] Geoffrey C. Gunn

Portugal’s sovereignty over Macau remains an interesting topic. Both the origins of the Portuguese settlement and the level of sovereignty/independence from the Chinese authorities have been debated, but most studies produced until the 20th century by both parties seem to be biased perspectives with the objective of justifying territorial claims in disputed areas.

The purpose of this dissertation is not to bring clarity to the topic of Portuguese sovereignty in Macau, but it’s important to understand the history of Portuguese presence in the territory so we can comprehend the complex political and cultural environment in which the political decision-making process developed.

In the beginning of the 16th century the relation between Europe and Asia was changing. Asia, especially China, was mostly known in Europe through the adventures of Marco Polo during the late 13th century. In fact, the Silk Road had been an important exchange center between the East and West for centuries, but the maritime developments of the 15th and 16th century shortened the distance between Europe and Asia allowing the establishment of new trade routes thus the exponential increase in trade and cultural exchanges. Prior to the new routes, trade with Asia was made through land or through the Mediterranean controlled by Genoa, Venetia, and Muslim traders, but later, with the taking of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Empire, the products became pricier due to taxes imposed by the ottomans and European countries needed a way to bypass the Mediterranean and Constantinople thus finding alternative routes became a priority.

Portugal was at the forefront of the European ‘Expansionist Era’ for several reasons: first, Portugal has an extensive Atlantic coastal line; secondly, Portuguese Kings hired sailors and had the help of Jesuit scholars who developed technology and substantially improved maps.

The wealth generated combined with the prevailing belief in the right of conquest and the idea of evangelization led the European powers to the establishment of commercial outposts and colonial systems all over the world.

In 1509 when the navigator Diogo Lopes Sequeira and his crew arrived in Malacca the encounter between the Portuguese and Chinese merchants is documented:

“We ask about the Chinese, where are they from, from how far, how often they come to Mallaca or to their trading posts, what goods they trade, how many ships come every year, what their ships are like, if they go back the same year, if they have official outposts in Mallaca or elsewhere, if they are wealthy merchants, if they weak men or warriors, if they have weaponry, what garments they wear, if they are robust men and overall body constitution, if they are Christian or Gentile, if their land is big, if there’s more than one King amongst them, if there are any Muslim amongst them or others that do not share their laws and beliefs, and if they are not Christian what do they belief and worship, what customs do they follow, and to where does their land stretches, and whom they trust.”¹⁴

This document further states that the Captains of the Chinese junks claimed to have heard about the Portuguese sailors before and warned the Portuguese not to trust the Muslims in Malacca. Given that Diogo Lopes Sequeira was unable to establish a trading post, part of his crew was imprisoned, he barely escaped capture and almost lost his ships it seems that it was sound advice.

In December 10 of 1510, Afonso de Albuquerque conquers Goa, in India, a prosper port that became the political center of Portuguese India from where the Viceroy governed the Portuguese possessions in Asia for the next centuries.

It was from Goa that the expedition to conquer Malacca, an important spice trading port, left in April 1511 headed by ‘the Great’ Afonso de Albuquerque. Malacca was conquered in August 1511, but the Malayan-Portuguese War lasted until 1641 when the Dutch occupied the territory. The belligerents against Portugal were the Sultanate of

¹⁴ In “A Presença de Portugal em Macau”, António da Silva Rego, 1946, documento original ANTT: -- CC, I, 6-82: “Item. Preguntarees pollos Chins, e de que parte veem, e de cam lomge, e de quamto em quanto vem a Mallaca ou aos lugares em que trautam, e as mercadaryas que trazem, e quamtas naaos delles vem cada anno, e pellas feyçoes de suas naaaos, e se tornam no anno em que veem, e se teem feitores ou cassas em Mallaca ou outra alguuma terra, e se sam mercadores ricos, e se sam homeens fracos se guerreiros, e se teem armas ou artelharias, e que vestidos trazem, e se sam grandes homeens de corpos e toda a outra enformaçam delles, e se sam christãos se gentios, ou se he grande terra a sua, e se teem mais de hum rey antre elles, e se vyveem antre elles Mouros ou outra allguma gente que nam vyva na sua ley ou crença e, se nam sam christãos, em que creem ou a que adoram, e que custumes guardam e pera que parte se estemde a sua terra, e com quem confynan.”

Malacca, the Sultanate of Johor, Ming China, and from 1607 the Dutch East India Company.

During the first half of the 1400s China was a naval power. Its merchants regularly went to Africa sailing ships far bigger than Columbus'. In Asia China had established a powerful tributary system.

When in 1511 Portugal conquered Malacca it attacked a country under the Ming's tributary system and as such protected my China. The Sultan filled a complaint with the Emperor.

In 1514 Jorge Álvares reached Tamao and became the first Portuguese to reach China by sea route. Three years later in 1517 Captain Fernão Peres d'Andrade takes his ships to Guangzhou as an official emissary of King Manuel of Portugal. The embassy headed by Captain Peres d'Andrade and Tomé Pires established first official contacts between Portugal and China and the mission was a success at first to the extent they were allowed to proceed to Beijing. The violent and reckless actions of Simão d'Andrade, amongst others, who defied mandarinal authorities and built a fort in Tuen Mun, combined with the news of the events in Malacca lead to the events known as the first and second Battles of Tamao in 1521 and 1522.

The Chinese Imperial Government imprisoned and executed several Portuguese diplomatic envoys in Guangzhou and later in 1521 refused to accept the Portuguese Embassy. The prisoners were used as leverage to restore the deposed Sultan of Malacca. Tomé Pires was forced to write letters to several Portuguese authorities including the King of Portugal requesting the return of the status-quo. Furthermore, Chinese trading posts in Malacca maintained their commercial ties with the Javanese and Malayan merchants instead of the Portuguese given that the Emperor forbade trade with Portugal.

After the conquest of important trading posts such as Goa and Malacca and several smaller posts in the region the Imperial Court questioned Portugal's commercial interest in China. Nevertheless, driven by greed local mandarins accepted bribes and allowed Portuguese merchants to trade illegally in a nearby island called Shangchuan (Ilha de São João, Saint John Island), later in Liam-Po from where they were expelled in 1545.

A series of domestic disasters, epidemics, fear that merchants were becoming too rich and powerful, the fight against the Mongols far from the ocean meant that China's naval power dwindled and in 1525 the government mandated the destruction of all oceangoing ships. Obviously not all were destroyed, pirates were able to live outside of the scope of local authorities and their raids became a big problem for seaside settlements.

Having arrived in Japan in 1542, Portuguese sailors and merchants gradually established a trade route between Malacca – Macau – Japan. In the beginning, as previously stated, the Portuguese were limited to trade in the nearby islands but trading Japanese products in Canton was highly profitable and the merchants were eager to establish a permanent post. In 1553 or 1554 under the guise of drying its cargo after a complicated journey, Portuguese ships arrive in Macau where they were allowed to trade, but not live, nor build residences.

Since Chinese merchants were forbidden by law to trade with the Japanese, Portugal became the key intermediary in these exchanges by the 1550s. This trade was highly lucrative not only to merchants, but to the mandarin authorities. Thus in 1557 Portuguese were allowed to reside in Macau on a permanent basis. It can be said for certain that Portugal did not conquer this plot of land, it was authorized to stay with a degree of autonomy at the volition of the local authorities. There's also the theory that because the area was frequently raided by pirates who would sometimes go up the river to Canton and cause destruction and instability, the settlement and naval expertise of the Portuguese in Macau was a way to ward off the pirates, protect the territories from their raids, and, at the same time, reap the benefits of the Japanese trade.

Even though the Portuguese authorities administrated the territory and made decisions regarding its safety such as building defensive walls and administrating some justice (Portuguese on Portuguese disputes), its mandate was limited and from 1573 the Portuguese started paying an annuity to the imperial treasure or ground rent. This was not interpreted by the Portuguese authorities as Tribute and according to Fok - renowned Chinese historian - even thou "Portuguese presence on the isthmus was the subject of a fierce debate among Ming Mandarins"¹⁵, "the Portuguese were never recognized as a vassal of the Ming, no Portuguese was ever received by the Son of Heaven, and no tribute was sent by the Portuguese of Macau to Beijing. They thus remained outside the formal Chinese system of tributary relationships."¹⁶

Also, in 1573 with the erection of the 'Porta do Cerco', a physical border between Macau and China, the territory became completely dependent on China. Portuguese needed permission to cross the border and Portuguese ships were not allowed to go up the river to Canton. Macau's survival depended on the produce of Chinese farmers and

¹⁵ Fok in Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Encountering Macau – A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 17.

¹⁶ Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Encountering Macau – A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 18.

as such, China could easily starve the territory. Basically, Portuguese authority was at the discretion of the Cantonese authorities. Despite Beijing being the political center of the country, territories had ample autonomy. Macau was far from Beijing and the Imperial commissaries did not visit the territory which meant the Ming authorities had their information regarding Macau filtered by the local Cantonese mandarins who often had conflicts of interests with Macau.

At the time foreign delegations were not allowed to stay in Beijing and the only way Portuguese could communicate with Beijing directly was through periodic embassies sent to the capital. Traditionally these embassies were from tributary states, so it was a long and arduous process to obtain authorization to travel to Beijing under the banner of “jinhe” “Congratulatory Mission” instead of ‘jingong’ “Tributary Mission”. Cultural differences, language barriers, and the protocol itself made the process extremely lengthy and expensive.

After the failed Tomé Pires embassy Portugal sent three more embassies. Jesuit priests, who were in Beijing due to their scientific expertise in mechanics and astronomy, were of great help for the success of these three missions, translating documents, letters, and above all explaining protocol.

From the 1540s to 1638 trade between Japan and Macau brought the city to life, fortunes were made, and the city grew within its limits. The entrance of other European powers, namely the Dutch and British, in the Japanese trade had eroded Macau’s position, but not destroyed it. That would change with the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639 when the Shogun fearful of Christianity and foreign infiltration initiated a policy of closed country ‘Sankoku’ that would last until 1853.

Macanese fate was linked to the continent and the dynastic transition impacted Macau heavily. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty in 1644 the Qing established what would become the last Chinese dynasty and would last 276 years. The fight for power between the Qing and Southern Ming caused terrible strain in Macau. In the 1640s famine plagued continental China and a wave of refugees sought protection in Macau.

Zheng Zhilong, a skilled pirate from Fukien baptized in Macau as Nicholas Iquan Gaspard, fought the Qing before defecting, but his son known as Koxinga, kept his father’s war against the central power. The Southern Ming were eventually defeated but their actions were extremely disruptive and in 1661 with the objective of cutting Koxinga’s sources of aid and supplies in the south, the Qing enforced a sea ban ordering coastal residents from several districts to abandon the littoral. All maritime commerce

was forbidden, boundary markers were erected, and trespassers had to face severe punishments including the death penalty. In 1662 after the order reached Macau Chinese abandoned the city and even though Portuguese could reside in the city they were forbidden from sailing. Given that Macau lived of sea commerce this decree would asphyxiate the territory and lead to its starvation. At the time the 'Leal Senado' suggested an Embassy to Beijing. It came to fruition and it lasted three years from 1667 to 1670 with the objective of saving Macau's status as a commercial port, but also to hinder the Dutch Embassy (1666-1668) from obtaining privileges that would conflict with Portuguese interests. Headed by Manuel Saldanha the mission was a success. Advised by missionaries who instructed the mission in matters such as protocol, the topic of Macau was never brought up, but the representatives played their part and gained the favor of the Court.

Obviously, Macau was not the only coastal territory highly affected by the ban and local Guangdong officials requested its lift in 1669 which was granted and the population allowed back.

With the lost of the Japanese trade, Macau's golden years were over. In 1685 the situation aggravated further when Macau lost the monopoly of China's external trade with the opening of Guangzhou port to foreigners at a time when British and Dutch were eclipsing Portuguese merchants. The year 1688 contributed to the impoverishment of the territory with the implementation of the 'hoppu' - Chinese customs house - implemented to control the access of foreign ships to the Delta River axing Portuguese tax revenues by exclusively collecting from both Chinese and foreign ships.

China was opening itself to foreign trade – with the 'Thirteen Factories' settlement – but not to foreign infiltration. Foreigners were allowed to conduct business and maintain warehouses and trading posts along the Pearl River but were not allowed to hold residency (until 1760) and consequently these merchants lived in Macau most of the year making arrangements for the trade fairs to come. In the late 17th century and until mid 18th century these residents and their business helped keep Macau afloat. Additionally, Macau turned to the intra-Asia market solidifying other routes such as Macau – Vietnam, Macau – Macassar, Macau – Timor, Macassar – Flores – Solor – Timor, often connecting to Goa and Lisbon as well.

Faced with dwindling profits and weaken position of Macau the mandarins tighten their authority in the territory: in 1736 a mandarin delegate - 'tso tang' - starts residing in Macau and in 1749 imposed the new Penal System virtually abolishing the double

jurisdiction system and forcing Macau into the Chinese jurisdiction system (with the exception of minor disputes between Portuguese).

An example of Chinese authority more specifically hoppu's power is the dismissal of Telles de Menezes who in 1747 became Governor of Macau. After destroying a stake wall that had been built by the hoppu beyond the approved limits, the Leal Senado forced him to pay for its reconstruction and apologize. Additionally, he refused to surrender to Chinese authorities two Portuguese citizens accused of the assassination of two Chinese vagrants and eventually repatriated them to Timor. Chinese authorities filled a formal complaint with Goa (at the time the head of the all Portuguese territories in Asia), Goa had to pay a bribe and Telles was forced to return to Goa after a myriad of public humiliations.¹⁷

To soften the impact of the new Penal Code an Embassy headed by Francisco de Assis Pacheco de Sampaio was sent in 1752. Despite it being considered a success the missionaries could not be of help because since 1724 they were exiled in Canton - with some exceptions, namely scientists - but when in 1762 the Jesuits were expelled from Macau by the Portuguese King, the missionary cooperation link between Macau and Beijing was severed.¹⁸

In fact, being considered a success simply meant that the Embassy had been received, it had properly followed the rules, and the Court was not displeased with the Emissaries. In terms of results, Macau's position remained the same and the animosity between Macau's and Cantonese authorities was never tackled despite the months spent by emissaries in Canton while obtaining permission to continue¹⁹.

Entering the 19th century the demands of the tso-tang became more and more unreasonable to the Portuguese and - due more to Portuguese internal politics than the situation in Macau - in a unilateral decision, the new Portuguese Constitution of 1822 enshrined Macau as an integral part of Portugal colonial system:

¹⁷ Calvet de Magalhães, *Macau e a China no Apos Guerra* (Macau: Instituto Portugues do Oriente, 1992): 6, and Zhidong Hao, *Macau History and Society* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011): 37.

¹⁸ As previously mentioned, Portugal sent four Embassies to Beijing. The third one was headed by Alexandre Metello de Sousa e Menezes and Father António de Magalhães in 1726 this time with the intent of defending Christianity in China after the ban of Christian missions in 1721 and the proscription of Catholicism in 1724.

¹⁹ Calvet de Magalhães, *Macau e a China no Apos Guerra* (Macau: Instituto Portugues do Oriente, 1992): 7.

“ARTICLE 20º — The Portuguese Nation is constituted by the union of all Portuguese from both hemispheres. Its territory shapes the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarves and comprehends:

(...)

IV — In Asia, Salsete, Bardez, Goa, Diu, and the Macau territories and the Solor Islands and Timor.”²⁰

The next step of integration of Macau in the Portuguese colonial system happened in 1844 with the Decree of September 20 that elevated the status of Macau which until then had been administrated under the Vice Roy of the Portuguese India. Macau became the head of a new province (Macau, Timor, and Solor) and consequently had to answer directly to Lisbon.

The British had obtained the rights to Hong Kong in 1842, Portugal was struggling to compete and frustrated that its historical position in the territory was overshadowed by British power. A long diplomatic battle for the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty began.

After the First Opium War, Portugal made the best use of Chinese weaken position and in 1846 following Lisbon’s directives Governor Ferreira do Amaral stopped paying ground rent, closed the Chinese customs (hoppu) declaring the territory a free port, refused Chinese jurisdiction, and imposed taxes on the Chinese population. The ‘Leal Senado’ (governmental assembly) did not approve of his actions so the Governor dissolved it. China was too weak to answer institutionally, but the locals killed the Governor in 1849 making him the only Portuguese Governor to be killed as a reaction to implemented policies. The political instability at the time kept the crisis from escalating further and China struggled to regain its previous administrative power.

The political chaos of the 19th century in China changed the political landscape drastically. After the Opium Wars, Boxer War, and Treaties of Tientsin (issues in which Portugal declared neutrality) permanent embassies were allowed and Macau did not have to rely on the Cantonese authorities to communicate with the central power anymore.

Due to its size, Portugal did not conclude a “Commerce and Friendship Agreement” with China in 1858 like the big powers and it would have to wait until 1887 to do so. The Governor of Macau Isidoro Francisco Guimarães was responsible for the negotiations and was ordered to use the domestic and international conditions, that is, the fragility of the

²⁰ Jorge Miranda, *As Constituições Portuguesas: de 1822 ao Texto Actual da Constituição* (Lisbon: Livraria Petrony, 1984): 23-24.

Chinese state, to negotiate an agreement that unequivocally stated Portuguese sovereignty over Macau. Not as a lease, but as part of its colonial system.

A treaty that recognized said premise was signed in August 13, 1862, but the Chinese negotiators changed their stance and ultimately did not ratify it.

The frustration accumulated but the regional context was favorable to Portugal: (1) in 1886 in order to increase its revenue, China increased opium import tax and to collect it needed both Hong Kong and Macau's effort to control contraband²¹; (2) rumors that Portugal was considering ceding Macau to France (with whom China was fighting a war 1884-1885) encouraged China to the negotiating table. In March 26, 1887 a protocol was signed by the Minister of Portugal Barros Gomes and the Superior Officer of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service James Duncan Campbell.

Protocol:

“Article I. A Treaty of friendship and commerce with the most favoured nation clause will be concluded and signed at Peking.

Article II. China confirms perpetual occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese possession.

Article III. Portugal engages never to alienate Macao and its dependencies without agreement with China.

Article IV. Portugal engages to co-operate in opium revenue work at Macao in the same way as England at Hong Kong.”

The treaty of Commerce and Friendship was signed in Beijing on December 1, 1887 by Thomás de Sousa Rosa, Prince Ch'ing and Minister of Public Works Sun.²²

“Art II: China confirms in its entirety the second article of the Protocol of Lisbon, relating to the perpetual occupation and government of Macao by Portugal.

It is stipulated that Commissioners appointed by both Governments shall proceed to the delimitation of the boundaries, which shall be determined by a special convention; but so long as the delimitation of the boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect

²¹ Calvet de Magalhães, *Macau e a China no Apos Guerra* (Macau: Instituto Portugues do Oriente, 1992): 13.

²² William Frederick Mayers, *Treaties Between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers*, 4th ed., (Shanghai: North-China Herald, 1902): 156–157. Accessed on December 2, 2018, <https://archive.org/stream/cu31924023464278#page/n177/mode/2up>

to them shall continue as at present, without addition, diminution, or alteration by either of the parties.”

The Treaty was ratified in 1888, but the delimitation of boundaries was never conducted which would lead to a diplomatic crisis also involving the Japanese military during the Second World War.

According to Calvet de Magalhães, renowned Portuguese diplomat and Consul in Canton from 1946 it is clear that: “The Portuguese were tolerated as long as they were not a threat to China and as long as its presence was convenient. If we take a look at the negotiations of the 1887 protocol we can see that during the negotiations the Imperial Government never admitted the possibility of a hand over of Macau, allowing only the recognition of an administrative territory or a free perpetual lease. .” . (...) Thus, to the Chinese Macau continued to be, as always, Chinese territory under Portuguese administration.”²³

In 1888, the Portuguese Consulate in Canton is inaugurated. Located in Shamian Island, at the time a concession divided between Britain and France, it proved to be an excellent post for commercial purposes and, especially during the Second Sino-Japanese War, an important intelligence collecting center. The Portuguese Consulate in Canton was under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Macau, due to its status, was under the Ministry of Colonies. According to Calvet de Magalhães²⁴ there was little to no cooperation between these two posts and no efforts to coordinate a policy for Macau even though the Consul in Canton Vasco Martins Morgado (1933-1939) periodically sent reports to Lisbon with suggestions regarding Macau’s course of action.

Regarding the economy, Macau already lackluster economy had to compete with other powers after the Opium war and the opening of multiple ports to foreign trade. Additionally, with the establishment of Hong Kong in 1842, British dominated sea trade. Macau’s 19th century economy relied on opium, the spice trade from Calcutta, gambling, and the coolie trade, mostly indentured laborers, shipped to California, Cuba, and Peru. The coolie trade was practiced from several ports but in the mid 19th century both local and international pressure mounted urging these countries for greater regulation, but abuses persisted and “Domestically, the trade fed corruption in Macau while adding only marginally to the commercial improvement and prosperity of the colony.” Furthermore it

²³ Calvet de Magalhães, *Macau e a China no Apos Guerra* (Macau: Instituto Portugues do Oriente, 1992): 19.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 26-27. The lack of willingness from Macau to cooperate with Canton would remain a problem after 1946 when Calvet de Magalhães took on the position of Consul in Canton in 1946.

“damaged the good name of Portugal and strained relations with China.”²⁵ The trade was banned in 1873.

Late 19th century Macau had industry too: tea factories, tobacco factories, traditional crafts industries such as matches, incense, and firecrackers, and fishing. There was also an investment in infrastructure in the late 19th century and 20th century made possible by the profitable opium and gambling monopolies.

Macau in the 20th century

The political upheaval of 19th century China would continue into the 20th century and was of great interest for the European powers especially those with a stake in Asia.

Guangzhou or Canton had long been a flourishing city, not just for domestic trade but international trade, as one of the stops of the maritime lines of the Silk Road. It retained the monopoly of foreign trade up until the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, signed after the first Opium War and the first of many unequal treaties, when China was forced to open several ports to foreign trade. Guangzhou was the center of diplomatic activity and during the period that preceded the war an important source of information.

Vasco Martins Morgado, the Portuguese Consul General in Canton from 1933 to 1939 (when the city fell to the Japanese army and foreign legations left) wrote important reports dating from February 1938 to May 1939 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon describing the political situation, war developments, and assessing the risks to Portuguese Macau only eight hours away.²⁶

Portuguese interests in the Pacific area had been internationally recognized in 1922 in the Nine Power Treaty in which Portugal was one of the signatory nations.

One of Portugal’s foreign policy priorities was to maintain its colonial Empire. In the advent of the new Portuguese regime in the 1930’s the policy of official neutrality was formulated. In accordance with the principle of neutrality – and at a stage when it was impossible to tell the outcome of the conflict – in 1932 Portugal refuses to recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo. The League of Nations would do the same in 1933 and consequently Japan left the organization.

²⁵ Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Encountering Macau – A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 74.

²⁶ “Hong Kong e Macau que estão a cinco e oito horas de distância” in Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 229.

The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty would convene again at the Brussels Conference in November 1937 to discuss peaceful means to end the Sino-Japanese conflict. Salazar's instructions to the Portuguese head of negotiations Dr. Augusto de Castro could not have been clearer:

“Portuguese policy regarding the conflict in the Extreme Orient has been and shall continue to be of complete neutrality. Such as been said by the Government of Macau and this policy has been communicated to Britain. Our stance at the meeting that you preside over should be to favor everything of conciliatory nature and avoid and be protest every thing that aggravate one of the parts...”.²⁷

In reality, juggling the interests of the several actors was complex and sometimes out of the control of Portuguese authorities. Macau, due to its location, had long been a haven to revolutionaries and refugees alike. In the 1930s there was an influx of people from different backgrounds and nationalities. Macau became an espionage center, just like many other neutral territories, where Japanese agents and Chinese nationalists often attacked each other. In a city bursting through its seams, a mix of lack of personnel and incompetence of the local police force, a non-resolved issue could easily be perceived as taking one's side. These exogenous factors were difficult to control and often the authorities had to rely on the good relations cultivated over the years with their foreign counterparts which was in itself tricky not only because there were several Chinese factions with different interests, but the Japanese power structure was intricate to navigate. On one hand there was an effort to build a relationship with the Japanese Consuls and even when there was mistrust there was respect for the diplomatic institution. Now the traditional channels of diplomatic communication were losing its importance. Military authorities and civil authorities struggled to find common ground and negotiations with civil authorities would be completely ignored. On his report dated February 23, 1938 Vasco Martins Morgado states: “Some observations and confidential information, allows us to affirm: the Japanese Government does not control its military; the Army is in Charge; the people and the soldiers do not want war, obey blindly, guided by patriotic sentiments, but with no enthusiasm.”²⁸

²⁷ Telegram n. 32 from MNE to the Minister of Portugal in Brussels, November 2, 1937.

²⁸ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 34.

The Islands

If juggling the interests of several actors was a delicate task, the stakes were even higher when there was a clear conflict between Portuguese interests and Japanese interests. The Japanese military presented itself as the savior of the people who were under European rule. A liberator of the Asian people. According to that thesis, Portuguese colonizers were to be removed. But more pressing than that the ultimate Japanese vision of Asia, were the immediate strategic needs of Japan, namely access to the territories circumventing Macau that, as we have seen, were disputed by Portugal and China.

Macau's situation worsened in 1937 with the advancement of Japanese forces in South China. The Japanese strategy in China required the asphyxiation of the Chinese combatants, both military and militia, thus the blockade of the Yangtze River, but Hong Kong and the Indochina continued to facilitate the supply of the nationalists. Macau, on the other hand, was in a different position. Its neutrality status required some degree of cooperation regarding contraband.

In September of 1937 Chinese started building defensive positions, namely trenches, in the east side of Lapa Island. The diplomatic communications show that Portugal perceived these actions as an occupation²⁹. One of Salazar's main concerns was that this change of status quo could be thought as a result of an agreement with Portugal favoring China and perceived as a breach in neutrality leading to the escalation of the situation with the involvement of other powers.³⁰ Salazar contacted the consul in Beijing instructing him to make the proper diligence.

“Every minute we receive worrying news from the colony. Important Chinese forces are organizing defenses by Macau fearing the landing of Japanese forces in Macau to support other anti-Chinese forces. These forces offer the Governor of Macau their help to repel the Japanese which has been refused arguing that Portugal has enough forces. On the other hand, under the pretext that Chinese were planning to take Macau, Japan offers its support to repel them which has equally been refused following the same reasoning”³¹ Lisbon feared Japanese could use this alarmist news to commit an act against Portuguese sovereignty with the usual assurances of friendship while claiming it to be temporary.

²⁹ Telegram n. 12, Confidential, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Minister in Beijing. September 27, 1937.

³⁰ Ibid and Telegram n. 13, Confidential, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Minister in Beijing. September 29, 1937.

³¹ Telegram n. 336 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London. September 17, 1937.

Given this agitation, Salazar wanted to avoid misunderstandings and on September 14, 1937 telegraphs Tokyo asking the Consul to communicate with Japanese authorities and request that war ships avoid Macau's territorial waters given that said presence at the time of such convulsion in Southern China would be highly inconvenient to Portuguese authorities and would stir further mistrust with the Chinese. Concerning this topic Salazar also telegraphs London requesting Monteiro to approach the British Government regarding possible cooperation between Hong Kong and Macau in case of a serious and unpredictable events given that Macau's safety was also of the British interest.³² The Consul in Tokyo, after contacting Japanese Foreign Minister, contacts Lisbon confirming Japanese assurances that the Navy would, for the time being, refrain from sending war vessels.³³

In late September and early October, Japanese aircrafts overflow Macau and Lapa several times and the Portuguese consul in Tokyo, Freitas, filled a formal complaint with the Minister of Foreign Affairs who in turn claimed to have no knowledge but after consulting the Navy was informed that in fact they had happened non intentionally, but because of the small scale of the territory it was extremely difficult for pilots to avoid it.³⁴ Pressure seemed to be building up, the communications show that both Macau and Lisbon were highly alarmed with the escalation of the events and even started talking about possible collaboration with Hong Kong to defend the territory.

On December 11, 1937 there's the first confirmation on the records regarding Japanese intentions. Salazar informs Tokyo that the Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong was informed by the Japanese Consul of that city that Japan, in accordance with its southern operations, could occupy islands in the vicinity of Macau and Hong Kong, some of which were disputed between Portugal and China. Portugal immediately replied that if any other nation were to disembark in said island Portugal reserved the right to occupy the east part of the island.³⁵

In December Japanese forces reach Ilha da Montanha and occupy several Chinese houses assuring that their mission is to eliminate Chinese nationalists. Their stay was short, and Macau's Governador saw this occasion as an opportunity to send Portuguese troops to the island following the old Portuguese policy of taking advantage of Chinese

³² Telegram n. 332 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London. September 14, 1937 and Telegram n. 18 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. September 14, 1937.

³³ Telegram n. 337 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London. September 17, 1937.

³⁴ Telegram n. 27, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs October 7, 1937.

³⁵ Telegram n. 25, from the the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. December 11, 1937.

weakness to further their position. Officially the Governador stated that the troops were sent with the intent of protecting Portuguese citizens, not to disrespect the status quo with China. Nonetheless Chinese protested and the mistrust grew.

Vasco Martins alerts for the rumors in Canton about Japanese preferential treatment of Portuguese ships given that the Portuguese ships seemed to be able to navigate to Canton and Hong Kong without being searched by Japanese War ships. According to the consul there was widespread doubt regarding Portuguese neutrality. In turn the belief that Portugal's neutrality was but official translated into an influx of Chinese in Macau where they believed would be safe from Japanese attacks and occupation.³⁶

The consul's 'Informação Política nº 2' dated March 27, 1938 further explores the distrust of Portuguese neutral status and offers a suggestion:

“The continuance in Montanha Island (...) of some Portuguese police officers after the retreat of the Japanese reinforces this notion. The reasons presented by the Governor of Macau are resourceful, intelligent, patriotic, and timely and can be used to try to explain our presence there, but are not enough to quell that belief. Maybe if we had, before the war openly told China that in case of emergency we would occupy the disputed territories temporarily until the end of the conflict, not disregarding previous agreements regarding the established rights and borders, it would have been a transparent action that would have not left the Chinese thinking that we act as a response to Japanese action instead of thinking that we are taking advantage of China's weakness to occupy the territories that we long claim as ours. (...) this justifies and increases, perhaps undeservingly the discredit of our friendship with China so often invoked by us”³⁷ “The doubt that Portugal does not share the desire of conquest, started to dissipate only after the arrival of Portuguese war vessels and soldiers. This was interpreted by the Chinese as a sign that Japan respects Macau because of its defense capabilities and not because of the political ideology that links Portugal, Italy, and Germany. It is to stop the Chinese from thinking that we are agreeable with the Japanese that I consider of the most convenience the continuation of naval forces and soldiers here.”³⁸

Regarding the occupation of the islands in dispute a secret memorandum was negotiated between Portugal and Japan. The first Portuguese draft follows:

³⁶ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 35.

³⁷ Ibid: 43-44.

³⁸ Ibid: 45.

“1° If Japan lands any troops in said island they shall be instructed not to go beyond the following limits (meridian 113° e 31’ East; south limit of Von-can 22° 6’ 8’’) of the area claimed by Portugal

2° The landing of Japanese troops in Lapa is not advisable due to the proximity of Chinese troops to Portugal and Portugal wishes not get involved in the conflict;

3° If Japan lands forces in said islands Portugal shall formally protest given that, if it wouldn’t it could be deduced that Portugal forgave its territorial claims. The protest is a diplomatic necessity not a declaration of animosity;

4° When Japan takes actions upon said territories it shall wan the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong ou authorities in Macau so that the appropriate measures can be enacted with no delay in Lapa..³⁹”

In the end, Japan agreed on the first three articles: the Japanese Foreign Minister guaranteed that in case of occupation of the islands Japan would, as far as possible, try not to offend Portuguese interests and sensibilities, it would accept Portuguese protests as a formality, not with animosity, but to protect military secret operations it could not inform Portugal beforehand.⁴⁰ The Memorandum was signed on December 3, 1937 by the Portuguese Consul and the Japanese Consul in Hong Kong.

Regardless, on December 28, the Governor of Macau telegraphs Lisbon informing that Japanese troops had landed in the island of Von-Can.⁴¹ It was at this time that Gorgulho occupied Man Lio Ho (a Chinese village in the ‘portuguese side’ of Montanha).

The Japanese troops left by the end of January, but would re-occupy the territory in on April 24, 1940

The impact of the taking of Canton in Macau

As previously mentioned with the Japanese progress towards south, Macau’s position became vulnerable to Japanese pressure. The cast shadowed over the Portuguese neutrality in China led thousands of people to seek refuge in Macau, many of them anti-Japanese activists.

According to António de Andrade Silva’s memoirs of his life in Macau during the war, in the early stages of the conflict, that is 1937-1939, Macau was full of life. Many of

³⁹ Ibid: 45.

⁴⁰ Telegram n. 36, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. December 18, 1937.

⁴¹ Telegram n. 457, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London. December 29, 1937.

the newcomers, Chinese and foreign alike, were wealthy and the cabarets, the casinos, the opium houses were vibrant with this injection of money.⁴²

In 1938 for Japanese to succeed an effective blockade was imperative. The blockade in the Yangtze River did not solve the problem of the contraband and Japan asked for Portuguese collaboration in Macau.

In Macau the objective of the local Japanese authorities was obvious: to show the Portuguese authorities the benefits that could be reaped from a conciliatory, collaborative relation.

A strategy of public deference and backstage demands ensued. The public deference was meant to strain the relation between China and Portugal with the objective of isolating the small isthmus, leaving the territory no other option but to collaborate.

The consul in Canton reports in May 1938 how this strategy was working complaining that Japanese deference towards Portuguese ships was being interpreted as complicity. Which translated into resentment in the smallest of things: delay in answering, delay in scheduling interviews, and unwillingness to reply the consul's queries.⁴³

Japanese authorities would show their discontent accusing Portugal of tacitly consenting to the presence and anti-Japanese activities of Chinese troops after a speedboat being chased by Japanese authorities hid in Macau.⁴⁴ And after another incident on May 28 when a Japanese speedboat was attacked by an automatic rifle from a building in the isthmus.⁴⁵

The Portuguese Minister in Tokyo vehemently protested the accusation of the presence of Chinese troops in the territory, and the complicity of the local authorities assuring Tokyo that Portuguese authorities would punish any Chinese citizen that had practiced criminal, hostile acts.

Furthermore, even though Portuguese ships, as we have seen, were allowed to sail freely, there were several incidents in which fishing and cargo junks (namely salt) were apprehended.⁴⁶

The Japanese presence and its power were ever present in Macau and well reported:

⁴² Antonio de Andrade e Silva, *Eu Estive em Macau Durante a Guerra* (Macau: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1991): 23-24.

⁴³ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 85, May 16, 1938

⁴⁴ Telegram n. 7, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. April 24, 1938.

⁴⁵ Telegram n. 11, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. May 28, 1938.

⁴⁶ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 63, April 9, 1938.

“In the meantime, Japanese military and naval chiefs have settled peacefully in Macau with their aids in plain clothes exerting a discreet vigilance over the anti-japanese population, spying on the trade on the port that they suspected, with a certain degree of plausibility, was supplying the non occupied China. And sometimes in the muddy water surrounding the colony we would seem floating mutilated bodies, without knowing who they were or where they came from...”⁴⁷

António Silva even admits that Afonso Sequeira (Macau’s Health Inspector) once faced with a headless body, Japanese execution style, that drifted ashore decided to order its burial attesting that ‘no signs of foul play were detected’ in order to avoid possible complications from an official investigation.⁴⁸

In November 1938 Japanese authorities made the first official diligence looking to develop greater cooperation with Macau. The Japanese Consul in Canton offered advantages to Macau making it an intermediary point between South China and the world were Japanese vessels would transfer and refuel and therefore a Japanese consular post was needed.⁴⁹ After Japanese authorities blocked the Yangtze river Chinese junks were forbidden from trading to mainland China and cutting one of Portugal’s most profitable trade routes. This was of great importance given that Japan intended to complicate Hong Kong’s dealings. It was becoming clear to Portugal that the age-old alliance with England could, in the future, be prejudicial.⁵⁰ Once again Portugal had to hedge its alliances and interests.

Salazar, following his policy of neutrality, was open to economic investment from Axis and Allies alike as long as it respected certain requirements in place to safeguard Portugal’s national interest and its autocratic economy: no monopolies were to be created, main industries had to be explored by companies owned mainly by Portuguese.⁵¹ Overall Salazar was wary of Japanese ambitions⁵² in Asia and believed that if Japan were to win the war, all European presence and European trade would end.

The Japanese objective was to create a quid pro quo relation: in exchange for cooperative neutrality, Japan would respect its sovereignty and invest in Macau.

⁴⁷ Antonio de Andrade e Silva, *Eu Estive em Macau Durante a Guerra* (Macau: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1991): 25.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*: 25.

⁴⁹ Telegram n. 18, from the Consul in Canton to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 22, 1938.

⁵⁰ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 15.

⁵¹ Telegram 4, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Consul in Canton, November 12, 1938.

⁵² Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 13.

In the end of 1938 Japan had taken Guangdong, but as Vasco Martins Morgado notes in his reports: “Japan is occupying territories, but it’s still not winning them”⁵³. Vasco Martins reports the arrival of the new Japanese General Consul to Canton, Katsuo Okazaki, on November 3, 1938⁵⁴, vents his frustration about the new puppet governor installed Mr. Lu Chun Yung and the inability to get an answer to his queries adding “I have never discerned in my relations with the Japanese in Canton any sense of order or intention. There’s always someone unknown to us (...). Thus, the difficulty of getting anything at all done. There are always so many people to be consulted, to be involved, that we get lost in the mazes of authority.”⁵⁵

It is with the intent to better navigate this haze and to improve the relations in Macau with the Japanese that on December 29, 1938 Capitan Carlos Gorgulho, Commander of the Police in Macau arrives to Canton to meet the Japanese high military authorities namely the General in Chief Ando Rikichi.⁵⁶

The Japanese priorities can be discerned from their questions: (1) would it be possible to send to Macau air navigation services; (2) could Japan use the track field as an aerodrome. Gorgulho answered that regarding the air navigation services the MNE should be contacted, and that the aerodrome was an English concession, more specifically it belonged to Melco (British owned Electricity company). Ando added that it was important to reach an agreement concerning economic development in Macau, but more interestingly it stated it was important for Portugal to fight communism, his wish that would recognize the state of Manchukuo, and cooperate economically with Japan.⁵⁷

This was the first encounter between Gorgulho and the Japanese authorities, but not the last. In 1939 Gorgulho would head an official visit to Japan.

Captain Gorgulho visit to Japan

Gorgulho’s visit to Japan took place in February 1939.

On his report Gorgulho complains about the Japanese mistrust, excess of protocol, and the incredibly slow manner of work of the Japanese bureaucratic machine. Refers to the visit of the Meiji palace as “one of the biggest plights I’ve been through”.

⁵³ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 303. May 25, 1939.

⁵⁴ Ibid: 240. November 20, 1938.

⁵⁵ Ibid: 271. 31 Janeiro 1939.

⁵⁶ Ibid: 267-268. 31 December 1938.

⁵⁷ Telegram n. 1, from the Governador of Macau to the Minister of Colonies, January 2, 1939.

During his visit he met the Minister of War, General Itagaki, the vice Minister of Foreign affairs, Mr Sawada, as well as the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yonai and the Vice Admiral Yamamoto; attended four official dinners, and was awarded with the order of the Knight of the Rising Sun.

The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told Gorgulho “Please convey to your government that the Japanese people have its ambitions defined and will not falter to achieve them. The nation supports the Army and the Navy.”

To be noted is the secret meeting requested in loco by the Minister of War, Itagaki, who suggested that “given the friendly relations between Portugal and Japan, the Portuguese government could secretly allow the establishment of a Japanese military base in the island of Timor where military deposits could be installed.”⁵⁸ Immediately Gorgulho answered that the query was outside of the scope of his visit and authority. The establishment of a Japanese Consulate in the territory was also on the table.

This visit was of high interest to foreign delegates especially China that had its diplomatic services watch it closely. Feeding old Chinese fears, Portuguese delegations both in China and the MNE itself had exchanges with Chinese dignitaries to answer its queries and dismiss the idea of a secret agreement between the two countries regarding Macau’s status quo. The dignitaries were assured Portugal was to maintain its strict neutral policy. In fact, Portugal had absolute no intention of neglecting its relationship with China. Portugal acknowledged regardless of the outcome of the war, maintain good relations with China was a priority.

During Gorgulho’s visit Japanese newspapers rushed to print stories claiming the Portugal was about to recognize the state of Manchukuo and concede privileges to Japan in Macau. Portugal’s diplomatic machine worked tirelessly to deny what it considered to be incorrect information, reinforcing it was a ‘friendship’ visit, but also stating that a local agreement regarding ease of navigation could be on the table.⁵⁹

The built up for the crisis, 1939 and 1940

The year of 1939 was a year of exchanges between the two countries and of gradual nuisances and insistent requests.

⁵⁸ Minister of Colonies, Gabinete do Ministro report n.º 1232. *Macau, Missão ao Japão*. (in Torre do Tombo Arquivo Salazar, UL-10A1, cx. 767, AOS/CO/UL-10A1).

⁵⁹ Telegram n. 2, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Shanghai. March 6, 1939.

Early 1939 Admiral Shegala visits Macau and shows interest in establishing an air navigation service such as pan America already had in the territory. The Governor welcomed this idea, it wouldn't create a dangerous precedent, it wouldn't breach neutrality, and according to the Governor the US was neglecting the air service to Macau and flying almost exclusively to Hong Kong. Colonel Imeda would a few months later insist on the topic.

On January 11, 1939 General Ando, accompanied by Colonel Gimuro and Major Tanimuro arrive in Macau and suggest⁶⁰ sending an emissary to Japan to discuss the limits of the islands circumventing Macau, Lapa being the most pressing issue. In March 1939, Japan takes hold of the territories in Macau's immediate proximity (Kong Mon), taking control of the other side of the border, that is Porta do Cerco and its customs office.

Tanaka visits Hong Kong and Macau on March 8, 1939 followed by Colonel Ishino on May 6.

The Army Chief of staff, Admiral Sukihara visits Macau in April 22, 1939 to request Macau's assistance to detain two motorized vessels used for contraband that Japanese knew belonged to a member of the Macanese administration Lobo, and requesting that the Navy could temporarily install a TSF (radio) station for their exclusive use and finally to express the wish to capture several boats from the customs services, anchored in the interior port of Macau between the Lapa and Macau.⁶¹ The Governor ordered Lobo's boats to suspend their services to avoid entanglement in contraband, refused the request for radio communications, and finally told Japan it could not reach said boats without violating Portuguese territorial waters. In fact, this was a big problem to Portugal, the limits of the disputed islands were disputed, but relatively easy to understand (west, east), but the territorial waters were much trickier to define.

Japan used this gray area as an excuse to disrespect Portuguese sovereignty and control/inspect/tax boats near Macau often.

The custom's boats issue would become a source of diplomatic strain when on May 8, 1939 a Japanese commissary (not named) told the Portuguese authorities that Japan could take them if Portugal refused to surrender them.⁶² In June Admiral Sukihara himself intervenes and asking the governor to surrender the boats to avoid violence and to avoid "causing Portugal any embarrassment".⁶³

⁶⁰ Telegram n. 5, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. January 11, 1939.

⁶¹ Telegram n. 55, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. April 24, 1939.

⁶² Telegram n. 76, from Governador Macau to the Minister of Colonies. May 8, 1939.

⁶³ Telegram 114, from the Governador Macau to the Minister of Colonies. July 28, 1939.

From May there are reports that the situation is worsening, the Japanese started imposing difficulties that until that point didn't exist.⁶⁴

On May 6, 1939 the Minister of Colonies complains to Salazar that "the military authorities don't pay any attention to what the civil authorities have to say and the Minister of Japan in Lisbon can only deal with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs which does not directly deal with the military authorities."⁶⁵

Another frequent topic of conversation between the Canton – Macau – Japanese authorities was the end of the Yangtze river blockade. Essential for Macau's survival that now relied heavily on Hong Kong. After the taking of Hong Kong the French Treaty Port of Guangzhouwan became Macau's lifeline and that too controlled by the Japanese furthering Japanese grip on the supply of the island.

On September 13, 1939 yet another request for cooperation this time issued by Captain Higo and Lieutenant Oka: (1) help stop Chinese newspapers anti Wang Jingwei (head of the Japanese Empire controlled state puppet in Eastern China), (2) the presence of 'terrorists' coming from Hong Kong, (3) protect pro-Japanese Chinese from Chiang Kai-Shek supporters.

To which the Governor answered: (1) Macau's censorship commission forbids the publication of a great number of articles that be prejudicial to the relationship between Portugal and Japan, but it was difficult to control the pamphlets dropped by air; (2) Macau's secret services in cooperation with Hong Kong and Canton have repatriated several Chinese that failed to be vetted; (3) Macau has proven to be strict in this regard and severely punishes such acts.⁶⁶

In early 1940 the Japanese Consul in Lisbon has a meeting with Salazar in which he shows interest in further developing the relations between the countries in Macau and Timor and in order to substantiate such desire Japan had just sent the former business liaison Charge of Affairs - about whom Salazar said "person that was impatient and sometimes impertinent, going beyond the instructions of his own government"⁶⁷ - in Lisbon to Macau to study possible venues of cooperation. His choice of words (according to Salazar's notes) are quite interesting: "Japan has been working towards that goal, having the authorities in China deal with the Government of Macau to facilitate supply

⁶⁴ Note n. 572 from the Minister of Colonies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. May 6, 1939.

⁶⁵ Ibidem.

⁶⁶ Telegram n. 137, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. September 13, 1939.

⁶⁷ Telegram n. 7, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. March 9, 1940.

lanes and trade with the neighboring regions, such as Canton.”⁶⁸ The undertone emphasizes a power relation: Japan allows Macau to procure goods in China. Japan is in control of the supply lanes.

After his stop in Macau the former ‘Charge of Affairs’ visits Tokyo where he has a meeting with the Portuguese Minister and leaves a warning: “the Japanese Government has decided to pressure Macau to obtain at all costs to obtain oil concession in Timor. The Japanese Government and the military and navy authorities wish to obtain at all costs oil of a colony from a country that would not eventually impose an embargo to exports. The military authorities were impatient and want to go through with the strangulation of Macau.(...) Adding that the recent oil concessions to the British had caused a terrible impression with is government given that the ones Japan had received were sterile.”⁶⁹ Days before, the Japanese Minister in Lisbon in a meeting with Salazar had made had insistently asked for collaboration in Timor.

This marks a new stage in the relations when Japan clearly states its intentions towards Macau, making a clear connection between Macau and Timor.

Ever since the beginning of the year military maneuvers by the forces of Wang Jingwei in the proximity of Lapa had been taking place pressuring Macau and encumbering relations. By the end of March, and after the diplomatic demarches in the first half of the month, Salazar orders Esteves Fernandes in Tokyo to make diligence in order to obtain an agreement recognizing the Portuguese part of Lapa – just like Japan had done concerning Montanha – with a special directive “it is advisable not let them know that we connect what is going on in Macau with Japanese pretensions in Timor if, however, if so is officially stated, you should appear surprised and convey that it does not seem coherent with the friendly relation always affirmed by Japan and has been taken into account in our dealings regarding Timor.”⁷⁰ The next day Salazar telegraphs London and reinforces this idea: “Our position is always to try to untie the situation in Macau and the issues of Timor while trying to amicably please Japan somehow in Timor to avoid pressure that can be put on us in Macau under 1000 pretexts derived from the conflict in China.”⁷¹

⁶⁸ Salazar, Meeting Notes between Salazar and the Japanese Consul on February 3, 1940, “Dez anos de Política Externa”.

⁶⁹ Telegram n. 14, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. March 9, 1940.

⁷⁰ Telegram n. 2, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. March 27, 1940.

⁷¹ Telegram n. 67, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Ambassador in London. March 28, 1940.

In March the Lapa situation seemed to have been resolved: Portugal pointed out the Memorandum of 1937 after being requested to leave Lapa all together and according to Salazar “[the Japanese] seemed to believe in our good faith and deferred the resolution of the issue, allowing Portuguese troops’ presence in the claimed territory⁷², but on April 8, Esteves Fernandes reports from Tokyo after a meeting at the Ministry in which the general director said the Ministry had no knowledge about the Memorandum of 1937, that the Lapa issue was to be solved locally with the authorities in Hong Kong or Canton further dismissing the importance of the issue. His final remark shows how little the Portuguese Minister could achieve in Tokyo: “I’m convinced that this Ministry will do nothing useful to us. It wants to be granted the concession but has no interest nor means to remedy the situation in Macau.”⁷³ In fact just four days later, on the 12th, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs Esteves Fernandes, that it would not deal with such topic at all.⁷⁴

The immense number of actors at play made negotiations lengthy and in 1940, according to a report, Macau had to maintain relations with six authorities: (1) Japanese Navy, (2) Japanese Army, (3) Japanese Deployment Command Japonês in Chin san, (4) Governor of the Chong san district, (5) General Comander of the Chinese Pacification Forces, and (6) Commander of the Chinese Forces in Lapa and Chin san.⁷⁵

On May 1, Salazar telegraphs Tokyo to inform the Minister about the latest developments regarding Lapa: in 1937 when Japanese forces occupied part of the island, Macau sent a police force battalion to secure what claimed as its territory. These forces stayed for years and the acceptance of their presence combined with the Memorandum of 1937 about Montanha was interpreted as a tacit acceptance of Portuguese sovereignty over that part of the island. In March the Japanese military asked the police force to leave, but the situation seemed to have been solved, but on May 1st the Portuguese forces were, without due cause, attacked by Chinese military and civilians, believed to be instigated by Japanese since the group hoisted the Japanese flag. The Portuguese forces left the island following obeying instructions to not resist to a degree that could drag the Portuguese and Japanese governments.⁷⁶ In Tokyo Esteves Fernandes promptly notified

⁷² Telegram n. 67, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Ambassador in London, March 28, 1940.

⁷³ Telegram n. 19, from the Minister in Tokyo to Minister of Foreign Affairs. April 8, 1940.

⁷⁴ Telegram n. 21, from Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. April 12, 1940.

⁷⁵ Gab 25 “Relatório sucinto 1928-1952”

⁷⁶ Telegram n. 28, from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in Washington. May 1, 1940.

the authorities the retreat did not mean the abandonment of sovereignty claims adding that the timing of the incident, coinciding with the negotiations in Timor, is certain to hamper the continuation of the talks.⁷⁷

Salazar, always fearful of being accused of breaching neutrality, telegraphs Washington May 11: “The British government announced a few days ago the decision to send on May 28 a War Vessel to Macau. In the current state of affairs in the extreme orient it would be interesting if the Government of the USA were to send a vessel on the same day. We cannot make an official diligence on this matter, but you may, in a personal capacity and initiative, allude to this visit and insinuate the presence of an American vessel.”⁷⁸ This would not meet consubstantiation.

In July, Japanese newspapers report that the Navy is seriously alarmed by the considerable increase of munitions and other material to China through Hong-Kong, Kung Chovwang, and Macau. This news report, obviously approved by the military censorship, led Esteves Fernandes to comment: “I’m afraid this is in preparation of a maneuver against countries with possessions in China.”⁷⁹ In fact, on September 12 Japanese forces close their grip in of Lapa, occupying the disputed areas, setting artillery - some directed at Macau - and imposing the payment of transit taxes to Macau.⁸⁰ According to the Minister in Tokyo⁸¹ Japanese forces actions were driven by strategic goals and do avoid contraband of oil and other items from Macau and surrounding areas to the enemy’s territory. The General Director of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the opportunity to reiterate the need to obtain the oil concessions in Timor and to allow the prospection of copper and zinc, and finally the need for expediency in regard to the air service from Timor to Palau. The General Director of Asia also spoke with Esteves Fernandes stating the priority was to control the re-exportation of goods to China asking Portugal not to support Japanese enemies; asking the Portuguese authorities in Macau to pressure the Chinese authorities in the Lapa’s custom services to accept a Japanese director and to forbid the printing of articles against the Government in Nanquim.

Salazar was starting to grow weary of the ‘double speak’ of the Japanese authorities: “The actions of the military authorities contradict the successive friendly declarations

⁷⁷ Telegram n. 18, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. May 1, 1940.

⁷⁸ Telegram n. 32, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Portugal in Washington, May 11, 1940.

⁷⁹ Telegram n. 39, from the Minister in Tokyo to Minister of Foreign Affairs. July 12, 1940.

⁸⁰ Telegram n. 30, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister in Tokyo. September 12, 1940.

⁸¹ Telegram n. 48, from Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 20, 1940.

from the Japanese government and its actions are not facilitating the favorable resolution of their pretensions in Macau and in Timor. We have been trying, as far as possible, to satisfy Japanese interests, harmonizing them with our own, but the utterances and promises of that government frequently shifted to threats or actions incompatible with the principle of amicable cooperation.”⁸²

On September 27, 1940 Japan joins the Axis, becoming entangled in the world theater at least to a certain degree.

In late October, the Portuguese Governor of Macau Artur Tamagnini Barbosa dies in office and Gabriel Maurício Teixeira is appointed as the new Governor.

The 1941 crisis

There is an absence of diplomatic documents and telegraphic exchanges regarding Macau during the first half of 1941. Firstly, the diplomatic efforts were being directed to the Timor negotiations; secondly, Japan nominated its vice consul to Macau Fukui Yasumitsu on April 20, but he arrived at the territory to take office a few months later, mid 1941. Thirdly, the new Governor Gabriel Maurício Teixeira was facing serious domestic difficulties: overpopulation due to refugees, brutal inflation, and a cholera epidemic. Lastly, Japan was entangled in Indochina and would soon face the American oil and gasoline embargo.

On June 21, 1941, Portugal suffers the first big loud action against a Portuguese vessel, the seizure of the Portuguese flagged ship ‘Guia’. This event was the prelude of things to come.

On August 27, 1941, Consul Fukui issued the Governor an Ultimatum threatening Macau’s food supply. The demands of the Ultimatum (see appendix) were not new: (1) stop contraband/smuggling and the use of Macau’s territorial waters to supply resistance in China; (2) not allow anti-Japanese forces to operate in the territory (refers particularly to pro-Chongqing organizations); (3) ban anti-Japanese press, publications, and propaganda; were the main demands. As this was an ultimatum, Portugal was given eleven days to comply or face sanctions that would effectively starve the island.

Macau, overly populated and with its regular supply chains severely impacted by the conflict, was facing galloping inflation, abject poverty (mostly Chinese refugees) and a blockade would certainly bring about a wave of discontent that the flimsy Portuguese

⁸² Telegram n. 32, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister in Tokyo. September 23, 1940.

forces would not be able to control. Starvation was not the Governor's sole fear, social and political instability could lead to a breach of neutrality with dire consequences for the isthmus status quo.

The agreement demanded more than just the compliance and control of the Portuguese authorities, it also demand ample rights to the Japanese military authorities in the territory and in its water namely such as disclosing shipping registries and cargo manifestos, the ban of maritime activities, and the right to use premises in Macau (without specifying its purpose or leadership).

Despite having accepted the ultimatum, diplomatic communication between the Governor and the Minister of Colonies prove that the Governor refused to accept all of Japanese demands trying to eliminate, or at least soften the official version to the point where it wouldn't offend Portuguese dignity. The Governor telegraphs the Minister saying that he was inflexible in his refusal to provide cargo manifestos of foreign vessels and to give freedom of circulation to Japanese vessels and man in Macanese territorial waters on the basis that doing so would constitute economic espionage.

Telegraphic communications also show that the Governor believed that the smuggling accusations were an exaggeration. The police had, in fact, recently apprehended gasoline on three occasions which was absolutely inevitable and also proof of the Japanese blockade inefficiency. Adding that "I can assure you that I've been fulfilling in strict compliance the duties of the most rigid and impartial neutrality and the only complaint the Japanese might have is that certain liberties that had become common place in Macau had been halted since they were not only offensive to our neutrality, but disrespectful of our laws."⁸³

The Ultimatum was accepted by the Governor on September 5th and the Maurício Teixeira summarizes the agreement in the following terms:

- Suspend the trade by junks;
- The fight against smuggling to be headed by the Port Authority and the creation of a brigade with the sole purpose of fighting this crime;
- To grant open carry arm permits to six Japanese informants with the objective of fighting contraband;
- To provide Japanese authorities a copy of the vessels registered with the Port Authorities;

⁸³ Telegram n. (not readable), from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. September 3, 1941.

- To forbid the navigation during the night of speedboats;
- To allow the connecting officer the private possession of two vessels registered with the Port Authority and given their private status could not hoist a Japanese flag nor carry out inspections or policing activities.

The suppression of junk trade was supposed to be temporary, but according to the Governor gave the colony some moral leeway to negotiate issues regarding the supply of foodstuff. That is, arguing that the suppression of trade junks would be a massive blow to the local economy, Macau would agree with its temporary suppression in order to stop smuggling and at great personal cost. This was perceived by the Governor as a 'strong moral position' for future negotiations. When, in reality, the lost was but apparent since, according to the Governor, the 'mechanic of contraband' would just adapt, specially taking in consideration pro-Japanese individuals and Japanese individuals themselves were highly involved in the trade.

Regarding the arm permits and the new brigade the Governor confesses to have had no objections since he believed the Japanese claim was true namely that to some extent the port authority was complicit with contraband.⁸⁴

The special brigade was constituted by five Chinese citizens selected by the Japanese and were admitted to the regular Macanese police force as Chinese aids and later assigned to the Port Authority exclusively under the hierarchy of the Portuguese police force.

As for the informants were non-uniformed and were not authorized to perform any acts other than obtain and pass along information.

On September 10, 1941, five days after the acceptance of the ultimatum, a Japanese patrol boat shoots a Portuguese patrol boat in Portuguese territorial waters in Macau following several incidents in August when Japanese boats tried to inspect and tax ships in Portuguese waters.⁸⁵ The Gaimusho would answer in the following terms: "... no Japanese naval vessel has attacked boats belonging to the Macau government.

However, the report adds to say, as the naval patrol unit based on Ma Lao Chau fired some warning shots at smuggling junks operating in its vicinity, a few stray bullets may have fallen near Portuguese patrol boats (...) as long as the Macau Government continue their effective cooperation in preventing the smuggling which they have recently been rendering, the need for resorting to forcible measures by the Japanese Navy will not

⁸⁴ Telegram n. 88, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. November 27, 1941.

⁸⁵ Telegram n. 30, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. September 20, 1941.

arise, and consequently, untoward incidents such as now being complained of will not recur in the future.”⁸⁶ Salazar considers this answer being “the usual threats” further stating that Macau has to be best of its ability been fighting contraband.⁸⁷

During this complex time, the Governor telegraphs Lisbon a personal exasperation: “this is how the Governor of Macau spends most of his time: putting up with Japanese.”⁸⁸

On October 13, 1941 Portugal and Japan sign an agreement regarding a Palau-Dili air service (see the following chapter). Rapidly international news agencies speculated that Japan had threatened Macau to obtain said agreement, but despite the pressures, the agreement was identical to a air service agreement signed with Australia and it was not exclusive, nor political in any way. Salazar states: “It is false that the Japanese pressured Macau to obtain the signature of the agreement. Nonetheless the situation of Macau and the political atmosphere in the extreme orient can’t be ignored by us in our dealings with Japan.”⁸⁹

On October 4, 1941, yet another incident that should have been solved by the agreed upon articles of the ultimatum, namely the one regarding the Portuguese territorial waters, but it was not.

A motor boat (Ozuma maru) registered at the harbor office under the name of Commander Taijiri carried out a strict inspection of Chinese boats which constituted a “flagrant violation of the undertaking given to Macau government by commander Taijiri to the effect that the boat registered under his name would never exercise any inspection or take any police action, in territorial waters of Macau, as such measures are of the exclusive initiative of the Portuguese Authorities.” Adding that through the exclusive action of the Portuguese authorities the contraband has been successfully suppressed.⁹⁰

The incident of ‘Porta do Cerco’

Given that ‘Porta do Cerco’ was the border line between China and Macau, it had been throughout history the site of several incident of various degrees of seriousness.

On September 24, 1941 Japanese military accompanied by civilians armed with a machine gun and riffles had taken positions by the border. In order to understand the

⁸⁶ Oficio n. 242, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. October 11, 1941.

⁸⁷ Telegram n.36, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. October 13, 1941.

⁸⁸ Telegram n. 88, from Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. November 27, 1941.

⁸⁹ Telegram n. 315, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Portugal in Washington, October 17, 1941.

⁹⁰ Letter from Governor Teixeira to Consul Fukui, October 6, 1941.

standout, Captain-Major José Joaquim da Silva e Costa, head of administrative services, went to the site where he was informed that a woman tried to take to san Chong four tins of peanut oil which was not allowed given that she did not possess a license to export. Later a Chinese citizen told a Portuguese border officer that if the woman was not allowed to take the tins the Japanese would take them by force. That same man left and shortly after came back accompanied by Japanese forces demanding the oil. The Portuguese sergeant in charge decided to close the border and to call the Governor's office to avoid the escalation of the incident. The Japanese military authorities sent someone too and it was this person, an unnamed Sawa envoy, who talked to the Japanese officers who eventually left. Sawa's envoy at the time told José Joaquim da Silva e Costa that there had been a misunderstanding.⁹¹

The Governor's official protests with Consul Fukui show that Portugal may have accepted the Ultimatum, but it was not fully compliant to Japan. The Governor offers several suggestions to avoid the re occurrence of incidents of such nature, but the most impressive part of the diligence is as follows:

“As you know quite well, there are no discriminatory measures in Macau for Japanese subjects but if some of them by their good behaviour deserve the esteem and high consideration of the Portuguese authorities there are many others (Formosans as a rule) who think they are exempted from the fulfillment of the obligations which are imposed by law even to the Portuguese nationals. (...) The recurrence of these incidents gives the wrong notion that every Japanese subject purposely ignores the Portuguese laws. (...) I believe that the best way would be if you could advise the Japanese subjects residents in this colony (...) not to ignore Portuguese laws or to seek for greater advantages than those allowed to Portuguese nationals and in case they do not feel happy with the Portuguese laws, nobody forces them to stay in Macau.”⁹²

Difficult as it had already been, 1941 was about to deliver its final blow. The Allied forces invaded Timor claiming the need to protect the territory from independent Japanese attack and on December 25 British forces surrender to Japan in Hong Kong.

Just days before the Governor of Macau writes the Minister of Colonies saying the Japanese were incredibly kind telling the Governor that the authorities were making their best efforts to supply foodstuff to the island. The Consul of Japan had also made queries

⁹¹ José Joaquim da Silva e Costa, 'Relato do incidente nas portas do cerco', September 25, 1941.

⁹² Letter from Governor Teixeira to Consul Fukui. September 23, 1941.

regarding the situation in Timor, but most importantly it had asked if Japan could purchase two Portuguese dredgers and one dutch dredger anchored in Macau.

The dredgers

The governor's first reaction to the request regarding the dredgers was to say it was impossible since they were needed, but maybe the Portuguese ones a rental could be arranged as long as the dredgers were not used in a war zone.

In his telegram, the Governor adds that regardless of the kind faces and smiles the Japanese were ready to turn the requests into orders if Portugal offered too much resistance.⁹³

Just a few days later, the Governor would express his feelings of uneasiness regarding the Japanese behavior: "Political situation with the Japanese extremely delicate. I'm suspicious. It is not natural."⁹⁴

The memoirs of António de Andrade Silva show us the high spirits of the Japanese after the victory of Pearl Harbor and Honk Kong and how that affected their behavior in Macau: "The Japanese felt like the Rulers of the Universe!... so proud of themselves that their attitudes became an affront and unbearable! They walked in Macau as if it were conquered territory, almost imposing themselves as the owners of the land, making demands as the winners they were..."⁹⁵ despite that he also claims that the Japanese weren't abusing Macau too much, taking in consideration that its survival was completely on their hands.⁹⁶

The Year of Being Too Busy Elsewhere

After the taking of Hong Kong panic took hold, everyone was fearful that Macau would be next.

Macau had absolutely no defense capabilities against Japan but the Governor had explicit orders from Lisbon to use all of the force at his disposal mostly to avoid a backlash just like the one in Timor, as show on the next chapter, having Portugal been accused by the Axis of complacency with the Allies for not resisting.⁹⁷

⁹³ Telegram n. (not readable), from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. December 22, 1941.

⁹⁴ Telegram n. 16, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies, December 29, 1941.

⁹⁵ António de Andrade Silva, *Eu estive em Macau Durante a Guerra* (Lisbon: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1991): 70

⁹⁶ *Ibid*: 69.

⁹⁷ Telegram n. (Not readable), from the Minister of Colonies to the Governor of Macau. January 12, 1942.

The Japanese Minister in Lisbon was in constant contact with Salazar on the issue of Timor and affirm in February 20, 1942 that Macau's neutrality would be respected.⁹⁸

In the beginning of 1942 the Japanese navy through the Consul ordered Portugal to rent some dredgers threatening to cut the supply of the island. To allow Portuguese to save face they suggested the rental to be done through a commercial company.⁹⁹ The dredgers were to be used in the Hainan Island occupied by the Japanese.

On the 10th Japan cut the supply and communication lines with Lapa and Ching san leaving the territory with enough rice supplies for mere five days. The Governor desperately appeals the Minister of Colonies to allow the renting asking only the guarantee the dredgers would not be used in military operations.¹⁰⁰ Adding "it is the only policy possible against such torturous and shameless people as the Japanese."¹⁰¹ Permission to grant the temporary rental of the dredgers is given from Lisbon as long as that would not breach neutrality.¹⁰²

The contract regarding the dredgers would be signed in October 1944¹⁰³. In the meantime Japan had been kept occupied by the tides of war, especially the consequences of the oil and gasoline embargo and the entrance of the US in the theater of operations.

The Japanese forces in retaliation for the Allied invasion of Timor in December 1941, which was an island with strategic interest to both Japan and Australia, invades Timor in February 20, 1942.

After the invasion of Timor by the Japanese the telegraphic communications regarding Macau's problems is substantially reduced. There are several possible reasons; first, after the taking of Hong Kong Japan was in total control of the surrounding territories thus Macau had no other option but to deal with the Japanese authorities diminishing the confrontation and incidents; second, Japan got entangled in Timor and diverted its diplomatic efforts to Lisbon; third, from 1943 the tides of war change; fourth, Macau did not have much more to offer in 1941 and 1942 it had exchanged most of its machinery and other useful items for food; lastly, Macau was an important center of espionage where Japan could obtain information regarding the Chinese forces.

⁹⁸ Telegram n. (Not readable), from the Minister of Colonies to the Governor of Macau. February 20, 1942.

⁹⁹ Telegram n. (Not readable), from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. January 6, 1942.

¹⁰⁰ Telegram n. 3, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. January 10, 1942.

¹⁰¹ Telegram n. 5, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. January 13, 1942.

¹⁰² Telegram n. 2, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Governor of Macau. January 12, 1942.

¹⁰³ Telegram n. 61, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. (not readable) 1944.

The prospect of war was unlikely, but severing diplomatic relations was not off the table. Furthermore unsure of the future, the Minister of Colonies, telegraphs Macau asking the Governor to have some sort of plan in case Portugal had to abandon its neutrality policy, suggesting taking control, of the vessels in the port including foreign merchant vessels.¹⁰⁴

The 'Sian' crisis

Having taken control Macau's water by mid 43, the Japanese forces carried out inspections in Portuguese waters for the sake of stopping sm

On August 18-19, 1943, the most deadly attack in Macau during the war took place. During the cover of the night a group of 200 people (Japanese and pro-Japanese) believed to be following Japanese orders takes control of a British vessel with 100 Chinese citizens that had been anchored in Macau since the beginning of the hostilities, the Sian. The attack was carried out from two speedboats, the attackers had rifles, and left 20 Portuguese guards dead.

This bold attack combined with the Japanese troop movements October that year when the Japanese deployed to Malauca, Lapa about 1000 men, supported by two aircrafts and one counter torpedo led the Governor to believe Macau was at the verge of an attack.¹⁰⁵

Assassination of the Japanese citizens in Japan

Since the beginning of the war Portuguese authorities were pressured to censor, arrest and allow pro-Japanese Chinese into the police force to curb anti Japanese activity in Macau. It was not uncommon to hear gunshots or to find bodies of anti-Japanese Chinese in the territory.

This background fight between Chinese and Japanese led to a few serious crises namely the assassination of Japanese officials in 1945.

On March 22 of 1945 in broad day light the Consul Yasumitsu Fukui was assassinated. Maorito Morishima soon protested in Lisbon¹⁰⁶ arguing that it was Portuguese responsibility to protect foreign citizens, especially government officials from countries Portugal considers to be friend with, and his diligence demanded the following:

¹⁰⁴ Telegram n. 20, from the Minister of Colonies to the Governor of Macau. August 13, 1942.

¹⁰⁵ Telegram n. 75, from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies, January 12, 1942.

¹⁰⁶ Conversation Report, 23 March 1945, Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/NE-7B, cx. 362, pt. 40.

(1) Portuguese formal apologies, (2) the apprehension and punishment of the criminals, (3) and the replacement of the responsible for the public order, that is, the head of the police department.

Received on the 23rd at the MNE by the Secretary General the Portuguese state officially presented its condolences and assured Morishima that all the legal steps were being taken and that all possible investigation paths were being carefully considered.

According to the report the Japanese Minister seemed pleased but complained that the Portuguese police hired Chinese citizens and/or connected to America, that was a source of unrest because the US was actively trying to destroy Japan-Portugal long history of friendship.

The Secretary General simply pointed out public tranquility and safety was on Portuguese best interest and if the Japanese authorities had any leads they should collaborate with the local police. At this point the Minister tries to give the Secretary General a list of names of people the Portuguese authorities should take into custody.

The Secretary General did not take the list, said that was to be given to the local authorities, but made it clear that Portugal was a sovereign state and it conducted its investigations independently.

The contrast between the attitude of the Secretary General in 1945 and the Governor of Macau in 1940, when he was forced to accept the Japanese ultimatum, is stark. In 1945 Japanese position had weakened. In March 1945 there was a sense that the war would soon end, on the European western front the Allied forces breach the Rhine and on the eastern front the soviet forces were gained ground, in the Asia theater, Tokyo had been critically bombed on March 9-10, Japan was losing the Philippines and had lost Iwo Jima. Thus, even though Portugal was keen to keep its neutral status, deference to Japanese requests was no longer necessary. Rapidly losing its allies in Europe, Lisbon was still a valuable listening post.

Referring to the assassination of Consul Fukui, the Japanese Consul in Lisbon Mr. Morishima argues that Fukui was the victim of a politically oriented conspiracy orchestrated by the Chief of the Secret Services in Macau, Colonel Sawa.

In his memoirs Morishima recalls a conversation with Teixeira do Amaral, MNE Secretary General, when he was asked to discretely intervene with the Japanese authorities in Tokyo asking for Colonel Sawa's restraint: "In Macau, Japanese forces without noticing the Governor deployed Colonel Sawa who is currently training personnel. It is common knowledge that Colonel Sawa has been arresting Chinese which is outside of his

jurisdiction. It is obviously a violation of Portuguese sovereignty. Despite this, and taking into account the bilateral relations between the two nations, the Governor is giving tacit consent to these frequent incidents.”¹⁰⁷

Morishima’s insight on Macau is quite important: “considering that Macau’s forces did not have the capacity to maintain the order in the eventuality of a North American offensive in Hong Kong, the idea of deploying Japanese forces to Macau in order to protect Japanese citizens was insistently being considered. The Japanese military high officials in Nankin had submitted an aggressive proposal to send Japanese forces to Macau which was supported by Consul Eiichi Iwai.”¹⁰⁸ Fukui’s assassination was just of many techniques used with the objective of creating a pretext to send forces.

Morishima, considered that late in war the diplomatic crisis between Portugal and Japan was more severe regarding Macau than Timor. Morishima once again intervenes and proposes to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Togo that Sawa’s agency should be immediately closed; deportation of all Tairiku-ronin; nomination of a new Consul in Macau, and the lift of the blockade. In mid June 1945 Masaki Yodogawa is nominated Consul, the blockade is lifted and Sawa reprimended. Once again, the Japanese civil forces were essential to the restraint of aggressive Japanese behaviour from the military.

Just one month passed and on April 15, 1945, an official of the Japanese Navy, Mr. Shibayama, is assassinated during the morning on the street. The Japanese government sends an official communication¹⁰⁹, copy paste of the one sent in March, with a list of four requests.

Once again, the Secretary General presents his condolences and emphasizes the investigation was ongoing, and the authorities were doing the best they could to find the culprits.

¹⁰⁷ Morito Morishima, *Pearl Harbor, Lisboa, Toquio* (Almada: Ad Litteram, 2017): 106.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid: 107.

¹⁰⁹ Conversation Report, 23 March 1945, Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/NE-7B, cx. 362, pt. 40.

Chapter 3: Timor

Two years after the taking of Malacca, in 1513 Portuguese sailors land in Timor to establish a trading post and develop a maritime route that would connect Portuguese posts in Asia in Goa and then Lisbon. The importance of Timor's trade changed over the centuries, but generally it was a profitable trade around sandalwood and spices such as cloves, mace and nutmeg.

During the first two centuries of Portuguese presence in Timor it can hardly be said that the territory was a colony: Timor was ruled from Goa by a viceroy that depended heavily on the local authority and on intermarriage between Portuguese sailors and natives. The first Governor was appointed in 1701 António Coelho Guerreiro. The Dutch had taken west Timor in 1653 and the two countries developed their commercial activities in the territory without the conflict and animosity that had defied the relations between the countries in the 17th century. Indeed the first border agreement negotiations started in 1858 to no avail having the first border agreement been signed in 1915.

Japanese Economic Penetration

In October 1937, Vasco Vieira Garin, a diplomat with the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes a lengthy report titled "Japanese Infiltration in Asia". While he notes that attempts at infiltrating Macau's economy were minimal, in Timor the situation was different. The author starts by saying that these suspicions were yet to be confirmed due to lack of documentation, but there seemed to be a insistent attempt of penetration and infiltration by the Japanese in Timor.

On July 20, 1937 it was established in Tokyo a Luso-Japanese company with a capital of five million yen with the objective of promoting trade (imports and exports) between Japan and Timor. Eventually it became clear that the company was nothing but a subsidiary of Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha which main goal was to expand Japanese trade in South Asia.

The Dutch Government had a clear policy of imposing difficulties to Japanese investment specially to companies tied to the Navy (such as Nanyo) and was vocal about Portugal's need to follow in the footsteps. This concern was shared by the English who as early as July 1937 show its discontentment with the Japanese presence in the Island.

In 1937 Europe was still peaceful but the war had been taking a hold of Asia. Japan was knees deep into its expansionist project, gaining ground and Timor would give the country a fabulous strategic advantage in the case of the attack of Australia.

The records show that in 1936 several Japanese citizens went to the territory with the intention of opening shop with special interest in cabotage services to and from Palao and possibly connecting to Macau to sell foodstuff from Timor. In 1936 queries regarding a possible licence to explore cotton and other textile plants as well as factories to transform the cotton were made.

On his report Vasco Vieira Garin demonstrates that as early as 1937 Portugal was already well aware of the collaborationism between Portuguese nationals and Japanese companies. This information had been given to Portugal by the Dutch delegation in Lisbon. The Dutch disclosed that Sales Luis, Portuguese, retired military doctor, was the main shareholder of the “Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho” (a agricultural development society) had sold his rights to the Japanese without approval of the Portuguese administrative services that strictly followed a policy of not allowing foreigners to own more than 50% of the stakes of a company of strategic value to the Portuguese republic.

The report also details the purchase by Sales Luis of manganese to export to Japan. The Japanese had expressed their interest in the manganese and oil deposits of the island as early as 1935.

Another issue in Timor was the entanglement and allegiance of a prospector, Sr. Wittouck. Indeed, the British were following this individual closely.

On January 30, 1936 Timor opened a public tender to the prospection and exploration of oil, mineral oils, and hydrocarbon gas. Mr. François Wittouck, a Belgian citizen, as President of the ‘Allied Mining Corporation’ was the only candidate and the local administrative powers favoured said concession, but in May 1936, the British Embassy in Lisbon cast doubt over the interests of Japan in Timor considering them overall strategic, not economic. In November 1936 in an ‘aide mémoire’ the British Embassy claims that there were reasons to believe that Mr. Wittouck was entangled with powerful American and Japanese financiers in Manilla.

The British had personal stakes in the oil exploration in Timor. In fact, Portugal had given the company H. H. Staughton (connected with the Anglo Eastern Oil co.), a procurement and exploitation concession, but the company did not seem to be fulfilling

its responsibilities and had illegally transferred the rights of exploration thus Timor started the process of revoking the licenses and nullifying the concession rights.

Vasco Vieira Garin importantly noted that at the time of the opening of the public tender the Japanese Legation in Lisbon and Mitsui had shown considerable interest, but did not submit a proposal.

In his final remarks the diplomat apprises the MNE: “In conclusion we should remain alert and act with caution in regards to any Japanese penetration attempt in Timor. As of now and in the near future there are absolutely no signs of danger to our sovereignty.” He continues, “When it comes to Japanese ambitious, Timor is located in a dangerous area and in case of a military conflict in the Pacific its strategic position could be coveted by Japan (...), but that won’t happen before a solution is found for the problem of China which is years from happening.”¹¹⁰

Twentieth century Timor desperately needed trade. It depended on the dutch lines which connected to Macassar and the service was unreliable. For Garin, Portugal should allow Japan to trade thus opening the Japanese market (and of its controlled territories) to Timor’s products, but Garin overestimated the extent the British were willing to go to protect the island, and the Japanese pressures in Macau. Despite being pro trade relations, he asks for the complete exclusion of Japanese investment and the acceptance of British, Australian, and Dutch initiatives. In fact, for him this conflict was also about race stating “For all the merits of the Japanese anti-communist fight, the truth is Japan is and will continue to be the most dangerous enemy of the white race.”¹¹¹

There were several concerns regarding the concession of economic rights to Japan. As we have seen the nature of the relation between the military branches, mostly navy, and the economy was a symbiosis for the sake of national interest, and secondly Portugal perceived Japan as greedy: “Economic collaboration to the Japanese is nothing but the complete surrender of the territories’ riches to its unlimited exploitation.”¹¹²

The Portuguese Consul in Macau also warned the MNE about the Japanese modus operandi of diplomatic and military corps in China namely the invocation of a long friendship to obtain somehow a special authorization only to use it as precedent in the future to disrespect local authorities and rules.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Vasco Vieira Garin, *Infiltração Japonesa na Ásia* (Report), November 4, 1937, 21.

¹¹¹ Vasco Vieira Garin, *Infiltração Japonesa na Ásia* (Report), November 4, 1937, 24.

¹¹² Manuel Joaquim da Silva Guedes, *O Japão e as Índias Holandesas* (Report), 1941, 12.

¹¹³ Vasco Martins Morgado, *A Guerra Vista de Cantão* (Instituto Português do Oriente: Macau, 1998): 220.

We also need to take in consideration the historic relationship between Portugal and England and how British needs could influence Portuguese foreign policy. In November 1937 Salazar gives clear instructions to Armindo Monteiro to, in his conversations with Eden, mention that Portugal is aware of the Japanese intention to infiltrate Timor, and to reinforce the idea that Portugal is acting cautiously in this regard.¹¹⁴ In October of 1937 this concern will lead to the enactment of Decree n. 28084 regulating the transfer of commercial rights, privileges, and shares to companies and individuals operating in the Portuguese colonial territory. All the property/shares transfers from this point onwards had to be approved by the Ministry of Colonies and, in order to be approved, they had to comply with the governing principal: public interest companies/concessions had to remain under the control of Portuguese companies or citizens.

With the Japanese development of its aircraft capability from 1939, British show concern regarding the construction of aviation facilities in Timor and Macau.¹¹⁵ England was also involved in the request of the establishment of a air line service between Canberra and Timor with was brought up by the Ambassador of England in Lisbon on May 16, 1939.¹¹⁶

From 1938 to 1941 the issue of the “Sociedade Nanio-Kaisha” was ever present. In 1938 the Charge d’Affaires had extensive meetings with high ranked officials: the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Colonies, and Salazar himself. The Japanese delegate protested that Japan was being discriminated against in Timor since oil prospection concessions had been granted to Australia, but difficulties had been imposed to Japan thus what could have been a private, simple business deal, became a diplomatic issue. In order to avoid having its neutrality status questioned, and trying to find a conciliatory approach Portugal sent an inspector to Timor to better assess the situation always guaranteeing that no discrimination was taking place, it was simply a matter of national interest to keep important companies under the control of Portuguese.¹¹⁷ In that spirit Portugal offered two options, either Japan would sell a part of its shares to an approved Portuguese citizen or the society’s social capital would be increased and acquired by a Portuguese entity indicated by the Government (the next year

¹¹⁴ Telegram n. (not readable), from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Ambassador in London, November 1937.

¹¹⁵ Telegram n. 164, from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. May 14, 1939.

¹¹⁶ Telegram n. 114, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London. May 16, 1939.

¹¹⁷ Telegram n. 23, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. November 8, 1938 and Telegram n. 24, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. November 9, 1938.

the 'Banco Untramarino' became a member of Pátria and Trabalho, rendering the Portuguese the majority holders again)¹¹⁸. Only after solving this core issue the society would be allowed to register in Timor and start its business. It was very important to Salazar that the Japanese did not have the impression that Portugal was deferring the solution hence the proposed solution. Salazar was cautious about creating a precedent that could lead Timor's companies into the hands of foreigners.¹¹⁹ Additionally, according to the Secretary General of the MNE, Teixeira de Sampaio, the Minister of Japan in Lisbon was informed that the society was agricultural and as such legally it could not be granted a oil prospection concession.¹²⁰ In February 1940, in a meeting with Salazar, the Japanese Minister shows that his government is willing to constitute another society that fits the necessary requirements mentioning with sadness that it had come to Japan's attention that a concession had been granted to Australia.¹²¹

The fact that Salazar had several meetings with the Japanese Minister in Lisbon even before the escalation of the events, shows that the MNE was fully committed to finding an agreeable solution to both parties. Salazar wanted to emphasize that the bureaucratic hurdles that Japan was facing in Timor regarding its investment and oil prospection were merely legal and not the reflection of a discriminatory policy against Japan.¹²² The Japanese Minister on the other hand emphasized that the Japanese investment was not a political move in disguise, affirming that Japan would respect Portuguese sovereignty in its domains evoking a long history of amicable relations as the basis of respectful cooperation. Japan also calls the principle of reciprocity stating its willingness to grant Portugal concessions in Machuria.¹²³

As we have seen, in March, 1940, Portugal is officially informed in Tokyo¹²⁴ that the Japanese Government had decided to pressure Macau in order to obtain the desired oil concessions in Timor. Since the beginning of the conflict Salazar had been adamant about his strategy to defend the territories: maintain strict neutrality and do not tie the Macau and Timor issues together to avoid dragging the territories together in case of a local incident. Salazar also prioritized the principle of not negotiating from a weakened position,

¹¹⁸ Telegram n. 67, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Ambassador in London, March 28, 1940.

¹¹⁹ Telegram n. 26, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo. November 5, 1938.

¹²⁰ Teixeira de Sampaio, *Apontamento de conversa com o Ministro do Japão*, December 8, 1939.

¹²¹ António Salazar, *Apontamento da entrevista solicitada pelo Ministro do Japão em Lisboa*, February 3, 1940

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Telegram n. 19, from the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. April 8, 1940.

¹²⁴ Telegram n. 14, from the Minister of Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. March 9, 1940.

which was not always possible as we have seen, but when faced with threats Salazar resorted to several techniques such as deferring until the last minute and always publicly deny the existence of such imbalance. As we have seen this pressures would escalate and contribute to the taking of Lapa by the Japanese forces and the next year the blockade of Macau's supply lanes. In the telegraphic early communications Salazar seems unsure about the relation between the taking of Lapa and Timor, not knowing if it was a causal relationship or a coincidence later explored for further demands,¹²⁵ but a few months later refers to the Japanese pretensions in Timor as the cause of the pressure felt in Macau.¹²⁶

In 1940 Timor issued oil concessions to a Portuguese society with Australian capitals and had reserved an area for other prospectors possibly Japanese that would be allowed to begin as soon as the legal issues with the 'Pátria e Trabalho' society were solved¹²⁷. Japan was not content with the state of affairs: not only the lengthy negotiations regarding status, but also the plot left to explore, which according to Japanese engineers was completely sterile¹²⁸. The Japanese government suggests a conciliatory proposal: the east part of the island, now a Portuguese-Australian concession should be redivided to accommodate Japan too. Japan also shows willingness to tri-party negotiations¹²⁹ but by the 1940s Salazar believes that Japan was interested in more than just a concession, it had his eyes set on a monopoly in Timor, which could not by any means be allowed.¹³⁰ Salazar was not, at this point concerned about an hostile act in Timor, but Japanese "pressure, demands, and retaliation in Macau, where they are easy to conduct under the guise of the war's state of affairs."¹³¹

The Palau-Timor Air Service Agreement

Japan's queries in 1940 were not solely about oil exploration. Japan had made several diligence to obtain an agreement to connect through air service Dili - the capital of Timor - and Palao situated in the Archipelago of Micronesia under the mandate of Japan since the First World War after being seized by the Japanese troops from the Germans.

¹²⁵ Telegram n. 67, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Ambassador in London. March 28, 1940.

¹²⁶ Telegram n. 28, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington, May 1, 1940.

¹²⁷ Telegram n. 67, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Ambassador in London, March 28, 1940

¹²⁸ Telegram n. 14, from the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign, March 9, 1940.

¹²⁹ Telegram n. 82, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, April 13, 1940.

¹³⁰ Telegram n. 12, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo, March 27, 1940.

¹³¹ Telegram n. 68, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, March 28, 1940.

Portugal was in similar negotiations with Australia to establish a Canberra-Dili air service and from the beginning had shown interest in the air lines as long as they respected the principle of reciprocity and were for purely commercial purposes.

In August 1940, Japan starts showing some frustration due to the long negotiations. The incidents in Macau during 1939 and early 1940 had diverted Portuguese diplomatic efforts thus the meetings with Japanese officials tended to move in that direction. In September, 1940 the details for experimental flights were almost completed and the Ministry of Colonies was waiting for details from the Japanese authorities.

It is important to understand the timeline of events and the intersection between events in Macau and Timor. Regarding the air service, Portugal, despite worrying about Japanese infiltration, was keen on the idea of establishing said service before the height of pressure in Macau. Portugal's objective was to end Timor's isolation and inject life in the economy, not only that in December 1940, Portugal signs an agreement with Australia to establish a Canberra-Dili air service, highly appreciated by the British. Australia too, had military objectives, namely the air surveillance of the region. Being a neutral country meant Portugal could not show favoritism and, as such, it was difficult to explain from a legal stand point why a similar Japanese request was not being accepted. Portugal's neutral status, the situation of Macau, and the new agreement with Australia put Salazar in a difficult situation. To ease Japanese mistrust, Salazar allowed Japan to conduct six experimental flights between December 1940 and June 1941 to the exasperation of the Allies that frequently demanded details regarding the flights. The Americans had never shown much interest in the incidents in Macau - given that in strategic terms its loss would not have had much consequence in the overall war - were now taking an interest in Timor and, along with the Dutch, the British, and Australian, were concerned about Japanese intentions and penetration in the island.

Salazar understood the risks, but had to hedge in order to maintain sovereignty of the territories. The apparent inability to understand the Portuguese conundrum and the insistent queries and criticism regarding the air service was irritating to Salazar: "it seems they are unable to understand the cost to Portugal of taking actions considered hostile to the Japanese and the risk of retaliation in Macau. This perspective is ever present in the pursuit of our policies."¹³²

¹³² Telegram n. 27, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Portugal in Washington, March 6, 1941.

Portuguese authorities had strict rules regarding the experimental flights and who was aboard, granting visas sparsely and making sure these flights could not become a *de facto* connection before reaching an agreement. The Japanese attaché Takeo Ueno tried to negotiate a system where, during the experimental period, flight licenses would be automatically renewed every month¹³³. This system would have left Portuguese with less control over these connections and without a finalized agreement with specific rules, ambiguities could be explored. To avoid any misunderstandings the Portuguese authorities were strict issuing licenses, the flights were only allowed for technical purposes, transportation of people or mail was not allowed, and each flight required authorization.

In May, 1941 Japanese authorities complain in Tokyo that the Governor of Timor, was discriminating against Japan was would not allow the exportation of cor nor copra, while at the same time selling these products to Australia and the Dutch. Furthermore complain that Japanese technical liaisons had been forbidden from taking measurements in the territory.¹³⁴ This is the first registered complaint against the Governor of Timor. This animosity will, in 1943 lead to a grave crisis, as we will see.

The air service agreement signed in Lisbon, October 13, 1941 by Salazar and the Minister Shin Ichi-Chiba was the culmination of almost a year and a half of negotiations between the two countries, involved interests of powerful third parties – the new air line brought Japanese planes within 500 miles of Port Darwin - that were concerned about the usage the Japanese could give to this air connection.

To Japan, this air service was important to fulfill the goal of “intensively intensify”¹³⁵ the relations with the Oceanic Islands, severely constrained by distance.

To the island of Timor these technical agreements were beneficial since it required the establishment of communication lines, technical support thus leading to improvement of expertise.

On July 24, 1941 in an official communication from the Japanese Delegation in Lisbon, The Minister Ichi-Shin-Chiba wrote directly to the Secretary General of the MNE, Luís Teixeira de Sampayo, stating the Japanese Government was “vividly anxious”¹³⁶ to reach an agreement in the shortest possible time.

¹³³ Meeting Report, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹³⁴ Telegram n. 15, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 20, 1941.

¹³⁵ Asahi Shinbu, October 14 of 1941, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹³⁶ Letter n. 59 to Sampayo Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

This agreement was not unique in any way. On December 11, 1941 Portugal established a similar one creating an Air Service between Dilly and Port Darwin in Australia. In May 1941 Portugal sent a copy of this document to the Japanese Delegation in Lisbon upon request of the Minister Shin-Ichi-Chiba. Nonetheless, the Portuguese Legation in Tokyo informed Lisbon on October 21, 1941¹³⁷ that a campaign of gossiping was implying the agreements were the result of pressure and threats - namely a possible invasion of Macau - and that the commercial line had political reach framed within the Japanese expansionist program in the southern seas, some commentators calling the opening of this air line as ‘provocative’.¹³⁸

It would be naive to think the Macau’s blockade of September 1941 was unrelated to the signing of the agreements, but no documents containing a direct, specific threat regarding the technical air service agreements were found. Macau’s governor waived part of the territory’s sovereignty (admitting pro-japanese forces in the police force, semi-allowing Japanese forces to patrol the waters to fight smugglers, etc) to save Macau’s supply lane. It was undignified, but kept the territory from starving. The agreement similar to the one with Australia, at any other time, would have been inconspicuous. Salazar saw in these agreements a way to please the Japanese at little political cost. Portugal, protecting itself behind legal subterfuges, delayed time and time again the issue of oil concessions to Japan.

According to the NY Times, on October 16, “Secretary Knox declared in a press conference on the 15th that the navy had information concerning the agreement between Portugal and Japan concerning a flight connection, adding that it had no possible justification on a commercial level” and “(...) it’s interesting the fact that Japan was able to ‘force’ Portugal into conceding permission to land.”¹³⁹ On the 18th, the NY Times Far East correspondent added: “the further the project regarding the air connection between Palau and Timor is examined, it becomes clear it is nonsensical to pretend it is a commercial enterprise. (...) daily round trip flights between Palau and Dilly, 1200 miles each way, sound absurd considering the extreme scarcity of gasoline Japan is facing - except if these flights give the Japanese the ability to surveil all the movements of the strategic arteries regarding transportation, supplier ships coming from Sydney and other oriental coast of Australia ports. The Japanese planes could send this information to

¹³⁷ Telegram sent n. 44, Tokyo, 1941, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹³⁸ ‘Sydney Morning Herald’, no date, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹³⁹ Press summary from the Portuguese Legation in Washington, 24 October 1941, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

German ships in the Indian Ocean. Also it is important to notice, that in those arteries, an intense American naval movement is happening.”

Salazar answered these allegations with a public statement published in the *Diário de Notícias* on October 23:

“The signature of the agreement between Portugal and Japan to the establishment of an air connection between Palao and Dilly, and vice-versa, has been mistakenly interpreted by the media from some countries.

The conversations started a long time ago, were initiated by Japan and have been happening since July 1940 between the two Governments. The negotiations have been the most correct, embedded in cordiality and harmony such are the relations between our countries

To the execution of the agreement, several experimental flights occurred, and it was agreed that the final adjustments would be made in a separate document, for that purpose talks with Japanese experts who will be send to Timor will ensue soon.”

On his report 1947 report “Timor e a Invasao Niponica” [Timor and the Japanese Invasion], Manuel Guedes reinforces the idea that Porugal was, from the beginning well aware of Japanese penetration intentions saying under the pretext of avaluating further commercial and agricultural enterprises in 1941 Japanase citizens – who Portuguese authorities were convinced were actually military personnel – went to the island to gather geographical information.¹⁴⁰

The Japanese technicians arrived in Timor on the October 16 on board of the flying-boat ‘Sazanami’ with the purpose of creating a schedule, a price list, obtain authorization to use the infrastructure, establish radio-telegraphic cooperation regarding meteorological information, preparation of the Japanese office of the company “Dai Nippon Koku Kaisha” and residences for the Japanese employees. On a secret telegram sent by the Ministry of Colonies to the Governor of Timor, he’s instructed to receive them in “the most kindly fashion”, but to inform them that he does not have the authority to sign any agreements due to the lack of Portuguese technicians in Timor, such inquiries should be directed to Lisbon. Also, the agreement clearly states the infrastructures to be used are to be located in Dili and ‘kind’ efforts should be made to avoid having the Japanese technicians visiting other sites ‘under the pretext’ of assessing new possible locations. Visits to the Bay area should not be authorized. The Governor is asked ‘not to be difficult’ but if need be to

¹⁴⁰ Manuel Joaquim da Silva Guedes. *Timor e a Invasao Niponica*. (Not published: MNE,1947): 14-15.

remember that the contract “was Japan’s idea, not a Portuguese one”. On the 31st of November of 1941¹⁴¹ the Governor of Timor informs the Ministry of Colonies that the Japanese were not demanding, behaved correctly and did not try to visit other parts of the island. They left Timor on the 26th.

According to The Daily Telegraph, October 17, 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander and Chief in the Far East, declared that even though the extension of the air line was ‘significant’, “As long as we are awake and let Japan see it, I think the situation will remain as it is.”¹⁴²

In October 1941, and after years of diplomatic demarches Mr Tokitaro Kuroki would take office in Timor, officially inaugurating the Japanese Consulate in Timor.

On November 3, 1941, the Legation of the Netherlands wrote the MNE¹⁴³:

“The Royal Government of the Netherlands feels it is its responsibility to warn Portugal about a probability that Japan will attempt a political infiltration in Timor. Taking in consideration the great importance of the dutch interests in these territories and the inevitable political feature of the Japanese projects regarding the establishment of the air connection. (...) The Royal Government of the Netherlands sees the development of this situation with great concern. It is confident that Portugal, faithful to its traditional politics, will resist these infiltration attempts.”

The Portuguese official response, November 4, emphasized the similarity between this agreement and the one with Australia, as well as the absence of political clauses and the economical interest of the country, stating Portugal could not refuse lucrative proposals.

On the next day, November 5, the Portuguese MNE was informed¹⁴⁴ by the Portuguese Embassy in London that the Governor of the Dutch Indies had established a prohibition for the exporting of oil to Portuguese Timor to avoid its usage by the Japanese new air liners.

¹⁴¹ Telegram received from the Ministry of Colonies n.º 19 Secret, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹⁴² The Daily Telegraph, October 17, 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹⁴³ Not signed, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950

¹⁴⁴ Telegram n. 380 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1941 Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

Just two days later, on the 7th, Washington informs¹⁴⁵ the MNE that Australian commentators are calling for an Allied takeover of Timor in order to prevent Japanese infiltration.

Portugal continued its diplomatic endeavors in order to assure the Allied forces and the USA that the agreement was void of military and political objectives, but, always careful, ordered Timor to be prudent in the issuing of visas to Japanese citizens given the international atmosphere.¹⁴⁶

On November 14, Bianchi – the Portuguese ambassador in Washington – met Stanley Hornbeck¹⁴⁷ he describes an interesting exchange. According to Bianchi, Hornbeck seemed completely up to date regarding Timor’s situation and asked to make an off-the-record remark - since the comment was nothing more than a ‘maquiavelic’ illation devoided of concrete evidence – and asked in an rhetorical manner “do you recall what happened to the Japanese sentinels on the far frontier of Manchuria that disappeared without a trace during winter until the Japanese stopped sending them there?”. Hornbeck had already expressed his concerns in October¹⁴⁸, stating the Portuguese had supplied Japan with a unique base that allowed large scale observations, in one of the aeronautical centers of the pacific and orient, thus facilitating their goals.

In the same telegram, Bianchi informs the MNE that the NY Herald Tribune had just published an article in which a commentator argued that the air line could become a military base and, if that was the case, Australia would occupy Timor in self defense.

In November of 1941 the Allied forces, firmly believed Japan would try to use this commercial line for military purposes. They also believed Portugal was not doing enough to protect the island from a possible attack. This situation escalates and by the end of December an Allied force of Australians and Dutch military force, with the support of Great Britain, invaded East Timor under self defense claims prompting an international crisis. Additionally, with the recent change in Japanese leadership, namely the nomination of General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister of Japan the international community feared a

¹⁴⁵ Telegram n. 537, from the Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 7, 1941. Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹⁴⁶ Telegram n. 15, from Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Tokyo, November 11, 1941.

¹⁴⁷ Telegram received from Washington n. 558, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

¹⁴⁸ Telegram n. 518, from the Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E17.P2-950.

Japan that would be fully committed to a world war and not just committed to a war in China and Asia-Pacific.¹⁴⁹

Portugal was hedging, as it had since the beginning of the conflict: appeasing Japanese with the air-line agreement while not giving too much, that is delaying the negotiations regarding the oil concessions, in order not to alienate the Allies. As we will see, Salazar failed.

The Allied Invasion

After several months of diplomatic efforts on both fronts – on one side guarantying to Japan that they were given the same conditions than Australia regarding the air services, on the other side guarantying the Allies that the agreements were completely void of military meaning, that is, solely commercial – Portugal was about to lose control of the situation.

As we have seen, in November of 1941 Australia stated several times Timor was an entrance point to their territory. Japanese infiltration of East Timor combined with meager Portuguese military presence, unable to defend the island in case of attack, thus left Australia in a vulnerable situation and preemptive action was being taken in consideration by the political and military spheres.

Portugal, worried about the public Australian statements, enters negotiations with Great Britain on November 4, to demonstrate its willingness to better protect the island without revoking its neutrality status. Portugal's negotiation mind-frame was that a Japanese invasion was highly unlikely, this entire campaign spurred out of Australian fear of Japanese infiltration and desire to obtain from Portugal monopolistic agreements. According to the Portuguese Government, relations with Japan were cordial and Japan did not require East Timor to invade Australia if so desired. In fact, Salazar was more concerned about an attack to Portuguese sovereignty from the Dutch.¹⁵⁰ Additionally Salazar asked the Portuguese diplomatic agents to emphasize that an attack on West Timor would not necessarily mean an occupation of East Timor always downplaying the strategic value of East Timor.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Teixeira de Sampayo, Report on the meeting with the Japanese Minister of Japan (and the Secretary General of the MNE, Teixeira de Sampayo), November 12, 1941.

¹⁵⁰ Telegram n. 314, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, December 6, 1941.

¹⁵¹ Telegram n. 395, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Washington, December 10, 1941.

Answering British inquiries Portugal stated that in case of invasion, Portugal would defend its territory, but considering the existence of the alliance with Great Britain, it would, not only accept British help, but it expected Great Britain to provide it.¹⁵²

Portugal did not accept a foreign contingency presence in East Timor, but was willing to, in case of effective Japanese attack, request support from Great Britain that would send an Allied force, formed by Dutch and Australian members, and this force would only enter Portuguese territory at Portuguese request and would withdraw as soon as their presence was no longer needed.¹⁵³

During these conversations Portugal made sure it was clear this help would happen only in case of attack, it could not take the form of preemptive action and this agreement would be evoked under the principles of the Portuguese-British Alliance, which meant that even if the forces used were from other Allied countries, namely Dutch and/or Australian, they had to answer to the British High Commander.

Salazar had sent explicit instructions to the diplomatic corps saying that “a landing of Allied forces in our territory could become a pretext for the Japanese to consider our neutrality breached and act against us in Macau and in any other territory.”¹⁵⁴

The parties were planning to meet in Singapore for further conversations and possibly sign a joint declaration, but the reality of the region imposed itself to the timing set by the intervenients: on the 9th, fourteen Japanese citizens arrived in Dilly, after their ship was attacked¹⁵⁵. On the 9th, 11th and 12th Australian planes violate Portuguese airspace – Portugal promptly protests in London - on the 15th London declares that it is ready to provide immediate assistance to Portugal in Timor in case of invasion and finally on the 16th Japanese submarines are detected near Timor¹⁵⁶ and one of them is sank by an Australian plane, confirming that the Allied force was on the move, nearing Dilly, in what the Portuguese Government considered a clear violation of Portuguese sovereignty going against the spirit of the negotiations in progress.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Despatch n. 654, from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Defesa de Macau” (Macau’s Defense), November 16, 1941.

¹⁵³ Telegram n. 17, from the Minister of Colonies to the Governor of Timor, December 12, 1941.

¹⁵⁴ Telegrams n. 356-357, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, December 16, 1941.

¹⁵⁵ The report does not identify the attackers, nor explains why the Japanese ship was close to East Timor’s waters. Not numbered Report from January 26, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁵⁶ Telegram n. 356-357, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, December 16, 1941.

¹⁵⁷ Telegrams n. 356-357, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, December 16, 1941.

The Governor of Timor is given an ultimatum to allow the landing of the Allied force on December 17 of 1941¹⁵⁸. The Governor refuses, but the landing proceeds due to the modesty of the Portuguese forces. There were no confrontations between the Allied forces and the Portuguese ones, the protests were conducted through diplomatic channels.

Salazar, always trying to hide Portuguese weaken position briefed the National Assembly stating Timor “is in perfect tranquility” and the forces landed “believing they were operating with the agreement of the Portuguese Government and in our interest.”

While Portugal was preparing to reinforce Timor’s garrison, presenting formal protests in London, Australia, and the Netherlands, in Timor the Allied forces were interning Japanese in Dilly. The Governor of Timor, trying to safeguard Portuguese good relations with Japan tries to negotiate an agreement with the Allies that would allow the Japanese citizens to be put under Portuguese authorities, but did not succeed.

The reinforcements were being gathered in Lourenço Marques, capital of Mozambique, and should double the number of Allied forces at the time in East Timor.

It seemed that Portugal and Great Britain had achieved an agreement: Portuguese forces capable of better defending the island were to be sent to East Timor and the terms of assistance in case of emergency had been settled. The Allied forces were to withdraw from East Timor upon arrival of the Portuguese contingency that departed from Lourenço Marques on December 28, on a ship named ‘João Belo’ supported by the warship ‘Gonçalves Zarco’, expected to arrive to its destination on the February 7, 1942.

The Japanese position was at first reassuring having the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, in conversation with the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo, said that the Japanese policy of cooperation with Portugal was unchangeable¹⁵⁹. Contrary to Portugal’s initial belief that did not mean Japan would not attack the island, it meant Japan did not question Portuguese sovereignty, but the territory was no longer neutral.

Portugal was once again hedging between Allied and Axis forces. In Lisbon, the Minister of Japan criticized the actions of the Allied and expressed sympathy for Portugal, unfortunately for Portugal Japan saw the occupation as a threat to their interests and well being of its citizens and needed the situation to be solved quickly.

The official demarche from the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo is as follows:

¹⁵⁸ Telegram n. 32, from the Governor of Timor to the Minister of Colonies, December 17, 1941.

¹⁵⁹ Telegram n. 368 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, December 22, 1941.

“- The Japanese Government expresses its deepest sympathies in this grave moment and wished to be the witness of portuguese strict neutrality policy, not only in regards to the Sino-Japanese incidente, but also to the European war, and now, in the Extreme Orient;

- The Japanese Government has always worked with all its good will to cultivate cordial relations, to take to good port the issues of Macau, concessions and other issues in Timor;

- Finally, that the Japanese Government is committed to, in the future, maintain the long good relationship between Japan and Portugal; unfortunately, in the case of the occupation of Timor by the Australian and Dutch forces, its only natural that the Japanese Navy will have to adopt appropriate measures although the Japanese Government hoped this could be avoided. For that to happen, it is for the best that Portugal takes all necessary measures in order to remove the invading forces out of the island.”¹⁶⁰

The Minister of Japan also requested a report on the well being of the Japanese residents in Timor¹⁶¹ and later requested information on the course of the ship “João Belo”.

On February 2, 1942, Japanese planes attack West Timor and on the 8th Dilly.

Portugal vehemently protested arguing that because one of the belligerents had violated its sovereignty that did not mean others could too. Portuguese sovereignty and neutrality should be respected while the government negotiated a solution. Furthermore, the Allied forces stationed in East Timor, were too small to be considered a threat¹⁶². To no avail, on the 19th Japanese troops entered the territory to expel the Allied forces in, what it considered, a self-defense move.

The Japanese Invasion and Occupation

On the same day the Japanese Minister in Lisbon personally explained to the Secretary General¹⁶³ that Japan respected Portuguese sovereignty over the Island and, as long as neutrality was strictly maintained, Japanese forces would withdraw as soon as their defensive objective had been achieved, that is the complete withdrawal of Allied

¹⁶⁰ Note from the Japanese Legation in Lisbon to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 23, 1941.

¹⁶¹ Telegram n. 37, from the Governor of Timor to the Minister of Colonies, December 24, 1941.

¹⁶² Personal Audience in São Bento, February 19, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁶³ Telegram n. 60 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London, February 19, 1942.

forces from Portuguese Timor. Portugal argued that a solution had already been reached with the allied forces and a Portuguese contingency would soon replace the Allied forces, but the Japanese Minister retorted claiming this replacement was taking too long and Japan did not trust England would respect the agreement, adding “C’est la guerre.”¹⁶⁴ Japan needed to protect its 34 citizens in the island, now under the internment of Allied forces. The Japanese Minister also criticized Portugal for ‘not even discharging symbolic gunfire at the time of the first invasion’.

In Japan, too, the Portuguese Minister was called by the Vice Minister of Japan who explained the Japanese reasoning: Japan respected Portuguese territorial integrity - prove of that was the case of Macau - but it was necessary to expel the Japanese enemies from the island¹⁶⁵.

Meanwhile the Portuguese troops at sea continued on their way, even after the Japanese invasion, in part because Salazar did not want the international community to think Portugal had given up¹⁶⁶.

The importance given by the regime to the image projected during this crisis was completely justified. Indeed, the US considered the attitude of Lisbon towards the Japanese landing in Timor as ‘vitaly important’¹⁶⁷, because it believed that Germany might try one day to invade the Azores and Cape Verde, Atlantic strategic positions. Therefore, Portuguese action regarding the invasion of Timor could open a precedent of action¹⁶⁸.

It is also interesting to notice that between December 1941 and February 1942, there were several high level meetings in Lisbon between Portugal and Japan in which the situation of Timor was not the main topic, the defense of Japanese interests in Latin America and Hong Kong was the issue at hand.

On February 26, Japan instructed Portugal the ships coming from Mozambique should not cross the 90° longitude meridian, but they were already beyond that point. Further instructions were given, namely the ships were to stay at least 300 miles away from Sumatra or Java. According to a Portuguese report, Portuguese authorities felt that

¹⁶⁴ Personal audience in São Bento, February 19, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁶⁵ Telegram n. 142 from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁶⁶ Notes by the Secretary General Sampayo, February 28, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁶⁷ ‘Evening Standard’, Edition: February 21, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁶⁸ Telegram n. 148 from Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 21, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

Japan was “trying to blame eventual accidents on Portugal.” The Minister of Japan seemed to believe it was Portuguese responsibility to avoid unfortunate incidents, stating in a meeting with the Secretary General, “it’s not just about Timor and Macau, it’s about the ‘tableau general’”¹⁶⁹. The ships were ordered to navigate south to avoid battle zones and eventually were sent to Singapore and then Goa.

The Japanese invasion of the island was not swift. According to a Portuguese report it seemed that the Japanese Consul was ignored by the Japanese troops and even their commander could not stop acts of violence such as the burning of the archives or the destruction and pillage of the Ultramarino Bank. The Consul of Japan left the island in the end of April 1942, he had a meeting with the Portuguese Consul on the 23rd to officially say farewell¹⁷⁰. He was replaced by Consul Saita.

In three days, the Japanese forces overpowered the Allied force and the majority surrendered. A group of 400 men remained in the territory fighting a guerrilla style battle until February 10, 1943.

These soldiers were able to cause substantial damage to the Japanese plans dragging the war for one year and an estimated 4000 Japanese soldiers’ death. Only possible due to the fact the population nurtured anti-Japanese feelings and provided help and shelter to Allied soldiers. Local anti Japanese actions would become a source of diplomatic tension between Lisbon and Tokyo, with the Japanese delegation repeatedly complaining that the population and even some Portuguese soldiers were not respecting neutrality¹⁷¹.

At the beginning of the occupation Japanese authorities kept the Governor informed and allowed the local administration to run smoothly with little interference. Japan was convinced that the taking of Timor would be an easy operation and the troops’ moral after the successes of late 1941 was high. The Japanese military rapidly took control of Koepang (main strategic point in West Timor) and Dili (capital of East Timor), but the guerrilla took a toll on the operations. It also led to a tense situation between the Japanese military authorities and the Governor: Japan accused Portugal of aiding the Allied forces and little by little stripped away the Governor’s authority.

On May 8, 1942, The Japanese High Commander Sadashichi Doi gives the Governor a list of Portuguese administrators that had allegedly disrespected neutrality

¹⁶⁹ Meeting Report, February 26, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷⁰ Telegram n. 49 Secret from the Governor of Timor to the Ministry of Colonies, 23 April 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷¹ Telegram n. 60 secret, from the Governor of Timor to the Minister of Colonies, May 29, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

and demands their punishment. In response the Governor asks for a detailed account of the acts committed without which he could not conduct an investigation. The Governor was aware some of the allegations were indeed accurate, but all the actions had taken place despite his requests for neutrality. Governor Ferreira de Carvalho tried to the best of his authority in a complicated situation - guerrilla warfare, lack of goods, under Allied bombings – to maintain neutrality. On his telegram¹⁷² to Lisbon on May 8, the Governor states that “it has been my constant priority to defend Portuguese neutrality”, he even admits that some Portuguese officials were disrespecting his directives and providing support to the Allied forces, he names them and asks guidance on how to punish these officials, but the Governor had a long history of complicated relations with the Japanese. As we have seen, in 1941 he had been accused of anti-Japanese sentiments when, in reality, he was just following directives from Lisbon. In the end Japanese authorities accused the Portuguese Governor of being anti-Japanese, of disrespecting neutrality and of providing important military information to the Allied contingent¹⁷³. Furthermore, he was accused of refusing to come to terms with the Japanese military command, with the Japanese Consul, and even with the Consul General.¹⁷⁴ On May 31, 1942 Japan invokes the need to protect its military operations against leaks of information and suspends Portuguese telegraphic communications leaving the island in complete isolation.

The suspension of the telegraphic communications was, without a doubt, the main topic of conversation between Lisbon and Tokyo in 1942.

Before the communications were suspended, the Governor was able to send a complaint to the Portuguese government regarding the indiscipline and violent manners of the Japanese troops. These complaints were submitted both in Dilly and in Tokyo to promises of moderation from the Japanese Government¹⁷⁵. Lisbon had to wait until the end of the war to assess the reality of the widespread violence and murder that happened in the three years of occupation: 14% of the population was killed, around 60,000 people¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷² Telegram n. 52 secret, from the Governor of Timor to the Minister of Colonies, May 8, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷³ Telegram n. 168, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, June, 18, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷⁴ Meeting Report, September 4, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷⁵ Situation explained in the telegram n. 131 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of Colonies, May 17m 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷⁶ Sonny Inbaraj, *East Timor: Blood and Tears in ASEAN* (Chiang Mai: Silkwoon Books, 1995).

The Japanese Commander argued that despite the fact that Portugal had the right – as the recognized sovereign of the territory – to maintain its communication lanes (essential to the administration of the territory) the reestablishment was not possible due to the level of mistrust regarding the Governor and requested his removal. Portuguese answer to the to the accusations regarding the Governor was always consistent: how could the MNE assess if the conduct of the Governor was correct or not if the MNE could not communicate with him.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Governor was the center of Portuguese authority and the symbol of Portuguese sovereignty. Removing him would come at a high price to the prestige and maintenance of the Empire.

Japan offered a solution: that all communications were to be made by a Japanese operator. Japan could send messages through Macau in open language, that is, not coded, and the Portuguese Government could telegraph to Timor using code. Considering it an insult, the Governor refused.

The meetings during the first months of occupation were constant, but with little results. The Japanese authorities claimed that they were not accusing Salazar and his government of breaching its neutrality, in fact, the Japanese Government trusted its Portuguese counterpart, but not the Governor.¹⁷⁸ In 1942 an important shift in the Japanese Legation in Lisbon takes place, Morito Morishima replaces Shin-Ichi Chiba as head of operations. His critical view of Japanese policy and his immense respect for Salazar would shape future negotiations. In his memoirs he wonders “Every time I think about my stay in Portugal, I can’t stop but thinking that if Japan had had one politician – just one – like Salazar, our country would have followed a different path and we would not be going through our current situation.”¹⁷⁹

Having spent several years working in the US (1937-1942) the new consul was well informed, well prepared, and became a relevant actor in the Japanese espionage efforts in Lisbon. Lisbon, just like other neutral territories, was an important listening post. The Portuguese location, making Lisbon a city of passage to the US, the importance of the Atlantic islands, and the wolfram trade, as well as the heavy presence of British and American high-level actors, made Lisbon stand out from the other neutral territories and, it was clear to the new consul, that breaking diplomatic relation meant losing a crucial source of information. His priority was to cultivate good relations with Lisbon thus he

¹⁷⁷ Meeting Report, October 26, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷⁸ Meeting Report, July 26, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁷⁹ Morito Morishima, *Pearl Harbor, Lisboa, Toquio* (Almada: Ad Litteram, 2017): 114.

had to diffuse the tension created by the occupation of Timor. This would require more than just an institutional approach, but one that would tackle the impact of the occupation on public opinion.

In his memoirs¹⁸⁰ Consul Morishima recalls how Portuguese, from both the private and public sector, interrupted contacts with the legation post occupation and recalls the cold answer to his official accreditation documents when he was asked to refrain from using expressions such as ‘long amicable relations’ and instead say ‘focus in our future amicable relations’.¹⁸¹ Morishima had been in the country for several months dealing with issues unofficially while waiting for his accreditation. The Japanese Legation in Lisbon grew impatient with the delay and accuses Portugal of holding the accreditation due to the unsolved issue of communication with Timor¹⁸².

Morishima refers to the period between mid 1942 and mid 1943 when the negotiations between the two countries were suspended. The Portuguese government demanded the authorization to send an inspector to Timor, Morishima – while recognizing Portuguese legal right – dismissed the request in mid 1942 because he knew it would not be accepted by the military authorities.

Also, in 1942 the Japanese Government insinuated that it would be highly beneficial to the countries’ relations if there was a public demonstration of support of the Japanese conduct from the Portuguese authorities like Marshal Pétain had done in Indochina. Pétain, trapped by the circumstances, had sent the Emperor a telegram stating his confidence in Japan and showing his understanding of Japanese actions taking in consideration the circumstances, but the Governor did not accept.

Throughout 1942 Japan insisted in a list of demands¹⁸³, that would enable Japan to: (1) defend the Japanese military from anti-Japanese attacks; (2) prevent military leaks especially strategic secrets; (3) maintain the public order; (4) control and inspect actions that could help Japanese enemies. Japan wanted Portugal to punish the population helping the Allied forces – which was an impossible endeavor taking in consideration the number of Portuguese officers stationed in the island and the strong anti-Japanese atmosphere.

The Japanese Minister in Lisbon claimed these demands were within Portugal’s neutrality policy stating that points one and two were an obligation of a neutral nation and

¹⁸⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁸¹ Ibid: 89.

¹⁸² Meeting Report, December 2, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁸³ Telegram n. 172, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 31, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

that punishing those who promoted disturbances and hostile acts against the Japanese forces was nothing more than maintaining public order¹⁸⁴.

During the second half of 1942 the problems got more complex: external commerce had been stopped since the invasion, the island's reserves were depleted¹⁸⁵, many lands were abandoned because of the guerrilla warfare.

In July, the Japanese military once again restricts Portuguese administrative power. The situation in Dilli was deteriorating due to the bombings, lack of goods (most indigenous people had run into the forests), and the tension between Japanese troops and the locals.

The Governor decided to transfer the capital of the territory to Bacau. Initially was met with understanding and Consul Saita informed the Governor that being an administrative decision it was his prerogative if it did not interfere with military operations. The Consul served as the intermediary and after talks with the military commander informed the Governor no objections were raised. After several days of preparation, the transfer began and most Portuguese left for Bacau. The Governor would be the last one to leave the city. On the day of his move a Japanese military contingency forbade him to proceed. Consul Saita was unaware of the last-minute change. According to Santa, the Consul met the Governor that night and, having been unable to dissuade the Commander, would try to communicate with Tokyo directly. Once again, just like in Macau, the diplomatic corps and military corps were not working together, and the diplomatic agents were more understanding and tried, to some degree, collaborate with Portugal. In the end, the Governor stayed in Dilli isolated and did not meet the population until 1945.

The relations between the Governor/the administrative authorities and the new Japanese Consul, Saita, were good. In his memoirs Jose Duarte Santa notes Consul Saita argued war should not be taking place in a neutral territory and believed in the diplomatic channels.¹⁸⁶

In August 1942 the situation escalates into complete disorder when the indigenous riots begin. Portugal had a special relationship with the local tribe leaders: they could profess their own religion and rites as long as they Portuguese sovereignty was recognized.

¹⁸⁴ Meeting Report, October 31, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁸⁵ Telegram n. 108, from the Minister in Tokyo to the Minister of Colonies, June 5, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁸⁶ Jose Duarte Santa, *Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941-1945* (Lisbon: Noticias Editorial): 47-48.

With chaos installed, indigenous people from West Timor, joined by disgruntled East Timor indigenous people, Javanese, and fueled by centuries of frustration and by the Japanese powerful message of anti-white colonialism in Asia, terrorized the territory burning houses, pillaging, killing people. The situation was serious, Portuguese and indigenous people alike ran to the wilderness for protection. The chaos led the Governor to contact to Minister of Colonies through the Japanese Minister Nakayama: “Absolute impossibility of protecting Portuguese lives due to constant and out of control indigenous riots having caused several casualties. I beg immediate transport to temporarily transfer Portuguese population somewhere else given that remaining in Timor is impossible.”¹⁸⁷ Due to the limited communications, Lisbon interpreted this telegram as a request to evacuate the island – understandably so – but, in reality, the Governor intended to evacuate only women, children, and the elderly (which takes place in December). It was never the Governor’s intention for the administration to abandon their posts.

Lisbon assures Tokyo that the Governor would not evacuate, “we have had in our history several cases of serious disturbances, difficulties or riots in our territories (...) some have died, but never abandoned the territory. The ones in Timor, if they die, they die as is their duty.”¹⁸⁸

In cooperation with Consul Saita and vice Consul Nakayama, the Governor and the Japanese civil and military authorities reach an agreement in October 1942: Portuguese people were to be interned in camps protected and supplied by Japanese military, otherwise the Japanese military would consider the conflicts a domestic matter and would not intervene.

The agreement was signed on October 24, 1942 in Dilli that contained the following provisions:

“1. Every Portuguese and their families must reside in a fixed area (to be decided) until order is reestablished;

2. Portuguese can not in any way cooperate with Australians and Dutch nor provide information regarding the movements of the Japanese forces;

3. Portuguese guns and ammunitions shall be kept by Japanese forces until order is reestablished. Portuguese may use part of that arsenal for self defense;

¹⁸⁷ Jose Suarte Santa, *Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941-1945* (Lisbon: Noticias Editorial): 69.

¹⁸⁸ Meeting Report, October 26, 1942, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

4. The Governor and Dilli's Administrator shall live in Dilli."¹⁸⁹

In accordance with the agreement, Portuguese and their families were placed under Japanese protection in two camps: Liquica and Maubara. Some Portuguese refused to move and fled to Australia. The Japanese Commander used this noncompliance to ignore the parts of the agreement and unilaterally set new rules for the Portuguese living in the camps. The local administration worked with the Japanese authorities to meet the population's needs.

On November 7, the US Embassy in Lisbon sends the MNE a list of 23 Portuguese citizens killed by or as a result of Japanese action.

In December, the Portuguese refugees in Australia tell their horror stories to the newspapers and public outrage against Japan bursts.

In 1943, communications with Japan were often conducted through Germany, either through their personnel or directly to the German Ambassador in Lisbon. Without the communications with Timor, Portugal's information regarding what was happening in the Island were obtained through Washington, London and, on a less relevant level, the Portuguese Legation in Tokyo.

Luiz Esteves Fernandes, Plenipotentiary Minister in Tokyo, had complained several times, both to the Portuguese Government and to the Japanese Government that it was difficult to maintain a meaningful conversation with the government in Tokyo. The access to the Japanese Ministry took several hours since the foreign legations were far from the decision center, and the only way to reach it was taking a railway controlled by the authorities. The Portuguese Legation was still essential for the negotiations as one of the main producers of political reports about Japan.

Jose Santa describes a series of events that constituted serious violations of the promises made to the Governor. From 1943 the Japanese Military Police force becomes more and more assertive arresting people without informing the administrators about their whereabouts or charges, assaulting Portuguese and indigenous people during interrogations, and overall disregard for Portuguese authority. He particularly complains about the behaviour of OTORY (Phoenix Organization), Sergeant Kitano, and Sergeant Kato.

In 1943 the foodstuff situation is dire: indigenous had been killed or were on the run thus the production had plummeted, inflation was too high, most of the population was

¹⁸⁹ Jose Suarte Santa, *Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941-1945* (Lisbon: Noticias Editorial): 69.

not working and most businesses had been abandoned. In order to feed the people, the Governor had no choice but to accept loans from the Nampo-Kaihatu Bank. From 1943 to the end of war, the administration asked for three loans in total.

Meanwhile in Lisbon, Morishima is trying to resume negotiations. By mid-1943 Salazar was frustrated at the stalemate, the Allies were becoming the apparent winners and Salazar took a definitive step towards a policy of cooperation but without abandoning neutral status: a collaborative neutrality.

On August 1943 – and after years of queries, negotiations, and pressure – Portugal invokes its long alliance with Great Britain and signs an agreement allowing Britain (not the Allies) to use the Azores, a much-coveted Atlantic island.

Morishima took this opportunity to resume negotiations with Portugal regarding Timor. The Consul started by protesting the agreement considering it a breach of neutrality. Salazar answered sternly: “Japan is publicly violating Portuguese sovereignty and its administrative rights, from a moral and legal standpoint it is not in a position to protest. If the Japanese Government files an official complaint, Portugal will be forced to protest every single act practiced by the Japanese Army in Timor.”¹⁹⁰ Morishima explains Japanese point of no return: “As long as the lease to Great Britain is limited to the usage of the Azorian Islands, Japan will not feel jeopardised, but in the future if this model of cooperation extends to the territories in east Africa, namely Mozambique, or Goa, in India, or even the Chinese coastal line in Macau, Japan will not ignore said actions.”¹⁹¹ At the same meeting the possibility of an inspector from Macau travelling to Timor is once again contemplated. This time Morishima will contact Tokyo and is able to convince the authorities to allow the trip, despite being aware that the organization would be lengthy and military authorities would probably frustrate proper data collection.

After over one year and a half of negotiations, a Portuguese Officer from Macau Captain Silva e Costa carried out his enquiry in March 1944 and, due to the complete isolation of the island, this is the only official document produced about the occupation period except for personal memoirs.

Captain Silva e Costa’s detailed report of his trip to Timor in 1944 was unable to depict the dark and desperate situation of the territory given that his travels were controlled by the Japanese and the people who he talked with were too afraid of Japanese retaliation, but it brought some hope to the Portuguese internees.

¹⁹⁰ Morito Morishima, *Pearl Harbor, Lisboa, Toquio* (Almada: Ad Litteram, 2017): 97.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*: 97.

Salazar, had centralized the decision making in Lisbon consequently the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo did not have the power to negotiate or sign treaties, or other meaningful documentation with the Government of Japan. There were several reasons for this decision: (1) Salazar need to control foreign policy decision making, (2) the Minister in Tokyo was not amongst his high ranked, trustworthy group of diplomats, (3) to, in general, slow down the response time. The last one may sound like it backfired during the negotiations regarding Timor, but as we will see that's not exactly the case.

While the negotiations in 1942 had been constant, they waned in 1943. The Legations were still in contact and efforts were made, but Salazar was convinced that “even though some progress might be possible at a slow pace, it was not to be expected that the negotiations with Tokyo for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the occupation of the territory by troops of ours would reach a favourable result”¹⁹².

By the end of 1943 it seemed that Japan had given up on the idea of attacking Australia thus the strategic value of East Timor dwindles, but despite Morishima's suggestion to negotiate with Portugal the retrieval of the Island, the Military Commander disagreed.

Morishima prepares a contingency plan in case Salazar joins the Allies: changing the diplomats' status so they could be accredited somewhere else too which would make their transfer easier and diminish the risk of arrest. His strategy is to delay the process and that is exactly what the Consul did in 1944. Morishima was also afraid the military would invade Macau: “Unfortunately, I know the Japanese Military forces and their leaders, always concerned with appearances and I'm afraid if Portugal enter into an alliance with Britain and the US, we might take Macau as retaliation.”¹⁹³

In 1944 the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was focused on obtaining a advantageous agreement with the US: Salazar wanted to obtain formal recognition of the Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies, and the guarantee that Portugal would be involved in the operations to take Timor back (if these were to happen), while, at the same time, negotiated a peaceful surrender of Timor back to Portuguese sovereignty.

The slow pace of the negotiations gave Salazar some leeway: he was postulating negotiations with the US, while trying to reach an agreement with Japan. For Salazar this was the perfect solution. He feared that the Allied forces would take over the island again

¹⁹² Meeting Report, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

¹⁹³ Morito Morishima, *Pearl Harbor, Lisboa, Toquio* (Almada: Ad Litteram, 2017): 101.

if they were the ones to liberate it and was hoping bilateral negotiations would avoid that ending. Unfortunately, the Allies were not willing to wait any longer.

Salazar considered this to be 'a new phase in Portuguese policy regarding the war' and expected Allied support in Timor's case. By the late 1943 it is fair to state the Allies were in an apparent advantage and were the apparent winner of the war. In the Pacific, the oil embargoes were taking its toll on Japan, and the Timor situation was put on the back burner only to be discussed by the Allies at the Cairo meeting when it was decided Anglo-Luso-American Staff talks would take place from September 18, 1944.

The US considered that direct Portuguese military effort was unnecessary. For the US "the most valuable aid [Portugal] can render consists in the grant of new facilities in the Azores for the passage of aircraft for the Far Eastern Wars."¹⁹⁴, but for Salazar Portuguese participation on the reconquest of Portuguese territory was a matter of duty and prestige and insisted upon this point.

Finally, it was agreed that (1) Portugal would have a direct participation by the employment of Portuguese military forces under the command of the allied forces in the operations of reconquest or reoccupation of the island if such operations were to take place, (2) Portugal would have an indirect participation by granting of further facilities in the Azores, at Santa Maria, for the purpose of facilitating the conveyance of American forces to the Pacific theatre of war and from the latter to the US.

On the November 28, 1944, two agreements were signed, and Portugal promptly started the arrangements needed to create a contingent ready to sail from Lourenço Marques and several warships ready to be placed under the orders of the High Command.

On August 17, 1945, the Japanese Consul to Lisbon contacts the Portuguese Government and informs that Japan is ready to reinstate Portuguese sovereignty in Timor and on the 20th the Minister of Portugal contacts Lisbon informing that the Japanese Government had agreed to the Portuguese conditions.

The Japanese Government remained in control of Timor until its surrender on September 2, 1945. The 2000 Portuguese forces stationed in Mozambique arrived in East Timor on September 27 of 1945, but the *de facto* surrender of authority to the Portuguese Governor took place on September 5, when the Japanese officially placed the Japanese forces under Portuguese authority in a symbolic gesture. By then, most troops were

¹⁹⁴ Portugal, Bulletin of Political, Economic and Cultural Information n. 87, "Official notes regarding Timor", Lisbon, October 31, 1945, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: S9.E10.P7-63772.

returning to Japan via West Timor. From September 11 until the arrival of the Portuguese troops, Australian troops were stationed in Timor as a guarantor of the surrender.

The Aftermath of the occupation

When the Japanese troops withdrew from East Timor in 1945 the damages were significant.

It took Portugal a long time to assess the damages. In 1946, during the peace negotiations, Washington requested a detailed report of the damages. The “Comissão de Avaliação dos Prejuízos causados pela Ocupação Estrangeira de Timor” (Commission for the Assessment of Damages caused by Foreign Occupation in Timor) produced a estimation calculating the losses through a comparative method: (a) the cattle existent before and after the invasion; (b) number of trees existent before and after the invasion; and (c) kilos of produce grown before and after the invasion.

The Portuguese report was sent in December of 1951¹⁹⁵:

I. Damaged Inflicted in Portuguese Territory (in Patacas)	
To the Portuguese state	14,363,958.49
To private residences and property	9,942,151.84
In respect of agricultural losses	8,486,880.65
To livestock	9,843,139.16

II. Damaged Inflicted on Portuguese Citizens or on Portuguese Property in non-Japanese Foreign Territory (in American Dollars)	
To the Portuguese community in Manila	59,391.00
To the Portuguese Catholic Missions in Shiu-Ming (Southern China)	500,000.00

III. Damaged Inflicted on Portuguese Property or on Portuguese Citizens in Japanese Territory (in American Dollars)	
To the Portuguese community in Japan	361,300.00

¹⁹⁵ Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E28.P6-1503

IV. Damaged Inflicted through the Violent Seizure of Vessels within the Territorial Waters of Macau	
To the British ship 'Saion'	HK\$ 71,013.90
To private persons	Patacas 94,470.00 £81

Total	
Patacas	42,730,600.14
Dollars USA	920,691.00
Dollars UK	94,470.00
Pound	81

Total (after conversion in Patacas): 47.260.600,00

These numbers can be contested. They were contested within the Ministries themselves. Another report, this time produced by the Ministry of Ultramar, reached disparaging numbers¹⁹⁶:

I. Damaged Inflicted on Portuguese citizens (in Patacas)	
Urban properties	7,421,234.54
Rustic properties	3,293,294.00
Movable assets	1,712,948.00
Livestock	899,578.00
Total	12,327,054.54

II. Damaged inflicted on the Diocese	
Urban properties	3,392,440.09

III. Damaged Inflicted on foreign citizens (in Patacas)	
Urban properties	8,946,822.73
Rustic properties	18,853.00
Movable assets	676,560.00

¹⁹⁶ Meeting Report, January 7, 1954, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E28.P6-1503.

Livestock	52,490.00
Total	9,694,724.73

Total: 26,414,219.36 Patacas

Banco Nacional Ultramarino's (National Bank) made its own report assessing losses of 372,151.84 patacas (furniture, archives, money, silver, and other assets) after the installations were looted by the Japanese forces.

The reports disparage greatly, but it is clear that the colony, that was already struggling, was absolutely devastated by the invasion: 14% of the population died¹⁹⁷, the forest was destroyed, and the fields left abandoned and the institution that had the funds to invest in the development of the island, was seriously affected.

War reparations

Portugal believed it was its right to participate in the process peacebuilding in the Pacific and the Ambassadors in Washington and London worked tirelessly to obtain a seat at the negotiation table. Unfortunately, according to information given by Dunham, the prevailing belief was that Great Britain probably would not support Portuguese claims due to Australia's opposition¹⁹⁸.

Salazar's priorities in the aftermath of the war was to be awarded war reparations to rebuild the territories. Salazar was acutely aware that the acceptance of colonialism was reversing. He had been able to obtain American recognition of its empire, but without economic revitalization domestic resistance could arise and it would be difficult to obtain the support of the international community. The regime also invoked historical and cultural reasons namely (1) the fact that Portugal had been the first European country to establish contact with the Extreme Orient; (2) international law precedent set in the 1922 Nine Power Pact, signed by France, the U.S., Italy, Japan, Great Britain Portugal, Netherlands, China and Belgium, recognizing the interests of these countries in the Pacific; (3) the existence of Portuguese population in the region.

Additionally, it invoked Portuguese contributions to the war effort, namely authorizing Great Britain and later the USA to use Azores and the prolongation of the

¹⁹⁷Sonny Inbaraj, *East Timor: Blood and Tears in ASEAN* (Chiang Mai: Silkwoon Books, 1995).

¹⁹⁸ Franco Nogueira, Meeting Report. November 4, 1950, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E28.P6-1503.

concessions after the end of the war as well as the prohibition of selling wolfram to Germany in 1944 at the expense of Portuguese own economical interests. The argument was that Portugal had been traditionally and consistently a rightful intervenient in the maintenance of Pacific Ocean's status quo.

“The absence of a war declaration or the severance of diplomatic relations are technical obstacles not easy to overcome.”¹⁹⁹ wrote Franco Nogueira, one of his suggestions to overcome this problem was to get support the support of the Netherlands, Canada, and Indonesia as possible supporter. Lastly, according to Nogueira, if Portugal could not participate in the multilateral negotiations it could negotiate bilaterally with Japan after the peace treaties were concluded.

Portugal did not participate in the negotiations but received the assurance that “the intervenients were firmly resolved to respect Portugal's rights regarding its insular possessions in the Pacific.”²⁰⁰

In the end Portugal did not take part in the international negotiations because of its neutrality status. Furthermore, after the US established the reconstruction of Japan as one of its priorities, a punitive stance against Japan was discouraged. Once again disappointed with the international community, Salazar reluctantly accepted to participate in the Marshall Plan.

¹⁹⁹ Franco Nogueira, Meeting Report, November 4, 1950, Arquivos Histórico-Diplomáticos: C.E28.P6-1503

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

Conclusion

The long and amicable relations between Portugal and Japan were put to test during the war. Even though both Portugal and Japan had common enemies, namely the communists, and their regimes shared some ideological affinities, the tides of war and the war's strategic demands imposed themselves, but most importantly Japanese vision of Asia did not include Portugal or the presence of any European powers. Portuguese diplomatic communications show that Portugal as early as 1936 believed if Japan were to win the war in China, it would take control of Macau and remove all European presence from the territory. By 1938, Vasco Martins even questions Japanese commitment to anti-communism, saying that Japan was merely trying to extract all Chinese riches and fighting communism was just a plus.

Portugal's strategic dogma to survive the war with its colonial empire intact was easy to explain, but strenuous to implement: to publicly maintain a strict neutrality, but when inevitable to collaborate to protect its interests, thus the term collaborating neutrality. In reality this demanded a cautious and skillful use of hedging.

Portugal was a neutral country and played its game with the Axis and the Allies in order to maximize its gains and did not fully commit to one side.

Salazar was incredible at playing both sides: on one hand he respected an old alliance with Great Britain, while maintaining its neutrality and selling wolfram to an allied enemy with no consequences. On the other hand, his conservative ways and being titled by most press as a fascist dictator gained him the respect and leeway to negotiate with the Axis powers who did not perceive him as an enemy.

The political chaos of the 19th century in China changed the political landscape drastically. Portuguese Macau existed because Chinese authorities tolerated it earlier on for profit, then because it was too entangled in its own domestic problems, and other times because Portugal was the lesser evil thus Portugal had to maintain amicable relations with China in order to maintain sovereignty in Macau. Even if Japan were to win the war, Macau's population was mostly Chinese population and it could not be alienated (it had been before to grave cost by José Ferreira do Amaral). During the turn of the century the question became more complex since more actors were fighting for dominance in the Chinese territory. One of the main actors was Japan. Portugal could not alienate Japan either. Its powerful navy controlled the sea lanes that became the lifeboat for the

Portuguese colony once the vicissitudes of war negatively affected trade, especially foodstuff, from China to Macau.

Juggling the interests of the several actors was complex and sometimes out of the control of Portuguese authorities. Bursting through its seams due to the influx of refugees, Macau, just as Hong Kong, became a cluster of Japanese resentment, a meeting place for the Chongqing undercover agents, and an espionage center of great value to all involved. Japan had obtained a privileged position in Macau and with gradual threats was able to infiltrate the police and customs authorities and able to recruit agents among the population. The difference between Hong Kong and Macau laid in the governmental attitude towards such activities. While the British actively supported hostile acts against Japan, facilitated smuggling to nationalist China, and expanded its reach through a web of intelligence services - the BAAG, British Army Aid Group - Portugal official position was not to support them, but not to chase them down either in order not to alienate either. Certain individuals within the Government had their own allegiances, and were collaborating with certain actors either for financial gain or for ideological purposes, but the Governor tried keeping a neutral stance.

A mix of lack of personnel and incompetence of the local police force could easily turn an open case, such as the murder of someone, into an accusation that Portugal was breaching neutrality by taking one's side. The ultimate consequence of neutrality breach was one that Portugal could not afford: losing its foothold in Asia. In reality, Macau's economy had been lackluster, so say the least, for three centuries, but the maintenance of the colonial empire was linked to Portuguese identity, the concept of inalienable Nation State. On the other hand, the world was changing fast, Colonialism, once considered a destiny call for the brave and righteous, was starting to be openly criticized by society and powerful countries alike. Salazar believed that once a slice of Portugal was taken away, the others would follow suit and Angola, the prized jewel of the Portuguese Empire, was too important to let go. Salazar also knew that powerful forces were working against the status quo in politics, he believed that communism was the world's biggest threat, the biggest evil.

It is probably not fair to accuse Salazar of being intoxicated with power. His insistence on controlling the most important folders and centralizing all the big processes of the country in himself were not the actions of a man thirsty for power, but of someone who sincerely believed no one else could protect the country as he could.

Returning to Macau, the exogenous factors were difficult to control and often times the authorities had to rely on the good relations cultivated over the years with their foreign counterparts which was in itself tricky not only because there were several Chinese factions with different interests, but the Japanese power structure was intricate to navigate. There was an effort to build a relationship with the Japanese Consuls and even when there was mistrust there was respect for the diplomatic institution. Now the traditional channels of diplomatic communication were losing its importance. Military authorities and civil authorities struggled to find common ground and negotiations with civil authorities would be completely ignored.

The widespread racist and stereotypical image of the sneaky Japanese had permeated Portuguese diplomatic actors. Often in reports agreeable Japanese are described with (what were considered to be) 'white' attributes, for instance "white on the inside yellow on the outside". This mistrust was not based solely on racism, but the truth is Japan often failed at communicating its true intentions. That is, the civil authorities were constantly off the loop, their opinions were disregarded, and their negotiations scrapped.

The taking of Montanha and later Lapa represented a change in status quo. Salazar feared that once Japan left, China would disrespect the previous agreements and take them back. Just like he feared that Dutch would take over East Timor if given half a chance.

The taking of the islands leads us to the first time Portugal tied the question of Macau and Timor. In 1940 there was a clear statement from the Japanese showing they intended to up the pressure in Macau to obtain oil concessions in Timor. Salazar was adamant about the entanglement of these two territories. His policy was to not tie the Macau and Timor issues together to avoid dragging the territories together in case of a local incident. This stance should be maintained whenever possible.

Salazar's control over foreign policy decision making meant all important decisions had to go through Lisbon, consequently Salazar was able to buy some time. As we have seen, Macau's Governor was overwhelmed with refugees, the administration of the territory, and the constant queries, requests, and demands from the Japanese and in Timor the Governor was unable to communicate with Lisbon. Additionally, the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo - considered a great diplomat - was unable to get anything done. Even going to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an ordeal. As we can see, the Portuguese civil authorities in contact with Japanese authorities, civil or military alike, were severely constrained.

Salazar's job was to hedge the interests of everyone involved. In 1941 after the Japanese ultimatum concerning measures to be taken in Macau to avoid smuggling, the Governor was forced to cede important pieces of sovereignty to maintain the territory afloat while keeping the ultimatum a secret to avoid international embarrassment.

At the same time in Timor, Japan gets the green light, despite some conditions, for the establishment of a commercial air service connecting Palao and Dilli. Salazar, warned by the allied forces in uni-sound that Japanese had military objectives, had been putting down the signing of the agreement for one year and a half. Salazar had been informed in 1937 about Japanese wishes to obtain a monopoly of oil (and others) concessions, so it is fair to elate, Salazar knew the strategic benefits Japan was gaining from the air line, but the air service was not the only Japanese incessant request. Japan wanted the oil concessions. Salazar delayed the negotiations for the air service, but after the signing of a similar one with Australia and the gradual pressures in Macau, Salazar appeased the Japanese by granting the air licence. It was a small price to pay compared to a breach of neutrality in Macau, but Salazar underestimated the Allied resolution and plans for Timor. Salazar was not, at this point concerned about an hostile act in Timor perpetrated by the Japanese, but was concerned about the pressure, demands, and retaliation in Macau.

To the constant Allied complaints regarding Salazar's policies in Timor Salazar shows frustration, not comprehending why the Allies can't understand the price of alienating Japan in Timor was the loss of Macau. This looming causal chain was always present.

In 1941 Portuguese hedging efforts failed. The Allied forces, tired of Salazar's delays and growing fearful of an invasion of Australia through Timor, preemptively invade the territory. This was the excuse Japan needed to attack. After almost five years of queries and negotiations about the oil concessions, that Japan so desperately needed, now that neutrality was not maintained, Japan could claim its occupation was within its rights. Having its discords with the Governor of Timor previously made known, it was easy for the Japanese to simply dismiss his authority.

We can clearly discern two periods in Salazar's foreign policy: (1) in between 1939 and 1942, his priority was to prevent the threat of an Axis (or proxy) invasion; (2) in between 1943 and 1945: dealing with increasing Allied demands over Azores and playing the Allied game in order to gain enough support to regain sovereignty over East Timor.

In the beginning of 1942 Japan was incredibly self-assure: it had obtained Hong Kong and had inflicted terrible damage to the US. At that moment, the Allied forces decided to

preemptively invade East Timor. Right after two major wins Japan swiftly decided to answer back and it easily gained supremacy in Timor.

It is impossible to know what would have happened if the Allied had not invaded the Island first. Regardless the relations between Japan and Portugal were friendly until that point. Even after that the feeling that comes across from the telegrams and meeting is of frustration, not animosity (at least regarding the diplomatic corps).

It is fair to say the situation changed after by 1942 especially after the decision of cutting communications from and to Timor. While occupying East Timor could have been an answer to a provocation, the cutting of communication, as well as the treatment given to the indigenous people of the island was the course chosen, relegating the diplomatic channels to a second plan.

If we make a purely quantitative assessment of the communications between the two countries, 1942 is the year the relation changes. Portugal refuses to comply with the Japanese request to get rid of the Governor of Timor, Ferreira de Carvalho and the negotiations in Lisbon are halted. The German Ambassador even suggests that Portugal makes up an excuse to save face, such as disease, to replace the Governor, but Salazar refuses another humiliation. Salazar was even reluctant to evacuate the island, stating that Portuguese males who died in Japanese hand would die as Portuguese.

In 1943 the tides of war change leading to a tepid year of relations between the two countries. Japan is trying to keep a grip in Asia, while Portugal is busy negotiating terms of cooperation with the Allies, negotiating the terms of use of the Azores.

It is interesting to realize that even in 1944 when it is apparent that Japan is going to lose the war, the two countries do not solve the problem bilaterally. There were negotiations, but they were not the focus of either of the countries. It is obvious that from 1944 the Great Powers' will, namely US, Germany and Soviet Union, are guiding the smaller states diplomatic choices.

It is understandable that Salazar did everything he could to avoid international embarrassment and kept how dire the situation in Macau out of public knowledge. As we have seen in 1941 the US and Great Britain start showing interest in Azores, Salazar's priority was to maintain sovereignty over the Portuguese territory. Showing weakness was not an option.

It is also clear that Portugal tried to cultivate a good relationship with the Japanese Consul in Macau.

It is difficult to assess if personal feelings affected the development of the events. Salazar's diaries hardly ever show any emotions. They are merely useful to study his routine. His personal correspondence was the best bet to find Salazar's opinion about Japan, unfortunately Luiz Esteves Fernandes, the Minister in Tokyo, and Ferreira de Carvalho, the Governor of Timor, were not relevant diplomats. Salazar did not rely on their opinions to make decisions. He relied on diplomats such as Bianchi in Washington and Monteiro in Great Britain.

It is also obvious that Salazar was tired. He had been managing crisis since 1926. First domestically, then the Spanish crisis, then the Second World War.

The overall conclusion is that Salazar did try to balance Portugal's Alliance obligations while trying to follow and accommodate policy towards Japan. Portugal did not underestimate Japan, it cultivated good relations with the Empire of the Sun since the thirties and that policy allowed Portugal to maintain to a certain degree its sovereignty to in Macau.

This dissertation also proposes the following: Japan constantly brandishes its respect for Portugal's neutrality using Macau as an example but, in reality, Japan did not need to invade Macau. Japan had Macau surrounded; a blockade was enough to pressure Portugal into infiltrate Timor under the pretense of commercial enterprise. In fact, one can argue that it was more beneficial to Japan not to invade Macau and continue using the threat of invasion.

Macau and Timor were different crisis, but they were connected, since they were both affected by the new status-quo Japan was trying to implement.

Another conclusion is that Salazar maintained its economical relations with Japan despite its ideological differences. Salazar kept protecting Japanese interests in Mexico even after the invasion of Timor. Portugal's problem with Japan in this field was the same as everyone else's: the dumping – mainly – of fabrics in Portuguese territories.

Salazar could have broken diplomatic relations with Japan without losing its neutrality status. He chose not to do it, and maintained the diplomatic channels open until mid 1943 when the Allies forced his hand. Even after the agreements with the Allies in 1943, Japanese diplomats had meetings at the MNE and Salazar, time and time again, assured Japan it did not intend to declare war.

The international system imposed itself in the relations between Japan and Portugal, but it is undeniable that Salazar did everything in his power to solve the problems diplomatically.

In the end Portugal's neutrality had to be a collaborative neutrality in order for the country to maintain even a shred of sovereignty in Macau.

APPENDIX:

- 1) Salazar's List of Functions;
- 2) List of accreditations:
 - (a) Portuguese Delegation Accredited in Japan;
 - (b) Japanese Delegation Accredited in Portugal;
- 3) Agreement regarding Commerce and Navigation, March 23, 1932;
- 4) Accord entre les Gouvernements Portugais et Japonais pour l'établissement d'un service aérien entre Dili et Palao, October 23, 1941
- 5) Map of Macau
- 6) Map of East and West Timor
- 7) The Ultimatum in Macau

2) List of accreditations:

(a) Portuguese Delegation Accredited in Japan

1930	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Justino de Montalvão Coelho
Second Secretary	Antero Carreiro de Freitas
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito
Osaka	Vice-consul, Tomokichi Fujisawa

1931	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Justino de Montalvão Coelho
Second Secretary	Waldemar da Fonseca Araújo
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moje	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito

Osaka	Vice-consul, Tomokichi Fujisana
Yokohama	Consul , _____

1932	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Justino de Montalvão Coelho
Second Secretary	Waldemar da Fonseca Araújo
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito
Osaka	Vice-consul,
Yokohama	Consul , _____

1933	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	José Jorge Rofrigues dos Santos
Second Secretary	Waldemar de Fonseca Araújo
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito

Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , _____

1934	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Tomaz Ribeiro de Melo
Second Secretary	Waldemar da Fonseca Araújo
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito
Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , _____

1935	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Tomaz Ribeiro de Melo
Second Secretary	Valdemar da Fonseca Araújo
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito

Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , _____

1936	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Tomaz Ribeiro de Melo
Second Secretary	Antero Carreira de Freitas
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito
Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , vago

1937	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Empty
Second Secretary	Antero Carreiro de Freitas
Consular Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito

Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , empty

1938	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Empty
Second Secretary	Antero Carreiro de Freitas
Consulate Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito
Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , empty

1939-1945	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Luiz Esteves Fernandes
Second Secretary	Manuel Joaquim da Silva Guedes
Consulate Personnel	
Kobe	
Nagasaki	
Tokyo	
Kyoto	
Moji	
Nagoya	

Osaka	
Yokohama	

1945	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister (2 nd class)	Luiz Esteves Fernandes
Second Secretary	Alberto Marciano Gorjão Franco Nogueira
Consulate Personnel	
Kobe	Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa Vice-consul, Vitor Edmundo da Silva e Sousa
Nagasaki	Vice-consul, _____
Tokyo	Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto Chanceler, Tetsujiro Jamaguchi
Kyoto	Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata
Moji	Vice-consul, Horace Nutter
Nagoya	Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito
Osaka	Vice-consul, Taro Inabata
Yokohama	Consul , _____

(b) Japanese Delegation Accredited in Portugal

1930	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Tamekichi Ohta

First Secretary	Kinta Arai
Second Secretary	Shin-Ichi Chiba
Secretary Interpreter (2 nd class)	Shunichi Komine
Attachés	Akira Fukuoka Kōichi Mimura Yosoe Ohguimi Noboru Watanabe
Consular Personnel	
Lisbon	Consul, Carlos Gomes

1931	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Tamekichi Ohta
First Secretary	Saichiro Koshida
Second Secretary	Shin-Ichi Chiba
Secretary Interpreter (2 nd class)	Yosoe Ohguimi
Attachés	Akira Fukuoka (Chargé d'Affaires) Kōichi Mimura Noboru Watanabe
Consular Personnel	
Lisbon	Consul, Carlos Gomes

1932	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	_____
Second Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires	Taneki Kumabé
Attachés	Akira Fukuoka (also Chargé d'Affaires)
Consular Personnel	

Lisbon	Consul, Carlos Gomes
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1933	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Akio Kasama
First Secretary	Taneki Kumabé
Attachés	Zenjiro Aibe Akira Fukuoka
Consular Personnel	
Lisbon	Consul, Carlos Gomes

1934	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Akio Kasama
First Secretary	Taneki Kumabé
Attachés	Zenjiro Aibe Akira Fukuoka
Consular Personnel	
Lisbon	Consul, Carlos Gomes

1935	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Akio Kasama
First Secretary	Taneki Kumabé
Attachés	Akira Fukuoka
Consular Personnel	

Oporto	Consul, Ricardo Spratley
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1936	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Akio Kasama
First Secretary	Genichiro Omore
Attachés	Keija Hida
Consular Personnel	
Oporto	Consul, Ricardo Spratley

1937	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Akio Kasama (ausente)
First Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires	Genichiro Omori
Attachés	Nabumaga Sata Keija Hida
Consular Personnel	
Porto	Consul, Ricardo Spratley

1938	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	
First Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires	Takeshi Yanagisawa
Attachés	Nabumaga Sata Daisaku Osawa
Consular Personnel	

Oporto	Consul, Ricardo Spratley
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1939	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	
First Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires	Takeshi Yanagisawa
Attachés	Nabumaga Sata Daisaku Osawa
Consular Personnel	

1940	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Kikuji Yonezawa
Third Secretary	Naokichi Katsuda
Attachés	Nabumaga Sata Takeo Ueno
Consular Personnel	

1941	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Kikuji Yonezawa
Military Attaché	Colonel Seiji Moriya (Madrid)
Naval Attaché	Frigate Captain Yoshio Enoo (Madrid)
Attachés	Nabumaga Sata

	Takeo Ueno Toshio Yoshioka
Chancellor	Tadashi Iwasse

1942	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Shin-ichi Chiba
Advisory Minister	Masutaro Inoue
Military Attaché	Tenente-Colonel Keizo Sakurai (Madrid)
Naval Attaché	Captain Lieutenant Munetugu Oisi(Madrid)
Assistant Military Attaché	Major Kiyosi Hasebe (Madrid)
Third Secretary	Toshio Yoshioka
Financial Attaché	Hisao Tomooka
Attachés	Takeo Ueno Tadashi Iwasse
Chancellor	Akira Tsujino

1943	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Morito Morishima
Advisory Minister	Masutaro Inoue
Advisory Minister	Kotaro Ono
First Secretary	Shun-ichi Komine
Third Secretary	Toshio Yoshioka
Third Secretary	Kenichi Toh
Third Secretary	Masana Horiuchi
Third Secretary	Ryuichi Ando

Third Secretary	Sashichiro Matui
Financial Attaché	Hisao Tomooka
Attachés	Sadamitsu Suzuki Takeo Ueno Hikoichi Somemiya Hiroshi Hori Tadashi Iwasse
Military Attaché and Aeronautical Military Attaché	Colonel Yoshisada Mishima
Assistant Military Attaché and Aeronautical Military Attaché	Tenente-Colonel Naoki Matsuyama
Naval Attaché	Captain Lieutenant Munetugu Oisi
Aeronautical Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché	Captain Lieutenant Kenzo Inoué

1944	
Diplomatic Personnel	
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister	Morito Morishima
Advisory Minister	Masutaro Inoue
Advisory Minister	Kotaro Ono
First Secretary	Shun-ichi Komine
Third Secretary	Toshio Yoshioka
Third Secretary	Kenichi Toh
Third Secretary	Masana Horiuchi
Third Secretary	Ryuichi Ando
Third Secretary	Sashichiro Matui
Attachés	Tokitiro Uomoto Hiroshi Nemoto Masami Nakane Sadamitsu Suzuki

	Koji Ichikawa Hiroshi Hori Takeo Ueno Hokoichi Somemiya Tadashi Iwasse Kanji Nakae
Military Attaché and Aeronautical Military Attaché	Colonel Yoshisada Mishima
Assistant Military Attaché and Aeronautical Military Attaché	Tenente-Colonel Naoki Matsuyama Tenente-Colonel Mikio Okawa
Naval Attaché	Frigate Captain Munetugu Oisi
Aeronautical Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché	Frigate Captain Kenzo Inoué

1945

3) Agreement regarding Commerce and Navigation

Signed in Lisbon

March 23, 1932

French official text communicated by the Director of the Japanese Office accredited to the League of Nations and the Head of the Portuguese Office accredited to the League of Nations. The registration of this Agreement took place April 22, 1932

The Government of his majesty the Emperor of Japan and the Government of the Portuguese Republic, being desirous of encouraging the development of commercial relations between Japan and Portugal, have resolved, as a provisional measure applicable until the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation regulating all economic relations between the two countries, to authorize their respective Plenipotentiaries to embody in the present Agreement the following provisions regarding commerce and navigation, upon which the High Contracting Parties are already agreed:

Article 1.

Natural and industrial products of the territories of either High Contracting Party shall, irrespective of the place from which they come, enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment, upon importation into the territory of the other, as regards both import and internal duties and any other advantage which is or which may hereafter be granted to any other foreign country.

Article 2.

The provisions of the present Agreement shall not apply to the advantages which wither High Contracting Party grants or may hereafter grant by way of exception to contiguous States, or to the treatment granted to the products of national fisheries or of fisheries which are, as regards the importation of their products assimilated to national fisheries, or to the special favours which Portugal grants or may hereafter grant exclusively to Brazil.

Article 3.

As regards the importation into the territories of either High Contracting Party of any natural or industrial product of the other Party, no prohibitions or restrictions shall be maintained or imposed unless they are also applicable to the importation of similar natural or industrial products of any other foreign country.

Exceptions to this rule shall only be made in the case of prohibitions or restrictions of a sanitary or other nature dictated by considerations of public health and necessary for the protection of cattle or useful plants.

Article 4.

Japan undertakes, for the duration of the present Agreement, to allow the importation, transport and sale within the country of all Portuguese wines of a strength of 21° or under. Nevertheless, this provision may cease to apply should Japan establish a wine monopoly. Japan recognizes that the appellations “Porto” (Port, Oporto, Port Wine, Portwein, and combinations of similar names) and “Madeira” (Madère, Madeira Wine, Madeirawein and combinations of similar names), together with the appellations “Setubal Muscatel” and territories of the Douro, the island of Madeira, Setubal and Carcavelos, and

undertakes to allow the importation of wines bearing these appellations only if they come from the aforesaid territories and are accompanied by certificates of origin issued by the competent Portuguese name of the actual place of origin or the expression “type”, “kind”, “quality” or any other similar expression.

The provisions of this Agreement shall not affect the regulations contained in the Japanese laws on wines for the protection of public health.

The provisions of this Article shall not be regarded as affecting engagements already existing between Japan and third Powers.

Article 5.

During the period of validity of the present Agreement, the High Contracting Parties shall grant each other most-favoured-nation treatment in the matters of navigation, and in particular as regards on maritime commerce.

Article 6.

The provision of the present Agreement shall be applicable to all the territories and possessions belonging to either High Contracting Party or administered by such Party.

Article 7.

The present Agreement shall come into force thirty days after the date of signature.

It shall be valid for one year from the date of its entry into force.

Should it not be denounced by either High Contracting Party at least three months before the expiration of the said period, the present Agreement shall be renewed by tacit consent and shall remain in force until the expiration of a period of three months from the date of its denunciation.

Done in duplicate at Lisbon on the twenty-third day of the third month of the seventh year of Showa, corresponding to March 23, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two.

(L.S.) Tamekichi Ohta.

(L.S.) Fernando Augusto Branco.

**4) Accord entre les Gouvernements Portugais et Japonais pour l'établissement
d'un service aérien entre Dili et Palao**

Signed in Lisbon

October 23, 1941

Le Gouvernement Portugais et le Gouvernement Japonais, désirant établir des liaisons aériennes entre l'île de Timor et le Japon, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1^{er}.

Le Gouvernement Portugais accorde à une compagnie de transport aérien japonaise désignée par le Gouvernement Japonais, l'autorisation pour l'exploitation d'un service aérien commercial régulier entre Palao ou un autre lieu dans les environs de Palao, désigné par le Gouvernement Japonais, Dili, et vice versa.

Article 2.

Le Gouvernement Japonais, de son côté, accorde à une compagnie de transport aérien portugaise désignée par le Gouvernement Portugais, l'autorisation pour l'exploitation d'un service aérien commercial régulier entre Dili et Palao ou un autre lieu dans les environs de Palao, désigné par le Gouvernement Japonais, et vice versa.

Article 3.

Les compagnies de transport aérien établies aux termes des deux articles précédents auront l'obligation de transporter du courrier, des voyageurs et des marchandises, et les deux Gouvernements prennent l'engagement réciproque de n'apporter aucune restriction

injustifiée à ce transport de courrier, de voyageurs et de marchandises, par la compagnie désignée par l'autre Gouvernement.

Les dispositions du présent article n'empêcheront pas que, pour une raison d'Etat, l'un des Gouvernements interdise, dans son territoire, le transport du courrier et le débarquement ou le séjour de tout employé ou membre de l'équipage ou voyageur des avions des compagnies qui feront l'exploitation des services aériens prévus dans les articles 1^{er} et 2 de cet accord.

Article 4.

La compagnie de transport aérien désigné par le Gouvernement Japonais pour l'exploitation du service aérien prévue à l'article 1^{er}, devra effectuer ce service au moins une fois tous les quinze jours, en chaque sens, à moins que cela ne soit impossible pour raison de force majeure. La compagnie Portugais désignée par le Gouvernement Portugais et prévue à l'article 2, sera soumise à la même obligation.

Article 5.

Le Gouvernement Portugais assurera à la compagnie japonaise désignée par le Gouvernement Japonais, l'utilisation de l'infrastructure et l'octroi des facilités techniques qu'il reconnaîtra comme nécessaires pour la réalisation du service dans la partie du parcours où il survolera le territoire de Timor, et réciproquement le Gouvernement Japonais assurera à la compagnie portugaise désignée par le Gouvernement Portugais, l'utilisation de l'infrastructure et l'octroi des facilités techniques qu'il reconnaîtra comme nécessaires pour la réalisation du service dans la partie du parcours où il survolera le territoire japonais.

Article 6.

Les détails d'ordre technique nécessaire à l'exécution du présent accord seront fixés dans un document signé entre les autorités compétentes des deux pays.

Article 7.

Le Gouvernement Japonais se réserve le droit de révoquer la désignation faite au profit d'une compagnie et de la remplacer par une autre en faveur d'une autre compagnie de transport aérien japonaise.

Le Gouvernement Portugais se réserve le même droit, relativement à la désignation qu'il fera au profit d'une compagnie de transport aérien portugaise. Dans ces cas, la concession sera immédiatement périmée par rapport à la première compagnie et ses clauses fonctionneront au profit de la compagnie désignée postérieurement, sans qu'il en puisse résulter aucune revendication justifiée de la part de la première compagnie contre le Gouvernement à qui la révocation a été notifiée.

Article 8.

La présent accord deviendra caduc si le service aérien japonais qui y est prévu n'est pas inauguré dans le délai maximum de six mois, à compter de la date à laquelle l'utilisation de l'infrastructure et l'octroi des facilités techniques auront été jugés possibles ; il deviendra également caduc s'il vient à être interrompu pendant plus de six mois, sauf raison de force majeure.

Article 9.

L'exploitation des services aériens ci-dessus prévus sera réglée par les dispositions de la Convention relative à la navigation aérienne du 13 octobre 1919 et par les lois et règlements en vigueur dans les territoires survolés, à moins que ces lois et règlements ne soient contraires à cet accord ou à la susdite Convention de 1919.

Les avions des compagnies portugais et japonaise survoleront respectivement les territoires japonais et portugais selon un parcours indiqué par le Gouvernement du territoire survolé.

Les variations à ces parcours ne pourront être faites qu'en cas d'urgence ou avec le consentement du Gouvernement du territoire survolé.

Article 10.

Il est entendu que les concessions prévues n'ont pas le caractère d'exclusif. Les deux Gouvernements se réservent entièrement le droit d'autoriser l'établissement d'autres services aériens dans leurs territoires respectifs, et dans conditions qu'ils jugeront convenables.

Article 11.

Au cas du prolongement éventuel du service prévu dans les articles 1^{er} et 2, au delà de Timor et du Japon, respectivement, les deux Gouvernements fixeront, d'un commun accord, les conditions dans lesquelles ce prolongement avoir lieu.

Article 12.

Le présent accord entrera en vigueur trente jours après la date de la signature ; il sera valable pour une durée de cinq ans et, par la suite, il sera automatiquement prorogé pour des périodes successives d'une année. Toutefois, il pourra être dénoncé par l'un des deux Gouvernements, au moyen d'un préavis envoyé à l'autre Gouvernement, six mois d'avance au moins, avant l'expiration de la période initiale ou de ses prorogations annuelles.

En foi de quoi, les soussignés dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ont signé le présent accord et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Lisbonne, en double exemplaire en langue française, le treize Octobre 1941, correspondant au treizième jour du dixième mois de la seizième année de Syowa.

(L.S) Oliveira Salazar

(L.S) Shin-ichi Chiba


Map of Timor



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The Ultimatum in Macau



澳門ヲ中繼地トシテ行ハルル利敵物資ヲ封セサル限リ軍ノ對敵經濟封鎖ハ完璧ヲ期シ難キヲ以テ澳門ノ敵性特ニ對敵交易及密輸行爲ヲ禁絶セシムルハ軍ノ緊需ナル要求タルニ至レリ

(二) 交渉経緯

(A) 前述ノ必要ニ基キ昭和十六年八月十九日軍ニ陸、海、外三省關係官ノ參集ヲ求メ本件ニ關シ協議シ左ノ如ク協定セリ

對 澳 門 施 策 要 領

昭一六、八、一九
南支陸海外協定

第一 方 針

一 澳門ノ敵性特ニ對敵交易及密輸行爲ヲ禁絶セシムルコトヲ主眼トス、但シ施策ニ當リテハ表面上ハ澳門ノ中立性ヲ濺存シ香港ヨリスル物資取得竝ニ情報蒐集等ノ爲之カ利用ヲ著シク不利ナ

ラシメサル事ニ著意ス

第二 指導要領

ニ別紙「澳門ニ對スル敵性排除ニ關スル申入事項」ヲ澳門政府ニ對シ申入ル、之カ爲先ツ澳門領事ハ澳門ニ於テ直接總督ニ對シ之ヲ申入レ容認セシムルニ努ムルモ所要ニ應シ廣東總領事及陸海軍幕僚同行スルモノトス、尙申入事項ニ關シテハ陸、海、外三者ニ於テ夫々八月二十日正午ヲ期シ中央ニ報告又ハ諮詢スルモノトス

陸、海、外共中央ニ於テ是認セハ速ニ交渉ヲ開始スルモノトシ申入時期ハ八月二十五、六日頃ト予想ス

ニ申入事項ニ對スル折衝要領

- 1、申入事項第一項ハ飽迄貫徹ヲ期スルモノトシ絶對讓歩セス
- 2、申入事項第二、第三項ハ澳門政廳ノ對面其他ヲ願慮シ其實徹上相當ノ彈力性ヲ保有ス、而シテ兩項共ニ受諾シ來レル場合ニ於テモ先方ノ面子尊重ノ立前及前掲方針中但書ノ主旨ヲ願慮シ政廳側ニ於テ措置ニ手加減ヲ加フル事ハ容認ス
- 3、澳門、中山間ノ交易解禁ヲ申出ツル場合ハ申入事項ヲ受諾スル場合其代償トシテ我對鎖ニ支障ナキ範圍ニ於テ之ヲ容認ス
- 4、本折衝ハ先ツ澳門領事ニ於テ輕易且迅速ニ先方ヲ是認セシムル如ク取扱フモ受諾ニ難色アル場合ハ廣東總領事及陸海軍幕僚同行シ再度申入レヲ行ヒ其壓力ヲ強化ス、其時機ハ第一

同申入後一週間以内トシ特ニコノ際所要ノ宣傳並ニ陸海軍ノ
威壓的行動ヲ併用ス

四 遂ニ我方申入事項ヲ拒否セハ陸海軍相策應シテ澳門封鎖ヲ強化
シ特ニ食糧ノ供給ヲ遮断スルト共ニ澳門内部ノ擾亂ヲ圖リ且武
力的壓迫ヲ強化シ以テ之ヲ屈伏シ我主張ニ聽從セシム

別紙「澳門ニ對スル敵性排除ニ關スル申入事項」

昭一六、八、一九
南支陸海外協定

一 未占領地向ケ軍需品（利敵物資）ノ輸送禁止取締

(イ) 澳門ヲ中繼トシテ未占領地ノ支那沿岸及「ビルマ」、佛印、
廣州灣等ヲ經由シテ敵地ヘ流入スル軍需品ノ禁止及其ノ他利
敵物資トナル可キ總テノ物資ノ輸送ノ嚴重ナル取締ニ任スル
コト

- (ロ) 倭ニ敵地流入ノ利敵物資ハ澳門ヨリ日本軍ノ對支封鎖侵犯ヲ企圖スル密航船ニ依リ多ク輸送セラレツツアル現状ナルヲ以テ常ニ澳門港内ノ船舶ヲ調査シ之等密航ヲ停止セシムルコト
- (ハ) 澳門政廳ノ實施スル右二項ノ禁止及取締ニ對シ日本側ハ之ニ協力スルモノトス、之カ爲澳門領内ニ於テ日本側機關ニ屬スル人員及使用船ニ對シ協力ニ必要ナル便宜ヲ供與シ且之カ保護ニ當ルコト
- ニ我方ノ指定スル重慶側機關ノ閉鎖或ハ敵性人物ノ追放
- (イ) 重慶側報諜略機關アリテ我方占據地内ノ擾亂ヲ計リツツアリ、我方ノ指定ニ依リ之カ閉鎖ヲナスコト
- (ロ) 敵性ヲ有スル運輸公司並ニ(運輸)業者ノ組織スル秘密結社

アリ之カ徹底的取締並ニ處分ヲナスコト

ニ反日宣傳「デマ」及言論並ニ結社ノ徹底的取締

(イ) 支那紙、外字紙ヲ問ハス反日的及反國民政府の言論、放送、
映畫、政治運動等ノ取締

(ロ) 「テロ」行爲ノ取締並ニ此ノ種人員ノ侵入防止

(B) 八月二十七日在澳門帝國福井領事代理ハ澳門總督ヲ往訪前記ノ決

定案ニ基ク總督宛公文ヲ手交シテ交渉ヲ開始シ更ニ二日間續行、

此間總督ハ純理論ヲ以テ我方申入ハ主權侵害ノ嫌アリト爲セルモ

福井領事代理ハ寧ラ密檢等緩蔣の事實ヲ擧ケ事實論ヲ以テ應酬セル結

果二十九日ノ交渉ニ於テ遂ニ總督ハ我方申入ヲ諒トシ二、三公文

中ノ字句ハ鬼モ角トシ本件申入ヲ受諾スルニ至レリ、尙正式回答

文ヲ可及的速カニ手交スル様要請シ置キタリ

(d) 本件ニ關シ澳門政廳側ノ全面的受諾明カトナレルヲ以テ在澳門出先陸、海、外關係者ニ於テ對澳門政廳申入レ受諾ニ伴フ實施要領ニ關シ試案ヲ作製シ九月一日再ヒ軍ニ陸、海、外關係官ノ參集ヲ求メ該試案ヲ審議シ左記ノ通決定セリ、依テ澳門總督ヨリノ正式回答ヲ待ツコトナク直ニ本決定案ニ基キ澳門側ト實施要領ニ關シ具體的ニ協議ヲ進ムルト共ニ實行ニ入ルコトセリ

左記

對澳門政廳申入レ受諾ニ伴フ實施要領

昭一六、九、一
南支陸海外協定

(イ) 澳門政廳側ノ處置

→ 戎克ニ依ル一切ノ貿易ヲ停止ス

ニ適當ナル場所ニ日本側トノ連絡機關ヲ設立シ密航關係一切ノ
事項ヲ處理セシム

三 澳門領海內在泊船舶中密輸ヲナス虞アリト認めラレタル船舶
及其ノ載貨武器等ノ處理ニ關シテハ日本側ト連絡スルモノト
ス

四 澳門政廳ハ港務部ニ登録セル船舶一覽表寫ヲ日本側陸、海、
外各機關ニ一部宛交付ス

五 澳門一廣州灣一海防一西貢關係航路就航船ノマニウイフニス
ト(載貨表)寫ヲ出港ノ際ハ出港前日正午迄ハ、入港ノ際ハ直チニ日本
側陸、海、外各機關ニ一部宛送付ス

澳門一香港定期連絡船ノマニウイフニスト寫ハ前項ヲ準シ成

可速カニ送付ス

六 澳門港内夜間航行ハ香港定期船及官廳船外之ヲ禁止ス

(ロ) 日本側ノ處置

一 陸軍機關ハ主トシテ陸上ニ於テ政廳側取締ニ協力ス

二 海軍機關ハ主トシテ海上及ヒ附屬島嶼ニ於テ之ニ協力ス

三 我方右關係人員竝ニ船舶ハ陸軍側、海上ノ巡視ヲ行フ

右人員ハ必要ニ應シ政廳側ヨリ自衛武器ノ貸與ヲ受クルモノ

トス

實施細目其他ニ開シテハ日本側ト政廳側ト協議ノ上別ニ定ム

備 考 中山、澳門間交易再開ニ就テハ成ルヘク速ニ實施スル

如ク考慮スルモノトス

(三) 澳門政廳側ノ正式受諾回答

九月五日澳門總督ヨリ在澳門福井領事代理蓮宛公文ヲ以テ全面的ニ我方要求ヲ受諾シタル旨正式回答手交越セリ

一方問題トナレル我方申入中ノ使用字句ニ付テハ福井領事代理ヨリ主權侵害等ノ意ヲ含マサル旨ノ説明書ヲ覺書トシテ交付スルコトニ依リ解決セルヲ以テ本件同答文ハ我方申入ニ對スル無條件且全面的受諾ナリト解セラル

正式回答原文（和譯、英譯附）別紙ノ通り

(四) 九月五日右ノ正式回答アリタルニヨリ翌六日午前十一時ヨリ政廳ニ於テ出先隨、海、外代表者總督ト會見シ前記九月一日決定ノ實施要領ニ基キ交渉セル結果左ノ如シ

(A) 解決事項

(イ) 澳門政廳側ノ處置

一 戒克ニヨル一切ノ貿易ヲ停止スルコトヲ受諾ス

但シ斯クテハ澳門ノ生活必需品(主トシテ食料品)供給ノ途

ナキヲ以テ中山縣方面ヨリ若干ノ補給ヲ許可セラレ度旨申出

アリ當方トシテモ出來得ル限り便宜取計フヘキ旨回答ス

ニ 政廳側ニ於テ港務部内ニ特別密輸取締隊ヲ編成セルヲ以テ該

機關ト連絡セラレタシトノ申出アリ右申出ノ通り承諾ス

三 異議ナシ

四 異議ナシ

(ロ) 日本側ノ處置

一 異議ナシ

二 異議ナシ

三 異議ナシ

但シ自衛武器ハ携行差支ナキモ政廳側ヨリ貸與スルコト困難ナルニヨリ日本側ニ於テ準備セラレタシトノコトニ依リ之ヲ承諾ス

(B) 未解決事項

(イ) 澳門政廳側ノ處置

五、ニ關シ總督ハマニウツエスト（積貨表）ハ「ポルトガル」船以外ハ差出難シト主張シ我方ニ於テハ澳門ヨリノ就航船全部ノモノヲ要求シ圓滿ナル解決ヲ得ス更ニ海軍側田尻中佐ト經濟

局長ニ於テ協議決定スルコトトシ未決定案トセリ

六、ニ關シ總督ヨリ澳民ノ生活及澳門ノ食糧政策ヨリシテ澳船ノ夜間航行ヲ許可セラレ度旨申出アリ我方ハ此ニ對シ從來澳船ノ行動密輸ニ關係アルモノ尠カラス此ヲ取締ラサレハ密輸防止ノ徹底困難ナル實情ヲ説明シ此カ航行禁止ヲ要求セシモ總督ハ純理論ヲ持シテ譲ラス結局田尻中佐ト更ニ協議決定スルコトトシ未決案トナレリ

(五) 本件ノ實施ニ當リ更ニ澳門連絡機關ヲ強化スルノ必要生シタルニヨリ軍ニ於テハ九月二日渡集作命甲第四四號ヲ以テ憲兵准士官以下六名ヲ増加シ澳門連絡機關長ニ敵性排除特ニ對敵交易並ニ密輸取締協力ニ關スル新任務ヲ附與シ實行ニ移ラシメタリ

0921

報告先 總 軍、(參謀本部、陸軍省へ參考迄)

譯文

別紙

昭和十六年九月五日

澳門總督

ガブリエル、モウリシオ、アキセイラ

澳門日本帝國領事館

藤井領事 殿

願啓、貴方公文審翰竝ニ同審ニ添附ノ旨、記シ有リタル添附覺書正ニ領收仕候、

右ニ對シ、該添附覺書申入事項ニ從ヒ、同八月二十七日付貴公文審翰

ニ依ル御提案ヲ小官受諾致シタルヲ此處ニ申述フルヲ欣快ニ存候、

此處ニ本審ヲ呈スルハ、唯單ニ御提案受諾ヲ御通知申上ルニ止ラス、

其ノ間小官ノ所懐トスル純正ナル諮詢精神ノ存在スルヲ御感知賜ルヲ

0922

0923

得ハ小官幸甚ノ至リニ存スル次第ニ御座候、右賜詞精神ハ常ニ小官ニ
賦與セラレ有リ、日本當局ト小官ノ間ニ常ニ交換セラレアルモノニテ
相互ノ尊敬ト了解ノ間ニ日葡兩國間ノ歴史の友好關係ヲ強化シアルモ
ノニ御座候

小官ハ此ノ徳ニ再ヒ貴官ニ對シ敬意ヲ表シ候

敬具

Macau, 5 de Setembro de 1941

0924

Exmo. Senhor,

Tenho a honra de acusar a recepcão de V. Exa. desta data e memorandum anexo, e com a maior satisfacão comunico a V. Exa. a minha aceitacão das propostas que acompanharam o officio de V. Exa. de 27 de Agosto ultimo, com a interpretacão do memorandum acima referido.

Alem da aceitacão das propostas, rogo a V. Exa. se digna expressamente informar o seu Governo dos desejos de honesta cooperacão que me animam, os quais, sendo certamente correspondidos pelas autoridades japonesas, farão com que as nossas relacões decorram num ambiente de mutua compreensão e respeito, cimentando assim a tradicional amizade que tem ligado as nossas Patrias.

Aproveito a oportunidade para reiterar a V. Exa. com grande e sincera estima a minha mais distinta consideracão.

A bem da Macao.

O Governador,

(Signed)

Gabriel Mauricio Teixeira

Exmo. Senho J. Fukui

Consul de Sua Magestade Imperial do Japao em

MACAO.

Source: JACAR, “Progress Report on Suggestion and Acceptance of Policies against Hostile Forces Including Promotion of Countermeasure against Macao (Aomen) Government’s Attitude to Smuggling”, C04123881900 Kato Rinpei, Chief of Staff, Nami Group, Ministry of Army, 1941.09.21.

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