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Spatial Concepts and Linguistic Forms : A Study of Case Categorie in Sinhala

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神戸大学博士論文

SPATIAL CONCEPTS AND LINGUISTIC FORMS

A Study of Case Categories in Sinhala

(空間的概念と言語形式、シンハラ語の格範疇についての研究)

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ディリープ・チャンドララール

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by

Dileep Chandralal

ABSTRACT

The principal aim of this dissertation is to establish case relations cognitively and structurally between verbs and their nominal arguments referred to as 'participants' and to define the case marking system in terms of a set of event schemas embracing clusters of event-chains. The concept of network structure in linguistic categorization helps us to capture different constructional variants as well as the whole unity of a category. The main assumption being that abstract grammatical categories are derived from more basic categories related to the domain of physical space, our main concern in this study will be with the interrelationship between such basic categories and extended categories. We will see that the three main source structures , locative ablative and dative, are used time and again for a wider range of expressions, revealing the dynamics of case concepts responsible for the conceptual development and polysemy of case markers. Our data are mainly from Sinhala.

This dissertation has two parts: Part 1 deals with the theoretical back ground; Part 2 pursues data analysis. Part 1 consists of Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Chapter 1 clarifies the purposes of thus study and our approach. Chapter 2 reviews earlier approaches to case semantics. Chapter 3 presents the Cognitive Grammar framework relevant for the study of case categories.

Part 2 starts from Chapter 4, in which I examine how the basic spatial configurations are manifested through the static locative relation. In Chapter 5, we observe how the locative structure is extended to other social, mental and abstract domains, using, for example, container schema. Chapter 6 introduces the general structure and meaning of the ablative and proposes that the ablative can express not only "starting points" but "intermediate paths" also. Chapter 7 examines how various path relations and motion events have evolved along spatial and non-spatial dimensions, such as abstract source, instrument, time and cause.

In Chapter 8, the allative relation is established as the structural template to demonstrate how the image-schematic structure for the dative form is extended to different domains, non-spatial and abstract, expressing non-prototypical and peripheral values. In Chapter 9, what is often called "experiencer subject" construction in South-Asian languages is investigated. It is shown that the experiencer is considered as Ground and marked as a goal expression while the "stimulus" is conceived as Figure in involitive process events. Modal and aspectual developments discussed in Chapter 10 bring out the vast area of abstract concepts or inner world covered by the dative use.

Finally, in Chapter 11 conclusions are drawn and some implications and speculations are offered. It is shown that the prototype model of category structure is of particular significance in tracing the conceptual development of case categories. It is also demonstrated that the networks of categories are established through the presevation of image schemas. This study proves that the methods of language analysis advocated by Cognitive Grammarians are applicable to the analysis of other languages.

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Chapter 1 — Introduction

Introduction

Every language has a set of rules stating the way meanings are transformed into linguistic expressions. In formulating the correspondence between the two levels -- semantic and syntactic --, grammarians built a construct called CASE, whose function is taken to bring up the mappings from cognitive categories into linguistic categories. Our attempt here is to study case distributions and developments at linguistic level, and various processes, which produce such distributions and developments. Taking a cognitive approach, I assume that each case marking expression is a complex category of varied senses. The task to be undertaken is describing all the senses and the implicit relations among them. We believe that these goals cannot be achieved without taking into account some mental constructs and mechanisms that human beings use for reasoning and producing knowledge, many of which are based on spatial-like notions and operations.

Many studies about the semantics of case functions have attempted to present a minimalist account of semantics in terms of a set of core case relations. Anderson 1971, which attempted to relate all case functions to a small number of universal relations, represents a strong hypothesis of case grammar. Starosta 1988 pointed out that by allocating case-like phenomena among various subsystems the grammar is able to limit the case-role inventory to a small, fixed universal set while eliminating redundancy and also to capture important generalizations. DeLancey 1991 argues for one particular approach to case grammar, in which a core set of case roles is defined with respect to a small set of cognitive state-and event-schemas, assuming that it will provide for a principled limitation on the set of universal case roles.

Cognitive linguistic research has largely contributed to the development of a constrained theory of case grammar by assuming that subsystems and sub-meanings should be clustered in a network structure. According to the symbolic view of grammar, one structure is used as a basis for categorizing another. The process of categorization and the structures it produces are very important for our understanding of grammatical categories. Correspondences between different structures and between facets of different structures are established in this process.

The symbolic structures comprising grammar are schematic to varying degrees. A grammatical construction is analyzable as a set of constructional variants and represented as a network of categorizing relationships. It is important to observe that the two principal types of relationship as identified by Langacker(1987) are (a) the relation between a schema and its instantiations (i.e. schematicity) and (b) the relation between prototypical and peripheral values (i.e. semantic extension). However, the two modes of categorization are not disparate but rather interrelated; categorization based on extension, for example, incorporates schematic relationships. Categorizing relationships are thus based on nodes provided by constructional schemas which constitute prototypical variants, semantic extensions, instantiations, or subschemas.

The network structure in linguistic categorization facilitates capturing different constructional variants as well as the whole unity of a category and explains its distributional restrictions and degrees of productivity. A case category is considered to be typically complex, comprising a network of related senses. Cognitive semantics helps us to arrange all meanings of a case in a single network, demonstrating their interrelatedness. That is, by reference to the structure of the semantic network of a case, we can capture variants or sub-meanings of the category and state the relationships among them. This simple but holistic system also captures the relations of the case category to other parts of the clause structure: Distinction between the semantic content of the case and that of verbs, nominal arguments and adverbial expressions is made explicit. Case relations are established cognitively and structurally between verbs and their

nominal arguments referred to as 'participants' or 'actants'.

This study structured within the above-mentioned framework is intended to define the case marking system in terms of a set of event schemas embracing clusters of event-chains. I will depend on a localist hypothesis, which describes the relationship between spatial and abstract uses of case. Localist theory in its most radicalist form attempted to relate all case functions to a small number of universal relations. Accordingly, the spatial uses of the cases representing physical location and movement('location at' and 'movement from/to') are the most basic and 'concrete' situations. All other meanings, abstract or metaphorical, are considered derivable from this 'concrete' manifestation.

Viewing case systems in terms of location and movement fits the billiard-ball model proposed by Langacker(1991) as the archetypal model of thinking about the world and linguistically representing it. A basic concern of cognitive grammar, as we will observe later(3.1), is to characterize grammatical constructs with reference to "idealized cognitive models"(ICMs) that are grounded in everyday experience and basic to the conception of the world. The two sources that give rise to conceptual structures are:

1. the structural nature of bodily and social experience plus
2. our innate capacity to imaginatively project from such basic human experience to abstract conceptual structures. (Lakoff,1986)

As some developmental studies have demonstrated (for example, Slobin 1982), our most fundamental conceptualizations of the world are based on, and revolve around, the activities of discrete entities. Thus, basic events in the world involve entities, location, motion, force, space, time, causation, perspective, etc.(Talmy 1985). Findings in cognitive semantics(Talmy 1983, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, Langacker 1987 etc.) reveal that the kind of mental constructs and mechanisms that human beings use for reasoning and producing knowledge are mostly based on spatial-like notions. Such image-schemata have spatial components, either static or dynamic, of varied levels such as entity-mass, part-whole, container -contained, full-empty, figure-ground, link, contact, force dynamics, path, etc. The ICMs based on these background assumptions are considered to be flexible enough to accommodate non-basic, abstract relations in encoding events linguistically.

1.1 Semantic structures and spatial relations

Space has been studied from different angles in various fields such as Philosophy, Geography, and Physics. Some key conceptions of space can be observed in scientific and philosophic thoughts attributed to Aristotle, Newton, Kant and Humboldt. However, The issue here is not how space is to be characterized, but how human beings use space for reasoning and in handling linguistic means. In particular I will be concerned with how spatial relationships and image-schemas based on them or referring to them are instrumental for structuring multiplicity of meanings.

In this study space is assumed as a universally valid frame of reference for linguistic encoding. The existence of an idealized cognitive model based on spatial location and physical motion is considered as the basic level of conceptualization of events. Event types to be observed here are centered around the three-way opposition of 'in/at', 'from' and 'to'. First, locative relations ('in/at') are established by recognizing some kind of asymmetrical relation between entities. While such locative relations are considered to be primitive and static, the events accompanied by the expression of goal ('to') and/or source ('from') are taken to be complex and dynamic. When the speaker wants to express an entity's departure from a location and its reaching a new location, he uses linguistic expressions of source and goal that appear respectively indicating the origin of motion and the destination of motion. It is admitted that movement in space inherently involves directionality. This directionality of movement is always seen relative to the background in which the spatial orientation of entities is perceived. As Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976 analyzed, motion is the perception of recurrent changes of

spatial relations. We perceive a change of location or orientation of entities. This perception provides a frame of reference for specifying directionality.

However, more complicated configurations are derived depending on the factors such as the perspective taken by the speaker/conceptualize, distribution of attention, subject/object choice, imposition of figure/ground organization and cognitive discrimination between core and periphery case roles or participants. Rather than the objective spatial arrangement between entities, it is the construal of a spatial arrangement by the speaker that determines the choice of linguistic elements. The description of static spatial relations or dynamic movement of entities depends on the way the speaker distributes his attention during the perception of such spatial relations and the particular way he construes the situations.

Talmy(1983) borrowed the terms FIGURE and GROUND from Gestalt Psychology to interpret the process of ordering or arrangement of the asymmetrical relation between entities. Figure was used to indicate the object to be located and Ground the reference object. Some other terms, for example, Trajector and Landmark(Langacker,1987) have been used by different scholars to indicate the same or similar notions. In this study I adopted the terms by Talmy, which are widely used to describe the location and the change of location not only in spatial or physical field but in a wide range of abstract relations also. The location and motion of things, persons, feelings(e.g. love), emotions(e.g. happiness), cognitive states(e.g. memory), sensations(e.g. pain and hunger), possession, temporal relations, manner, reason, purpose and many other abstract situations are linguistically expressed through these spatial notions. Observe the following example:

(3) a. Taatta-Ta taraha giyaa
father-DAT anger went
'It got to him.'

The experiencer__the locus of emotion__is treated here as Ground and specified as Goal by marking for dative case, while 'anger' is taken as Figure or Theme /Mover. Accordingly, the linguistic-cognitive semantics of the utterance is that anger goes to a person specified as a goal, in which the person is affected by the emotion. This represents one particular construal of the situation by the speaker. This has the implication that there are some other possible ways of conceiving and linguistically expressing the event. Now look at the following example:

(3) b. Taatta taraha gatta
father anger got
'Father got angry.'

Here the situation is coded as a transitive event which is apparent in the way the order of constituents is arranged and the way the constituents remain marked or unmarked. The sentence follows the SUBJECT-OBJECT-VERB order semantically corresponding to AGENT-THEME/PATIENT-ACTION. In this case the person is not the locus of emotion; instead, he, as implied by the agentive position, potentially has control over the emotion. We may say that the speaker does not perceive the situation as a motion event in which the orientation of a Figure is typically described relative to a Ground. Notions like reference frame or the figure/ ground organization are particularly interesting, as they refer to space as particular relationships between entities interacting with each other and for that matter provide important clues to identify systems of relationships basic to conceptualization.

In describing basic events in terms of space and motion, we assume that motion events whose internal structures consist of changes of location consist of the following components:

(4) COMPOSITION OF MOTION EVENTS
1. an entity remains in a static location
2. the entity enters the process of dynamic location
3. there is a point where the entity moves from
4. there is also a point where the entity moves to

5. the entity passes through some intermediate points
6. it follows a path which has directionality
7. the entity comes to a static location

Consequently, a linguistic expression characterizing a motion event may describe a particular movement of a Figure with respect to a Ground. A Ground can be the starting point or source(ablative motion), the endpoint or goal(allative motion) and/or intermediate points or path. In an intransitive event that denotes a noncausal relation, a Figure will be the initial participant occupying the subject position of the clause as in (5a), while in a transitive event it will be a noninitial participant occupying the object position as in (4b):

(5) a. The ball rolled into the box
[Figure] [Ground]
b. The child put the ball into the box
[Figure] [Ground]

In these structures only the Ground is marked for directionality. However, at a different organizational level a Figure also will imply directionality and can be perceived as a starting point or an endpoint. Looking into such dimensions will help us to understand the facts concerning subject/object selection and the status of the initial participant in a clause like (5b).

The notion of action chain or causal chain is now famous as one of the cognitive models developed to analyze certain semantic and grammatical constructs pertaining to clause structure. The causal representation of clausal structure first proposed by Talmy(1972, 1976) was further elaborated by Langacker(1987). DeLancey 1985, Klaiman 1988 and Croft 1991 represent a few of some other analyses that used this theory effectively. According to this model, which represents the elements of event structure as objects or participants acting on other objects or participants resulting in a transmission of energy, the initial element and the final element in the sequence are designated as a starting point and an endpoint respectively. Without the help of the analytical tools given in this model, it will be difficult to provide an adequate description of the event structure in (5b). It is important to note that the event in (5a) is inchoative whereas that of (5b) is causative. This causative element which occupies an important place in the event structure in (5b) should be added to the COMPOSITION OF MOTION EVENTS given in (4).

(4') COMPOSITION OF MOTION EVENTS (added component)
8. the event involves entities acting on other entities resulting in transmission of force

Accordingly, in (5b), the initial participant (*the child*) is the starting point and the participant in the object position (*the ball*) is the endpoint with respect to energy flow.

The structure of events is also viewed in terms of conceptually autonomous thematic relationship(Langacker,1991). An autonomous thematic relationship of motion will occur without any involvement of energy transmission. Therefore, certain changes of state or location can be conceptualized without the force-dynamic factor. (3b) and (5a) considered above represent cases of such an autonomous thematic relationship.

Both of these perspectives have a profound impact on the description of clause structure and grammatical elements. The great difference between the two perspectives lies in directionality implied by them. The concept of action chain allows the speaker to see the event from the action-chain head or energy source to the action-chain tail or energy goal, while in the perspective of autonomous thematic relationship, which has no relation to energy flow, the initial participant of the event will be the action-chain tail. Because of these two different mental paths followed by the speaker, the salient participant in the event conception will be an agent at one time and a theme/patient at another. These salient participants occupy the status of starting points in the sequence of event components and grammatically acquire the subject position in the clause structure. An energy source and a theme in each event conception are usually marked by zero reflecting

their cognitive salience. At the grammatical level they become the unmarked choices for subject and object relations.

While subject and object categories have prototypical values defined by their respective roles as agent and patient, their semantic relations are somewhat schematic due to the involvement of figure/ground organization. Following the thinking of cognitive grammar, we maintain that the basic function of case markers is semantic in nature. Especially the oblique cases serve this purpose. Mostly the subject- and object-marking cases appear to be semantically abstract, their basic roles, agent and theme, being schematic roles. Subject, for example, does not automatically represent an agent. A schematic definition like 'the head with respect to the profiled portion of an action chain'(Langacker,1991, p.309) would accommodate different types of agents and capture the common features of agent prototype. As clause-level constructs, subject and object achieve a certain degree of neutralization with respect to agent-like and patient-like entities. Therefore we will take subject and object as representing the starting point and endpoint of the action chain, and oblique cases as representing other entities involved more or less directly in the action chain.

In a language like Sinhala we find that both relations, subject and object, are subsumed in the nominative case, which enables us to follow the tradition that goes back to the Greeks, making a distinction between the nominative and other cases, namely grammatical case vs. semantic cases. The nominative is typically considered as the case used in isolation, the case used in naming. It is called the 'citation form'. The term 'nominative'(Greek *onomastike*, Latin (*nominativus*) means 'naming'. It appears morphologically unmarked and represents grammatical or syntactic cases which mainly include subject and object relations. We will not overlook, however, the fact that such grammatical cases have semantic or pragmatic basis, which is very relevant for describing meaning and function of cases. Apart from the core grammatical cases, there is a number of oblique cases among which are 'local cases' such as locative, allative and ablative. They are basically semantic cases having a straightforward relationship with semantic roles and presenting 'local' notions such as location, locomotion, source, goal and path.

Our primary concern in this study will be the three oblique cases because of their strictly semantic and inherently polysemous nature. However, a sharp distinction between semantic cases and grammatical cases is not to be made, as there will never be purely syntactic cases in a human language. Also, nobody can reject their conceptual importance reflected in the linguistic structure. We hypothesize that case marking phenomena are highly sensitive cross-linguistically to semantic roles, cognitive factors and the elements of figure/ground organization in varied degrees.

This cognitive model of event structure provides us with ample opportunity to understand that grammatical organization of human language is motivated by the properties of cognitive system including both perceptual experience and conceptual interpretation. The choice of subject/object and other grammatical relations is directly manipulated by the interactional relationship among participants in the event structure, which, as outlined above, would result in the transmission of energy and comes to link up with different types of motion. The mapping of grammatical structures with event types and revealing basic cognitive motivations for such correlations will be a central theme in this dissertation.

1.2 Identifying the derivational relationship between basic and extended categories

Most basic categories that serve as inputs for expressing less concrete concepts include body parts like 'head', 'face', 'back' and 'face', basic human activities like 'do', 'make', 'take', 'hold' and 'say' or movements like 'go' and 'come' and basic physical states like 'sitting', 'standing', 'lying' and 'be/exist'. They are all materially based categories representing propositional meanings. Following the localist tradition, I have chosen for this study spatial location, static and dynamic, including motion events. As I am dealing with case marking, I thought that

spatial location with static and dynamic relations will offer a convenient pool of reference points for understanding the conceptual development of case markers from local functions to a host of abstract senses. Moreover, it has already been pointed out in many discussions that spatial location serves the most frequent source domain for the development of grammatical concepts (Hjelmslew 1935; Anderson 1971,1973; Lyons 1967,1975,1977; Diehl 1975).

The main assumption being that abstract, grammatical categories are derived from more basic categories related to the domain of space, our main concern in this study will be with the interrelationship between such basic categories and extended categories. We examine how linguistic expressions originally used for one basic concept or meaning are extended to also refer to more abstract concepts and relational meanings. We use the term "conceptual development" or "conceptual transfer" to indicate this process which serves to relate purely abstract or more abstract senses to more concrete and material contents across different conceptual domains.

The process concerned involves inputs, or basic categories, and outputs, or extended meanings. Basic categories are said to represent physical objects and states and to refer to the aspects of elementary human behavior, providing concrete reference points for spatial/human orientation(Heine et al. 1991). While some scholars have argued that 'activity' as a prototypical category is more basic than 'space', that is, spatial concepts tend to be derived from concepts representing activities, we maintain the other way round, i.e. that spatial concepts are more basic than other categories, specifically in the area of case marking, as assumed in the localist hypothesis.

Then the basic categories we are dealing with here are Location, Source and Goal. Taking into consideration their salient spatial dimension and relational nature, we can present them as propositional structures in the following way:

Table 1.1 Propositional Structures of Spatial Concepts

Proposition-type	Propositional structure	relational type
Locational proposition:	"X is at Y"	static
Motional propositions:	a) "X moves from Y"	dynamic
	b) "X moves to Y"	dynamic

They may be interpreted as some basic cognitive structures used with implicit referential participants for the expression of spatial orientation. They are assumed to offer primary conceptual source for a network of subcategories or new senses.

While the propositional structures sketched above indicate some basic situations of spatial orientation in highly general ways, a basic category represented by a case marker is recognized as a prototypical category that has a focal, or prototypical sense. Deviation from this prototypical instance is taken to be "an extension". In the locative relation *be-at*, for example, being in a place and contact with a place constitute the prototypical sense. However, "contact" will be optional in some contexts, making the "being at a place" obligatory. In a later situation, however, this optional sense is foregrounded and is likely to develop into a new focal sense. This is what happens in Sinhala when the locative marker denotes only "contact" with a reference object as demonstrated later in our study. This type of process that leads to an extension of the prototype structure is called "prototype extension"(Givon 1989).

According to the prototype extension model proposed by Givon(1989), prototype-like categories are extended through analogy or metaphor. Prototypes are flexible enough to absorb new meanings which are characteristic of new, target domains. For example, as we will see later, in Sinhala spatial concept is used to conceptualize 'possession'. In this case, spatial location, i.e. *be-at* relation is

metaphorically interpreted in the new domain of possession. Location's function as a template for referring to the abstract concept of possession may be conceptually derived from the fact that an entity that belongs to a person is generally found to be located close to the person. The process concerned is introduced as "conceptual manipulation"(Heine et al. 1991).

Thus the deviation from the prototype structure and the acquisition of new meanings may in fact said to be the main features of conceptual development. It is also observed that the conceptual development of linguistic forms from lexicalme anings to a variety of grammatical meanings occurs along a universal and unidirectional path (Bybee and Pagliuca 1987, Heine et al. 1991), of which some common characteristics can be isolated as follows:

Table 1.2 Some Characteristics of the Basic/Extended dichotomy

Basic Categories	Extended Categories
concrete	less concrete/more abstract
physical	nonphysical
lexically rich	more generalized
autonomous	relational
free form	bound form
free positioning	more fixed
relatively infrequent	highly frequent

We will recognize the basic/extended difference according to these semantic and morphosyntactic criteria. In terms of semantics, extended meaning is less concrete, more abstract and more generalized. In similar terms, extended categories will be relational both conceptually and morphologically, while basic categories remain autonomous. Parallel to this development, extended category will appear as a bound form, positionally more fixed, and tending to show high text frequency.

Tracing back to physically based, semantically concrete forms in search of conceptual sources corresponding to case forms is not so difficult in Sinhala because there remain some relics that help us identify the source structure of a given construction. The presence of a case marker, locative, ablative or dative, on the nominal constituent is highly suggestive of the basic category, Location, Source or Goal, respectively. Such morphological evidence together with the constructional features will allow us to identify one of the basic propositional structures mentioned earlier as the relevant template for a given construction-type.

Another significant effect of conceptual development will be brought forth by the analyses to follow: As a result of exploiting one and the same basic category repeatedly for different purposes, there can be a variety of expressions, or construction-types traceable to the same source concept. Each construction-type emerging in this way is associated with a different range of meanings. Thus,we will see that the three main source structures, locative, ablative and dative, are used time and again for a wider range of expressions, revealing the dynamics of case concepts responsible for the conceptual growth and polysemy of case markers. However, the same dynamics will also be responsible for the fact that such different construction-types can overlap in their use, expressing the same kind of semantic content.

Following this cognitive model of case marking, I will first examine how different spatial configurations are manifested through the static locative relation. Next, taking the ablative relation as the basic source structure, I observe how different path relations and motion events have evolved along spatial and non-spatial dimensions. Then the allative relation is established as the structural template to demonstrate how the image-schematic structure for the dative form

is extended to different domains, non-spatial and abstract, expressing non-prototypical and peripheral values. The unity of domains is described in terms of domain mapping and metaphorical transfers directly accounting for polysemy. It is argued that establishing a set of basic schemas will help to formulate a constrained theory of event chains accounting for the basic case marking patterns.

Case relations are used not only for marking the relation between a nominal participant and a predicate but also for indicating the relation between a sub-clause and its governing predicate in complex, multiclausal sentences. Because of this extension and cognitive motivations for it, modern linguistic theory attaches much importance to interclausal syntax and semantics(Foley and Van valin,1984 and Langacker, 1991, etc.). A subordinate clause includes a non-finite verb appearing in a nominalized form. The case marker is added to this non-finite verb which functions as the head of the subordinate clause. In many languages the ablative, the locative and the allative are used in this way respectively to indicate 'since', 'while' and 'until' relations in the temporal and other domains. This kind of development of clausal subordinating markers from case markers can be seen to be extensions of basic cases to the semantic domains of social, temporal and logical relations (Genetti,1986). Viewing semantic development in this way allows us to consider the dynamics of polysemy and recognize its prominence in semantic theory.

I will explore the hypothesis with the data sampling mainly drawn from Sinhala, one of the native languages of Sri Lanka. Data were collected by the author's native intuition and, when necessary, were checked by other Sinhala informants. As another source of data, published materials such as textbooks, novels and newspapers were used. Additional data were also obtained from other Indian languages, and Japanese and English. This work of putting the assumptions of cognitive semantics to the test with the data from Sinhala will show that the most of the proposals and formulations made by the Cognitive Grammar school are not mere speculations but are based on thorough empirical foundations and have definite functional status in representing certain processing strategies for understanding and producing sentences. In this sense, this study, while describing an individual grammar, i.e. the case system in Sinhala, will prove the validity of the cognitive model and reveal a set of universals of case semantics, contributing to the exploration of universal grammar.

1.3 Organization of the dissertation

Chapter 2 briefly traces the history of case semantics from ancient traditions to the modern views. Chapter 3 outlines our conceptual basis, providing a brief introduction to the Cognitive Grammar framework. Chapter 4 will discuss the static locations whereas Chapter 5 deals with the conceptual expansion of the locative relation. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the ablative and path expressions while Chapter 7 examines the conceptual expansion of the ablative. The dative and goal expressions are investigated in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, we observe how the involuntary experiential events are construed as goal expressions. Chapter 10 discusses further extension of the dative into aspectual markers and subordinate-clause markers. The final chapter includes the summary, concluding remarks and further implications. It is shown that the prototype model of category structure is of particular significance in tracing the conceptual development of case categories. It is also demonstrated that the networks of categories are established through the preservation of image schemas. This study proves that the methods of language analysis advocated by Cognitive Grammarians are applicable to the analysis of other languages.

Chapter 2 – Case Semantics: A Brief History

Introduction

The area concerned in this study is case marking, the domain of grammatical relationships between the predicate and the main noun phrase of the utterance. A case is a system of marking nominal constituents for the type of relationship they bear to other parts of the sentence, which can be verbs, prepositions, postpositions, or other nouns. Traditionally the term 'case' refers to an inflectional category. Later it was expanded to cover other categories such as prepositions and postpositions. Consider the following Latin sentence:

(1) Domin-us equ-um consul-i dedit
master-NOM horse-ACC consul-DAT give-PERF.3SG
'The master gave the horse to the consul.'

Here the relationships of the nouns to the verb are marked by case suffixes denoting the nominative, the accusative and the dative. However, these suffixes should not be taken to be the only morphological means for marking noun-verb relationship. A completely different system can be observed in (2).

(2) Sensei ga Toshiro ni hon o yat-ta
teacher SUBJ IO book DO give-PAST
'The teacher gave Toshiro a book.'

Unlike in (1), (2) uses only postpositions to indicate the relationships of nouns to the verb. The former exemplifies inflectional marking while the latter allows us to understand case with reference to other morphological means.

Before reviewing the different treatments of case semantics, let me clarify some terminological points. First, to avoid any confusion, we may need to distinguish among CASE MARKERS, CASE FORMS and CASE RELATIONS. As described above, CASE MARKERS are various morphological means such as suffixes and postpositions used to signal the nature of relationship between nominal constituents and other parts of the sentence, especially the verb. A case marker is taken as a meaningful and symbolic unit. A case marker refers to a concrete domain by virtue of its inherent 'local' meaning. Simultaneously, by virtue of its syntactic relations with nominals, it will evoke, presumably, a less concrete domain. In that case, the union between the two domains is achieved by the case marking expression. Thus the use of case is considered as an adpositional metaphor which usually relies on the local meaning of the case marker.

CASE FORMS are word forms consisting of lexical items and case suffixes. In the sentence (1) each nominal constituent, *dominus*, *equum*, and *consuli*, presents a case form. Case forms express various cases of the lexeme. A set of case forms in which a lexeme appears in various forms constitutes a PARADIGM as in Table 1.

Table 1 Case Paradigm of the Latin Noun *dominus* 'master'

	Singular	Plural
nominative	*domin-us*	*domin-i*
genitive	*domin-I*	*domin-orum*
dative	*domin-o*	*domin-is*
accusative	*domin-um*	*domin-os*
vocative	*domin-e*	*domin-i*
ablative	*domin-o*	*domin-is*

As the Table 1 shows, the case forms of a noun are morphologically marked. The inflections simultaneously represent case, number and gender distinctions. *Dominum*, for example, represents accusative case, masculine gender and singular number. Another point demonstrated by the paradigm is that the case forms and their functions do not always stand in a one-to-one relation. Thus *-i* can express

genitive singular or nominative or vocative plural.

The domain of syntactic-semantic relations between the predicate and the noun phrase are to be called CASE RELATIONS. They are central in providing a link between underlying semantic role concepts and overt case forms. Fillmore's 1968 conception of a genarative grammar adopted such semantic role concepts or 'deep cases' as basic and universal. These 'syntactic-semantic relations' later, when isolated as purely semantic relations independent from noun phrase marking, came to be referred to as semantic roles, case roles and thematic roles.

Semantic roles are further distinguished from, and contrasted with, grammatical relations. The term GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS refer to purely syntactic relations such as subject, direct object and indirect object. A grammatical relation may subsume more than one semantic relation. It is widely known that the subject typically expresses a variety of semantic roles. Observe the following minimal pairs.

(3) a. John slipped on the ice and rolled down the hill.
b. John slipped along the bench next to her.

(4) a. Bill will get re-elected.
b. Bill will defeat him easily.

The subjects in (3a) and (4a) denote patients whereas those in (3b) and (4b) express agentive roles. Such semantic relations, which are subsumed under a single grammatical relation and hence hard to identify by surface morphosyntactic marking, are isolated by semantic tests.

It is also necessary to note that neither grammatical relations nor semantic relations are in a one-to-one correspondence with morphological cases. In Sinhala, for instance, the nominative expresses direct object as well as subject as in (5). As for semantic roles, as (6) shows, both the source and the instrument are expressed by the ablative in Sinhala.

(5) nariyaa kaputaa rawaTa-nawa
fox-NOM crow-NOM cheat-IND
'The fox cheats the crow.'

(6) a. at-in lee e-nawa
hand-ABL blood come-IND
'(There's) blood coming out from the hand.'
b. at-in tallu kara-nawa
hand-ABL push-IND
'(He's) pushing with his hand.'

As we will see later in detail, the Fillmorean case grammar established case relations as constant across clause-types and across languages, independently of linguistic coding patterns. This approach identifies a case relation as representing the same truth-value directly associated with external situations. Instead, the cognitive grammar approach associates a particular case relation to a particular clause-type representing a particular perspective of a scene. Therefore, surface manifestations of case relations as specific grammatical configurations become very important linguistic data in the hand of cognitive grammarians. The case markers are very relevant to the linguistic analysis as they signal sentence-specific perspectives taken by the speakers regarding external situations. This view is related to one of the main assumptions in cognitive grammar: linguistic meaning does not represent external reality directly but equates with conceptualization of it.

However, the idea that the grammatical configuration allows the speaker to view the situation from a particular perspective is not new. Pânini, one of the earliest grammarians in the world apparently had this idea in his mind when he formulated his theory of *karaka* in which the relationship between case and semantic relations was a dominant theme. I will briefly discuss Pânini's pioneering work regarding the domain of case.

2.1 KARAKA: Pânini's theory

Pânini's monumental work known as Astadyayi('eight books')(5th-4th c,BC.)

presented a sophisticated system of grammar on the Sanskrit language. It is recognized that Pânini's functional analysis of word-forms of the Sanskrit has had a great influence for the development of comparative historical linguistics in the West(Cardona,1976). The aspect of Panini's grammar that we are concerned with here is called Karaka theory, which is one of the central themes of his system of grammar.

Pânini has not defined the Karaka concept itself but only provided the definition of six categories of Karakas as listed in (7).

(7) kartr agent
karman object
karana instrument
sampradana destination
apadana source
adhikarana locus

A Karaka, as the name implies, is a 'causal or contributory factor' for the action denoted by a verb such as *patati* 'falls'. For the action of falling to take place, two or three factors are required to be contributory as the following sentence shows.

(8) Vrks-at parn-am bhum-au pata-ti
tree-ABL leaf-NOM ground-LOC fall-PRES-SING
'The leaf falls from the tree to the ground.'

The leaf, the tree and the ground are taken as contributory to the action of falling, and a particular Karaka category is assigned to each factor based on the specific role played by it in bringing out the action. Thus the main noun phrases in (8) obtain the categories as follows:

(9) NP KARAKA
leaf kartr(agent)
tree apadana(source)
ground adhikarana(locus)

While the assignment of these categories are based upon semantic roles, the Karakas are directly involved with the morpho-syntactic manifestations of the utterances. The Karaka classification provides the guiding principle for the choice of verbal and nominal suffixes.

According to the Indian philosophy of language, all words are considered to be analyzable into atomic elements called *dhatu* 'roots' or 'bases' and *pratyaya* 'affixes' or 'inflections'. A root or a base cannot be used directly without adding some affixes or inflections. *parna* ('leaf') takes *-am*, the suffix for the first case of an inanimate nominal stem, corresponding with 'nominative' in the Western grammar, which is motivated by the contributory factor or Karaka of Kartr (agent). *vrksa* ('tree') takes the *-at* suffix of the fifth case corresponding with 'ablative' by virtue of being the point of departure for falling. The stem *bhumi* ('ground') is supposed to represent the locus of the falling leaf and hence realized with the *-au* suffix of the seventh case for the nominal stem, which corresponds with 'locative'. Thus the case inflections become the primary means of expressing karakas. The case system (*vibhakti* 'division') of Sanskrit consists of eight items, which are arranged in an accepted order and named after ordinal numbers as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 Sanskrit Case System as represented by the nominal stem *deva* 'god'

CASE NAME	WESTERN NAME	SINGULAR FORM
First Case	nominative	devah
Second Case	accusative	devam
Third Case	instrumental	devena
Forth Case	dative	devaya

Fifth Case	ablative	devat
Sixth Case	genitive	devasya
Seventh Case	locative	deve
Eighth Case	vocative	deva

This association of cases with Karakas may create the wrong impression that there is a one-to-one correspondence between cases and Karakas. Look at the following list of cases corresponding to Karakas, which reveals the fallacy of such a conception.

(10) nominative — kartr (agent)
accusative — karman (object)
instrumental — karana (instrument)
dative — sampradana (destination)
ablative — apadana (source)
locative — adhikarana (locus)

Obviously two cases, vocative and genitive, are missing from this list. The vocative by any measure cannot become a contributory factor to the action denoted by the verb and therefore cannot bear a Karaka status. Next, the genitive was excluded by Panini from the Karaka categories, isolating it as *sesa* ('the remainder'), because it does not imply a causal factor of an action. While Karakas encompass relations between entities and an action, the genitive expresses a relation between an entity and another or, at the syntactic level, a connection between two noun phrases as in (11).

(11) Rama-sya putra-h vrks-am chinna-ti
-GEN son-NOM tree-ACC cut-3pSING
'Rama's son is cutting the tree.'

The noun of the genitive form qualifies another noun in that the former designates an entity relating to the latter, thereby making explicit the possessor-possessed relation.

Another fact to be noted regarding the case-Karaka relation is that the nominative, which syntactically denotes the subject relation, is not necessarily in a one-to-one correspondence with the Kartr Karaka or agent. Observe the following active-passive pair:

(12) a. devadatta-h odan-am pacha-ti
-NOM rice-ACC cook-3pSING
'Devadatta cooks the rice.'
b. devadatt-ena pach-ya-te odana-h
-INST cook-PASS-3pSING rice-NOM
'The rice is cooked by Devadatta.'

In (12a) the nominative-marked noun holds the Katr Karaka or agentive relation while its passive counterpart in (12b) has the nominative-marked noun to denote Karman Karaka or object relation. (The state of affairs points to the fact that the term 'patient relation' will be more appropriate than the 'object relation' commonly used for the Karaka of Karman.)

Though some modern interpreters tend to see the Karaka categories as purely semantic, Pânini was not so naive as to define Karakas in terms of simple semantic categories. His approach was more sophisticated to include syntactic-semantic and other possible considerations in defining the Karaka categories with an extended sense. A discussion of the usage of Karaka categories in their extended senses will further illuminate Pânini's Karaka theory.

As we have already observed, the locus for the occurrence of an action is usually called Adhikarana and marked for the Seventh Case or locative. But the same locus can be marked as Karman, the object or patient, with some morpho-syntactic variations such as prefixing the verb with a particular preverb as in (13).

(13) si (lying) > adhi-si (on-lying)
stha staying > adhi-stha (on-staying)

as (sitting) > adhi-as (on-sitting)

Now compare the following pair of sentences:

(14) a. Bhuum-au aas-te Devadatta-h
ground-LOC sit-3pSING -NOM
'Devadatta is sitting on the ground.'

b. Bhuumi-m adhya-aas-te Devadatta-h
ground-ACC PRE-sit-3pSING -NOM
'Devadatta is sitting on the ground.' or rather 'Devadatta occupies the ground.'

While *bhumi* refers to the location in both sentences, the nominal stem with the locative inflection in (14a) is interpreted as expressing Adhikarana or locus, and the nominal stem in (14b) takes the accusative inflection by virtue of the prefixed verb and is interpreted as denoting Karman or object/patient. Conceptually, it will be equal to say that (14a) treats the ground as the location of Devadatta's sitting whereas (14b) treats the ground as an entity affected by his sitting. While the sentence in (14a) has assigned the typical role for the locative phrase, the prefixed verb in (14b) has advanced the locative to direct object, making it an affected entity. This, I believe, clearly shows that conceptualization of meaning can work independently from objective reality in linguistic encoding. Broadly speaking, then, Karakas are not mere semantic relations but covert conceptual relationships holding between nominal substances and verbal actions.

This variational approach of Pânini allowed him to adopt a sentence-specific conception of entities, disregarding the traditionally accepted classification of entities as animate and inanimate. He included both Devadatta, a human being and the axe, an inanimate entity in the same Karaka category of Kart(agent) as (15) shows.

(15) a. Devadatta-h vrks-am chinna-ti
-NOM tree-ACC cut-3pSING
'Devadatta is cutting the tree.'

b. Parasu-h vrks-am chinna-ti
axe-NOM tree-ACC cut-3pSING
'The axe is cutting the tree.'

As Vatsyayana, the ancient Indian logitian(c. AD 350) pointed out, the fundamental condition for the Karaka classification is some property or power grounded in things rather than the bare things. This view fits in well with the analysis of force dynamics proposed by Talmy(1988). The view further accounts for such sentences as (16), in which a container has assumed an agentive role, though the typical semantic role assigned to a cauldron is the locus of cooking.

(16) sthali pacha-ti
cauldron-NOM cook-3pSING
'The cauldron cooks.'

The sentence-specific perspective has turned the 'locus' into an 'agent', imposing the agentive template on the situation. So the assignment of Karaka categories is guided by the principles regarding how and in what capacity the things participate in an action or event. This, again, is very close to the position taken by the cognitive grammarians like Langacker(1987) and Croft(1991), both of whom analyze semantic roles along the line of the perceived energy flow within an event.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we can now answer the question 'What is a Karaka?' more satisfactorily. Karaka means a doer or a participant in an action. Not only agent and instrument but recipient, source and, even locus are to be connected with the action by causal relationship. While an agent is directly involved in initiating a causal sequence leading to a physical activity, some other entities also participate in the action performing a special functional activity. For example, when Devadatta intends cutting the tree, he picks up an axe, swings it at the tree repeatedly making contacts and, finally may let the tree fall over. Out of this causal sequence, the speaker selects some entities as causal participants and

attributes to each of them a particular functional power. Then the speaker makes grammatical decisions in order to package his conceptualized event into a linguistic form. Based upon the causal roles or Karaka categories he selected, the speaker fixes on a particular clause-type and uses appropriate verbal and nominal inflections to create a coherent linguistic expression.

Looked in this way, Karakas essentially bring out the connection between meanings of grammatical categories and semantic elements. The Karaka theory provides a list of causal factors or semantic roles which are necessary to describe each participant's involvement in the causal and clausal relationship. A Karaka is, then, not only a causal factor but also that which is syntactically connected with the verb form through case-inflections and hence a necessary part of clausal structure.

Pânini's notion of Karaka categorization is not a rigorous linguistic theory based on an in-depth analysis of syntax and semantics. The Karaka description in Astadhyayi gives us just the bare skeleton of his theory. Because of its descriptive inadequacy, the theory has remained ambiguous and controversial, letting the dispute over the exact nature of the Karaka categories be aflame from time to time. The Naiyayikas(logicians), for example, argued for the authority of semantics (*'artha*) while the Vaiyakaranas(grammarians) were concerned with the dominance of syntax(*'sabda*).* What is indisputable is the deep insight into human language the great scholar showed two millennia ago.

2.2 Greek Tradition

The traditional notion of case can be traced back to the Greeks. In Ancient Greek as well as Latin apparently case marking and number marking were fused together. As a result, each stem had two separate paradigms for Singular and Plural. There was also gender distinction: feminine nouns and masculine nouns showed different declensional patterns. Because of this fusion of case, gender and number, cases were described in terms of case forms rather than stems and suffixes.

The term 'case' (from Latin *casus?*) is a translation of the Greek *ptosis?* 'fall'. What is meant by 'fall' is a falling away from a standard form or a 'base' form. Term originally covered the forms of both nouns and verbs falling away from base forms. The nominative was considered to be the base of nouns while the first person singular of the present indicative was taken to be the base of verbs. The same idea can be seen in the origin of the term 'declension' used in referring to in flectional classes, which literally means 'bending down or aside'. Aristotle distinguished among nouns (*onomata*), verbs (*rhemata*) and 'linking words' (*syndesmoi*) and included all these forms, even adverbial derivations in the category of *ptosis?* While *onomata* (nominative) and *rhemata* (indicative present) were base forms, all derivations from such base forms were considered as cases.

Later the term 'case' departed from this wider meaning and came to indicate only nominal inflections. Dionysios, who authored the first treatise in the western grammar gave five cases, all of which are nominal inflections. The five cases were the right, the generic, the dative, the accusative and the vocative. The right case (*ptosis orthe?*) also called the direct case (*ptosis eutheia?*) was the nominative (*ptosis onomastike?*). Other cases were inflected cases, which were called *ptoseis plagiai?* 'slanting' or 'oblique cases' by early Greek grammarians, namely *generike?* 'genitive', *dotike?* 'dative' and *aitiatike?*'accusative' plus the newly recognized vocative case. As the list shows, by the time of Dionysios(c.100BC), the case category was no more confined to the inflected or oblique cases but had widened its scope to include direct case also. Another case, the ablative was added to the list at the stage of translating the Greek case labels into Latin. The term

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* For a detailed description of the synatactic-semantic dispute over the nature of the Karaka categories, see Matilal 1990.

'accusative' is considered as a mistranslation of the Greek *ptosis aitiatike?*, which means 'that which is caused or effected'. However, the other meaning of *aitia*, namely 'accusation', was taken to be the matter in the Latin translation '*accusandi casus*'(Robins,1967).

An important feature emerging from the case classification is the formal distinction between the nominative and the oblique cases. The nominative appears morphologically unmarked while other cases are marked and inflected. Originally, the nominative was used to denote a bare entity, in isolation, even outside clausal construction. However, when used inside the structure of a clause, the nominative expresses subject and topic. Greek grammarians referred to this part of the clause as *onoma* 'name'. The remainder or predicative part was called *rhema* 'saying', which included oblique cases bearing varied semantic roles.

The nominative was given the first place in the ordering because of its status as the case of subject. The oblique cases were taken as representing localistic relationships, i.e. the genitive as the case of source, the dative as the case of the resting point and the accusative as the case of goal. According to this view, the ordering of Greek cases is not to be taken as accidental. The vocative took the final place in the ordering because it did not fit in with this semantic system. Original semantic motivation was later obscured when the ablative, which did not exist in Greek, was added as the sixth and final case in the Latin grammar(Welte,1984).

2.3 Fillmore's Case Grammar

Fillmorean approach to case roles deviated from the contemporary Transformational Grammar in some important ways. The main purpose of 'The Case for Case' (Fillmore,1968) was to establish a set of semantically defined case roles, which he believed to be universal and innate. He claimed that the grammatical notion of 'case' deserves a place in the base structure of the grammar. In this base structure, concepts like 'subject' and 'direct object', which were 'regarded as proper only to the surface structure of some (but possibly not all) languages' (Fillmore, 1968:3), do not take an important place. Instead, case relationships like 'agent' assume a prominent role as primitive terms of the theory.

Two basic assumptions which Fillmore considered to be essential to the development of the argument are (1) the centrality of syntax and (2) the importance of covert categories. The concept of 'covert categories' allowed to think that there are great commonalities at the bottom of of all languages; involving nouns and the related structures are many semantically relevant syntactic relationships. They are in large part covert, but are empirically discoverable, not mere objects of speculations.

Following Hjelmslev, Fillmore offered to abandon the idea that 'an essential characteristic of the grammatical category of case is *expression in the form of affixes or substantuves'* (Fillmore,1968:21). For Fillmore, such an expression meant to be a *case form*. Thus the term *case* used to identify the underlying syntactic-semantic relationship is to be distinguished from the case form.

Fillmore adopted the 'conceptual framework' interpretation of case systems, according to which basic case roles 'identify certain types of judgements human beings are capable of making about the events that are going around them, judgements about such matters as who did it, who it happened to, and what got changed'(Fillmore,1968:24). The proposed set of cases and their definitions are:

Agentive (A): the case of the typically animate perceived instigator of the action identified by the verb.
Instrumental (I): the case of the inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb.
Dative (D): the case of the animate being affected by the state or action identified by the verb.
Factive (F): the case of the object or being resulting from the action or

state identified by the verb, or understood as a part of the meaning of the verb.

Locative (L): the case which identifies the location or spatial orientation of the state or action identified by the verb.

Objective (O): the semantically most neutral case, the case of anything representable by a noun whose role in the action or state identified by the verb is identified by the semantic interpretation of the verb itself; conceivably the concept should be limited to things which are affected by the action or state identified by the verb.

Fillmore's case grammar maintained that the case roles assigned to NPs would remain constant through transformations. According to this view, cases can not be interpreted as matched by surface-structure relations. Following are some of the examples given by him:

(17) John opened the door.
(18) The door was opened by John.
(19) The key opened the door.
(20) John opened the door with the key.
(21) John used the key to open the door.

Fillmore clearly stated that *John* is the agent in (17) as much as (18), *the key* is the instrumental in (19) as well as in (20) and (21). Despite the fact that the surface grammatical status of NPs varies, their deep semantic role always remains invariant.

Originally Fillmore assumed that each NP in a sentence could bear one, and only one, case role. Accordingly a predicate cannot assign the same case role to different NPs in a sentence. Each noun is associated with a label identifying the case relation it holds with the rest of the sentence. Verbs are selected according to the case environments provided by the sentence and specified as lexical features. The name given by Fillmore to such representations is 'case frame'. Verbs can assign some optional case roles, which are placed in parenthesis in the case frame. It is observed that the verb *open*, for example, can occur in the following case frames, based on the corresponding sentences:

(22) The door opened. [____ O]
(23) John opened the door. [____ O + A]
(24) The wind opened the door. [____ O + I]
(25) John opened the door with a chisel. [____ O + I + A]

The frame feature for open was given as in (26).

(26) + [____ O (I) (A)]

With the frame feature given in (26), it was possible to represent related transitive and intransitive verbs without giving separate semantic entries.

Fillmorean case relations are identified without any necessary connection with surface representations of the sentences. The case relations emerging from the previously established case environments do not necessarily correspond with surface representations. Since case relations remain invariant across constructions, two deep cases may be represented in the same way in a surface structure. While observing various mechanisms involving the selection of overt case forms, Fillmore observed that there is a general preference regarding the way case roles appear overtly in the subject position. He proposed a general rule for the 'unmarked' subject choice as follows:

(27) If there is an A, it becomes the subject; otherwise, if there is an I, it becomes the subject; otherwise, the subject is the O.

This can be seen as an attempt made at an earlier stage to propose a hierarchy of case relations or thematic relations.

Fillmore further showed that Sapir's typological distinctions for American

pronominal systems can be expressed in case grammar quite simply. Focusing on the two deep structure cases of Agentive and Objective, he demonstrated that one can imagine sentences of the following three types:

(28) (a) V + A intransitive sentences with active 'subjects'
(b) V + O + A transitive sentences with agents
(c) V + O intransitive sentences with inactive 'subjects'

By identifying two distinct sets of intransitive verbs, one with active subjects or underlying Agentive case (V + A), and the other with inactive subjects or underlying Objective case (V + O), Fillmore indicated the phenomenon of what later came to be known as 'split intransitivity'.

Having appraised the pioneer work of Fillmore, we should now admit that his theory of semantic roles did not provide adequate details needed for the semantic description of verbs and the semantic representation of particular construction types. Further, since case relations were assumed to be established on the basis of the valence description of individual verbs, irrespective of the particular way in which the event is linguistically coded, his theory seems not to have paid much attention to other independent means for corroborating the determination of case roles.

Fillmore's theory assumes that case categories exist in cognition independently of language, and these primitive cognitive categories are used by the speaker to convey meanings through sounds and syntactic representations. Later, in his 1987 paper "A Private History of the Concept 'Frame'", Fillmore admitted that there seems to be another independent level of role structure needed for the semantic description of verbs in particular limited domains. This level is accepted to be the cognitive or conceptual one via which a mapping from semantic level to the formal, syntactic one is achieved.

Another problem with the Fillmorean approach to the case analysis, as pointed out by Stanley Starostra, concerns examples of the type given in (29), which are widely known as 'spray paint' sentences.

(29) a. John sprayed paint on the wall.
b. John sprayed the wall with paint.

Fillmore gave such sentences as examples for the phenomenon called objectivalization, which has the effect of affecting deep structure case distinctions. Fillmore assumed that both phrases *on the wall* and *with paint* were initially provided with prepositions, i.e. were assigned with case elements of the Locative and the Instrumental respectively. The verb *spray* or *smear* has the capacity of converting the original case to the objective. According to this view, no distinction is made between one structure as basic and the other as derived, and there is no independent way to establish one form as the underlying representation. Once again we find here the difficulty caused by the direct association of case categories with pre-assumed, extra-linguistic, categories and taxonomies of real-life situations.

2.4 Anderson's Case Grammar

John Anderson(1971, 1977), adopting a localist standpoint, attempted to formulate a grammatical framework within which case relations, their occurrences in underlying representations and their surface manifestations were to be captured with their syntactic and semantic motivations. Anderson took a very abstract view of CASE and evaluated the relations contracted by nouns, interpreting various non-spatial relations as based on locational and directional structures.

Anderson(1971) proposed to introduce case relations in accordance with the subcategorization of the predicate and not vice versa. A set of constraints to be captured in a straightforward way by the use of feature notation was established on the notion of predicate. The features shown in (30) were associated with predicates.

(30) V ———> [loc, abl, erg, abs]

The rule implies that different predicate types, associated with a different set of case features, correlate with a different array of cases. Such categorization rules specify the character of the dependents that different kinds of predicate require. All nodes, which depend immediately on a predicate, are specified as 'cases'. The four features represent a set of universal 'case relations'. The overall view of grammar presented in this analysis is that constraints are uniformly required of dependents by their governers, and casehood is an automatic concomitant of dependence on a predicate(Anderson,1977:98).

According to the contrastive criterion advocated by Anderson, distinct articippants of a predicate are to be associated with distinct case relations, that is, case relations must contrast in their destribution. In the following sentence, which includes the all four participants, each is obviously associated with a distinct case relation, namely erg, abs, abl and loc, respectively.

(31) Roger sent the parcel from Cuxhaven to Edinburgh
[erg] [abs] [abl] [loc]

A case relation which introduces an instigator or a source of action (*Roger* in(31)) is erg whereas one representing a participant that is 'placed' with respect to a place (*parcel* in (31)) is abs. What represents an initial place or source (*from Cuxhaven*) is abl. The case relation loc introduces a place (for instance, *on the table* in (32)), or it can be a terminal place or goal like *to Edinburgh* in (31)).

(32) Roger kept the parcel on the table
[erg] [abs] [loc]

As evident from this discussion, the case relation abl labels a separate node, and together with loc it can make a simple directional sentence like (33).

(33) The ball rolled from the door to the window
[abs] [abl] [loc]

While from indicates the abl NP, to is not taken to indicate a separate case node. Anderson's analysis identifies 'PLACE' and 'GOAL'; the potential case relation 'allative' is taken as a loc. In a simple directional sentence like (33), the verb is subcategorized as [abs, abl, loc], not as [abs, abl, all].

According to Anderson's strong localist claim, the inventory of case relations is limited to four, and they are universally distinguished in terms of the distribution of two directional components of PLACE and SOURCE, as indicated in (34).

(34)

abs	loc	erg	abl
	place		place
		source	source

From this classification, it is observed, the following semantically natural sub-groupings will emerge.

(35) abs = [case], loc = [case] , erg = [case] , abl = [case]
[place] [source] [place]
[source]

Accordingly, loc and abl are grouped together as place relations and erg and abl as sources. This means that erg is the source of an action while abl the source of a spatial trajectory. However, the non-sources, abs and loc will be goals only in the presence of erg and abl respectively, that is, the goal of action and the spatial

goal. Thus, interpreting case relations according to syntagmatic contrast becomes one important characteristic in Anderson's case grammar.

Another consequence of adopting a minimal inventory of case relations is that all other putative case relations must represent contextually determined variants of the four case relations or combinations of a case relation with other elements. As an instance of the first possibility, the pair in (36) was given by Anderson(1977:120).

(36) a. Someone has built a filling station on the site
b. There is a filling station on the site

The factitive or object of result represented by the phrase *a filling station* in (36a) is appropriately reduced to a contextually determined variant of abs, specifically abs in a positively oriented existential structure like (36b).

Case relations associated with participants of some predicates represent combinations of different case relations. The semantic relation typically known as 'experiencer' belongs to a combination of loc and erg, defining a distinct subset of predicates. Anderson proves that 'experiencers' are both loc and erg by showing that they have sharing properties with both. 'Experiencers', for instance, behave like ergs, being modifiable by adverbs like secretly:

(37) a. Sharon secretly visited the Principal
b. Sharon secretly liked the Principal

In this sense, they are contrastive with human abs NPs:

(38) * Sharon secretly fell over

'Experiencers' resemble agents in being preferably human and being preferred over abs as subjects. They share with loc participants in the implicational relationship holding between goal and location. Compare the pairs in (39) and (40):

(39) a. Sharon knows the truth
b. Shirly has told the truth to Sharon
(40) a. The parcel is in the room
b. Shirly has taken the parcel into the room

Accordingly, combined case relations like 'experiencers' can be shown to be non-contrastive; they do not contrast with either erg or loc, and hence are considered to be associated with a distinct set of predicates.

On the other hand, as Anderson's case grammar approach does not advocate a one-to-one constraint on CR-argument mapping, it is allowed that a single argument would bear more than one case relation. Directional sentences like (41) were given by Anderson(1987:110) to clarify the point:

(41) a. The pencil rolled across the floor
b. Frances rolled the pencil across the floor
c. Frances rolled/strolled across the floor

The subject in (41a) and the object in (41b) bear the same case relation, abs as both participants introduce a 'moving object'. The subject in (41b), on the other hand, represents 'source of the action' and, hence, is erg. But the subject in (41c) can be taken as representing both the 'moving object' and 'source of the action' and, therefore, it is appropriate to assign this single argument the dual case relation - erg and abs. The assignment of dual case relation is a phenomenon different from that of combined case relation noted above. The case of dual case relations helps us to capture the generalizations governing impersonal passives and unaccusative predicates, which are not to be pursued here.

Anderson's localist approach, like other localist hypotheses, claims that the representation of spatial relations forms the template for semantic relations in general: 'abstract' domains are structured in terms of local case categories. This priority of concrete uses of case relations agrees with the proposal that the elements of underlying representations as well as the constraints on the derivations associated with them, have a cognitive basis, specifically in our perception of relations between objects in space(Anderson,1977:116-17).

Anderson(1971) has provided an in-depth analysis of some clauses that are

regarded as containing 'abstract' locations in order to propose that certain non-spatial phenomena can be explicated in such terms, i.e. as 'abstract' locatives. Following sentences were given as clauses with a type of abstract locative:

(42) Many people know part of the truth

(43) Part of the truth is known to many people

Anderson proposes that the noun phrase in the subject position, i.e. *many people* in (42), which is clearly not ergative as proved by the impossible sentences such as * *Know part of the truth* and * *He knew the language with the help of grammar*, is identifiable as a locative. Then, the two sentences (42) and (43) are interpreted as having a single underlying structure in which 'part of the truth' is 'located with respect to' 'many people' while the verb *know* is regarded as locative like *contain* in terms of the semantic representation governed by the V.

Together with *know* clauses, some other clauses containing *understand, need, hate, love, like*, etc. known as 'affective verbs' are also regarded as locative. It is reminded that many such English verbs which now take nominative or subject-ivized locative appeared with dative phrases at an earlier stage in the history of language. Many languages like Georgian and Sinhala still preserve the locative phrases morphologically marked as dative with such verbs.

Anderson further provides strong evidence for the localist hypothesis, taking what Fillmore(1968) calls datives and 'indirect objects' as related to the 'spatial' directional locatives and to some of the 'abstract' non-directional locatives. Look at the following Fillmorean datives:

(44) a. John sold the book to Mary

b. Mary bought the book from John

It is assumed that the 'merchant' CR is an abl while the 'customer' CR is a loc. Presumably, (44a) and (44b) differ in whether the 'merchant' CR or the dative 'customer' becomes an agent. Anderson shows that syntactic and semantic phenomena associated with these sentences are parallel to the 'spatial' directional locations, specifically to 'displacement' directionals like (45).

(45) The ball rolled from the door to the window

Similarly, the pair in (46) shares its syntactic and semantic properties with 'extention' directionals like (47).

(46) a. Mary has taught French to John

b. John has learnt French from Mary

(47) The fog stretches from Edinburgh to Stirling

For instance, (46a) does not imply that Mary no longer knows French. Such an absence of implicational relationship is shown to be related to the nature of 'extention' directionals, which is demonstrated by the fact that (47) does not imply that there is no more fog in Edinburgh.

A noteworthy semantic property of these 'indirect objects' is their intrinsic capacity to impose animacy. Anderson uses this semantic value, interalia, to propose that such an 'indirect object' analysis can be extended to superficially transitive verbs like *help, advise, obey*, etc. For instance, the structure underlying (48a) is taken as more overtly represented in (48b).

(48) a. Fred advises his nephew

b. Fred gives his nephew advice

Again, the 'indirect object' retains the dative marker overtly in many languages even though the sentence is superficially simple transitive. Thus, Anderson claims that non-spatial phenomena can be given a localistic interpretation and be characterized synchronically through a set of universal case relations.

Another prominent feature of Anderson's approach is his attachment to the belief that a case relation is always associated with a constant semantic value; he favors a fixed mapping of extra-linguistic roles to case relations. In the sentences like (49) and (50), the 'merchant' CR (*John*) and the 'teacher' CR (*Mary*) are interpreted as abl since the merchant is always the source of the transactions and the 'teacher' is the abstract source of the knowledge.

(49) a. John sold the book to Mary
[erg] [abs] [loc]
[abl]
b. Mary bought the book from John
[erg] [abs] [abl]
[loc]
(50) a. Mary taught French to John
[erg] [abs] [loc]
[abl]
b. John learnt French from Mary
[erg] [abs] [abl]
[loc]

The problems arising from a theory that holds roles constant under paraphrase are solved by using the principle of multiple CRs assignment. For instance, *John* and *Mary* occupying the subject positions of (49) and (50) are erg. Given the multiple CRs hypothesis, they can also be abl and loc, respectively in (a) sentences and (b) sentences. As case relations are interpreted according to syntagmatic contrast, abl combined with erg forces the spatial goal interpretation of the [loc] in (a) sentences, while erg combined with loc accords spatial source interpretation to the [abl] in (b) sentences. Thus, Anderson's Localist Case Grammar is capable of retaining the objective properties of the participants while recognizing variations based on conceptualization by exploiting the multiple case assignment.

2.5 Lakoff and Cognitive Grammar

Revealing the dissatisfaction with the existing models of language analysis, some scholars began to explore an alternative approach to the study of language structure. The most renovative approaches are those of Talmy(1975, 1978, 1983, 1985), Langacker(1987, 1991), Lakoff and Johnson(1980) and Lakoff (1977, 1986, 1987). They all maintain that language structure is a component, and the result, of non-linguistic phenomena, specifically of cognitive processes and that linguistic meaning is a property of mind, not objective reality. Particular attention is paid here to the approach of Lakoff as representative of Cognitive Grammar.

To Lakoff, "the most interesting result in linguistics would be those showing how language is related to other aspects of our being human"(Lakoff,1977:238). He criticizes generative linguistics as a "more powerful" theory in the sense that it advocates that all universals of language are purely-linguistic and that none follow from other facts about the mind and body. At the other end of the theory-continuum are the theories that say that all universals of language follow from, or are special cases of, non-linguistic human abilities. Taking the middle position, Lakoff claims that linguistic universals are largely determined by the experiential factors such as perception, reasoning, the nature of the body, the emotions, memory, social structure, sensori-motor and cognitive development, etc.(Lakoff,1977).

Influenced by the newly established prototype theory, Lakoff claims that rules of language and linguistic categories are part of our overall cognitive apparatus. Unlike the classical theory of categories, the prototype theory holds that human categorization is commonly achieved through prototypes and that categories should be described not as discrete but as having fuzzy edges and graded membership. It was introduced as a theory about how the mind makes sense of the world. Accordingly, categories are to be characterized using cognitive models that are used to make sense of humanly conceived portion of experience(Lakoff, 1986). Such models are of four types:

Propositional Models: They specify elements, their properties, and the relations holding among them.

Image-schematic Models: These are specific schematic images, such as trajectories or long, thin shapes or containers.

Metaphoric Models: These are mappings from a propositional or image-schematic

model in one domain to a corresponding structure in another domain.
Metonymic Models: These are models of one or more of the above types, together with a function from one element of the model to another.

These mechanisms are able to characterize the base structure, to distinguish between central members and non-central members, and to shed light on the links in the internal chains. Central members are recognized faster and learned earlier because they yield PROTOTYPE EFFECTS that facilitate comprehending the category as a whole.

There is another way to comprehend a category: understanding it metonymically in terms of a subcategory or a submodel. Lakoff has demonstrated that the concept of *mother* involves a complex model in which a number of individual base models converge to form a cluster. Diverse base models emerging from the vast complexities of modern life to form the experiential cluster of *mother* cannot be grasped by the classical view according to which, it is possible to provide clear and sufficient conditions for a category like *mother*. When the base models for *mother* diverge and when there is a lack of convergence, we get a variety of expressions like *stepmother, surrogate mother, adoptive mother, foster mother, biological mother, donor mother*, etc. Thus, while the concept *mother* is defined by a cluster of converging base models, one of the cases that give rise to prototype effects would appear as the ideal case.

The subcategories of *mother* given above are considered as deviations from the central case, where all the models converge. They are defined as deviations by convention. When there is a central case and conventionalized variations on it, this category defined by a cluster of converging models is called a RADIAL STRUCTURE. Categories appearing as radial structures are very common in natural language. The basic idea behind the notion of radial categories is that various senses of a given linguistic expression form a radially structured category or a network of minimally different subcategories with a central member to which all others are related through cognitive processes like metaphor, metonymy and image-schema transformation, etc. These radial categories are described in terms of a chaining principle.

Lakoff(1987), following Brugman(1981), uses a case study of *over* to prove the idea that lexical items are natural categories of senses. After establishing the central sense of *over* as the main schema, it is shown that additional senses are linked to the main schema. That is, all the senses of *over* form a chain with the main schema at the center; while the additional senses are part of the chain, some of these senses link to other senses. For example, while (51) is linked to the main schema, (52) with an end-point focus sense cannot be freely added to the main schema or to the related schema of (51).

(51) Sam walked over the hill

(52) Same lives over the hill

In this case the chain with the main schema at the center is extended to include the additional senses like that of (52). The *above* sense as in (53) and the *covering* sense as in (54) can also be included in this link.

(53) The helicopter is hovering over the hill

(54) There was a veil over the face

Another instance of the link is the *excess* sense as in (55), which is based not merely on an image schema, but an image schema plus a metaphor.

(55) The bathtub overflowed

The metaphor involved is not uncommon: AN ACTIVITY IS A CONTAINER. The metaphorical sense in (56) is considered as an extension of a spatial schema, where the trajector is above the landmark.

(56) She has a strange power over me

The metaphorical mapping that applies to (56) is CONTROL IS UP; LACK OF CONTROL IS DOWN. Thus, a radial structure with the main schema occupying the central position and additional senses related or shared with represents a system of varied links. All the noncentral senses are motivated by other senses, image-schema transformations, metaphorical models and principles of linking.

Lakoff(1987) pointed out that natural image-schema transformations play a central role in forming radial categories of senses. They are, by no means, to be arbitrary, but strong motivational factors directly reflecting our experiences. Lokoff hypothesized that our perceptions and mental images are structured by image schemas and that this image-schematic structure allows us to categorize what we perceive and further to fit language to our perceptions.

Lakoff's views of case marking were predominantly shaped by his overall cognitivist approach. Lakoff(1977) has suggested that mapping of semantic roles and grammatical relations is done in terms of prototypical properties. Each semantic role as well as each grammatical relation represents a complex category that includes prototypical properties and schematic values. Prototypical transitive sentences, for instance, exhibit a cluster of properties: VOLITION, CONTROL, and PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY are among the prototypical agent properties whereas THING AFFECTED is a central property of prototypical patient. With these properties as strong determinants of subjecthood and objecthood, the agent-patient-action structures like (57) are taken to be prototypical transitive constructions.

(57) Max broke the glass

However, we have non-prototypical sentences like (58) with a patient appearing as subject even when the verb is non-passive.

(58) This car drives easily

Whereas PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY is normally an agent property, it has become a property of the patient in this situation; THING AFFECTED, the patient's prototypical property is cancelled out. That is, the car is more responsible for driving easily than the agent is. Thus, that the patient word acquires subjecthood becomes a motivated fact.

Let us now see what makes the difference between (59a) and (59b):

(59) a. Mary taught French to John

b. Mary taught John French

THING AFFECTED being a principal factor in determining object relation, *French* is the patient as well as the object in (59a). This prototypical property of patient/object has shifted to the other participant, *John* in (59b, where he is considered to be affected by teaching. *John*, thus, has acquired direct object status by virtue of having this central patient property.

Lakoff suggests that these basic structures are metaphorically extended to many other dimensions. Some examples for such role structures and dimensions are given below:

(60) a. give: giver SPATIAL SOURCE, ENERGY SOURCE
thing SPATIAL OBJECT
recipient SPATIAL GOAL

b. take: taker ENERGY SOURCE, SPATIAL GOAL
thing SPATIAL OBJECT
giver SPATIAL SOURCE

c. believe: believer INFORMATION LOCATION
believed INFORMATION OBJECT

d. occur (to): idea INFORMATION OBJECT
person INFORMATION GOAL

In constructions with these predicates, the choice of grammatical relations is determined according to the roles and dimensions specified by the lexical representations plus context(Lakoff,1977:264-65).

Lakoff rejected formal syntax, formal semantics and transformational derivations, rating them as inadequate to deal with the experiential, imaginative, and ecological aspects of mind or to account for linguistic universals. In summing up, the following can be given as some of the salient characteristics of this approach:

(a) The senses of each expression form a radially structured category, with a central member and links, defined by image-schema transformations and metaphors.

(b) Consequently the meanings of the expressions are represented by image schemas and metaphorical models
(c) Grammatical forms are selected according to role-based perspectives; case roles are not constant across paraphrases. In general, linguistic expressions are motivated form-meaning correspondences, not arbitrary combinations.

In this brief survey in the case literature, I have tried to highlight some predominant views of the case with particular attention to the semantic approaches. All these views together hold that case is a complex category, grammatically flexible and conceptually motivated. In next chapter, I will introduce the theoretical preliminaries on which I have based my approach to case semantics.

Chapter 3 -- Conceptual Framework

Introduction

A main branch of Buddhist logicians known as the Dinnaga-Dharmakirti School in the classical Indian philosophy, which immensely contributed to general epistemological inquiry, maintains that our perceptual(sensory) experience has an element within it that cannot be expressed in words. As B.K.Matilal interprets, the alleged thesis goes this way: "Language captures similarities and shared characteristics between experiences. Hence what is conveyed by a linguistic symbol is the shared or shareable part of the experience. Uniqueness belongs to the particulars or the particularity of the experiencer"(Matilal,1990). If we take this view in its strict sense which is equivalent to the concept of 'ineffability', we cannot expect any language to be universal. However, in a non-strict sense, it will accommodate the universality of human language with its ability to convey the shared experience.

Most classical Indian philosophers who delved into some fundamental philosophical dilemmas and who proposed highly celebrated theses such as the one given above (in its strict sense) were obviously talking about the metaphysical importance of language, which is not our concern at least here. The aspect of language that forms the basis for this dissertation comes from the non-strict version of the above view which is very close to our intuition, i.e., the universal principles of grammar or the principles governing the use of language which are deemed to be shared by all language-users. The French psychologist Paul Fraisse formulated a similar idea about imaginative operations involved in human cognitive activity. As he observes, "a basic law of perception is to minimize small differences (tendency toward assimilation) and exaggerate appreciable differences (tendency toward contrast)"(Fraisse,1964,p.77). Language has an inherent ability and flexibility to unite potentially different instances of human experience into semantico-syntactic similarity, and language-users have universal strategies to develop semantico-syntactic categories such as predicate and argument, tense and aspect, and case markers. These areas of linguistic organization have drawn considerable attention of the linguists trying to elucidate linguistic universals and the mystery of human conceptual system.

This study assumes that case categories as very crucial to such pervasive issues as transitivity and event structure, coding and participant roles, aspectual distinctions and temporal/atemporal relations, etc. and in terms of cognitive functions of generalization and differentiation as well. However, this stance is opent o questions. Firstly, one may think how case categories are so important when there are some languages which do not have a system of noun inflection to overtly mark different case roles. Secondly, even in those languages that have noun-inflectional morphology, case roles may seem to be secondary or intermediary categories carrying some types of residual relations between predicates and arguments. The first misgiving can be attributed to the long tradition in Western European linguistic thinking to treat case as interwoven with morphological forms. This biased treatment may be a legacy of working with highly inflected languages like Greek and Latin over a long period of time.

As for the second point, are case forms irrelevant categories? Definitely, they are not themselves verbs or nominals, but perform a distinct function realizing specific relations which make an obvious link between predicates and arguments in terms of syntax and semantics. This leads to the central issue of the present study which aims at designating basic meaning relationships and their borderlines in different utterances. However, the supreme relevance of this link lies in recognition of the fact that case forms are manifestations of the interaction of categories so fundamental to the relation between constituents/participant roles and predicate semantics including aspectual phenomena.

A systematic description of the semantic roles of the arguments associated with predicates is indispensable for characterizing verb types such as verbs of actions, processes, and states, or verbs of motion, possession, and communication, etc. and clause types such as transitive, intransitive, causative, passive or inchoative, etc., as Case Grammarians have demonstrated. While taking into account the important part played by basic, prototypical linguistic categories and clause-types, we need to examine how these categories are adapted to express varied, new meanings, generating alternate coding-patterns and clause-types. Especially, motivations for assigning the relation associated with a particular participant to one case role rather than the other should be examined by way of making explicit some formal and functional principles governing the distribution of case roles.

3.1 Cognitive Grammar: a brief introduction

We believe that any comprehensive model intended to undertake linguistic inquiry should integrate syntax into wider semantic considerations including the pragmatic dimension of language. In accordance with this conviction I will adopt a basic prototype model of semantics as assumed by the cognitive tradition(Rosch 1978, Talmy 1977,1985, DeLancey 1981, Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987,1991, Croft 1990). We cannot understand the meaning of an utterance unless we understand the structure of experience it presupposes including some background assumptions of the given speech community. From the point of view of perception and production, the meaning of a linguistic structure does not represent the objective properties of the denoted entity but only some subjective aspect related to the entity as well as to the speaker/conceptualizer. Language is not an omnipotent, omniscient tool to penetrate the intangibility of multi-faceted events in real time.

This view assumes that language is cognitively based and, therefore, experientially based. This demands an encyclopedic view of linguistic semantics: while our conception of objects includes a canonical viewpoint, this information is necessarily a part of an encyclopedic characterization of the predicates designating them.[1] What is further accepted within the encyclopedic approach is that not all facets of our knowledge of an entity are equal in status; they form a gradation in terms of their centrality. The centrality of a particular specification is determined in correlation with the extent to which the specification is conventional, generic, intrinsic, and characteristic.[2] According to this view, some facets of our knowledge are central while others are peripheral.

This, again, can be attributed to the relative prototypicality of linguistic structures. Our lexicalization patterns and coding patterns are mediated by a complex conceptual system which can organize categories around prototypes, alter the level of the categorization, move from the prototypicality to the peripheral spheres and extend the category in various directions, etc. Correspondingly, speakers have the ability to view a conceived situation in many different ways and code the same scene in linguistically different ways. In this process, different grammatical constructions and alternative patterns help the speakers to achieve this cognitive purpose of differentiation.

It is hypothesized that every language has its own devices, especially grammatical and lexical mechanisms to describe different viewpoints of a situation. Therefore each linguistic expression should be viewed as means of coding a particular way of viewing a scene. Thus, the content conveyed by a linguistic expression is filtered through the conceptual construal. The content of a linguistic expression is characterized relative to one or more cognitive domains. Cognitive domains may be basic or abstract. Basic domains represent the lowest level in hierarchies of conceptual complexity. A semantic unit characterized relative to a basic domain, in the next step, will provide the base for higher-order concepts

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[1] Langacker(1987),p.123
[2] Langacker(1987),p.159

which in turn will serve as domains for the characterization of further concepts of the next higher level. In this way far-ranging hierarchies of conceptual complexity unfold in the human mind. Such a nonbasic domain, equivalent to an ICM (Idealized Cognitive Model) in Lakoff's terminology(Lakoff 1982, 1987) is introduced as an abstract domain by Langacker(1987).

As all linguistic units are grounded in the contexts of domains, understanding the structures and properties of such domains is basic to an understanding of the entire 'scene' or 'situation'. Though such internal details may vary from person to person, these conceptual structures, or domains are usually assumed by speakers to constitute common knowledge shared by the speech community. Depending on their properties, structures and participants involved, the scenes or situations vary along the line of schematization.

In finding an appropriate linguistic expression for a conceptualization, the speaker turns to a well of symbolic resources called grammar from which he may choose a basic pattern and assemble a symbolic expression. An expression so assembled will conform to linguistic convention embodied in the grammar. To the extent a target structure accords with the conventional units in the grammar, these units are said to sanction this usage.[3] Sanction being a matter of degree, there may appear cases in which the target structure is not fully compatible with the sanctioning unit. Such partial sanction is an acceptable feature of language use. [CHAIR], for example, is purely elaborative as a concept fully compatible with the specifications of the schema [FURNITURE]. [CHAIR], on the other hand, when used to indicate the position of the person in charge of a meeting as in *She takes the chair in all our meetings*, is partially elaborative as a structure deviating from the specifications of the schema and therefore to be characterized in terms of prototypical instances. [CHAIR], a new target structure based on partial sanction and increasingly used to mean chairperson as in *She was the chair of the planning committee* further deviates from the specifications of the prototype. Thus new usages, whether they conform to the existing structures or deviate from them, require the seal of conventionality to pass and become an accepted linguistic expression of the speech community.

Schemas are generalizations that speakers extract from accepted or conventionalized usages. By judging against these generalizations, novel expressions obtain the measure of sanction and conventionality they require. The relation between such generalizations and the target structures are called "schematicity". When using a new target structure, speakers tend to observe some measure of similarity between the sanctioning structure and target structure, overlooking insignificant dissimilarities.

Perception of similarity and dissimilarity between the sanctioning structure (original sense) and the target structure (extended sense) is of central importance in accounting for semantic extension. Many kinds of semantic extensions such as *polysemy* caused by the relation between the central sense and the extensions, *subsumption* in which the specifications of one structure are subsumed by the specifications of another structure, *instance* which obtains when a particular structure is a special case of another structure, and *metaphorical extension* in which a new structure is found to be related to an existing structure by a metaphorical mapping can be attributed to this mental operation called analogy.[4]

Cognitive Grammar considers the mental operation of analogy as fundamental to the description of language processes and also to any theory of linguistic semantics with adequate explanatory power. A closer look will reveal that there is a two-way relationship between the sanctioning structures and the target structures, i.e. specification and extension.[5] In one case, the new structure is

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[3] Langacker(1987),p.66

[4] Goldberg 1992 interprets these four extensions as Inheritance Links. See Goldberg,1992,p.73

[5] Langacker(1987)

considered a more fully specified instance or a particular elaboration of a pre-existing structure. Here the relation forms a taxonomic hierarchy involving superordinate and subordinate nodes. In the other case, the new structure deviates from the specifications of the existing structure. Here the relation with the dominant nodes is more flexible: the speaker identifies some properties of the new structure similar to the prototype and takes it as an extension from the prototype. In both cases, the speaker is allowed to create new schemas by abstracting the points of similarity. In the former case, the schemas of the existing structures sanction the new expressions elaborated into more specific structures through different subschemas. In the latter case, on the other hand, partial generalizations represented in the form of new schemata allow deviation, exceptions and sub-regularities making way for a new prototype category. This capacity of human mind to extract new schemas and to analogize in new directions, and its importance to language change are fully accepted in Cognitive Grammar.[6]

3.2 The Cognitive Grammar analysis of metaphor

There are some unique features of the way Cognitive Grammar views metaphor. One such feature is revealed in the analysis that metaphor is not purely a linguistic phenomenon, but part of a more general cognitive operation. Langer (1942) sees metaphorical thinking as originating from the nature of perception itself rather than from language. Langer states that "Metaphor is our most striking evidence of abstractive seeing, of the power of the human mind to see presentational symbols"(Langer 1948 reprint, p.14). According to this view, original perception of visual experience is an abstractive process, which can be represented through symbolic images. As some linguists have pointed out, the vocabulary for abstract sensations and manners like 'unemotional', 'enthusiastic or affectionate' and 'serious' are often replaced by high-imagery words like 'cold' 'warm' and 'heavy' respectively.[7] Such perceptual processes and their linkage with language provide important clues to the role of cognition in metaphor.

According to Anderson(1964), metaphor is a result of a "conceptual resolution" of disparate elements. Both the comprehension and production of metaphor are generally considered as a cognitive problem centered around the question of how a congruent conceptual entity is evolved from apparently disparate elements. The main problem about metaphor would be to identify the mechanism which relate these two disparate domains.

When put this way, the point suggests another important cognitive problem concerning the nature of metaphor: do the cognitive processes involved in literal language and metaphorical language diverge from one another? Cognitive Grammar claims that the same cognitive processes used in literal language comprehension are responsible for the comprehension of metaphor also. Rumelhart(1979) suggested that for the child, the production of literal and non-literal speech may involve exactly the same processes.

> The process of comprehension is identical to the process of selecting and verifying conceptual schemata to account for the situation (including its linguistic components) to be understood. Having selected and verified that some configuration of schemata offers a sufficient account for the situation, it is said to be understood. As I use the term, a "schema" is taken to be an abstract representation of a generalized concept or situation, and a schema is said to "account for a situation" whenever that situation can be taken as an instance of the general class of concepts represented by the schema.
>
> (Rumelhart, 1979: 88)

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[6] Bolinger(1961) and Langacker(1987)

[7] Rumelhart(1979)

This approach closely resembles with the encyclopedic view of linguistic semantics a ccording to which nonlinguistic knowledge plays an important role in the process of language comprehension from the very beginning.

According to the traditional approach of semantic construction, a set of meanings for the individual lexemes has to be assumed first. Then, a set of rules of composition is used to combine the individual meanings of the lexemes. This combination helps to obtain the sentential meaning. Similarly, by combining the meanings of individual sentences we can approach the meaning of discourse. Thus, the traditional approach advocates the "bottom up" processes leading from smaller component-meanings to larger units for constructing meaning. Conversely, the Cognitive Grammar approach emphasizes the "top down" processes, which use nonlinguistic knowledge including experiences, memories and beliefs as clues to interpret a given utterance. Let us look at the following sentence and how its meaning is constructed within this approach.

(1) The policeman raised his hand and stopped the car.

(example from Rumelhart)

In comprehension of this utterance, the primary task will be to search memory for a schema which can account for the described event. While there are many possible interpretations of this sentence, the most probable picture one might get is of a traffic policeman signaling to a driver to stop his/her car. This interpretation heavily depends on a network of concepts not given by the sentence itself. But the sentence provides access to a scene in which a) the policeman saw a car which was going to pass him, b) the car has a driver, c) the policeman raised his hand for signaling to the driver to stop, and d) the driver understood the signal and stopped the car. Our general knowledge of cars, police service and traffic control, and of the ways of doing things in the real world is very critical in activating a suitable schema and arriving at the interpretation.

Rumelhart argues that the same schema-based notion of the comprehension process is responsible for understanding both literal and metaphorical language. For example, consider the following metaphor.

(2) Love is blind.

What will be the schema capable of accounting for the utterance? In this utterance, the lexical categories providing access to conceptual categories are *love*, the subject term and *blind*, the adjectival predicate. The grammatical category *is* as a copula performs the function of equation between the two conceptual categories. The comprehender understands that 'blind' is more concrete and salient than the abstract concept of 'love'. These structural and conceptual clues indicate that *love* is the metaphorical topic while *blind* is the metaphorical vehicle in this utterance. Discussing the psychological process in the comprehension of metaphor, Paivio(1979) proves that since the metaphorical vehicle functions as a conceptual peg it is processed before the topic in general. Therefore one will tend to scan and select the features of 'blind', the predicate concept, and will apply the schemas suggested by it to the subject concept. The concrete term *blind* will provide rapid access to the information-rich images that will intersect with information evoked by *love*. Thus, the two concepts of a metaphor work together to produce a new concept. The schema generally called to one's mind by the word *blind* directs the comprehender to arrive at the interpretation that love is to be seen as blind.

However, we find that the schema associated with *blind* matches only partially with the topic segment of the utterance. While certain properties like "being unable to see clearly" might belong in the concept of love, other features like "being attributed to muscle or lens" cannot be shown to be true of love. When the specifications of the existing schema are partially compatible with the data in question, the target structure is taken to be metaphorical(See 3.1). As Rumelhart explains, the final stage of interpretation seems to be as follows:

> We say that a statement is literally true when we find an existing schema that accounts fully for the data in question. We say that a statement is

> metaphorically true when we find that although certain primary aspects of the schema hold, others equally primary do not hold. When no schema can be found which allows for a good fit between any important aspects of the schema and the object for which it is said to account, we are simply unable to interpret the imput at all. (Rumelhart, 1979:90)

According to this observation, the comprehension of metaphor involves an attempt of a person seeking to reduce the apparent anomaly, incongruity or 'the unevenness of account' and to grasp a coherent conceptual entity by inferring analogies that are supposed to relate two different domains. The novel integration is achieved by finding a general schema within which a partial identity between the two disparate domains is established. This is in line with the view that metaphor and some other types of semantic change involve a problem-solving strategy. For example, Lakoff and Johnson(1980) view the problem-solving process as the main characteristic of metaphor. Heine et al.(1991) interprets grammaticalization as the result of a process that has problem-solving as its main goal. Traugott and König(1991) argue that metaphor, metonymy and semantic change in general are different types of problem-solving.

However, regarding Rumelhart's observation, it is immediately necessary to enter an important caveat. Although Rumelhart mentions that in the metaphor 'certain primary aspects of the schema hold', it is not necessarily primary aspects that hold; in most cases only some peripheral features of the source domain are preserved in the image-schema transformation(Sweetser(1987) and Givón(1989)). In the semantic change of *be going to*, Givón argues, while motion in time is an ingredient of motion in space, it may not be the core of the prototype of *go*. We are soon to take this example in detail.

With this caveat in mind, I want to turn to other aspects of metaphorical extension which open up fruitful avenues for our investigation. Though we have so far concerned the process of comprehension of metaphor, the schema-based approach is central in regard to production, as well as comprehension, of metaphor because, basically, before uttering a metaphor the language user must first activate metaphorical mapping between the two domains, that is, projecting the structure captured by a schema onto a different domain. Further at a deeper level, metaphorical extension is observed as mapping of more concrete relationships onto the domain of the speaker's subjective perception, especially, of the domains of deontics, epistemics and speech-act verbs.[8]

This brings us to an important qualification. Metaphorical mapping plays a significant role not only in the lexico-conceptual expansion of the type discussed above but also in the development of grammatical functions. Heine et al. (1991) claims that metaphorical abstraction is one of the main driving forces underlying grammaticalization. How metaphor is responsible for the development of grammatical functions is shown by the following example.

(3) a. Henry is going to town
b. The rain is going to come

In diachronic terms, the form *be going to* in (3a) and (3b) is considered to have developed from a single lexical origin, an expression of spatial motion. (3a) retains the literal meaning whereas (3b) has a transferred meaning, expressing future tense. Heine et al. demonstrates that the transition from the verbal action of (3a) to the future tense category in (3b) is metaphorical in nature, mainly for the following reasons:

a) The form *be going to* is literal in (3a) and has a transferred meaning in (3b)

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[8]The hypothesis that meanings tend to become increasingly situated in the speaker's subjective belief state or attitude toward the proposition was proposed by Traugott(1989) as the Third Tendency identified for semantic change.

b) The verb *go (to)* denoting a physical action as in (3a) serves as a structural template for conceptualizing a grammatical notion, that of denoting a temporal deixis.
c) The verb *go (to)* denotes a concrete movement in (3a) while it conveys a concept of the more abstract domain of tense categories in (3b).
d) (3b) involves anomalies or rule violations of the following kind:
(i) the verb *go (to)* is used here with an inanimate subject.
(ii) its use with another verb *come* shows a contrasting deitic direction.
e) The verb *go (to)*, typically associated with a human world as in (3a) is used in (3b), dealing with a world that is not necessarily human.
f) The form *be going to* involves semantic ambiguity, more particularly "homonymy" between the literal and transferred meanings as becomes explicit from a sentence like *I am going to work*.

These observations, though in a simplified way, would show that the transition from (3a) to (3b) is metaphorical in nature(Heine et al. 1991).

Many linguists have examined the role of metaphor in the development of grammatical meanings. Bybee and Pagliuca(1985) proposes that metaphorical extension is one of the important mechanisms in the process of generalization or weakening of semantic content through which grammatical meanings develop out of lexical meaning. Similar views have been expressed by Claudi and Heine(1986), Sweetser(1988), Traugott(1988) and Heine et al.(1991). Sweetser(1988) refers to the unidirectionality of the shift as one important fact explained by metaphorical analysis. Especially the derivation is deemed to be unidirectional when the metaphorical transfer leads to the development of grammatical markers. This is because lexical items referring to 'more concrete' entities come to be used, denoting 'more abstract' concepts. A result of this development is polysemy, traditionally characterized as a complex term, with more than one sense, or with different senses related in some way. With the process of abstraction, the derived category is increasingly used to denote different meanings. The development of such polysemies will be a main concern in this dissertation.

3.3. The Cognitive Model of grammatical structure

Having elucidated some basic assumptions of Cognitive Grammar, we can now begin to examine the possibility of building a cognitive model that includes and orders the myriads of experience in the real world into the restricted area of linguistic constructions. Cognitive processing of human experience for linguistic expression is considered to occur in a very restricted way. Talmy(1985) has investigated how the conceptual models of certain physical and psychological aspects of the world are built into the semantic structure of language. Talmy has p roposed four "imaging systems" of language, each functioning independently to structure a referent scene:

1. Geometric schematization which abstracts spatial and temporal patterns present in a scene
2. Perspective point deployment which allows one to take a particular vantage point out of a range of perspective points
3. Distribution of attention which allows us to direct greatest attention to one or another selection of elements within the configuration
4. Force dynamics which structures language according to the forces that the elements of the configuration exert on each other

What Talmy proposed here is a very comprehensive model covering both visual and kinesthetic aspects of perceptual system responsible for conceptual organization and semantic schematization.

Langacker(1991) proposes a unified conceptual organizing system consisting of two basic models that he calls the billiard-ball model and the stage model. The billiard-ball model assumes that we tend to conceive our world in terms of discrete objects, each of which occupies a distinct location. Some of these objects move around in space, interacting with others through direct physical contact.

While motion is driven by energy, an energy transmission occurs from the initial object called action-chain head to the final object called action-chain tail. The billiard-ball model helps us to describe the characteristics of a prototypical finite clause, and the notion of an action chain adopted here is fundamental to our experience in the world and our conception of events.

The stage model assumes that the role of perceiver is analogous to a member of an audience watching a play in that an observer is capable of attending only to a limited portion of his surroundings at any one moment. A viewer also tends to organize the scene into a setting with a number of interactive participants. As Langacker proposed, certain role conceptions are very basic to the meaning of linguistic expressions and to the characterization of linguistic elements. They are referred to as role archetypes. An *agent* is a person who volitionally carries out physical activity resulting, through physical contact, in the transmission of energy to an external object. A *patient* is an inanimate object which absorbs the energy transmitted via physical contact and thereby undergoes some change of state. An *instrument* is an inanimate object manipulated by an agent to affect a patient; it is the intermediary path or the conduit for transmitting energy from the agent to the patient. To Langacker, an experiencer is a person engaged in mental activity. A *mover* is an entity that undergoes a change of location.

What is obtained by combining certain of these models is the canonical event model as sketched in Figure 1. Langacker points out that "this model represents the normal observation of a prototypical action: from an external vantage point, a viewer observes an energetic interaction between an agent and a patient that occurs within an inclusive setting and that constitutes a single event. The constructs that invoke this conception for the characterization of their prototypes includes such notions as *subject, direct object, transitivity, central participant, clause-level adverb,* and *finite clause* itself'(Langacker 1991,P.285).




Figure 1

This directs us to another important claim of cognitive grammar, i.e. grammar itself serves an "imagic" function. Language uses certain grammatical categories to structure and organize meaning. Accordingly, two different grammatical structures represent two different semantic structures, though they look synonymous, with the same lexical terms. What is to be noted is such lexical terms occupy different slots which are parts of different grammatical organizations. The following pair of sentences is famous as an example for this case:

(4) a. John taught English to Mary
b. John taught Mary English

(4a) with the preposition to highlights the path traversed by the mover, the knowledge of English, in which Mary is the perceived goal, whereas (4b) directs our attention to the resulting state in which Mary obviously receives the knowledge of English. That Mary undergoes a change of state is implied only in (4b) in which she is chosen as patient at the semantic level and direct object at the grammatical level. These two sentences, though traditionally considered as transformationally related, are taken to be semantically distinct in the Cognitive Grammar analysis. The underlying principle is that grammatical structures are symbolic.

Since language has a limited number of grammatical structures, in coding different experiences and events or in coercing them into a particular event-type, symbolicity of grammatical structures will be a valuable asset. Grammatical structures are generous enough to accommodate various events including less concrete relationships. Grammatical structures play a key role in organizing a scene in a particular way, allowing to foreground or background certain aspects of the scene and to view it from different perspectives and realizing one domain in another through metaphor and metonymy.

Our study partly demonstrates that the morphosyntactic structures of utterances can be representative of the substructures of different domains, i.e. properties originally belonging, not to the domain of topic, but to the domain of vehicle. In this process, vehicle is not explicitly mentioned but a selected organizational feature of it is used as a structural template. The idea of bringing correspondences between substructures in different domains into a commonly shared novel concept is very similar to the process of syntactic integration proposed by Langacker(1987), according to which the specifications of one domain are realized in another by virtue of having certain substructures in common.

Based on these the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, this dissertation attempts to build a localist model of case marking. In the other chapters that follow, I examine semantic data as actual instances of human experience expressed through various event-types and construction-types. During the course of analysis, the linguistic-cognitive factors belonging to the conceptual model mentioned above w ill be further illustrated, appreciating their theoretical and descriptive value.

Chapter 4 __ Static Location

Introduction

Each language carries with its semantic code a universe of locations, a conceptual microcosm, highlighting some aspects of it and leaving some other aspects to remain obscure. Although the way of treating space may vary from one language to the next, as research on the space perception of human infants has revealed, the modes of spatial organization that provide the basis for the various spatial distinctions made in any given language are innate and the same for all human beings regardless of language. Accepting space as a universally valid framework allows us to compare how different languages manage to tackle myriads of aspects present in spatial scenes within their limited resource of linguistic elements.

We assume that the concept of space would contain a large amount of information which cannot be evoked by the immediate perceptual experience. The immanent organizational factors of perception will combine with conceptualization a ctivities to generate spatial expressions in natural language. The information process relating perceptually based spatial forms and linguistically realized spatial forms, under study here, will serve as a basis for semantic analysis in general and for exploring the fact that languages differ with respect to the way they segment any given area of experience in particular.

Previous studies of linguistic space include the work of Gruber(1965), Fillmore (1968), Cooper(1968), Leech(1969), Bennett(1975), Miller and Johnson-Laird(1976), Clark(1978), Talmy(1983) and Herskovits(1984). Most of these studies based on English have been mainly concerned with the semantic analysis of prepositions and prepositional phrases. We have benefited from the cross-linguistically applicable concepts and notions proposed by these linguists. Sinhala, which serves as the main source of data for the present study, is a language with nominal inflections, and for that matter its system of coordinates available for spatial distinctions may not be so elaborate as in English. However, this should not be taken as a signal to go ahead along a smooth path. The spatial system of any human language cannot be understood without going through the labyrinth of spatial configurations assembled upon some basic geometric components and schematic abstractions. Considering the very mechanism of language, interpreting spatial expressions cannot be done in a simple, straightforward way. The problem of identifying the in tended meanings of the spatial expressions does exist.

4.1 Organization of spatial elements

In this section I will consider how the spatial elements come to be organized in the spatial system of language. Every spatial construction represents an aspect of spatial scene or situation. There are at least two spatial objects involved in this scene. A locational marking-- e.g. a preposition, postposition or a nominal inflection is used to combine the two main objects, thereby showing the spatial relation: R(x,y), where x is a located object, y is a reference object,and R is a spatial relatio n.Morphosyntactically, the nominal denoting the refer-ence object is marked with a locative morpheme while the nominal denoting the located object remains nominative:

(1) a. The cat is on the mat.
b. Totto-chan wa mado-giwa ni imasu.
c. yatura at-ee tie-nawa
key hand-LOC be-IND
'The key is in (my) hand.'

---

* Locative marking in Sinhala is *-e* or *-ee* for the Singular and *-wala* for the plural.

These morphosyntactic features can be taken as iconically indicating that the unmarked NP, i.e. the located object has a simple geometric character while the marked NP, i.e. the reference object has a greater geometric complexity.

Psychologically, this kind of property difference presupposes that we possess the innate ability to identify a focal object within a broader field whose location is already known, installed in memory and easily recoverable by the participants in the communication. It is in this context that *y*'s function as a reference object serving for a focal object featured as *x* gains upper hand: out of the two, only *y* can help to narrow the domain of search for *x*, not vice versa. The process of "narrowing in" on the immediate environment of an object can be understood as an activity of dividing the spatial scene into subregions. Roughly, a dividing line has been drawn between two search domains: searching for the reference object *y* takes place in the first domain while searching for the located object takes place in a subdomain of the first (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976).

The spatial segmentation of this type is very useful for determining the exact location of an object. The notions of Figure and Ground used in Gestalt psychology were applied by Talmy (1983) to describe the relation between the subdomain and the main domain respectively. Some other linguists-- e.g. Langacker (1987)-- introduced similar notions as Trajector and Landmark. When there are pairs of objects adjacent to each other, the identification of the objects of each pair as Figure or Ground depends on their typical properties and spatial values. We have already discussed some of these characteristics. Some other property differences are given below (For details see Talmy 1983):

(2)

	Figure	Ground
a.	more movable	more permanently located
b.	smaller	larger
c.	more salient	more backgrounded

The basic cognitive-perceptual capacity of the human mind will enable the speaker to make choices concerning Figure and Ground, according to which he will tend to say

(3) The ball is on the table

rather than

(4) The table is under the ball

in normal circumstances. In this situation, as seen in (3), the referent of the nominative NP which is more salient than the locative NP by virtue of being the focal point of attention has become the Figure while the referent of the locative NP, which is not focused upon and hence backgrounded, has become Ground. The sentence in (4) sounds odd because the referent of the nominative NP usually identified as Figure does not show figural properties in this context: a table is perceived to be at least more permanently located compared with a more movable ball and larger than a ball. To any participant of communication who has the cognitive ability to judge what kind of object is to be used as the fixed reference field by which to characterize a visually outstanding object like a table, a ball would not be the appropriate choice. The sentence can make sense, if the ball is not an ordinary one, but a large one anchored to the ground, held by tapes, under which there is a table, smaller in size and with geometric properties yet to be exposed.

The phenomenal inequality in spatial value of two objects, as noted in the preceding paragraph, creates an overwhelming effect in determining the Figure/ Ground relationship, aligning the main domain *y* to the Ground and the sub-domain *x* to the Figure. The central concept involved probably develops from a perceptual isolation of individual objects in a scene: the perceptual mechanism is able to isolate one object from another. This means that we have a higher degree of attention towards an object differentiated from the background against which it appears. However, human mind is such that the focal point of our attention may shift from one object to another from time to time. Depending on this attention shift, the same object that was set apart from its background as a discrete entity

and hence served as a conceptual figure at one moment can become part of the background and submerge in the mass of whole scene, letting another object emerge as the focal point of awareness, or Figure. The following pair of sentences will illustrate this shift of attention:

(5) Within a minute the child was under the bedclothes.

(6) There wasn't a single piece of cloth over the sleeping child.

The Figure/Ground alignment in these two sentences can be sketched in the following way:

	FIGURE	GROUND
(5)	the child	the bedclothes
(6)	a single piece of cloth	the sleeping child

Table 1

In (5) *the child* being the focus of attention gains cognitive salience while *the bedclothes* is backgrounded to serve as the main domain of the scene against which the subdomain represented by the nominal *the child* is characterized. Accordingly, the sentence means that the child as the movable entity crept under the bedclothes. On the other hand, *a single piece of cloth* is the focus of attention in (6), whose site is to be characterized against *the sleeping child*, which represents not a mobile entity but a fixed environment in this context. To say something like *there wasn't a single piece of cloth*, the speaker should first identify the main domain of the scene, namely the sleeping child in this context. The stative state of the *sleeping child* in (6) and the mobile character of the *creeping child* in (5) would enable the speaker to perceive the entities differentially as Ground versus Figure respectively.

Though mobility serves as an important variable in determining the Figure/ Ground distinction, the mental images of scenes assumed by the speakers will contribute largely to the formation of linguistic representations. Observe the following example:

(7) She pushed all her hair under a headscarf

If we consider which is more movable, hair or a headscarf, we will see that the latter has a higher degree of movability compared with the former. However, the mobility factor has not worked favorably to bring the headscarf into the focus of attention but has allowed it to remain backgrounded. The purpose of the speaker in this case is probably to put focus on the action of 'pushing all her hair ...' which is not semantically equal to 'just wearing a headscarf' expressed in a sentence like (8).

(8) She put a headscarf over her hair

Landau(1996) has suggested that the geometries of both Figure and Ground are relatively coarse, incorporating distinctions such as volume, surface, number, and principal axes. Compared with object recognition, which would require much more fine-grained spatial information, the Figure/Ground organization is said to incorporate relatively less geometric specification.

4.2 Basic values of locative constructions

One main purpose of a spatial expression-- for example, a locative construction-- is to mark the location of an object in some physical space so that the

object can be identified distinctively. The object to be located gains primary focus, and its spatial location is characterized in terms of a secondary object which acts as a reference object. The primary object which has spatial variables such as mobility and perceptual salience is designated as *x*; the secondary object which serves as reference for the former is *y*. *x*'s situation, orientation, or path is described in relation to the spatial characteristics of *y*. Though *x* is a moving object, it can remain stationary or located as allowed by the context. With this indeterminate character of *x*, spatial expressions can bring into surface either static locations or dynamic locations.

The locative states include in their semantic structure the two-place abstract predicate BE-AT(x, y). Accordingly, if a lexical structure expresses a situation in which an entity is situated at a place or in a state(Theme AT Loc), it is considered as a locative state. Consider, for example, a sentence like (9a) or (9b).

(9) a. The ball is in the bag.
b. The ball lay on the floor.

Such locative clauses frequently use a *be* verb as in (a) or a positional verb as in (b). The locative phrase includes an inessive preposition that locates the object with respect to the inside of the referent as in (a) or an adessive preposition that locates the object with respect to the surface as in (b).

In considering the semantics of spatial expressions, one will naturally turn to the attempts made by other linguists to delineate the locative prepositions in English. As Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) shows, it is generally accepted that the preposition "in" is used to indicate an area or volume containing some location as in (10).

(10) a. the office in Chicago
b. the dish in the cupboard

When the located object is supported by the reference object, the preposition usually selected by the speaker is "on" as in (11).

(11) a. the office on the third floor
b. the dish on the table

However, these generalizations do not help us to understand the semantic variations manifested by the locative prepositions. For instance, the situations expressed by the following locative constructions cannot be matched satisfactorily with the above-mentioned generalizations. Compare (12) with (10):

(12) a. the man in spectacles
b. What's in a name?

The located object is usually considered to be smaller than the reference object (Cooper 1968 and Talmy 1983). This is so specially in case of the spatial relation expressed by the preposition "in". According to Cooper(1968), "*x* is located internal to *y*, with the constraint that *x* is smaller than *y*". (12a) implies that *x* need not always be smaller than *y*; rather what we see here is the opposite tendency: *x* is larger than *y*. Now compare (13) with (11):

(13) a. the house on the river
b. the house on fire

Again, the examples in (11) do not pose any problem to the definition of ON-relation given by Cooper(1968), i.e. "a surface of x is contiguous with a surface of *y*, with the constraint that *y* supports *x*". The examples in (13), on the other hand, cannot be explained along these lines because (13a) does not imply a contiguity of the surfaces of *x* and *y*, while in both (13a) and (13b) y is not usually understood as supporting *x*. What we understand from this brief discussion is that there is a variety of object representations corresponding to surface spatial terms. The underlying meanings can only be understood with reference to geometrically idealized or "schematized" representations of objects(Talmy 1983). These spatial representations are crucial to understanding the mappings between spatial locatives and their corresponding regions. In the following sections, I will outline how these conceptual representations are repackaged when they are expressed linguistically, leading to cross-linguistic variations.

Developmental psychologists have pointed out that because of the attention that babies give to moving objects, the first image-schemas they form are apt to be those involving movement(Mandler 1996). While movement gives rise to the path schema, there is a variety of subschemas such as self-motion, caused-motion, source, and goal associated with, or embedded in, path itself. This kind of spatial analyses attracts my attention as they are very important in understanding the relational aspects of language, such as grammatical relations, case marking and the semantics of verbs. Lyons' emphasis on "the necessity of relating syntax to the spatiotemporal, 'orientational', framework within which language operates" (Lyons, 1968:299) provides insight into locative relations through locative vs directional, or static and dynamic distinctions to which we will turn in the next section.

4.3 Static vs dynamic functions of the category of case

Lyons(1968) has suggested that the opposition of 'locative' and 'directional' is a particular manifestation of a more general distinction between STATIC and DYNAMIC. This distinction which can be found within the aspectual categories of many languages will be discussed briefly here.

Static relations or non-dynamic situations are identical, internally consistent configurations while dynamic situations are constantly changing through conceived time(Langacker,1991). The following sentences all express static relations:

(14) a. Ranjit is a student. (equative)
b. These grapes are sour. (attributive)
c. The cat is on the chair. (locative)

The fact that all stages of a state are the same, unchanging throughout its duration allows the conceptualizer to perceive them holistically. In contrast, a dynamic relation includes a series of such stative relations; as the component states are not identical, a verb prototypically representing a dynamic relation scans sequentially through such states. Look at the following examples:

(15) a. Chitra cuts the cake.
b. Ranjit is walking.
c. The ball rolled down.

When Chitra cuts the cake, for instance, she first holds the knife, puts it on the cake, pushes it against the cake, and takes the knife off. While she repeats the series of these subevents, more and more pieces of the cake are cut off. Each subevent involves a change of state. Thus a dynamic event is bounded by states, and there are intermediary states during its course(Binnick,1991).

Static relations like those in (14), on the other hand, do not contain such subevents and do not involve a change of state. Regarding (14b), for instance, it cannot be argued that the grapes begin to be sour at some point, become sourer gradually and finishes being sour at another point, etc.: they are not linguistically expressed facts in (14b). This is because states are inherently persistent; they do not have natural boundaries, intermediary states or property of transition. Static relations also lack the property of volitionality.

The semantic properties distinguishing static relations from dynamic events are reflected in their syntactic manifestations. Unlike dynamic structures, static expressions lack inchoative or conative senses. Compare the following pairs:

(16) a. Chitra started cutting the cake.
b. * Ranjit started being tall.
(17) a. What he did was run.
b. * What he did was be tall.

The problem with (16b) is that the aspectualizer *start* referring to an initial stage is incompatible with a static predicate representing a single, homogenous gestalt like *tall*. While static relations do not involve agency or volitionality, the pseudo-cleft construction generally presupposes agency. Hence the oddity of (17b).

The static/dynamic distinction can also be observed in the maximal opposition of *imperfective* and *perfective*. When a process lacks inherent bounding

within the temporal scope of predication, its all component states are identical and does not involve a change of state, such a static situation is said to be imperfective. A process is considered to be perfective, on the other hand, when it manifests the opposite properties, i.e. is bounded within the temporal scope of predication, extends through time with some kind of change and prototypically profiles a physical action involving an energetic interaction. The following three classes of sentences were discussed by Lyons(1968) as static, and were shown to be related to the aspectual distinction of *static* and *dynamic*.

(18) John is in San Francisco.

(19) John has a book.

(20) The book is valuable.

For these 'unmarked', static sentences representing location, possession and 'being' (attributive) respectively, there are 'marked', dynamic patterns of the following types with locomotion, acquisition and 'becoming':

(18)' John came/went to San Francisco.

(19)' John got a book.

(20)' The book became valuable.

(18), (19) and (20) are imperfective while (18)', (19)' and (20)' are perfective by virtue of the semantic properties given above.

The syntactic distinction of static/dynamic can be shown to be semantically relevant. The perfective of the dynamic as in (18)", (19)" and (20)" is to imply the imperfective of the static sentences given in (18), (19) and (20) above.

(18)" John has gone to San Francisco.

(19)" John has got a book.

(20)" The book has become valuable.

This parallelism was used by Lyons(1968) as evidence to show that the opposition is aspectual. He maintains that each pair is identical in deep structure; what accounts for the difference is the opposition of static and dynamic.

Further, all the three classes of static sentences given in (18), (19) and (20) have their corresponding three-place causative or ditransitive constructions as shown below:

(21) Bill brought/took John to San Francisco.

(22) Bill gave John a book.

(23) Bill made the book valuable.

Again, the causative form is dynamic and implies the (unmarked) imperfective of the static sentence: Bill has brought John to San Francisco, so John is in San Francisco.

Then, all these sentences except unmarked, static ones are to be taken as instances of the dynamic locative construction. The two groups, one in (18)', 19)' and (20)' and the other in (18)", (19)" and (20)" are included in the two-place dynamic locative construction whereas the group represented by (21), (22) and (23) is the three-place dynamic locative construction. The two-place dynamic locative construction differs from the three-place dynamic locative construction in that the latter has a 'causative' feature by virtue of which the original agent, i.e. *John* in (18)' or (18)" is transformed into a causee or a non-agentive participant in (21) and (22). Depending on this difference, the moving entity appears as subject in (18)' and (18)" and as object in (21). The dynamic construction of motion events involving a change of possession shows a similar kind of difference. Compare (19)'and (19)" with (22): in (19)' and (19)" with a goal-viewpoint verb, the receiver is selected as subject while in (22) which has a source-viewpoint verb the giver is selected as subject and the receiver occupies the object position. The difference between (20)' or (20)" and (23) is one of 'becoming' and 'making': the former has the moving entity or the Theme in subject position while the latter has the initiator or human actor in this position.

The foregoing discussion of the two differntial dynamic constructions reveals that they represent motion events involving a change of state, spatial or non-spatial. One may also see that one group including (18'-20') and (18"-20")

represents "self-motion", while the other including (21-23) represents "caused-motion". Their relevance for morphosyntax has been discussed in various ways. Anderson(1971,1977) proposed a detailed analysis of dative and transitive scenes in terms of motion, source and goal. Lyons(1968) has drawn attention to the phenomenon of syncretic case marking used for a whole set of allative/locative/ directional and dative/possessive/'indirect object', introducing it as a fact evidential for the linguistic relevance of the static-dynamic relationship.

Dynamic events are assumed as inherently representing a higher level of conceptual organization and being multi-configurational as they consist of series of states and would profile changes of state(Langacker,1991). Complex configurations will include not only autonomous changes of state(e.g. two-place dynamic constructi ons), but also some changes caused by external agents or events(e.g. three-place dynamic constructions). We will consider that static relations based on states or single configurations are basic, and that it is on these fundamental structures that any other 'higher'-level structures like dynamic events are activated. In the next section the expression of static locatives will be examined with more detail.

4.4 Static location

In section 5.1 spatial scene was considered as including two domains, namely main domain and subdomain. Going through the cognitive routines to locate an object, we will first meet the main domain, the broader field of immediate region within which there will be the geometric subfield bound to be the focal point of attention. The existence and character of the subdomain is determined by the characteristics of the main domain, i.e. (a) the relation specified by the locative morpheme and (b) the spatial properties of the reference object. These two aspects of the main domain, which represent grammatical forms and lexical items respectively interact to determine the location of the focal object.

A particular entity qualifies to function as the focal point within the relational scene because it can be easily singled out as being located with respect to a reference object. The semantic representation of such locational constructions are characterizable in terms of their typical involvement with integrated conceptual complexes which often consist of a cluster of component elements, salient or less salient. These elements interweave to one another in different ways, one of which, for example, would allow to presume the particular relation between the speaker and the entity, thereby helping to structure the scene.

Another realm of interactions at the level of abstractions would be seen in the way that the abstract semantic categories such as space, time, motion, direction, etc. are combined with more particular case categories of location, source, goal and path. There seems to be widespread agreement that the most basic meanings that language expresses—both semantic and syntactic—are based on spatial representations. The perception of biological versus nonbiological motion as an early source of knowledge can be used to make the conceptual distinction between animate and inanimate things(Mandler and McDonough 1993). Spatial abstractions help to represent the initial meanings of such concepts as animate thing, inanimate thing, cause, agent, contacting a surface, object support, and containing.

Such notions as "animacy", "cause-to-move", "actionality", "objecthood", "location", and "possession" are used to learn grammatical relations and some relational aspects of language. However, there seems to be variabilty in the way these relational notions are encoded in individual languages. English, for example, does not mark the conceptual distinction between animate things versus inanimate things with morphosyntactic means. Look at the following sentences:

(24) Guns don't kill people, people kill people.

(25) a. The dog is under the table.

b. The box is under the table.

The same verb phrase or auxiliary verb and syntactic means are used for both animate things and inanimate things. However, English makes a general

distinction between "containment" and "support" by using the prepositions *in* and *on*, and ignores "contact". Some other languages, on the other hand, do not make such a distinction, and there are languages that make a three-way distinction. In some languages, focus is on completely different properties of space. Sinhala, for example, divides support relations into two, depending on whether the "support" is horizontal or vertical.

My primary concern is to establish a system of notation that can capture many of the basic meanings of the spatial locatives. I will try to identify the basic properties of the static location and the primary roles of the spatial locatives and stative-verb phrases. I will also address the role of syntax in this kind of spatial representations, focusing on the order in which the elements of the spatial arrangement are to be understood. My analysis will account for the crosslinguistic differences in spatial expressions.

Particular emphasis will be placed on the static location which is based on states and simple configurations. Static location specifies the state of a located object with respect to a reference point within a primary domain. The located objects appearing in unmarked forms occupy the subject position. Marked forms signifying the reference objects refer to the distinct locational relations. As the static location represents a static relation, the verbs participating in it cannot be inherently motional. Instead, locative or existential verbs like *be* play a main part in static locations. I will begin the discussion with a description of *be* verbs.

4.4.1 Function of *be* verbs in Sinhala

According to cognitive grammar, auxiliary verbs are distinguished from 'true' verbs or content verbs in terms of their semantic structure, whether it is conceptual or schematic. While a true verb supplies a specific conceptual content like *eating* or *walking*, an auxiliary verb does not have such a conceptual component by itself but becomes meaningful only in connection with a predicate. Likewise, they are syntactically distinguished from content verbs by the fact that they do not have selectional restrictions in themselves(Bach,1967).

In English and some other languages the use of *be* verb as a linking element between subject and predicate in stative sentences further helps to convey the senses of tense, mood, and aspect. The meaning of *be*, therefore, obtains only in connection with predicate. However, in many languages including Sinhala there is no overt, mandatory verb corresponding to the English verb *be* used to express static relations. It seems that *tienawa* ('be'), the overt form in Sinhala is mandatory only in certain tenses. Another noteworthy feature is that the same form *tienawa* is used for both locative and possessive sentences. Several linguists have attempted to establish a connection between existential, locative and possessive sentences (for example, Allen(1964) and Lyons(1967,1968a and 1968b)). I will examine here the function of *be* verbs in Sinhala and the overall organization of locative constructions.

Without a specific content, *be* verb performs its function of representing a static relation with the help of the items that it links, i.e. predicate nouns, adjectives and prepositional phrases. The nature of the items linked by the be verb, whether they are predicative or locational, definite or indefinite, the order of arrangement in terms of figure/ground relationship or topic/comment structure, etc. will inevitably yield different results. For the sake of comparison, a part of different uses of the *be* verb in English is given below:

(26) 'equative'
  a. Mary is the president. (identification)
  b. Rex is a dog. (class-membership)
  c. The book is John's. (ownership)

(27) 'attributive'
  This sweater is warm.

(28) 'existential'
  a. There are tigers in India. (spatial)

b. The concert is today. (temporal)

(29) 'locative'

The cat was on the chair.

Some of these sentences, especially equative and attributive sentences are expressed in Sinhala without using any verb corresponding to *be* verb. Look at the following Sinhala sentences translated from English:

(26)' a. Mary sabhapati
president

b. Rex ball-ek
dog-INDEF

c. Pota John-ge
book -GEN

(27)' mee sweeTaraya rasnei
this sweater warm

However, the presence of a verb corresponding to *be* verb seems to be necessary in some cases of existential and locative sentences:

(28)' Indiyaa-we koTi in-nawa
-LOC tigers be-IND
'There are tigers in India.'

(29)' puusa puTuwa uDa hiTi-ya
cat chair on be-PAST
'The cat was on the chair.'

What conditions are there to account for the presence or absence of the *be*-verb in Sinhala? This question will be addressed here with a view to providing an account of the nature and behavior of the *be*verbs in Sinhala.

In Sinhala there are two verbs corresponding to the form *be* in English, namely *tienawa* and *innawa*. They are distinguished in terms of animacy: inanimate nouns take *tienawa* whereas animate nouns take *innawa*. They are considered as irregular verbs: the past tense of *tienawa* is *tibuna*, *tibba* or *tiuna*. Animate verb *innawa* is inflected as *hiTiya* for the past tense, which seems to be another verb rather than an inflected form of the indicative present *innawa*.

The irregularity or defect in these verb forms can be traced back to their etymologies. It is my conviction that the inanimate existential verb *tienawa* is none other than the intransitive form derived from the transitive verb *tiyanawa* 'keep, put'. *Tienawa* is, thus, inherently locative, meaning 'be kept, exist'. The past tense *tibuna* or *tibba* comes from the more formal *tabanawa* 'keep,place'. The difference between intransitive *tibuna* and transitive *taebuwa* has disappeared from the past tense, whereupon the form *tibba* has come to be used in both the transitive sense('somebody put/kept something') and intransitive sense (i.e. 'was/were') in colloquial Sinhala.

The animate existential *innawa* is a derived form related to *indinawa* 'be sitting' and thus inherently locative. However, the past-tense form *hiTiya* is apparently not related to *innawa* or *indinawa*, but morphologically derived from *hiTinawa* 'be standing'. However, animate existential forms in their extended reading can appear not only in 'static' sense but in 'processual' senses also. For example, in sentences like

(30) a. nikan in-na
do-nothing be-IMP
'Do nothing.'/ 'Don't disturb.' (lit. 'Be non-active.')

b. poDDak in-na
a little be-IMP
'wait a minute.' (lit. 'Be a little.')

innawa is used as a process or dynamic verb and functions as a clausal head. Especially in (30b) *innawa* appears with a conceptual content. In this sense, the existential verb in Sinhala is dissimilar to the *be* verb in English. In English *be* is a 'dummy verb' generated by the grammatical rules to serve as the 'locus' for tense, mood and aspect in surface structure(cf. Lyons,1968b). To derive a clausal

head from a static relation, Sinhala uses another verb *wenawa* which means 'become' or 'happen' rather than 'be'. Consider, for instance, the following sentences:

(31) a. tawa kiTTu we-nna
more close become-IMP
'Stand closer (to each other).'
b. aaDambara we-nna epaa
proud become-IMP no
'Don't be proud.'
c. eyaa-Ta guruwara-ek we-nna oonae
he/she-DAT teacher-INDEF become-INF want
'He/she wants to become a teacher.'

However, in literary Sinhala this verb can also be used as a dummy verb:

(32) ohu guruwara-ek we-i
he teacher-INDEF be-1p.SING.PRES
'He is a teacher.' Or 'He becomes/will become a teacher.'

Such a sentence is aspectually ambiguous between 'be' and 'become'. It is observed that a remnant of the archaic auxiliary wei still remains in the negative form for the equative, as *no-wei* or *newei*. The equative sentences in (26), for instance, are transformed into negative forms in the following way:

(33) a. Mary sabhapati newei
president not
'Mary is not the president.'
b. Rex ball-ek newei
dog-INDEF not
'Rex is not a dog.'
c. pota John-ge newei
book -GEN not
'The book is not John's.'

However, the negative *newei* is not a verbal form inflected into the categories of person, gender and tense as in (32). Instead it is considered in modern Sinhala as a particle, a grammaticalized form; its relation to the auxiliary *wei* is obscured to the ordinary speaker.

It is now apparent that there is no verb corresponding to the form *be* as a copula in the grammar of Sinhala except in archaic, literary usage. Without being stuck in these morphological irregularities, I will turn to the selectional features of locative verbs. I have already mentioned that *tienawa* is used with inanimate subjects while *innawa* goes with animate subjects. The following examples (34 vs 35) are contrastive:

(34) a. gas tie-nawa
trees be-IND
'There are trees.'
b. paeaen-ak tie-nawa-da?
pen-INDEF be-IND-QUES
'Is there a pen?/Do you have a pen?'

(35) a. lamai in-nawa
children be-IND
'There are children.'
b. ball-ek in-nawa-da?
dog-INDEF be-IND-QUES
'Is there a dog?'

A question arises as to whether this categorization is so straightforward as implied by the above sentences. Let us take some, different nouns. Supernatural beings are considered as animate and hence take *innawa*:

(36) Bhuuta-yo in-nawa
ghost-PL be-IND
'Ghosts exist.'

Some nouns representing groups or organizations of living beings but do not fall neatly into the animate-inanimate dichotomy also take *innawa*:

(37) a. polisiya in-nawa
police be-IND
'There is police.'
b. paula lankaa-we in-nawa
family Sri Lanka-LOC be-IND
'My family is in Sri Lanka.'

However, some nouns referring to human activities take *tienawa* like inanimate objects:

(38) a. maech eka* ada tie-nawa
match SING today be-IND
'The match is today.'
b. konsa:t eka tie-nne Taunhool ek-ee
concert SING be-EMPH Town Hall SING-LOC
'The concert is at the Town Hall.'

There are a few nouns in Sinhala, which refer to non-living things but appear isomorphic with animate nouns and hence animate in inflection. Some of them take *tienawa* like inanimate nouns. For example, the noun for 'padlock' in Sinhala is isomorphic with the animate noun *ibba* whose primary meaning is 'tortoise'. Irrespective of its morphological uniformity with the animate noun, it behaves syntactically as an inanimate noun, conformimg to the real-world semantics:

(39) ibba tie-nawa
padlock be-IND
'The padlock is there.'

However, a rare word belonging to this category is seen to take *innawa*, behaving as an animate noun:

(40) mage kakul-e inn-ek in-nawa
my foot-LOC callus-INDEF be-IND
'There is a callus on my foot.'

Here is yet another interesting fact. In Sinhala the word for living fish isani mate in inflection and takes *innawa* as in (41), while the noun for dead fish or flesh of fish eaten as food is inanimate and takes *tienawa* as in (42):

(41) muud-e hungak maalu-wo in-nawa
sea-LOC lot of fish-PL be-IND
'There are plenty of fish in the sea.'
(42) ada alut maalu tie-nawa
today fresh fish be-IND
'Today there are fresh fish.'/ 'Today we have fresh fish.'

Based on this difference, 'prawns in the sea' and 'prawns on the table' show syntactically different behaviors:

(43) Taenki-ye loku isso in-nawa
Tank-LOC big prawns be-IND
'There are big prawns in the tank.'
(44) baedapu isso tie-nawa
fried prawns be-IND
'There are fried prawns.'

Our discussion shows that the existential verbs in Sinhala, unlike the English *be* verb, bear specific content, have selectional restrictions, and are capable of representing static relations without the help of other predicate constituents. Accordingly, their position is not necessarily auxiliary.

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* *eka* which originally means 'one' has established itself as a separate morpheme supplied automatically to singulaize a non-native noun.

4.4.2 Semantics of Spatial locatives

The spatial lexicon of any language is relatively extensive as it deals with perceptual and linguistic space including, for example, basic spatial relations of "in", "on" and "at", points of compass such as north, south, east, west, etc., various vertical and horizontal coordinates like "left"/"right", "up"/"down", "front"/"back" and "far"/"near", path and directions of "from", "to", "toward", "along", "through", "around", "beyond", etc., and units of length, area, volume, etc. From the whole range of spatial expressions, three basic spatial locatives denoting static location, "at", "in" and "on", will be the focus of attention in this section. The term "spatial locatives" is preferred to the term "preposition" since the latter is thought to be in adequate to grasp their grammatical and semantic potentialities and further considered as posing particular difficulties for cross-linguistic comparisons.

The principal senses of spatial locatives marked by *-e/-ee* in Sinhala seem to be simpler and probably more generic than many other spatial expressions. The selectional restrictions for "at", "in" and "on" distinctions in English are really complex, as the following examples illustrate:

(45) a. the office in/*at Tokyo
b. children at/*on play
c. in/*on the morning
d. It's on/*at Henderson Avenue.

The choice of noun phrases and spatial locatives seem to be arbitrary, and strong interdependencies between them make the encoding and decoding of locative constructions quite difficult.

To make the problem more complicated, the same "at", "in" and "on" expressions are used to indicate the location of moving objects and consequential path relation as well as to indicate the static location of objects. This dual function of spatial locatives is highlighted in the following sentences:

(46) a. The child is at the door.
b. The child threw the ball at the door.
(47) a. The ball is on the table.
b. The ball rolled on the table.
(48) a. She is in the room.
b. Please, come in.

While (a) sentences are used to express a pure place-function, (b) sentences express place plus path-functions. (46b) and (48b) are in particular taken to indicate directional path.

Clark(1972) has successfully explained the acquisition process of the three locative prepositions in English, IN, ON and UNDER by taking into account the notion of canonical position and the perceptual properties of the reference-point objects. Describing the semantic acquisition of locative terms in this way is made possible because of the fact that they are built up around body-space and canonical encounter(Clark 1972, Traugott 1978). The physical world we are living in is structured in such a way that the spatial orientation of objects and other percept-based factors systematically affect the speaker throughout his/her encoding process. Natural, frequent and salient factors are encoded easily, while less salient and less frequent factors appear to be more complex, less comprehensible and not easily communicable. For example, the locative terms referring to the objects of bounded three-dimensional container-space like IN are acquired by young children at an earlier point, compared with other locative terms such as ON and UNDER which have different values in terms of relative perceptual salience.

In relation to the problem of complexity/simplicity with which perceptual information is processed, we will further see that the speakers of Sinhala need not bother so much with perceptual distinctions pertaining to the objects, e.g. container, surface, or region as surfaced in English through IN, ON and AT, respectively. A large range of meanings including IN-, ON- and AT-relations covered by specific prepositions in English can be roughly expressed by one and the same locative morpheme *-e/-ee* in Sinhala:

(49) a. deweni wiidi-e pot saapuwa-k tie-nawa
second street-LOC bookshop-INDEF be-IND
'There is a bookshop on the second street.'
b. bitti-e pintuuray-ak ti-una
wall-LOC picture-INDEF be-PAST
'There was a picture on the wall.'
c. mee paeaen-e tiinta naeae
this pen-LOC ink no
'There is no ink in this pen.'
d. lankaa-we piTisara gam-ak
Sri Lanka-LOC rural village-INDEF
'a rural village in Sri Lanka'
e. amma saappu-e
mother shop-LOC
'Mother is at the shop.'
f. watura lip-ee
water hearth-LOC
'The kettle is on the hearth.'

As shown by these examples, the choice of nominals for reference objects are relatively free in Sinhala. The nominals marked by the locatice *-e/-ee* can refer to three-dimensional container-spaces or two-dimensional surface-spaces. One can also compare the following groups of examples:

(50) a. peTTi-ye pot tie-nawa
box-LOC books be-IND
'There are some books in the box.'
b. watt-e nay-ek in-nawa
garden-LOC snake-INDEF be-IND
'There is a snake in the garden.'
c. mal bandun-e mal tie-nawa da
flower vase-LOC flowers be-IND Q
'Are there flowers in the vase?'
d. sup ek-ee maess-ek hiTi-ya
soup-LOC fly-INDEF be-PAST
'There was a fly in the soup.'

(50a) indicates that a volume containing some entities can be the location, in which the volume should be a bounded three-dimensional space with a capacity for containing something, while (50b) presents a two-dimensional area in which an entity is enclosed. The meaning of "containment" in (50c) is different from both (50a)and (50b) in that the located objects are not fully interior-bound inside the reference object; they can extend beyond the interior. (50d), on the other hand, is imprecise as regards the relation between the located object and the refernce-point for it does not clearly mention whether the fly was in the body of liquid or on the top of the body of liquid or on the inner side of the soup cup. The ambiguity comes from the fact that a soup is not usually understood separately from the container because the latter is more specific in terms of dimensionality. Hence the fly is taken to be located internal to the container, not just internal to the liquid of soup. All the examples in (50) show that the locative morpheme in Sinhala is used to denote a location within a space whose perceptual properties can be varied but are brought into consistence under the constraint that the space indicated be geometrically featured as a kind of thing with an interior.

Another function covered by the same locative morpheme is to refer to surface, i.e. to identify an object's subregion within a space whose geometric feature is restricted to a kind of thing with a surface. Look at the following examples:

(51) a. eyaa-ge kammul-ee lapaya-k tie-nawa
she-GEN cheek-LOC mole-INDEF be-IND
'She has a mole on her face.'

b. bitti-ye hʷun-ek in-nawa
wall-LOC gecko-INDEF be-IND
'There is a gecko on the wall.'
c. klab eka hatara weni taTTu-we
club fourth floor-LOC
'The club is on the fourth floor.'
d. * paeaena pot-ee tie-nawa
pen book-LOC be-IND
'The pen is on the book.'

(51a) clearly indicates a surface relation. An entity can be vertically located on the surface of a thing as in (51b). In (51c), the located object is fully sup-ported by the surface of the reference object. However, when the surface of the located object is in contact with the surface of the reference object and the former is supported by the horizontal surface of the latter, the ordinary locative morpheme is consider-ed to be inadequate to indicate this relation. Hence the oddity of (51d). Sinhala has spacial morphological means to express this spatial relation. It is to be noted that the oddity has nothing to do with new/old information as proved by (52)

(52) * taapp-e wandur-ek in-nawa
wall-LOC monkey-INDEF be-IND
'There is a monkey on the wall.'

(52) appears to be odd because "a monkey on the wall" which is usually under-stood as involving a horizontal support relation is not adequately expressed by the ordinary locative morpheme. This horizontal support relation is distinguished from the vertical support relation and specified by the lexical item *uDa* in Sinhala as in (53a): (The morphology of this kind of locative terms is to be scrutinized very soon.)

(53) a. taappe uDa wandur-ek in-nawa
wall on monkey-INDEF be-IND
'There is a monkey on the wall.'
b. waeT-ee dalambu-ek in-nawa
fence-LOC caterpillar-INDEF be-IND
'There is a caterpillar on the fence.'

No oddity can be seen in (51) or (53b) above even without the lexical item *uDa* because "a gecko on the wall" or "a caterpillar on the fence" does not necessarily include a horizontal support relation. Instead these scenes allow us to assume the supporting surface to be vertical, for which the ordinary locative morpheme will do.

Thus, except the horizontal support relation, a variety of senses involving "interior" and "surface" can be expressed by the locative morpheme in Sinhala. Further, unlike English, which uses AT morpheme to denote some imprecise spatial relationships unaffected by the geometrical features of the referent object*, Sinhala can express similar regions which are not provided with clear demarcations through the same locative morpheme:

(54) a. eyaa reeguw-e waeDa kara-nne
he customs-LOC work do-EMPH
'He works at the customs.'
b. eyaa naaTya shaalaa-we
he theatre-LOC
'He is at the theatre.'
c. taepael kantooruwa deweni wiidi-ye
post office second street-LOC
'The post office is at the second street.'

These spatial relationships indicating a place of employment(54a), a place of

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* Bennardo (1993) points out that the relationship that the preposition AT expresses to be borne between two objects is not affected by any geometrical feature of the objects themleves, i.e. their dimensionlity is not significant.

activity (54b) or designating a region (54c) do not appear to be specific distinctions worth focusing on or describing in Sinhala; that is, they get no preferential treatment but the same morphosyntactic covering as ordinary locative relations.

So far we have seen that Sinhala does not make a significant distinction between the concepts of "interior", "surface" or "region" in the process of encoding, i.e. does not seem to consider them so important as to be expressed by distinct morphosyntactic means, or to be lexicalized. What seems to be more important to Sinhala speakers is the perceptual distinction between the two kinds of the surface -support relations called horizontal vs. vertical, based on the spatial properties such as plane or dimension. As we have seen, a clear-cut horizontal support relation is indicated by the specific locative term *uDa*. Such expressions deserve to be noted as another type of canonical locational view. I will discuss briefly the structural properties of these constructions.

There is a set of nominals referring to plane such as *uDa* and *yaTa* (vertical plane), *issaraha* and *passa* (horizontal plane), *aetula* and *piTa* (horizontal boundedness), which are used as autonomous nominal terms as well as relational terms. Most of them show nominal characteristics by inflecting into different case forms. Part of their paradigms can be shown as follows:

(55) uDa : uDA-Ta (dative)
uD-in (ablative)
yaTa: yaTa-Ta (dative)
yaT-in (ablative)
aetula: aetula-Ta (dative)
aetul-in (ablative)
aetul-ee (locative)

These terms appear in sentences in the following way:

(56) a. puusa puTuwa uDa-ta paen-na
cat chair on-DAT jump-PAST
'The cat jumped onto the chair.'
b. puusa puTuwa uD-in paen-na
cat chair on-ABL jump-PAST
'The cat jumped down from the chair.'

(56a) implies the trajector's locational change towards a Goal, highlighting the relational meaning ON TO while (56b) lexicalizes a change of location away from a source through the lexical structure ON FROM. It is apparent these relational forms are in fact nouns with the case endings *-Ta* and *-in* added to the noun root *uDa*. However, there are some knotty problems arising from the syntax of these constructions which would prevent us from treating them straightforwardly as regular nouns.

A relation between two entities usually considered as possessor-possessed relation is indicated in Sinhala by combining the two nominals with the locative(in case of inanimate nominals) or the genitive (in case of animate nouns) case. The syntactic relation will not be complete if the first member of the relation remains in the citation form.*

(57) a. mee *gama/gam-ee minissu
this village/village-LOC people
'people of this village'
b. *gaha/gah-ee atta
tree/tree-LOC branch
'the branch of the tree'

(58) a. *lameya/lameya-ge pota
child/child-GEN book
'the child's book'

* Compounds are put aside from the present discussion.

b. *eyaa/eyaa-ge karunaawa
he/he-GEN kindness
'his kindness'

This information takes us back to the syntax of relational terms. The data in (57) and (58) and their morphosyntax would reveal the fact that the nominal constructions representing the landmark in (56) do not follow the ordinary morphosyntactic rules for static location. We have to consider the syntactic position of the first member of the relation, namely the bare nominals, if we are to treat the second member, the inflected forms, for example, *uDaTa* and *uDin* appearing in (56a and b) as pure nominals. What case should be assigned to the noun *puTuwa* in (56) and how can we justify a case assigned so while the noun does not conform to the ordinary morphosyntactic rules, i.e. remains in the citation form?

With these questions, we will have no alternative but to turn to the other possibility that these spatial terms are inherently relational nouns though they have acquired case endings. We witness that similar expressions consisting of [NP + REL NOUN] are not rare in Sinhala. Diachronically, most of these relational nouns are based on body parts like 'hand', spatial relations like 'around' or spatial dimensions like 'height' or 'length'.

(59) 'hand': *lameya atin* 'by the child'
lameya atee 'belonging to the child'
'around': *gee waTee* 'around the house'
'closeness': *gee langa* 'near the house'
'length': *paara digee* 'along the road'
'horizontal': *paara haraha* 'across the road'
'direction': *paara dihaa* '(looking) at the road'
'inside': *peTTiya aetulee* 'inside the box'
'upside': *meese uDa* 'on the table'
'downside': *puTuwa yaTa* 'under the table'

Clear signs of their origin can be seen in the following examples, which appear with the extra word *paetta* 'side' as combinations of full-fledged lexical items. Compare the following expressions with the last three examples in (59):

(60) a. peTTi-ye aetul paetta 'the inside of the box'
b. meesa-e uDa paetta 'the upper surface of the table'
c. puTu-we yaTa paetta 'the under-side of the chair'

These source expressions have not yet undergone the process of "semantic bleaching", which is evidenced by the fact that the first member of the syntactic combination appears in the locative case, indicating a possessive relation. Thus, they are justifiably accepted as genitive constructions. Further it is observed that the second member is none other than a typical noun, and the whole noun phrase can be realized as an argument of a separate postposition, which provides some evidence for the nominal nature of this expression. Observe the following example:

(61) miniha puTu-we yaTa paetta dihaa oonaekamin bael-uwa
man chair-LOC under-side at attentively look-PAST
'The man looked carefully at the under-side of the chair.'

Some source expressions that retain the locative/genitive case ending in the first member of the nominal phrase demonstrate their pre-grammaticalization stage by allowing another lexical item to intervene between the two nominal forms. For example, *lamayagee atee* ('in the hand of the child'), presumably the source expression of *lameya atee* ('belonging to the child') can have *lameyagee dakunu atee* ('in the right hand of the child') as a variation evidently by modifying the sec ond member of the phrase. However, the conventionalized form *lameya-atee* cannot be modified in this way by inserting an adjective between the two constituent members of the phrase.

It is clear from this brief discussion that nouns, especially relational-type nouns will play an influential role in the evolution of spatial expressions in Sinhala. The fact that verbs and nouns represent the origins of spatial adpositions

seems to be a phenomenon not so rare among world languages. Croft (1991) has pointed out that it is this 'diachronically unstable universal process' that has made adpositions a transitory category rather than a universal category of the caliber of nouns and verbs.

Apart from diachronical factors, we may find some semantic explanation for the intermediate character of these quasi-postpositions. A closer look at their semantic characteristics reveals that they behave partly as noun, partly as adjectives and partly as particles. In (62a and b) *uDa* and *yaTa* are close to noun type with zero valency.

(62) a. miniha gaha uDa-Ta naeng-aa
man tree on -DAT climb-PAST
'The man climbed on to the top of the tree.'
b. miniha gaha yaTa-Ta giyaa
man tree under-DAT went
'The man went under the tree.'

(63a and b), on the other hand, have the same lexical item used as an adjective.

(63) a. meeka uDa taTTuwa
this upper storey
'This is upper storey.'
b. shariira-ye uDa koTasa
body-LOC upper part
'upper part of the body'

Its adjectival nature is evident from the succedent feature of gradability:

(64) a. meeka-Ta waDaa uDa taTTuw-ak naedda?
this-DAT more up storey-INDEF not Q
'Isn't there any other storey upper than this?'
b. UDa ma taTTuwa-Ta ya-mu
up most storey-DAT go-HORT
'Let's go to the top storey.'

The adjectival nature of the lexical items is brought forward by the fact that the Comparative operator *waDaa* and the superlative operator *ma* can be applied to them without any problem. Further, we will see in (65a and b) below that uDa occurs as a typical particle with the following verbs.

(65) a. lameya uDa bael-uwa
child up look-PAST
'The child looked up.'
b. baelum boole uDa giyaa
balloon up went
'The balloon went up.'

Finally, consider the following lines from a Sinhala folkloric rhyme, which poses a grammatical question.

(66) rajjuruwoo uDa-i uDa-i, guu kolloo bima-i bima-i
king up-COP up-COP, dirt lads ground-COP groud-COP
'The king is at the top in rank while you, vulgar lads, come from the ranks.'

Ignoring the metaphorical uses of the words, how their syntactic positions can be Identified would be a relevant question to ask. Is *uDa* a noun, an adjective or a particle? If we take *rajjuruwo* 'king' as the subject of the first clause, *uDa* may be taken as an adjectival predicate. Or, it can be considered as a locative noun, comp atible with the locative noun *bima* in the second clause. What I am suggesting, then, is that the quasi-postpositions of this type seem to be indeterminate and intermediate in different ways, behaving between autonomous nouns and relational terms.

When interpreted in terms of grammaticalization process, this semantic intermediacy is expected to manifest as a morphosyntactic uncertainty. For example, concerning the traditional dichotomy, open class vs. closed class, the status of the inherently relational nouns would be somewhere between the two classes. At the

initial stage as sources of the postpositions, they are still open classes. Towards the end of the grammaticalization process, being established as postpositions, they become closed classes.

In conclusion, then, we might say that inherently relational nouns are used in different ways to denote different space concepts. When the grammaticalized form is used for canonical location, i.e. to indicate the locale of predication, it can appear in bare form. (67) is illustrative:

(67) pattare puTuwa uDa ti-una
newspaper chair on be-PAST
'The newspaper was on the chair.'

However, this form is not adequate for indicating a change of location; the substantive postposition would itself inflect for case, dative or ablative, depending on whether the focus is on origin or termination of the motion indicated. Observe the examples in (56) repeated here as (68).

(68) a. puusa puTuwa uDa-Ta paen-na
cat chair on-DAT jump-PAST
'The cat jumped onto the chair.'
b. puusa puTuwa uD-in paen-na
cat chair on-ABL jump-PAST
'The cat jumped down from the chair.'

This discussion of quasi-postpositions brings us back to the basic issue working behind the over-all system, namely canonical location, of which I gave a very rough idea at an earlier stage. We assumed that basic spatial relations which are considered as highly salient features of the physical world such as three-dimensional container-space and two-dimensional surface-space represent the category of canonical locations.

Canonical location establishes a particular spot within the primary domain. The spatial term used to specify the locale of predication refers to a distinct part of the reference object. Here the location is characterized within the inherent geometric boundary of a primary reference object. It is structured by visual perception. Coming to more concrete terms, uDa, for example, is used to indicate the locale of a Figure that remains presumably observable on a Ground. (For a similar discussion on ON, see Wierzbicka 1993). In English on the box or in the box appeals to the perceptual knowledge about the primary reference object, the box in this case, the former referring to the exterior surface and the latter to the interior space.

There may exist some universal spatial primitives. However, in linguistically partitioning space, languages will repackage them in different ways(Gentner 1982). While preverbal children learn spatial concepts of containment, surface, contact, and supporting surface, they will be directed by specific language they hear to override such distinctions and to learn some new conceptual varieties on these, such as vertical versus horizontal support. This is, as we understand, what happens when the locative relations in Sinhala splits into locative suffix and UDA relation.

4.4.3 Spatial locatives in Japanese

Now the discussion shifts to how the locative relations are expressed in Japanese. Morphologically, Japanese has two different ways of expressing static location. The following examples illustrate one type of spatial expression.

(69) a. tsukue no ue ni shimbun ga aru
desk GEN on LOC newspaper SUB be
'There is a newspaper on the desk.'
b. hako no naka ni mikan ga aru
box GEN in LOC orange SUB be
'There are oranges in the box.'

In these examples *ue ni* and *naka ni* are morphological equivalents of English *on* and *in* respectively. *Ue* and *naka* are spatial nouns or relational nouns like *shita*

('under'), *soto* ('outside'), *mae*('front') and *ushiro*('back'). They can be used as ordinary nouns as in (70a and b).

(70) a. naka wa kurai
inside TOP dark
'It is dark inside.' (lit. 'Inside is dark.')
b. shita ga suzushii
down SUB cool
'Down is cool.'

When used to express static location, these relational nouns are added with the locative particle *ni*. Thus we obtain the sentence like (69a and b).

The spatial particle *ni* alone is used for the other type of spatial expression. Look at the following sentences:

(71) a. Hanako ga heya ni iru
Sub room LOC be
'Hanako is in the room.'
b. ike ni hasunohana ga aru
pond LOC lotus flower SUB be
'There are lotus flowers in the pond.'

In these examples locative relation is grammatically expressed only by the particle *ni*. Thus, the two morphosyntactic means for the expression of static location in Japanese are (1) [REL NOUN + SPATIAL PART] and (2) [SPATIAL PART].

Let us make the difference between two construction-types more explicit. When a sentence with relational noun plus spatial particle is processed (for expressing static location), certain structural features are to be accompanied: the speaker first chooses the primary reference object and the noun representing it. Next step is selecting an appropriate relational noun which represents a reference point like *ue, shita* and *naka*. The relational noun is combined with the other Noun (primary reference object) by the genitive form *no*. Varied forms can be obtained as in (72) by combining a reference point with a given reference object.

(72) a. hako no ue 'on the box'
b. hako no shita 'under the box'
c. hako no naka 'in the box'

Finally, the spatial particle *ni* is added to the constituent [NOUN + GEN + REL NOUN]. The resultant composite structure will be [[NOUN + GEN + REL NOUN] + SPATIAL PART]. Sentences with this structure is very common in Japanese. For example, we can see:

(73) a. hako no ue ni fukuro ga aru
box GEN on LOC bag SUB be
'There is a bag on the box.'
b. hako no shita ni ari ga iru
box GEN under LOC ants SUB be
'There are ants under the box.'
c. hako no naka ni mikan ga aru
box GEN in LOC orange SUB be
'There are oranges in the box.'

As becomes explicit from this discussion, in Japanese the relational nouns play an important role in the construction of static location. The grammatical morpheme *ni*, though it indicates static location, is inadequate to convey locative information because it does not refer to any specific perceptual features of the reference object. If one is to refer to the perceptual features such as 'surface', 'beneath' and 'interior', it is necessary to use relational nouns in Japanese.

However, relational nouns can be dropped if spatial relations can be inferred from the noun chosen by the speaker to denote a primary reference object. When the relational noun is dropped, the genitive marker is also dropped automatically as the question of combining two nominals, which is a typical function of a genitive marker, does not arise in this context. Then we get the structure [NOUN + SPATIAL PART]. Observe the following examples:

(74) a. kami ni kai-te atta
paper LOC write-PP was
'It was written on the paper.'
b. mado ni kumo ga iru
window LOC spider SUB be
'There is a spider on the window.'
c. tsukue ni hon ga aru
desk LOC book SUB be
'There is a book on the desk.' or
'There is a book in the desk.'
d. sora ni kumo ga aru
sky LOC clouds SUB be
7There are clouds in the sky.'
e. machi ni wa hito ga ooi
city LOC TOP people SUB many
'There are too many people in the city.'

As this sample of data shows, there is a great variety of uses of *ni*. (74a) is understood to indicate a surface relation by the meaning of the nominal selected to denote the reference object, which is two-dimensional in this case. (74b) shows some degree of indeterminancy with respect to the spatial relation: the spider can be on the window-pane, on the window-sill or between the window-frame and the curtain. In conceptualizing the reference object with the outline, the relation of support seems not to acquire much relevance. In (74c), the ambiguity results from the nature of the reference object, which can project surface relation or interior relation. In (74d), the pragmatically inferred geometric information allows the speaker/listener to attach the volume of containment to the reference object. The locative phrase in (74e) implies contiguity, support and containment -- people are conceived to be contiguous with, supported by and contained in the city area.

What information is provided by the spatial particle *ni* is determined by linguistic, pragmatic and non-linguistic, real-world knowledge of the speaker and listener. While (74c) can be taken to indicate surface support relation, (75a) cannot be taken to refer to the surface relation of the reference object; it only refers to the interior relation of the box. When the surface support relation acquires a special relevance, the structure with the relational noun becomes obligatory as in (75b).

(75) a. hako ni mikan ga aru
box LOC orange SUB be
'There are oranges in the box/*on the box.'
b. hako no ue ni mikan ga aru
box GEN on LOC orange SUB be
'There are oranges on the box.'

In this sense Japanese is very close to Sinhala. I have already observed that except the horizontal support relation which is specified by the relational noun *uDa,* a variety of locative senses involving "interior" and "surface" can be expressed by the locative morpheme in Sinhala. Thus Japanese and Sinhala show some common characteristics in relation to the expression of static location, which cannot be seen in English. This division can be partly attributed to the difference in word-order and the related phenomena.

As Greenberg's typological analysis illustrates, with overwhelmingly greater than chance frequency, languages with normal SOV order are postpositional (Greenberg 1966). It is also considered that genitive order is harmonic with the adposition order: in general, languages with prepositions have noun-genitive order while languages with postpositions have genitive-noun order. English being a prepositional language, its adpositions are all grammatical morphemes and they are not iterative. English prepositions refer to specific perceptual properties, though there are many indeterminancies stemming from the nature of the objects or from perception, etc.(Herskovits 1984). In Japanese and Sinhala, on the contrary,

adpositions are all postpositional and a variety of locative relationsare subsumed under the same locative morpheme (i.e. *ni* in Japanese or *-e/-ee* in Sinhala.

However, for certain locative relations, the locative morpheme is complemented or substituted by an additional morpheme, i.e. a relational noun like *ue* in Japanese and *uDa* in Sinhala. The additional morpheme becomes constituent with the genitive form to make a genitive construction (*hako no ue ni*) in Japanese, while it remains an adpositional construction (*peTTiya uDa*) in Sinhala. This variation turns to an analogy when considering Greenberg's observation that there is a cross-linguistically valid relationship between genitive construction and adpositional construction(Greenberg 1966). The proposal seems also diachronically valid as adpositions frequently derive from genitive constructions in many languages (See Croft 1990:chapter 3).

Taken together, Japanese and Sinhala seem to exhibit some semantico-Syntactic commonalties regardless of their respective genealogies and areal characteristics. These circumstances compel us to examine the syntactic types of static location constructions and draw a proper typology for such constructions.

4.4.4 Typology of static locations

Next I will discuss different construction-types of static location in terms of the order of linguistic elements and information structure. As we have already seen, the locative construction marks the location of an object in some physical space. The nominal denoting the located object remains nominative while the nominal denoting the reference object bears the locative marking. All the linguistic choices including the selection of NPs and their order of combination are made in conformity with the contextual factors such as speaker's purpose, the structure of the information the speaker will convey and the listener's sphere of knowledge, etc. Consider the following examples:

(76) lamai piTTani-ye in-nawa
children ground-LOC be-IND
'The children are in the ground.'

(77) pattaraya meese uDa tiye-nawa
newspaper table on be-IND
'The newspaper is on the table.'

In these sentences the nominative phrase precedes the locative phrase. Further note that the nominative nominal, the first element of the construction, is definite* . The definiteness presupposes that the information as to what is referred to by the nominal as located entity is already known to the listener. The initial nominals representing old information can be taken as TOPIC, while the locative phrases giving new information can be considered as COMMENT. This structure of information will be evident from an examination of the contexts in which these sentences can be uttered naturally. Sentences (76) and (77) are appropriate as responses to the questions asked about the located entities respectively as in (78) and (79):

(78) Where have all these children gone?

(79) Do you know where the newspaper is?

They will not be appropriate responses to the questions like

(78') Who are there in the ground in these late hours?

or (79') Can you say what's on the table?

The person who is asking the questions in (78) and (79) seem to have the relevant entities in his sphere of knowledge; only their whereabouts are not known to the speaker. Therefore it is reasonable to judge that the sentences given above are used to convey some locational information about a known entity. Our explanation for the definiteness can be compared with the observations made by Clark 1978, which provides some basic insights into the discourse rules governing locational constructions. According to Clark, "The absence of indefinite nominals in initial position reflects a general discourse constraint in languages"(Clark,1978,p.88). This kind of locational sentences having the subject in the sentence-initial position is called LOCATIVE CONSTRUCTION. The word order will be

(80) NP $_{def}$ + LOCATIVE + V $_{exist}$ for SOV languages and
NP $_{def}$ + V $_{exist}$ + LOCATIVE for SVO languages.

In contrast to the locative construction, there prevails another construction referred to as EXISTENTIAL CONSTRUCTION where the locative precedes the subject, which in turn is denoted by an indefinite nominal. The basic word order of existential sentences appears to be fixed universally:

(81) LOCATIVE + NP $_{indef}$ + V $_{exist}$ for SOV languages and
LOCATIVE + V $_{exist}$ + NP $_{indef}$ for SVO languages.

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* In Sinhala INDEFINITENESS is expressed by the suffix *-ek* with animate masculine nouns and *-ak* with animate Faminine as well as inanimate nouns. DEFINITENESS is expressed by the bare form of the nominal. As there is no special marker for DEFINITENESS, plural nouns can be definite or indefinite depending on the context.

The following examples will be illustrative:

(82) piTTani-ye ball-ek in-nawa
ground-LOC dog-INDEF be-IND
'There is a dog in the ground.'

(83) Meese uDa pattaray-ak ti-una
table on newspaper-INDEF be-PAST
'There was a newspaper on the table.'

In existential sentences, usually locatives are definite while subjects are indefinite. The locative element constitutes the TOPIC part of the sentence. The nominative phrase marked for INDEFINITENESS brings new information and serves as the COMMENT component. The appearance of the locative phrase in the initial position accords with the TOPIC + COMMENT order. Kuno(1973) assumes that the locatives are preposed very early, at the level of the "deep" underlying structure, because of a general tendency in a continuous discourse to start sentences with old information and to introduce new information toward the end of the sentence.

Rando and Napoli(1978) has witnessed an obvious connection between existential sentences in English and their intonation patterns. It is observed that the early-fall pattern, i.e. with stressed indefenite nominal and unstressed there locative in sentence-initial position is the most natural intonation for existential sentences. As Rando and Napoli maintains, "This is because the NP immediately following the verb is the focused constituent; it has been moved there from initial position precisely because initial position and focus position are not generally very compatible, especially when the NP is indefinite" (Rando and Napoli,1978:304).

When the subject nominal is indefinite, the locative usually appears to be definite and moves to the initial position in existential sentences. Thus it seems to be a natural phenomenon for existential sentences to have locatives preposed; it would be awkward for the locative to remain in a non-initial position. Compare the following (a) and (b) sentences:

(84) a. lind-ee gemb-ek in-nawa
well-LOC frog-INDEF be-IND
'There is a frog in the well.'

b. ??gemb-ek lind-ee in-nawa
frog-INDEF well-LOC be-IND

(85) a. peTTi-ye paeaen-ak tie-nawa
box-LOC pen-INDEF be-IND
'There is a pen in the box.'

b. ??paeaen-ak peTTi-ye tie-nawa
pen-INDEF box-LOC be-IND

(86) a. indiyaa-we koTi in-nawa
India-LOC tigers be-IND
'There are tigers in India.'

b. ??koTi indiyaa-we in-nawa*
tigers India-LOC be-IND

The problematic (b) sentences will sound natural when the contrastive particle *nan* is added to the locative.

(84) c. gemb-ek lind-ee nan in-nawa
frog-INDEF well-LOC CONTR be-IND
'A frog –in the well, there is one.'

(85) c. paeaen-ak peTTi-ye nan tie-nawa
pen-INDEF box-LOC CONTR be-IND
'A pen – in the box, there is one.'

(86) c. koTi indiyaa-we nan in-nawa
tigers India-LOC CONTR be-IND
'Tigers – in India, they exist.'

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* This sentence is completely acceptable with definite reading.
This suggests that the locative has become the focused constituent with the con-

trastive particle added after it. I assume that these sentences in (84c), (85c) and (86c) are based on (84a), (85a) and (86a) sentences, which have locatives preposed to the sentence-initial position. The locatives were postposed back to a non-initial position by *nan*-insertion in a later derivation because this position is more appropriate for a focused constituent. The phenomenon can be similar to the back-and-forth movement of locatives in English seen in the following examples* :

(87) In the well, there is a frog.
In the box, there is a pen.
In India, there are tigers,

Do the sentences in (84c), (85c) and (86c), then, defy the general discourse constraint that indefinite nominals are absent in initial position(Clark,1978, Kuno, 1973) I will suggest that though the subject nominals are suffixed with an indefinite marker, they are not semantically indefinite. They are anaphoric, that is, with something already introduced in the preceding discourse. Our argument is that these sentences will never be used discourse-initially. For example, (84c) can appear in a discourse like the following:

(88) a. ada pariikshanaya-Ta gemb-ek in-nawa-da?
today test-DAT frog-INDEF be-IND-Q
'Is there a frog for today's test?'
b. gemb-ek lind-ee nan in-nawa (repeated from 84c)
'A frog – in the well, there is one.'

The subject nominal refers to a type of entity or a class familiar to both the speaker and listener, though the exact entity referred to in the two sentences (question and answer) is not identical. In this sense, the superficially indefinite nominals in (84c, 85c and 86c) are anaphoric. Therefore they follow the general principle of "old information" first.

On the other hand, the locative in these sentences can be considered as a postposed constituent. Before postposing took place, (84c), for instance, had been very close to an ordinary existential sentence like the following:

(89) lind-ee nan gemb-ek in-nawa
well-LOC CONTR frog-INDEF be-IND
' In the well, there is a frog.'

One can compare (89) with (84a), which is an ordinary existential sentence. (89) differs from (84a) in that the former has its locative followed by *nan*. This sentenc eis similar to the Japanese existential sentence in (90) with respect to the structure.

(90) sono teiburu no ue ni wa hon ga atta
that table GEN on LOC CONTR book NOM existed
'On the table, there was a book.'

In such sentences the locative with the particle *wa* has both the thematic and contrastive interpretations(See Kuno,1973). In (84c), repeated here as (91), the thematic and contrastive meanings are divided between the subject nominal and non-subject nominal respectively.

(91) gembek lindee nan innawa
'A frog -- there is one in the well.'

In this sentence the locative obtains contrastive reading, while the subject nominal remains as the TOPIC or thematic. The subject nominal can remain thematic because of its anaphoricity. We may assume that (91) was born by post-posing the locative, which had been preposed earlier conforming to general practice of "old information" first.

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* The order of derivational sequence of the back-and-forth movement is opposite to that of Sinhala. In English, locative postposing is applied first, and then locative preposing(See Kuno,1973).

While (84a) and (89) are considered as ordinary existential sentences, the type of sentence appearing in (84c) or (91) may seem somewhat unusual. Further cross-linguistic research is needed to decide how uncommon this phenomenon is. At least, in Japanese, as Kuno(1973) has pointed out, the subject of an existential sentence cannot be thematic because its mandatory indefiniteness.

The locative phrase also seems to pose a problem here: is it definite or indefinite? Usually, as we have already seen, when the locative is definite it tends to be placed in the initial position allowing the introduction of new information in a second position. However, in the type of sentence discussed here the locative phrase, in spite of the fact that it seems to be definite, does not occupy the initial position. It seems that the information referred to by the locative phrase is not given in the prior discourse, and the speaker does not assume that it is already known to the listener. Therefore the locative nominal seems to be sem antically indefinite and can be appropriately placed in a noninitial position. The phenomenon is similar to the definite nominals in English *there*-sentences observed by Rando and Napoli(1978). Following Rando and Napoli, one can take these sentences not as normal existential sentences but as a subtype of them.

I will make here a further clarification about the peculiarity of this subtype of existential sentences. While existential sentences are generally used to assert the existence of some entity, the special type of sentences under investigation do not seem to conform to this functional purpose. Instead, they are functionally close to locative sentences because they are used by the speaker to convey information about the location of some entity. (84c), (85c) and (86c) will be felicitous replies specifying the locations where the entities referred to can be identified.

Further, the word order of these sentences, [non-locative NP + LOCATIVE + V], is the same as that of ordinary locative sentences. As this order of constituents reveals, the non-locative nominal serves as the TOPIC and the locative NP constitutes the COMMENT element. This particular correlation of spatial elements and information flow is typical to locative sentences, not to existential ones.

The occurrence of the indefinite NP, which constitutes a characteristic of existential sentences, also has been shown to share both existential and locative features because the relevant NP is anaphoric and semantically definite and hence can occur in the sentence-initial position. The acceptance of the initial NP as semantically definite further facilitates our position that these sentences are close to the locative construction rather than existential construction. Given the restriction on the distribution of definite NPs in existential sentences, the structural and semantic features of these sentences seem to be compatible with the analysis of locative sentences.

While these evidences show that this variety of existential sentences can be judged to share some important characteristics with locative sentences, a couple of crucial points can be inferred from this set of facts. The functional difference between locative and existential sentences is that the former conveys information about the location of an entity whereas the latter is used to assert the existence of an entity. According to this explanation, purely existential sentences can occur without a locative phrase as illustrated by the following examples:

(92) deiyo in-nawa
gods be-IND
'Gods exist.'

(93) prasna tie-nawa
problems be-IND
'There are problems.'

However, existential sentences are often described as implicitly locative (Lyons 1968, 1968b). Lyons has pointed out that the assertion that something exists should be complemented with a locative (or a temporal) expression before it can be interpreted(Lyons1968:390). Proving the correctness of this statement, most existential sentences usually appear with a locative phrase serving as an

adjunct:

(94) mehe-t prasna tie-nawa
here-too problems be-IND
lit. 'There are problems here too.'

(95) etana minissu in-nawa
there people be-IND
'There are (some) people in that place.'

(96) meese yaTa boola-yak ti-una
table under ball-INDEF be-PAST
'There was a ball under the table.'

When the existential sentences have locative phrases overtly appearing, they will always occur in the sentence-initial position, allowing the subject nominal, which is non-anaphoric and indefinite, to appear non-initially.

It should be noted that all the sentences given so far include existential verbs. Purely existential sentences, which are used by the speaker to make an existential statement, will be odd without the existential verb because they are inadequate to fulfill the function of asserting existence. Observe the following sentences, which are out without existential verbs.

(97) * deiyo (in-nawa)
gods be-IND

(98) * Indiyaa-we koTi (in-nawa)
India-LOC tigers be-IND)

(99) * mee raT-ee pol (tie-nawa)
this country-LOC coconuts be-IND

(100) * lind-ee watura (tie-nawa)
well-LOC water be-IND

However, the assertion of existence is not the sole function of existential sentences; another function is to establish a relation between an entity and a location. In uttering such sentences, while both the locative phrase and the non-locative nominal are heavily stressed, the existential verb is not considered to be so important. Therefore these sentences sound natural even without existential verbs.

(101) mehe-t prasna
here-too problems
'We have problems, too.'
Lit. 'There are problems here, too.'

(102) etana minissu
there people
'There are (some) people in that place.'

It should be noted that the verb can be omitted only when the speaker intends to express the existential predication in the present-tense indicative mood. The sentence in (103a) cannot be used without the existential verb because the claim made in the sentence belongs to the past tense. Hence (88b) is out.

(103) a. meese yaTa boolay-ak ti-una
table under ball-INDEF be-PAST
'There was a ball under the table.'

b. * meese yaTa boolayak

(103b) will be fully acceptable only when it is interpreted as a present-time occurrence. The same thing can be said about locative sentences also.

(104) a. lameya gedara (in-nawa)
child home (be-IND)
'The child is home.'

b. lameya gedara *(hiTiya)
child home (was)
'The child was at home.'

(105) a. pattaraya meese uDa (tie-nawa)
newspaper table on (be-IND)

'The newspaper is on the table.'

b. pattaraya meese uDa *(ti-una)
newspaper table on (be-PAST)
'The newspaper was on the table.'

In the sentences optionally appearing verbless(104a and 105a) the zero verb indicates the present indicative mood. When the locative verb is used to express a past event, it must appear overtly. The phenomenon becomes more explicit in negative sentences. The negative particle 'naeae' in Sinhala can independently indicate negative sense of existence for the present indicative mood. So the ordinary constituent order for the locative sentences of the present negative is NP_{sub} + NP_{loc} + $ZERO_{NEG}$. Accordingly, the negatives of (104a) and (105a) are As follows:

(104') a. lameya gedara naeae
child home no
'The child is not at home.'

(105') a. pattaraya meese uDa naeae
newspaper table on no
'The newspaper is not on the table.'

However, 'naeae' cannot express past, negative meaning by itself without the help of the locative verb. The negatives of (104b) and (105b), therefore, must include a locative verb as in (104'b) and (105'b).

(104') b. lameya gedara hiTiye naeae
child home be-EMPH PAST no
'The child was not at home.'

(105') b. pattaraya meese uDa tiune naeae
newspaper table on be-EMPH PAST no
'The newspaper was not on the table.'

Judging from these facts we can conclude that only the 'unmarked' component of existential/locative verb can avoid overt appearance while 'marked' components must appear at the phonological level. Since the present tense is unmarked, omitting the existential verb, that is, affording not to choose a specific tense equals to indicating the present tense.

Let us turn to existential sentences once again. Existential verb can be easily dropped when the existential sentence is used as a deictic statement. Following "the views of a number of 20th century empiricist philosophers, who would say that existential statements are logically equivalent to pointing, or deixis", Lyons (1967) has suggested that using the 'analogical' mode of reasoning by way of the *via negativa* allows the stripping off of all spatiotemporal implications in existential sentences. The occurrence of an originally deictic particle in existential sentences (Eng. *there*, Fr. *y*, Ital. *ci*, etc.) is also attributed to the locative and deictic relation(Lyons 1967). This definiteness of the locative, which is directly related to deixis, is one of the most typically identified features in describing existential sentences. Observe the following existential sentences, equally identifiable as deictic expressions.

(106) oluw-e roDD-ak (tie-nawa)
head-LOC dust-INDEF (be-IND)
'There is some dust on your head.'

(107) NikaT-e bat aeTay-ak (tie-nawa)
chin-LOC rice grain-INDEF (be-IND)
'There is a grain of rice on your chin.'(You have a crumb on your chin.)

(108) oya gah-ee kaTu (tie-nawa)
that tree-LOC thorns (be-IND)
'There are thorns on that tree.'

(109) kesel geDi-e kuumbi (in-nawa)
banana fruit-LOC ants (be-IND)
'There are ants in the banana.'

Viewed from their relevant contexts, the function of these sentences seems to be pointing to the presence of an entity/entities in a given location rather than asserting existence. Existential sentences used as deictic expressions do not need overtly appearing verbs because, with deictic sense, they imply only the present-tense indicative mood.

A basic restriction on existential sentences, as we have seen already, is that the existential verb cannot be omitted when the sentences are used to assert existence. We can find a different kind of restriction on locative sentences. While the existential verb can be omitted from the locative sentences when the predicate is in the present-tense indicative mood, there are some locative sentences that should retain the existential verb. Observe the following sentences:

(110) a. kannaDiya nalal-e
glasses forehead-LOC
'The glasses are on the forehead.'
b. ? kannaDiya nalal-e tie-nawa
glasses forehead-LOC be-IND
'The glasses are on the forehead.'

The sentence (110a) sounds natural without the existential 'be' verb when it is uttered as a response to a question like '*Do you know where my glasses are?*. However, (110b) is odd in such a context. This means that the linear arrangement of the nominative noun and the locative phrase is adequate to convey locational information about a known entity in Sinhala and that the 'be' verb is used when the speaker intends to assert the location of the entity. For example, while (111a) will be an appropriate response to a question like '*Where is the boss?*, the variation with the 'be' verb in (111b) cannot be uttered felicitously in the same context.

(111) a. mahatteya kantooru-we
boss office-LOC
'Boss is in the office.'
b. mahatteya kantooru-we in-nawa
boss office-LOC be-IND
'Boss is in the office.'

(111b) will be only appropriate as a response to a speculation such as '*It seems that the boss is absent today*' because the 'be' verb here establishes the relation between the location and the located entity and further asserts the existence of the entity in the given location.

We can observe another difference between these two patterns. In conveying locational information about a known entity, i.e. using [NP_{def} + Np_{loc}] pattern,the speaker refers to a temporary state of affairs. The pattern [NP_{def} +NP_{loc} + V_{exist}], on the other hand, seems to express locational situations perceived in more general terms. Accordingly, the latter will not be appropriate to make a claim about a temporary state of location like the proposition carried by (110), hence the oddity of (110b). (110b) can be amended to suit a statement of a general locational situation as follows:

(110c) kannaDiya laachchu-we tie-nawa
glasses drawer-LOC be-IND
'The glasses are in the drawer.'

However, whether a sentence turns out to be a statement of a general locative situation or a temporary locative situation depends on the context of the individual case. Note the difference through the following examples:

(112) a. taatta gedara
father home
'Father is home.'
b. taatta gedara in-nawa
father home be-IND
'Father is home.'

(112a) is used to convey the meaning that father is at home at the moment whereas(112b) is used in a rather general sense such as 'Father stays at home.'

(112b), not(112a) can refer to an everyday situation, if not indicated otherwise. Thus only *'transient locatives'* allow 'be' verb omission. The pair demonstrates how semantic information interacts with syntactic facts to determine the surface pattern.

However, the way syntactic facts interact with semantic information does not always show a straight-forward correspondence to the surface pattern. Some other facts seem to be involved:

(113) a. kurulla at-ee
bird hand-LOC
'The bird is on the hand.'
b. kurulla kuuDu-we in-nawa
bird nest-LOC be-IND
'The bird is in the nest.'
c. kurulla at-ee in-nawa
bird hand-LOC be-IND
'The bird is on the hand.'

(113a) may indicate that the bird is on the hand temporarily whereas (113b) denotes a locational state of the bird perceived as more general by the speaker. Then, should we align (113c) with (113a) because they share the same locative nominal, i.e. a similar locative scene or with (113b) as they have the existental 'be' verb in common? (113c) differs from (113a) in that it not only conveys locational information about the given entity but also asserts the existence of the entity. To differetiate (113a), (113b) and (113c), we can consider their correlational intonation patterns: in (113a) the intonation nucleus will be with the locative phrase that introduces new information whereas in (113b) the intonation nucleus patterns with the 'be' verb which is used to assert the existence of the located entity in the perceived location. In (113c) the intonation nucleus can be with the locative phrase or may distribute between the locative phrase and the 'be' verb equally. As these facts show, to get the full volume of information loaded in a locative sentence, we cannot depend solely on the presence or absence of the 'be' verb. What matters is the contextual factors like the speaker's purpose and the speaker's perspective on the scene, and so forth.

Next I will briefly discuss another construction derived from the locative, namely possessive construction. In Sinhala, as the following examples show, the same 'be' verbs *tienawa* and *innawa* are used as possessive verbs also, which simply indicates that possession is derived from existence.

(114) a. eyaa-Ta salli tie-nawa
he-DAT money be-IND
'He has money.'
b. ma-Ta put-ek in-nawa
I-DAT son-INDEF be-IND
'I have a son.'

In these examples the animate noun denoting possessor appears in the initial position and the subject nominal denoting the possessed object follows. This constituent order is identical with the existential construction where the locative phrase precedes the subject nominal which is nominative and indefinite(cf.(81)). What makes the possessive sentences different from existential sentences is the animacy and the case marking, i.e. dative, of the initial nominal. While the locative phrase in the existential construction denotes a 'place', the nominal marked by the dative case marking in the possessive construction denotes an animate location (Clark,1978). When the initial nominal denotes location void of animacy, it is marked by the locative case as in existential sentences:

(115) mee gah-ee atu hungak tie-nawa
this tree-LOC branches a lot be-IND
'This tree has many branches.'

In this example the initial nominal, which denotes an inanimate possessor, takes the locative case marking. However, when the inanimate nominal is perceived as

an animate being, it can take dative marking as in (116):

(116) mee gaha-Ta pana tie-nawa
this tree-DAT life be-IND
'This tree has life.'

Thus the case marking of the initial nominal in the possessive construction is typically directional, i.e. dative('to a place') for animate nouns and stative, i.e. locative('at a place') for inanimate nouns.

While we have stressed that the possessive construction is closely related to locative and existential constructions, it will be observed that one specific feature of the former, namely the obligatoriness of the existential verb, distinguishes it from the latter types of constructions:

(117) a. eyaa-Ta salli *(tie-nawa)
he-DAT money be-IND
'He has money.'
b. ma-Ta put-ek *(in-nawa)
I-DAT son-INDEF be-IND
'I have a son.'

Even when the predicate is in the present-tense indicative mood, the existential verb will not be subject to optional deletion. This feature can be attributed to the possessive meaning of the existential verb. The verb does not become a zero form; it has a specific conceptual content.

We have seen that the construction-type briefly discussed here is identical to the existential construction. Now we will turn to another type of possessive construction, which is identical to the locative construction in terms of the order of constituents. This construction-type is used when the speaker wants to describe a specific object with reference to a person or an animate being in terms of ownership (*my book*), kinship relation (*your uncle*), part/whole relationship (*my hand*) or some other social relationship like loyalty (*our company*), affiliation (*our school*), and sphere of function (*our bus*).* The construction-type to be discussed here requires that the possessor noun representing the reference-object be put in the predicative use:

(118) a. mee pota ma-gee
this book I-GEN
'This book is mine.'
b. mee iskoole oyaa-la-gee
this school you-PL-GEN
'This school is yours.'

The possessor noun is marked by *gee**. '*Gee*' or '*ge*', usually called 'genitive', is the possessor marking in Sinhala for the animate nouns in the predicative position.

In case of inanimate nouns, on the other hand, the possessor marking is identical with the locative marking. Observe the following examples:

(1119) a. mee miTa hand-ee
this handle scoop-LOC
'This handle belongs to the scoop.'
b. oya bottama ma-ge kalisam-ee
that button I-GEN trousers-LOC
'That button is from my trousers.'

In these sentences the initial NPs denoting possessed objects appear in the nominative case while inanimate possessor nouns conceived as reference-objects

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* The variety of relationships denoted by the possessive construction reveals a basic fact about possession: the category of possession does not represent a monolythic value; it is rather a conceptual matter.

** While the etymology of *ge/gee* based on *gei* or *gee* ('house') indicates the morpheme's spatial origin, it is no more used with such a concrete spatial meaning.

appear in the locative case. Because of the very close resemblance they bear to locative sentences, these sentences turn out to be ambiguous between possessive meaning and locative meaning. They can be easily interpreted in the locative sense as 'This handle is in the scoop'(119a) and 'That button is in my trousers' (119b). Perhaps for that reason, this particular possessive relationship with a juxtaposition of an inanimate possessed nominal and an inanimate possessor nominal is seen with less frequency in terms of occurrence.

According to the reference-point model proposed by Langacker(1991 & 1995), a reference-point is chosen on the basis of salience. While a person or an animate be ing is highly salient, an object is less salient. The genitive marker *-gee/gee* in Sinhala used to indicate possessive relationship reflects this high point of salience, while the locative marker *-ee/e* categorizes the referent nominal by default as a non-salient object, which is not a good candidate as a reference-point for possessive relationship. It is also observed that archetypically possessors are capable of controlling and manipulating possessed objects. In that case, inanimate objects do not qualify as good candidates for possessor nouns because they cannot control or manipulate possessed objects.

Irrespective of whether the reference-object is animate or inanimate, this possessive construction, which is identical with the locative construction by virtue of locativizing the possessor noun, however, lacks an outstanding element observable in locative constructions, that is, the presence of the existential verb. Locative sentences have the existential verb though it can be omitted under certain circumstances. The possessive construction discussed here, under no circumstances, will contain the existential verb. Therefore only (120a) is grammatical; (120b) is out:

(120) a. pota ma-gee
book I-GEN
'The book is mine.'
b. *pota ma-gee tie-nawa
book I-GEN be-IND
'The book is mine.'

The possessor noun in this construction is used as a nominal predicate and it cannot be added by a 'be' verb because 'be' verb in Sinhala, unlike in English, is not a copula combining the subject and nominal or adjectival predicate. It is interesting to note that the fact observed here regarding the "predicate-possessor" construction is contrastive with the "dative-possessor" construction: the existential verb is impossible with the former, while it is indispensable with the latter.

To summerize, we have distinguished five types of locational stative constructions. The locative construction and the existential construction were considered as two prototypical locational constructions. In addition, we discussed a special subtype of existential constructions where the subject appears in the initial position as in the locative construction, which brings out the fact that the two constructions are related to each other. Then, two possessive constructions were shown to be related to the locative and existential constructions: the possessive construction with an existential verb is structurally similar to the existential construction while the other, which has the possessor noun in the predicative use, is matched with the locative construction.

Regarding the presence of the existential verb, as we have seen, there seem to be some variations. The existential verb tends to appear in certain tenses and certain construction-types. I have pointed out that both in locative and existential sentences the existential verb is optional in the present tense which is the unmarked tense and hence can express itself without a phonetic representation. In addition to that, the existential verb is omitted in locative sentences when the 'comment' part, that is, the locative becomes the focused constituent and is heavily stressed. Existential sentences will deliver the goods without the existential verb when they are used as deictic expressions or deployed to emphasize the relation between the location and an entity.

We observed several construction-types for which the existential verb is

obligatory. The existential sentences, whose sole purpose is to assert existence, will be odd without existential verbs(cf.(114-117)). When locative and existential sentenc esappear in the past tense, the existential verb, without which the marked tense cannot be expressed, is obligatory. The existential verb is structurally indispensable to possessive sentences with animate possessors appearing in the 'topic' position.

We have also seen some other construction-types in which the existential verb is redundant. There is a strong tendency for *transient locatives*, i.e. the locative sentences that denote temporary state of affairs to appear without the existential verb as in (110a, 111a and 112a). Finally, there is no place for the existential verb in the "predicate-possessor" construction.

4.5 Conclusion

I have discussed the facts about the structure and processing of spatial relationships represented in linguistically encoded locative relationships. As there is a variety of object representations underlying spatial language, the mapping between spatial terms and their corresponding regions becomes crucial in bringing out the precise spatial relationship. Spatial language most often encodes relationships between two objects, one of which take as a place. Precisely speaking, therefore, we are talking about object representations and place representations. If we divide spatial language into the two domains of object and place or the "what" and "where" systems in this way, our focus was on the latter in this paper.

We have seen that there is a considerable amount of variability in the spatial relationships encoded by locative terms in different languages. The English distinctions of *in, on,* and *at* collapse into broader categories in Sinhala and to some extent in Japanese. On the other hand, Sinhala splits the single English distinction *on* into two finer categories as vertical and horizontal surface. Languages seem to differ as to what aspects or properties of objects they bring into focus.

Among the possibilities for encoding the static location, the verb phrase takes a prominent status, especially in Sinhala. High variations were observed with respect to the surface manifestation of the locative/existential verb in Sinhala that can be forced or blocked by some semantic and pragmatic constraints. While both Japanese and Sinhala seem to be sensitive to the phenomenon of animacy, the latter shows some exotic characteristics with regard to the verb selection.

Syntactic means was considered as another way of expressing static locations. We have observed the relationships between basic construction-types and derived or related constructions. A language may admit existential verbs as an obligatory portion of the spatial expression, prohibit them as redundant elements or consider them as elements of optional value.

Languages differ essentially with respect to the realization of the perceptual elements brought out by the deep semantic narrative. The order of surface elements of the language guides us to the order in which the elements of the spatial structure is to be read. The translation of the deep semantic concepts into the surface symbolic system occurs in a dynamic way. Our analysis has revealed that many of the morphosyntactic phenomena discussed here are crucially involved with some semantic, pragmatic and discourse-related factors, such as context, conceptual content, animacy, definite versus indefinite distinction, anaphoric relation, deixis, topic/comment dichotomy, marked/unmarked features, etc. Without reference to them, we cannot understand the meanings of surface linguistic structures. Thus the interaction between syntax and non-linguistic semantics becomes explicit. The surface symbolic system plays a fundamental role in pragmatic and cognitive tracking.

Chapter 5 – Conceptual Expansion of the locative

Introduction

We have already seen that existential sentences and possessive sentences have for their source the locative construction. Existentialization and possessivization were introduced as processes involving the topicalization of locative phrase or possessor noun. Such construction-types were derived from the basic source structure "X is AT Y". As we will see below, this basic structure expands slightly to allow for extended meanings of locative use with deviations from static location.

Based on the characterization of canonical location, I draw a twofold schema for the locative prototype and, subsequently, for all other meanings absorbed by it. When an object or an event is taken to be canonically located with respect to a Ground, we assume that there are two sub-situations at the core of the locational structure:

(1) a. An Object exists in a Place
    b. An Object acts in a Place

However, only the subsituation (1a), not (1b), characterizes static location. Hence the basic categories appearing in this subsituation are the Figure or located object, Ground or location, and the state of existence represented as in (2).

(2) Static Location: Figure Ground State (semantics)
SUB NOUN + LOC EXISTENTIAL VERB (syntax)

The Ground component is brought to the 'topic' position in deriving existential and possessive constructions, and certain judgements regarding the choice of the verb are made depending on the function of the particular utterance.

5.1. Contact as location

In such a basic situation as characterized above the state of existence will include Figure's contact with, and existence with respect to, a Ground. In a prototypical instance, it is the case that "existence" remains the focal feature wher eas "contact" appears not to be obligatory. This non-obligatory feature of "contact" may be foregrounded and become focal in another (non-basic)situation. Let us take, for example, a case in which an object is touching the surface of another object. The locative morpheme will highlight this scene as a contact or collision, where the touching object and the touched object are conceived as the located object and the location respectively. Deviating from the prototypical meaning, the "existence" is backgrounded, and the locative relation stands for contact or collision. (3) and (4) will illustrate this situation:

(3) boole mage at-ee waed-unaa
ball my hand-LOC hit-PAST
'The ball hit against my hand.'

(4) kaareka gah-ee haepp-unaa
car tree-LOC collide-PAST
'The car collided against the tree.'

The nominals with the locative morpheme in these sentences represent the things with surfaces. They are not supporting or supported surfaces, but touched surfaces, namely the areas with which the primary objects interact physically. It is this physical interaction that is highlighted by the locative morpheme. The selection of the locative morpheme is determined by the semantic properties of the verb on which each utterance is dependent. The common semantic property underlying these verbs, as seen in the examples (3) and (4), is a kind of physical contact with some force transferring from the primary object to the secondary object. The place

where this force comes to a stop is selected as the reference object and treated not as an allative relation but as a locative relation, as clearly marked by the locative morpheme.

5.2. Physiological and mental states as location

Next we turn to see how the spatial locative is used to represent certain non-spatial phenomena. Locative construction is used for the metaphorical expression of an animate participant's physiological and mental states: the participant is viewed as a located object while the state is conceived as the reference object. The participant is located with respect to the given state. Depending on the nature of the locational event, Schema 1(1a) or Schema 2(1b) is used as the conceptual template for this metaphorical extension. Observe the following examples:

(5) a. lameya baDaginn-e
child hunger-LOC
'The child is hungry.'
b. lameya baDaginn-e anDa-nawa
child hunger-LOC cry-IND
'The child is crying hungrily.'

(6) a. lameya siital-ee
child cold-LOC
'The child is in the cold.'
b. lameya siital-ee gaehe-nawa
child cold-LOC shiver-IND
'The child is shivering in the cold.'

(7) a. mama bay-ee hiTiya
I fear-LOC be-PAST
'I was in a state of fear.'
b. mama bay-ee kaeae gaeh-uwa
I fear-LOC scream-PAST
'I screamed out of fear.'

(8) Ranjit bara kalpanaawa-k-a
heavy thought-INDEF-LOC
'Ranjit is lost in a deep thought.'

These sentences follow the same pattern of word order and structure as characterized for locative sentences. However, geometrically bound areas of contact between Figure and Ground, regarded to be intrinsic in the locative prototype, are not conceivable with this type of locative phrase and, hence, do not characterize the kind of relation between the animate participant (Figure) and the locative state (Ground) in any of the examples above. That is to say, they describe abstract locations, namely, physiological states in (5) and (6) and mental states in (7) and (8). Here, the locative morpheme is used as a metaphorical expression and the core sense is shifted from the domain of spatial location to the new domain of abstract location.

According to the general 'folk model of the mend and body', body is primarily considered as a container in which feelings, emotions or states are contained. In these cases, however, conceptualization seems to work the other way round: Mental and physical states are conceived as containers, whereas animate beings are taken as objects that exist in this containment. The topological feature of location is preserved through the process of mapping between the two domains—concrete and abstract. The sentences given in (5a), (6a), (7a) and (8) are based on the Schema I, "An Object exists in a Place" while the sentences in (5b), (6b) and (7b) have absorbed the new meanings via Schema 2, "An Object acts in a Place".

Another aspect in which these sentences deviate from the locative prototype can be seen in the fact that even when the speaker wants to present the referent of the nominative NP as new information, that is, with an indefinite article, the locative phrase need not be preposed. One way to account for this exceptional

situation will be to draw the distinction, as Clark(1978) did, between locative constructions and existential constructions. Clark's exploration shows that the order NOM-LOC is preserved in locative constructions while the order LOC-NOM appears in existential ones. Judging by the properties of the structure in (2), we can say that the sentences in (5)-(8) all come under the same category of locative constructions, and with non-spatial locative phrases they cannot pattern with existential constructions. However, by considering semantic motivations for such a suggestion, we will be able, I believe, to give a more plausible explanation to this contrast. Some remarks in this perspective are presented along the following lines.

We are here confronted with the problem of specifying the precise significance of the order NOM-LOC for these (non-spatial) locative constructions. The case roles involved here being Theme and Location, we are reminded, the fundamental event structure is to be taken as Theme AT Location. This is nothing but to say that the underlying purpose of these structures is to mark stativeness: we observed that all the examples in (5)-(8) describe physiological or mental states which are evidently expressed in the glosses provided to them such as 'in the cold', 'in a state of fear' and 'in deep thought'. Properties of objects and parameters of existence are quite different in the domain of spatial location and in the domain of abstract location. Intuitive perception is supposed to have a natural restriction to the effect that abstract locations or states cannot be conceived independently of the Theme. On the other hand, the Theme or the located entity in these examples, by virtue of being an animate participant, is elevated to a high rank in terms of conceptual independence and salience. Therefore, locative phrases denoting states cannot come to the initial position of the sentence without any perspective-wise change occurring in the event structure and subsequently in situational roles.

This tendency of treating the animate participant and the state separately and according them 'located-object' perspective and 'locational site' perspective respectively using the topological structure of locational events is not so rare acros s languages. Following two groups in (9) and (10) represent English and Japanese examples:

(9) a. She was in a terrible state when we arrived
b. He was in two minds about leaving Japan
c. We are all of the same mind: opposed to the proposal
d. I am of the opinion that he is right
e. She came to me in the belief that I could help her

(10) a. kodomo wa kyoofu ni ononoite iru
'The child is shuddering with fear.'
b. kare wa kuusoo ni fukette ita
'He was lost in daydream.'
c. karera wa zeitaku ni oborete iru
'They are indulged in luxury.'

Both in English and Japanese the animate participants in the subject position are considered to be located in abstract states which are conceptualized as locations signaled by in or of in (9) and ni in (10). However, these abstract relations are encoded linguistically via the same Theme-AT-Location structure of the locative constructions.

Another strategy of employing the Theme-at-Location structure in expressing mental states involves the conceptualization of the mind as a container and the state as a content, following the 'folk model of the mind and body' mentioned earlier. Observe the following examples:

(11) ee adahasa magee hit-e-t ti-una
that idea my mind-LOC-too be-PAST
'That idea prevailed in my mind, too.'

(12) daen ee siddiya magee mataka-ye naeaea
now that incident my memory-LOC no
'Now the incident does not exist in my memory.'

(13) Chitra-ge hadawat-ee tie-na weedanaawa

-GEN heart-LOC be-GEREND pain
'The pain existing in Chitra's heart'

(14) eyaa-ge olu-we tie-nne wal adahas
he-GEN head-LOC be-EMPH vulgar thoughts
'He (always) has vulgar thoughts in his head.'

In these sentences, the mind, the memory, the heart, and the head are containers containing ideas, thoughts, mental pains and past incidents, etc. Thus the container-content schema fits in the Theme-at-Location structure to express inner states.

5.3. Further abstract situations as location

Locativization is applied to a great range of states, not just physiological and mental states, as seen in the following groups of examples:

(15) minissu wahalbaw-ee gaeli-la hiTi-yaa
people slavery-LOC stick-PP be-PAST
'People were stuck in slavery.'

(16) eyaa maasa-yak hirabaara-e hiTi-yaa
he month-INDEF imprisonment-LOC be-PAST
'He was imprisoned for a month.'

(17) api kaurut amaaru-we waeTi-la in-ne
we all difficulty-LOC fall-PP be-EMPH
'We all have got into difficulty.'

All these situations include some abstract states which are conceived and linguistically encoded as locations, and the animate participants are conceptualized as Figures existing in these locations.

Age, grade or standard can also be locativized, i.e. treated as locations with respect to which animate participants are taken to exist:

(18) baala wayas-e lamai
young age-LOC children
'children of young age'

(19) mage putaa tunweni panti-ye
my son third grade-LOC
'My son is in the third grade.'

The Theme-at-Location structure becomes the template for linguistic encoding of relationships between the class, grade or rank, on the one hand, and the associated members or participants on the other. The support of the former entities is essential for the existence of the latter entities. The locative marker indicates this abstract support relation.

Societal groups or organizations represent another domain of concepts conceptualized as Location:

(20) Chitra-ge paul-e okkoma gaeanu lamai
-GEN family-LOC all female children
'They all are girls in Chitra's family.'

(21) apee kanDaayam-ee usa aya naeae
our team-LOC tall people no
'There are no tall people in our team.'

(22) alut paksha-ye saamaajikayo hat daaha-k in-nawa
new party-LOC members seven thousand-INDEF be-IND
'There are 7,000 members in the new party.'

Again, groups or organizations are marked as Locations in which the associated members are seen to be located. They deviate from the prototypical conception of containment in that they do not have tangible bottoms to hold animated things. This abstract type of containment is marked by the locative marker.

The fact that the locative marker is frequently found in temporal uses indicates that the concept of time is also treated as Location for the purpose of linguistic encoding:

(23) ee wela-we oyaa kohe-da hiTi-ye?
that time-LOC you where-Q be-PAST EMPH

'Where were you at that time?'

(24) labana awurudd-e aaye hamuwe-mu
next year-LOC again meet-HORT
'Let's meet again next year.'

(25) giya maas-e waessa ti-bune naeae
last month-LOC rain be-PAST EMPH no
'Last month there was no rain.'

Since TIME is described as a more "abstract" domain of concepts derived from the category of SPACE (Heine et al. 1991:156-161), we consider the temporal uses in the examples given above as an instance of the conceptual transfer from the locative marker to the temporal marker. As revealed by the morphological signal and constituent order, what we see here is a substitution of temporal sense for the locative sense, which provides a prototypical formula for the derivation of the former by means of metaphorical extension.

In the examples given so far, the Themes located at Locations all appear to be animate participants. It should be noted, however, that the types of Themes appearing in such structures are not confined to the domain of animate participants; rather, they include various inanimate entities also. The following examples will be illustrative:

(26) Sinhala bhashaa-we akuru panas haya-k tie-nawa
Language-LOC letters fifty six-INDEF be-IND
'There are fifty six letters in Sinhala language.'

(27) mee lipi-ye honda karunu Tikak Tie-nawa
this paper-LOC good facts a few be-IND
'There are quite a few good facts in this paper.'

(28) oya tarka-ye kisima teerum-ak naeae
that argument-LOC any sense-INDEF no
'There is no any sense in that argument.'

(29) mee chitra-ye saengawunu avyajatwa-yak tie-nawa
this picture-LOC hidden genuineness-INDEF be-IND
'There is a hidden genuineness in this picture.'

Both the Themes and the Locations represent inanimate and abstract entities in these examples. This suggests that the use of the locative marker has developed from the most "concrete" spatial domain to purely "abstract" domains, which do not show signs of physical dimensionality. These abstract meanings are considered to be parasitical on the locative sense of the prototype.

5.4. Spatial location as the input for grammaticalization

We have shown how the static location is recruited as a source structure for the expression of various abstract concepts. As noted above, inherent in all these developments is the locative schema comprising the atemporal relation of existence of an entity with respect to a reference point. Finally I will turn to some locative nouns and phrases which serve as the input for grammaticalization, which will highlight a different category of spatial relations and will help to understand the particular mechanism used to express abstract relations.

5.4.1 Conceptual transfer of body-parts

First, I will show that some locative terms representing body-parts become a metaphorical vehicle for conceptualizing abstract relations. One example is *passa* ('back' or 'buttock') that has been grammaticalized as a locative adverb ('back' or 'after') and a temporal adverb ('later'). In Sinhala, the noun *passa* denotes 'buttock' as in (30a). This noun can mean 'back' as in (30b) or as in (30c) with the locative morpheme -*e*. It can also mean 'after' as in (30d). All of these uses retain the spatial meaning. Obviously, the temporal meaning in (30e) results from the spatial meaning; the non-focal sense of 'motion in time' in (30d) has become the focal

feature in (30e). To any native speaker of Sinhala,(30f) is unambiguously temporal in meaning. The adverb, originally the noun plus locative marker, indicates that it has a relationship with some other entity in space or time. However, this locative term without any noun to modify it denotes only temporal meaning as in (30f) (cf.(30c)). Another adverb, originally the noun plus ablative marker, is used to convey the spatial meaning separately as in (30g).

(30) a. oyaa-ge passa hari lokui
you-GEN buttock very big
'Your buttock is very big.'

b. passa bala-nna epaa
back see-IMP don't
'Don't look back.'

c. oyaa-ge pass-e mama in-nawa
you-GEN back-LOC I be-IND
'I will be at the back of you.'

d. oyaa-ge pass-e mama e-nawa
you-GEN back-LOC I come-IND
'I will come after you' or 'I will follow you.'

e. Ranjit-Ta pass-e Chitra aawa
-DAT back-LOC came
'Chitra came after Ranjit.'

f. pass-e e-nna
back-LOC come-IMP
'Come later.' *'Come after (me).'

g. pass-en e-nna
back-ABL come-IMP
'Come after me.'

The fact that the noun *passa* 'buttock' changes its meaning to 'back', 'after', and 'later' once it inflects into locative form, rather than when functioning by itself, may reflect the cognitive force inherent in the locative relation. When there is a subset of meanings that the locative prototype can put together in various ways, syntactic and semantic structures will involve in processing and interpreting spatio-temporal information in a accurate way, ignoring some meanings and emphasizing others.

Another locative term denoting a body-part and serving as the source for conceptual transfer is *atee* 'in the hand' derived from the noun *ata* 'hand') . In Sinhala this term expresses both 'hand' and the sense of possession, physical or abstract. Look at the following examples: (31a) illustrates the source structure, while (31b) elucidates the target structure.

(31) a. miniha-ge at-ee pattara-yak tie-nawa
man-GEN hand-LOC newspaper-INDEF be-IND
'The man has a newspaper in his hand.'

b. miniha at-ee salli tie-nawa
man hand-LOC money be-IND
'The man has money.'(He is rich.)

(31b) can be used in a context where the person has money, i.e. he is rich, though he does not have money at the moment the utterance is made. Note also that the possessor noun in (31b) does not carry genitive morphology, a fact which bears outt he postpositional function of the following noun *atee*. Now compare (31b) with (31c):

(31) c. eyaa ata warada-k naeae
he/she hand fault-INDEF no
'It's not his fault.' lit. 'There is no fault at his hand.'

While both (31b) and (31c) belong to the category of possessive constructions, (31c), unlike (31b), expresses abstract possession in the sense that the possessed entity is a concept not tangible or visible. (31c) also differs from (31b) with respect to the fact that the output of the grammaticalization does not bear the locative

morpheme, which clearly shows its decategorized status.

It is also interesting to note that the structure is still not fully conventionalized: though the structure has expanded to the extent that the actual location of an object in one's hand is no longer a necessary condition for its use, it seems to still retain a substantial part of its literal meaning; we can not say that all types of physical possession are easily accepted into the extended sense of 'possession' < 'hand'. One apparent contextual restriction applying to the extended use of 'possession' < 'hand' in Sinhala is that the possessed entity should be small in size, like something that can be carried in a hand. The restriction seems to be related to relative mobility as well as size. Therefore, nobody will take the house in (31d) to mean 'a building made for people to live in'.

(31) d. eyaa at-ee gey-ak tie-nawa
he/she hand-LOC house-INDEF be-IND
'(S)he has a (toy) house in his hand/* has a house.'

Terms for body-parts thus employed to express various locative, temporal and behavioral relations are graphic examples of how they can vary with their relative degree of prototypicality while showing schematic characteristics applicable to all class members. At one end there are very concrete, physical objects. At the other end is a cluster of abstract relations, intangible and devoid of physical dimensionality.

5.4.2 Conceptual transfer of spatial terms

Next I will show how some locative nouns denoting spatial dimensions have lost their spatial features and nominal characteristics and have assumed the function of postpositions, metaphorically expressing abstract relations. *Atare* 'between' or 'among' and *yaTate* 'under' are two such terms. *Atare* is derived by adding the locaive *-e* to the stem *atara* 'interval'. The term *atare* retains the spatial meaning as in (32) and has also gained a new meaning referring to an abstract concept as in (33). It has grammaticalized to the extent that when used as a function word it can appear without any morphological trappings. Therefore, (33) is only natural without the locative marker in bringing out the expected abstract sense.

(32) ee lamai atare apee puta-t hiTiya
those children among our son-too was
'There was our son too among those children.'

(33) oya mata deka atara gaeTum-ak naeae
those opinions two between conflict-INDEF no
'There is no conflict between the two opinions.'

Though (32) bears the locative morpheme, it has lost its nominal characteristics, deviating from the normal genitive construction. Usually in the genitive construction, the possessee noun follows the possessor noun which is marked by the genitive morpheme to indicate the possessive relationship. However, the noun preceding the locative noun in (32) and the one preceding the function word in (33) do not take any morpheme that indicates the relevant relationship. This tendency points to the fact that the term *atare* (with the locative marker) or *atara* (without the locative marker) placed after the "decategorized" noun behaves as a function word rather than a concrete noun. The term can be introduced as a linking particle or a kind of postposition that serves to locate the Figure with respect to the Ground. As this relational term in (33) does not provide any information about the shape or dimensionality of the Ground, it is taken to denote an abstract relation deviated from the original, spatial sense.

A similar kind of function word is *yaTate*, for which examples are presented in (34) and (35). *YaTate* 'under, subordinate to, or within somebody's jurisdiction' derived from *yaTa* 'under' by adding the nominal suffix *ata* and the locative marker *-e* behaves like a postposition in these examples.

(34) eyaa yaTate seevakayo daha denek in-nawa
he/she under workers ten people be-IND
'There are ten workers under his/her supervision.'

(35) oya kondeesi yaTate apa-Ta waeDa kara-nna baeae
those conditions under we-DAT work-INFIN can't
'We cannot work under those conditions.'

In both examples, the nouns preceding *yaTate* appear without the morphological trappings necessary for indicating nominal combinations. A term placed after such nouns is considered as a function word.

In (34), the nature of the relationship between the participants denoted by the adpositional phrase, i.e. Ground, on the one hand, and the ones represented by the nominative subject, i.e. Figure, on the other, directly involves the superior and inferior (subordinate) contrast. The way this relationship is expressed may be characterized by one of the conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), namely HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN. *YaTate* derived from *yaTa* 'under' is used as a template combining the two kinds of participants. This is a clear case in which social relationship is conceptualized through spatial relationship.

In (35), the relationship between the participants is more complex: while the both participants involved in the relationship are animate/human in (34), one participant, the one encoded by the adpositional phrase is an abstract entity in (35). In other words, the person indicated by the adpositional phrase has jurisdiction over the other persons denoted by the subject nominal in (34). It is this jurisdiction itself specified by rules or regulations and conditions that is expressed by the adpositional phrase in (35). Therefore the relationship between these 'superior' concepts and the 'subordinate' participants bound by them is necessarily abstract.

Thus, the locative relation of *yaTate* serves as a metaphorical template for ex pressing an abstract relationship. Metaphorical use of vertical stative relation is motivated by the principles of the vertical location in the spatial domain. The implicit notion is that an entity located vertically to another might be influenced by, or under control of, the one above through a gravitational force. Following this principle, the social ranking or influence of an entity over another is represented by the location of the former over the latter. The relationships in terms of social status and influence are represented by a location on the metaphorical vertical axis and linguistically expressed by the metaphorical use of *yaTate*.

As seen above, our final two groups of examples has dealt with the locative nouns or phrases serving as the source for grammaticalization. In all these examples, the organizational structure of static location is used to express non-spatial situations involving abstract states.

5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter we have investigated how the static location is conceptually used as a convenient vehicle for the expression of a variety of meanings. The Theme AT Loc structure is polysemous because it consists of many substructures. We observed its multi-faceted functions in spatial domain in the preceding chapter and how the main structure can be semantically extended so that non-canonical locations and further non-spatial locations are absorbed into it in this chapter. Especially, the observations made in this chapter demonstrate how a basic cognitive structure referring to an elementary human experience like locative relation serves as a template to express various situations, states, qualities, or relations that are more abstract in nature. Such various meanings are organized and expressed using the basic schema and the forms isomorphic with locational structures.

Chapter 6 – Ablative Case and Path Expressions

Introduction

While the locative constructions we have dealt with so far are used mainly for expressing static locations, the structures composed of Location plus Direction provide the speakers with means to talk about the complex world of dynamic locations. What is meant by 'dynamic location' is the location or locations of moving objects. A sequence of successive locations ('at' relations) traversed by a moving object includes the starting point ('from'), intermediate points ('along') and endpoint ('to'). Specifying these points, i.e. the locales traversed in motion situations is very important to human speech since they cover a large variety of physical activities which we engage in through our daily life. We will see how this function is achieved by the linguistic expressions of Path.

The three-way opposition of 'to': 'in/at': 'from' is traditionally known as the primary 'local' case-distinctions. Lyons(1968) reduces this categorization into a two -way opposition, according to which the most general distinction to be recognized within the 'local' functions of the cases is *locative* vs *directional* ('in/at' vs 'to' or 'from'), and the distinction between 'to' and 'from' is deemed as a secondary distinction within 'directional'. Lyons further suggests that "The opposition of 'locative' and 'directional' may be regarded as a particular manifestation of a more general distinction between *static* and *dynamic*.

Based on these observations, Anderson 1971 developed a localist theory of case-grammar, adopting a coherent account of case relations, their underlying notions and syntactic consequences. First he shows that there exists some kind of antonymic relation between locative and ablative which are +/-negative with respect to the semantic dimension of direction. This semantic dimension is incorporated as a subcategorization rule called +/-dynamic, with the constraint that it be dependent upon +locative. Choosing the positive means to introduce the category ablative before locative. Depending upon +dynamic or -dynamic, verbs are classified as to whether they require ablative or not. Thus we have two types of locative clauses as 'stative' and 'non-stative' or dynamic' as exemplified in (1) and (2).

(1) The ball lay on the floor

(2) The ball rolled from Jane to Mary

While (1) is 'non-directional', (2) is 'directional' with the two post-verbal noun phrases indicating respectively the initial and terminal locations of the trajector.

Anderson 1971 further develops the localistic theory, by establishing a close relationship between the 'non-local' (nominative and ergative) cases and the 'local'(locative and ablative) cases. Anderson shows that nominative and locative can either appear alone or together with ergative and ablative. When appearing alone,they would indicate 'stativity' while appearing together with 'source' cases (i.e. ergative and ablative) would introduce 'directionality'. For example, in (3) locativeis associated with ablative:

(3) He walked along the street

'Along' is considered as representative of the prepositions used to indicate intermediate points of path in English while 'from' and 'to' are used to indicate the origin and terminus of the path (Miller and Johnson-Laird,1976). According to Anderson 1971, what is peculiar in (3) is that both the initial and terminal locaTions of the nominative are attached with a single referent. Ablative is considered as 'reflexive' with regard to locative as ergative is to nominative. This analysis accounts for the anomaly -- 'only one locational element nontheless a directional clause'-- seen in examples like (3) (Anderson,1971:169-70). I will try to identify the ablative prototype and will examine how the prototypical meaning of the ablative form in Sinhala gradually shifted in new directions to acquire new meanings like the one of putative function of combined meanings given in (3).

6.1 Semantic Core of the Ablative

In order to draw a picture of the motion structure and path conception, it is first necessary to arrive at a definition of motion event. According to Talmy(1975), a MOTION SITUATION is a situation consisting of:

(4) One object moving or located with respect to another object

The situation is partitioned into the semantic components in the following way:

(5) Motion Situation: figure + motion + path + ground

Grammatical categories corresponding to the each component are:

(6) noun + verb + preposition/postposition + noun

The ground-specifying nominal in a motion/location structure is added with a path-specifying surface form whose deep morpheme will be FROM, TO or AT depending on the specific nature of the path traversed by the object. The ablative form as an expression of path specifies a figure's departure from a ground assumed as a place of origin. What is specified as path in our image-schema for the ablative is not just the beginning of a path but a figure's departure from it, characterizing direction. The basic image-schema for the ablative which I propose is ,<motion away from a source> as presented in Diagram 1.




Diagram 1

Considering the fact that conception of space is basic for the organization of information in human mind, I will designate locative source as the primary protopical sense of the ablative category. The locale assumed as place of origin for a motion event is taken as 'locative source'. Accordingly, the ablative morpheme marks an object's departure from a location. We believe this <physical motion away from a spatial location> will provide the basic foundation for building a structural template in organizing events in nonspatial domains and abstract concepts around the motion structure.

We can see through the following examples how the prototypical sense of the ablative morpheme helps to organize the spatial expressions of source.

(7) leena gah-en waeTu-naa
squirrel tree-ABL fall-PAST
'The squirrel fell from the tree.'

(8) daeaes-in kandulu gala-nawa
two eyes-ABL tears flow-IND
'tears flow from the eyes.'

(9) Ranjit bas ek-en baessa
bus-ABL got off
'Ranjit got off the bus.'

(10) dumriya weedikaaw-en piTat unaa
train platform-ABL left
'The train departed from the platform.'

All these sentences represent various events involving physical motion as explicitly expressed by motion verbs. While the Theme or moving object appears in the nominative form, the origin of path is coded as locative source in the ablative form in each example. Any speculation of a possibility to encode these events with a different perspective will bring unacceptable results, for example, like (7')-(10'):

(7') * gaha leena waeTT-uwaa
tree squirrel fall-CAUS-PAST
'The tree made the squirrel fall.'

(8') ? daeaes kandulu waegur-uwaa
two eyes tears shed-PAST
'The eyes shed tears.'

(9') *bas eka Ranjit baess-uwaa

bus drop-PAST
'The bus dropped Ranjit.'

(10') *weedikaawa dumriya piTat kalaa
platform train sent off
'The platform sent off the train.'

The fact that these sentences are unacceptable, questionable or marked makes explicit that source and agent are not coreferential with these propositions. The origin of path in these motion events cannot be agentive source but only locative source because, we argue, it represents canonical source.

Prototypical source is not marked as agent because it is an object taken as a place or Ground. The other object which is linked to the place and undergoes motion is considered as the Theme or Figure. Another object that makes the theme move (an action called 'caused-motion') is conventionally encoded as agent. Look at the following examples.

(11) Ranjit lind-en watura adi-nawa
well-ABL water draw-IND
'Ranjit is drawing water from the well.'

(12) mama pustakaala-en pot-ak gatta
I library-ABL book-INDEF took
'I borrowed a book from the library.'

In these examples, subject represents the agent, object encodes the theme, and the ablative marks the source. These examples further show that the source is directly involved with motion in Sinhala which is a language explicitly associated with semantic categories. In English, on the other hand, which is configurational and more syntacticized, the source need not be involved with an explicit motion. The following examples will be illustrative:

(13) a. I am from Sri Lanka.
b. This letter is from Japan.
c. music from an opera
d. quotations from Shakerpeare
e. documents from the 18th century
f. heat from the sun
g. a wind from the north

Sentences (1) and (2) convey only states in which the *from* phrase indicates the theme's origin. In (c)-(g), each NP includes a PP indicating a kind of origin or source: [NP[PP$_{SOURCE}$]]. However, none of them refers to an explicit motion.

Such relations between a theme and a source cannot be presented in Sinhala, using the structure [NP[PP]]. In Sinhala, some of the relations are presented as genitive constructions. For example, one will find the following sentences as corresponding to (13a, c, and e).

(14) a. mama Lankaa-we
I Sri Lanka-LOC
'I belong to Sri Lanka.'

b. operaaw-ak-a sangiitaya
opera-INDEF-LOC music
'music of an opera'

c. 18 waeni siyawasa-Ta ayat liyawili
18th century-DAT belonging documents
'documents belonging to the 18th century'

The following sentences corresponding to (13 b, d, f, and g) will further show that a theme and a source cannot be linked together without a verbal form that denotes a motion event.

(15) a. mee liuma Japaan-en aapu ekak
this letter -ABL come-PP one
'This letter is from Japan.'

b. sheekspiar-gen gattu uddruta
shakespeare-ABL take-PP qoatations
'quotations from Shakespeare'

c. suurya-gen ena taapaya
sun-ABL come-GERND heat
'heat from the sun'
d. utur-en hamana sulanga
north-ABL blow-GERND wind
'wind from the north'

The verbal forms 'coming', 'taken', and 'blowing' repackage the source relations as explicit motions. Thus, in encoding source concepts, the Sinhala speaker will have to rely on an alternative form like genitive structure, obscuring the source relation or will have to make the motional aspect explicit, using a verbal form as those given above. In English, on the other hand, source seems to be more syntactically developed. Here I am not going to elaborate the suggestion just introduced and leave it as a tentative remark.

Now let me show some semantic constraint on the use of the ablative form in Sinhala. Sinhala refrains from using the ablative inflection in some domains for which source is considered to be a universal spatial primitive. Observe how the spatial structures are manifested in the following sentences:

(16) miniha polisi-ye indan e-nawa
man police station-LOC from come-IND
'The man is coming from the police station.'
(17) Ranjit isteesam-e indan iskoole-Ta diiwa
station-LOC from school-DAT ran
'Ranjit ran from the station to the school.'

In these sentences, the starting points of the path is indicated not by the ablative inflection but by the separate ablative particle *indan*. If we use the ablative inflection for the source entities, the sentences may give a different reading as in (16') or will be out as in (17').

(16') ada polisi-en aawa
today police-ABL came
'Today (members of) the police came here.'
(17') *Ranjit isteesam-en iskooe-Ta diiwa
station-ABL school-DAT ran
'Ranjit ran from the station to the school.'

The particle *indan* or *indala* has more spatial flavor; it is a grammaticalized form derived from the existential verb *innawa* or *indinawa*. We can also see that the spatial meaning is manifested structurally: N-Loc. + *indan* literally means "being at N". Thus the proposition implicated is "*x* was at *y* before". The function of the ablative particle *indan/indala* can be roughly sketched in the following way. By using the ablative particle, the speaker emphasizes the spatial origin of a path and the path itself. On the contrary, the source relation is implied to be more abstract by using the inflectional suffix. Compare the following pair.

(18) a. mama iskool-e indan en-ne
I school-LOC from come-EMPH
'I am coming from the school.'
b. haema iskool-en ma lamai pasdenek aawa
every school-ABL EMPH children five came
'There were five children from every school.'

The use of ablative forms in the two sentences seems to be in complementary distribution. The sentence (a) with the particle *indan* implies that the origin of the motion is to be taken as spatial. If the speaker makes this utterance somewhere away from the school, the listener understands that "*x* was at *y* before" and that "*x* is not at *y* now". If the speaker makes the utterance at the school premises, it means that "*x* is at *y* now" and "*x* will not be at *y* in a later moment". The sentence (b) on the other hand, whose ablative phrase is marked with the suffix *-en* does not necessarily denote a spatial ground as the origin of path, but implies that the source entity is to be considered as an organization or institution. The proposition "*x* was at *y* before but is not at *y* now" does not apply to this

situation. The actual (spatial) place of departure for the Figure can be a place completely different from what the sentence morphologically presents as Ground.

According to this interpretation, *the people from the Island Revenue* is rendered to Sinhala as (19a).

(19) a. deeshiiya aadaayam departamentu-en ena minissu
Island Revenue Department-ABL coming people
b. seeshiiya aadaayam departamentu-we indan ena minissu
Island Revenue Department-LOC from coming people

However, (19b) does not necessarily represent the Figure as officers belonging to The Island Revenue; the people can be the members of general public who leave the premises of the Island Revenue Department. A similar difference in interpretation was observed regarding (16) vs (16'). To give another example, *gamen ena lamai* is used to represent children who belong to the village, while the phrase *gamee indan ena lamai* does not imply any intrinsic relation between the children and the village; rather it establishes the village as the children's spatial location before their movement away from it.

In addition to this function, the particle *indan* brings the path of motion into perspective; not just the beginning of path, but the path itself is focused. Look at the example in (17) given here as (20).

(20) Ranjit isteesam-e indan iskoole-Ta diiwa
station-LOC from school-DAT ran
'Ranjit ran from the station to the school.'

X's path from *y* to *z* is focused here. For this purpose, the phrase with the ablative inflection *isteesamen iskooleTa* is not adequate. Hence we declared that (17') is grammatically out. Also look at the following sentence:

(21) a. Chitra uDa indan pahala-Ta ir-ak aenda
up from down-DAT line-INDEF drew
'Chitra drew a line from the top to the bottom.'

One can get the picture represented by this sentence as follows: Chitra took a paper and put the ruler on the paper, started from the top of the paper, and drew a line towards the bottom, without lifting the pencil from the paper. When she finished, she had drawn a line connecting the top and the bottom. This scene cannot be presented by using the ablative suffix as in (21b).

b. *Chitra uD-in pahala-Ta ir-ak aenda
up-ABL down-DAT line-INDEF drew

Contrastive to these sentences are the structures of the following Sinhala proverbs:

(22) kabal-en lipa-Ta
hot plate-ABL hearth-DAT
'From the hot plate to the fire.'

(23) att-en atta-Ta panina kurulla temii nasii
branch-ABL branch-DAT jumping bird get wet in peril
'The bird hops from one branch to another in the rain in peril of its life.'

These expressions are do not emphasize the paths traversed. The only focused elements are the source and goals; intermediate points of the path are left unfocused.

Our discussion so far reveals that the inflectional ablative form indicates a source or the beginning of a path. By adding the ablative inflection to a noun, the object denoted by it turns out to be a place with a direction, that is a starting point of a path. Are we, then, to understand from this discussion that the function fulfilled by the ablative form is the beginning of path along? The answer to this question is not affirmative. By having a closer look at the meanings of the ablative form, we will be able to find instances of alternative uses, to which I will turn in the next section.

6.2 Non-canonical spatial source

After briefly considering the ablative prototype and canonical source, we turn

to a kind of source, explicitly spatial yet non-canonical. The type of clause we are concerned with seems to be both 'locational' and 'directional' but containing only one locational element. This is a phenomenon somewhat similar to the case of *along* which bears a putative function with the combined meanings of ablative and locative. The examples in (24) form an interesting type of non-stative, ablato-locational clauses for which an appropriate explanation is to be sought.

(24) a. nariya kakul-ak kaTuwa uD-in tiyaa gatta
fox foot-INDEF shell on-ABL put-PAST
'The fox put one of its feet over the (tortoise)shell.'
b. ibba watura yaT-in giyaa
tortoise water under-ABL went
'The turtle went away under water.'

These clauses differ from 'stative' locative structures in several respects. First, the shape of the nominal inflection by which the reference object is marked is different from the ordinary locative morpheme: *in/en* is not the locative but the ablative morpheme in Sinhala. Secondly, the ablative form is added not directly to the nominal stem but to a postpositional particle denoting canonical location like *uDa* or *yaTa*. Thirdly, the verbs occurring in these clauses are different from those that are characteristic of the locative verbs, namely 'be'-verbs or positional verbs like *tienawa* 'be'(inanimate) or *innawa* 'be'(animate). The difference in lexical content is obviously derived from the +dynamic feature chosen by the verbs. Moreover, even with 'directionality' added and a 'process' involved, the clause still retains a remnant of 'stative' locative structure, namely the presence of only one locational element. The account I have outlined above shows that thet ype of clause exemplified by (24) is distinctive enough to warrant more detailed study of its semantico-syntax.

How are we to interpret such clauses as (24)? What additional meaning is Conveyed when the the locative particle is marked by ablative morpheme? First thing to be considered is what type of verbs are selected for these clauses. Compare (24a) with (25):

(25) nariya-ge kakula kaTuwa uDa tie-nawa
fox-GEN foot shell on be-IND
'The fox's foot is there on the shell.'

We propose that the verbs selected by the clauses in question(e.g. (24a) and the ones used in the locative constructions like (25) are different with respect to the feature +/-stative. As for the lexical meaning, the verb in (25) is stative while ver b in (24a) is non-stative in that the former denotes a motion event while the latter represents only location. With this aspectual difference in the verb, we can next observe that the spatial entity and the character of its relationship with the predicate is mostly determined by the type of the verb contained in the clause. That is to say, verbs like *tiyaa gatta* 'put' and *giyaa* 'went' which emphasize the notion of 'event', not that of 'state' play a very important part in these clauses. Compare the following examples:

(26) a. puusa puTuwa uDa nidi
cat chair on asleep
'The cat is sleeping on the chair.'
b. * puusa puTuwa uD-in nidi
cat chair on-ABL asleep
(27) puusa puTuwa uD-in paen-naa
cat chair on-ABL jump-PAST
'The cat jumped over the chair.'

(26a) is a clause containing a stative predicate. The nature of the relationship between the located entity and the reference object is indicated by the locative particle *uDa*, according to which, a surface of the located entity is touching the locative surface of the reference object and supported by the latter. Generally, this sentence is understood to mean that the cat is sleeping flat on the chair. This interpretation is not allowed and, moreover, an alternative conceptualization

is ruled out when the locative particle is changed to the ablative form while retaining the stative predicate. Hence (26b) is out.

However, ablative morpheme can specify a different relationship when it is used with a non-stative predicate as in (27). (27) denotes a situation in which a surface of the trajector is not touching a surface of the reference object object, and therefore means 'The cat jumped over the chair'. The ablative morpheme added to uDa indicates that there is a non-stative path traversed by the trajector. Path is a spatial feature of motion explicitly represented by the dynamic verb 'jump' in this case.

To support my argument, I will theoretically base my account on Conceptual Semantics developed by Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990) and will quote from Jacken -doff(1993), which will defend the present assumption of locative structure:

(28) "A preposition can be directional only if it expresses a Path-function."

Following the theory of Conceptual Semantics in Jackendoff 1983, the vocabulary of primitive conceptual categories include, among other things, such entities as Thing, Event, State, Action, Place and Path. Some innate formation rules work for expanding such basic categories into more complex expressions. To be more precise, the basic category Place can be expanded into a Place-function whose argument will be the category Thing. For example, *under* expressing a Place-function can take *the table* as an argument to form the basic category Place which designates the region under the table. This rule can be represented as

(29) PLACE ---> [$_{\text{Place}}$ PLACE-FUNCTION (THING)]

In the same way, a Path can be expanded into one of the five functions TO, FROM, TOWARD, AWAY FROM or VIA with an argument or a reference Thing. An example of the basic category Path thus formed is *to the house*. However, a Path-function can take as its argument not only a Thing but also a Place already formed by (29). An example of a Path with a reference Place is *from under the Table*. In this case, there is a movement of an object; the Place "under the table" is the starting point, which means the Place becomes Source. Structurally, the Place "under the table" is the argument of the Path-function FROM. The preposition *from* is directional as it expresses a Path-function. In a sentence like

(30) The ball lay under the table

the verb *lay* incorporates only the Place-function whereas the verb *emerge* in a sentence like

(31) Rover emerged from under the table

incorporates both Place- and Path-functions. Thus, (31) can express implicitly 'stative' locational meaning and explicitly 'directional' ablative meaning. In the discussion to be conducted below I will assume the use of the ablative morpheme in Sinhala as an elaboration of the Path-function.

Expressions similar to (31) can be seen in Sinhala. Following group of examples will bring the phenomenon into perspective:

(32) a. Rover meese yaTa nidi
table under asleep
'Rover is sleeping under the table.'

b. Rover meese yaT-in aawa
table under-ABL came
'Rover came out/emerged from under the table.'

c. Rover meese yaTa dangala-nawa
table under wriggle-IND
'Rover is wriggling under the table.'

d. * Rover meese yaT-in dangala-nawa
table under-ABL wriggle-IND

(32a) is a locative clause with a stative predicate, in which the reference object is

marked with a locative term. (32b) with a verb incorporating the Path-function and a reference object specified by the ablative morpheme indicates that there was a movement of the trajector away from the Place designated as "under the table". (32c) shows that a non-stative verb will not always incorporate a Path-function but can remain only with the Place-function. Hence the reference object is marked with the locative term. Further, as (32d) shows, eventhough the verb is non-stative, as far as it remains indifferent to the Path-function, the clause cannot contain a reference object marked with the ablative or directional morpheme. In other words, when the verb is not incorporating a Path-function, expression of Source is impossible. Here we can see that a statement made earlier to the effect that the aspectual difference of 'stative' and 'non-stative' plays a very important part in this construction does not attend to the expected requirement. The deficiency can be remedied by adopting a revised condition—that the functional difference of Path and non-Path plays a vital role in the construction.

Analyzing the structures occurring with locative and ablative NPs, we have demonstrated that locative morpheme expresses the Place-function only while ablative morpheme expresses both the Place- and Path-functions. Verbs are, then, classified as to whether they require Path or reject it (i.e. +Path or -Path). We also find the examples as in (33) and (34), where the Path/non-Path variation occurs with the same (phonological) verb form.

(33) a. Ranjit meese yaTa lanuwa adi-nawa
table under cord pull-IND
'Ranjit is pulling the cord under the table.'

b. Ranjit meese yaT-in lanuwa adi-nawa
table under-ABL cord pull-IND
'Ranjit is pulling the cord beneath the table.'

(34) a. Ranjit meese yaTa dana gaa-nawa
table under crawl-IND
'Ranjit is crawling about under the table.

b. Ranjit meese yaT-in dana gaa-nawa
table under-ABL crawl-IND
'Ranjit is crawling on his hands and knees under the table.'

The example with the locative term in (33a) implies that Ranjit's action of pulling the cord takes place at the Place designated as "under the table" where the movement is restricted to the region under the table. According to the sentence in (33b), on the other hand, the movement both begins and ends at places not under the table. Here the Place "under the table" is only one point of the chain of action, which is neither the initial nor the final point of movement. It is this Path that is expressed by the ablative morpheme in (33b). Similarly, in (34a) ther eference object marked with the locative particle expresses a Place within the limits of which Ranjit's crawling takes place. (34b), on the other hand, has a reference object marked with the ablative morpheme added to the locative term which expresses not merely a Place but a Path along which the action of crawling takes place. In (a) examples a conceptualization of an absolutely precise Place is warranted whereas in (b) examples prevailing conceptualization is of a region in which the Place and the Path are not mutually exclusive but overlap one another. I suggest that these two different conceptualizations available to the speaker are directly responsible for the choice of alternative case-forms (i.e. -Path or +Path) with the identical verb form and for the variation thereby made in the clause structure.

6.2.1 Variations of the Locative-Path expression

Sinhala is a rich source of locative-path(Place plus Path) extensions, from which we can produce a variety of examples that appear at first glance somewhat exotic and peculiar but eventually the apparent anomaly is expelled by making explicit their underlying notions. A Path-sensitive ablative meaning obtains in the following examples:

(35) ooka bim-in tiya-nna
that ground-ABL put-IMPER
'Put it down.'

(36) mee puTuw-en indaga-nna
this chair-ABL sit-IMPER
'Sit down on this chair.'

(37) a. api puTuwa uDa laeaell-ak tiu-wa
we chair on board-INDEF keep-PAST
'We put a board on the chair.'

b. api puTuwa uD-in tawa puTuw-ak tiu-wa
we chair on-ABL another chair-INDEF keep-PAST
'We put another chair on the chair.'

The ablative morpheme in these sentences does not indicate Source in the usual sense. (35) is not usually understood as an order to put a thing on the ground, that is, more than the object's contact with the surface of the ground, the thing's transfer of location is in the speaker's perspective in this case. The motional aspect of the event is explicitly represented by the meaning of the verb. The reference object marked with the ablative morpheme indicates the target region of this motion, focusing on the path-like nature of it and further implying that the thing is to be located in the area contiguous with the ground.

In (36) the denoted event is not the positional state of 'sitting', but the motional action of 'sitting down'. For indicating the positional state, the speaker usually selects the locative morpheme. The verbal aspect of transition of posture is very crucial to the choice of the ablative form in this case. The use of the ablative morpheme in (37b) will be constrastive with (37a) which has a spatial relationship specified by a locative term. They differ in how the reference object is exactly related to the located object. The truth condition admitted by (37a) is that a board is put flat on the chair. Perceptual information about the relevant objects involving their expected sizes, shapes, mobility, etc. allow this kind of conceptualization. The objects involved in the situation implied in(37b) and their relationship are different in geometrical characteristics. The relationship between two chairs put one on top of the other cannot be taken as flat. It is a case in which a part of the located object is touching a part of the reference object; the rest of the located object is a bit away from the surface of the reference object. Here I propose that this shaky or non-stationary position is assumed as a movement away from a surface, and as worthy to be marked with the ablative morpheme.

Our data shows that the spatial relations presented in these examples do not include precisely specified locations. These generalizations cannot be captured by the concepts of Location or Source isolately. Here the concept of REGION introduced as a perceptual predicate by Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976 can be very useful, according to which *x* is included in the region of *y* and, in perceptual terms, *w* is the region of possible interaction with *y*. Given such a representation, we will be able to capture fuzzy boundaries of some regions of interaction, but still the problem remains unsolved as to how one can characterize precisely *x*'s way of interacting with *y*. While admitting that the semantics of REGION should be thoroughly investigated before coming to any conclusions, I will tentatively suggest that Path-function would be most appropriate to accommodate all these senses, as shown above.

Another instance of the use of the ablative morpheme expressing Path-function can be clarified along the following examples:

(38) a. mee peTTiya eli-yen tiya-nna da
this box outside-ABL put-INF Q
'Shall I put this box outside?'

b. oyaa issarah-in inda ga-nna
you front-ABL sit-IMPER

'You sit in the front.'

c. Ranjit pass-en e-nawa
back-ABL come-IND
'Ranjit is coming behind.'

First, a small caveat about the spatial terms should precede our exposition of the ablative. The sentences in (38) do not mention explicitly a reference object that enables to establish a landmark with respect to which trajectors can be directionally located. How can we understand, then, "outside", "front" and "behind" in these sentences? In interpreting these sentences, the dichotomy between the deictic system and the intrinsic system demonstrated in Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976 seems to be informative. Miller and Johnson-Laird made a clear distinction between the two ways of talking about space:

> We will call the linguistic system for talking about space relative to a speaker's egocentric origin and coordinate axes the deictic system. We will contrast the deictic system with the intrinsic system, where spatial terms are interpreted relative to coordinate axes derived from intrinsic parts of the referent itself. Another way to phrase this distinction is to say that in the deitic system spatial terms are interpreted relative to intrinsic parts of ego, whereas in the intrinsic system they are interpreted relative to intrinsic parts of something else.
>
> (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976:396)

Accordingly, to interpret the spatial expressions in (38), we should know that the speaker is using the spatial terms egocentrically, and, therefore, without depending on his location and orientation, they are incomprehensible. When the information is not supplied explicitly, it is assumed that the reference point is the deictic location of *I*. The speaker's egocentric perspective becomes apparent from the fact that these expressions denote relative locations rather than absolute locations. (38a) is used by the speaker to instruct the addressee to put the box outside. When the utterance is used, the speaker, addressee and the object are supposed to be "inside" still. "Outside" is defined from the "interior" position; there is a spatial gap between the ego's position and "outside". This sepa ration lends the ablative meaning to the spatial expression. If the participants in the conversation were already outside when the utterance occurred, there might be no call for using the ablative morpheme. Similarly, in (38b) it is generally understood that at least one of the participants in the conversation, most probably the addressee, is away from "the front" at the moment the sentence is uttered. In interpreting the sentence "Ranjit is coming behind" in (38c) with no any anchor explicitly indicated, we are to understand that the speaker's ego establishes the coordinates, and, therefore, "behind" is viewed relative to the ego's location. The gap between the ego's location and the trajector's location is indicated by the ablative morpheme added to the spatial term.

Then we have the question of interpreting the ablative meaning. It should be noted that the actual interpretation of path-like nature is directly related to the motion events which depend upon the verbal predicates with which they co-occur. Note that all the verbs in these examples denote some kind of motion including a transfer of location, a transition of posture, or an explicit motion from one place to another. Region associated with such motion events is distinguished by the ablative morpheme. It is not a figure's departure from a source but a region associated with a figure's motion that is covered by the ablative in these cases.

The distinction of dynamic predicates versus stative predicates will be useful in distinguishing the ablative-path expressions from the ordinary locative constructions. When the definition of the spatial field is not immediately affected by the motional aspect of the verbs or when it is not focusing on the trajector's motion, the spatial term will be marked with the locative morpheme. (39a), (39b) and (39 c) are contrastive with (38a), (38b) and (38c):

(39) a. eli-ye peTTi-yak tie-nawa
outside-LOC box-INDEF be-IND
'There is a box outside.'
b. issaraha kauruwat naeae
front anybody no
'There is nobody in the front.'
c. pass-e in-na aya-Ta aehe-nawa da?
back-LOC be-GERAND people-DAT hear(PASS)-IND Q
'Can you hear me, people in the back?'

The predicates in these sentences denote existential states; they cover only Place Functions, not Path functions and, therefore, the nominals denoting grounds cannot be marked with the ablative morpheme.

I will further argue that the space concept is used in these examples more abstractly than in the case of (38), that is, priority is given to the locations relative to other objects, compared with the examples in (38) where the priority is in the locations relative to the speaker's ego. For example, "outside", "front", and "back" in (39a, b and c) are defined from a position detached from the ego. Further, they are only relative to "inside", "back", and "front" respectively. Here w e are guided not "to overlook the fact that people do often talk about locations in terms of coordinate systems that remain, if not absolute, at least reasonably permanent" (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976).

The situation in (39c) needs some comment. This is an expression often heard from a speaker when taking the floor. In this particular sentence the people addressed by the speaker are neither in back of his ego nor in back of the hearer's ego. That is to say, the location of ego does not define the spatial field. The spatial relation is described more abstractly. Here the audience is viewed as an object with a unique three-dimensional coordinate system whose orientation is to determine the location. First, the audience is conceived of as having an intrinsic front: the front is taken to mean the side of the audience facing the speaker or the stage, and, then, back side is understood relative to this front. This observation seems to be quite convincing since it can account for the fact that a floor even when it is not occupied by an audience can be conceived of as having intrinsic front and back sides by virtue of its orientation towards the stage.

Our analysis above shows that spatial expressions can be interpreted in different ways depending on how the speaker has set up the coordinate system, intrinsically or diectically. These two ways of using the space concept must be taken into account in the interpretation of spatial expressions. The fact that the same lexical items used for spatial expressions in (38) and (39) allow different interpretations can be attributed to the difference between these two ways of using the space concept. However, when we consider the morphosyntax of these expressions we cannot forget that one of the most important factors that would contribute to the distinction between the sentences in (38) and (39) is Path-function. *Be*-verbs used in the examples in (39) incorporate State-function with the conceptual categories of Thing and Place as arguments. One argument, the Thing serves as a trajector and the other, the Place serves as a reference object, while their static relation is signalled by the locative morpheme which exp resses the Place-function.

Now recall that the verbs such as *tiyanawa* 'put, place', *indagannawa* 'sit' and *enawa* 'come' used in (38) incorporate Event- or Action-functions, each of which denotes a motion-like situation. In most cases, the ablative morpheme specifying the Path-function is not added to a nominal, which means that we will not encounter here an object from which motion proceeds, namely a conventional Source. Instead, movement is paired with a locus or a region assumed to be associated with a path: ablative marker is added to a spatial term, thereby indicating a location in the area contiguous with the exterior(38a), front (38b) and

back (38c) of ego. The structure of these ablative-path expressions highlights this region of interaction with ego as well as path. The structure is a vehicle for expressing the trajector's motion itself and also for conceptualizing the distance between the ego's location and the trajector's location as a kind of motion.

6.2.2 More focus on Path

In the previous section, we have seen that the ablative morpheme is not mere Source, Source in the conventional sense, "the object from which motion proceeds"(Gruber1976). What is usually indicated by an ablative is a situation in which *x* moves away from *y* and automatically ceases to be at *y*. The ablative form in our data does not indicate *x*'s actual movement away from *y*; it indicates only a perceptual separation or a path associated with a motion event. Moreover, *x* is expected to reach or to be in the area contiguous with *y*, when ablative is used in this particular way. Observe the following pair of examples:

(40) a. karreka otan-in natara kara-nna
car there-ABL stop-IMPER
'Stop the car somewhere there.'
b. kataawa otan-in awasan kara-nna
talk there-ABL end-IMPER
'Put an end to your talk there.'

In these situations the speaker indicates the place to stop the car or the point to end the talk. That is, the external situation addressed by the ablative form is not a departure from but an association with a location. While an event of the type "*x* moves away from *y*" can implicate "*x* moves to not *y*' or "*x* is not at *y*", neither of them obtains in these cases. Viewed in this way, the ablative relation is only a perceptual template imposed by the speaker on a situation for conceptu alizing and structuring it as an event with combined features of path and approximate goals. The particular template is selected when the speaker wants, as we have already demonstrated, to represent the situation as a motion event with a departure-like activity. when the function of the spatial marker is shifted from locating stationary objects to locating moving-objects, the ablative form is used to express the path traversed by the moving object.

The typical use of *from* and *to* indicates initial and terminal points of movement; the location from which *x* moves away and the location to which *x* moves are taken as distinctive categories(Gruber,1976). Jackendoff 1983 introduced them as "bounded paths". It seems that ablative-path expressions in Sinhala are used to indicate not these polarized points but some intermediate points with a direction, not bounded by the two endpoints. The semantics of the ablative in this special case, then, is similar to the putative function interpreted as a combination of the initial and terminal locations of movement, viz. ablative and allative, and attributed to the spatial prepositions like *along, across, around* and *through* by Anderson 1971 and 1977.

With this observation, emerges a new area of concern which was not formerly highlighted; its logical core can be stated as a claim: while the *from-to* pattern is basic among path-expressions, unbounded paths with no explicit beginning or end (closely corresponding to *routes* in Jackendoff's taxonomy) should be fully accepted into any analysis of spatial expressions. It has been widely remarked that many locative prepositions in English -- for example, *over, above, below, beneath, under, in, on, between, among, behind* and *before* -- are available as directional complements for expressing paths also(Jackendoff,1973:163, Fillmore, 1975:26, Gruber,1976:66 and Miller and Johnson-laird, 1976:407). As Fillmore has pointed out, it is in the case of complements of Path- and Goal-type that prepositional phrases having the same form as the underlying locative complements are used as directional complements in English. Jackendoff(1973) illustrates the point by the following minimal pair:

(41) a. The mouse is under the table
[PLACE UNDER ([THING TABLE])]
b. The mouse ran under the table

[PATH TO ([PLACE UNDER ([THING TABLE])])]

The same prepositional phrase is used in (41a and b) with different meanings, that is, the prepositions are ambiguous between a pure place-function and place plus path(TO or VIA)-function. This question of ambiguity demonstrated by Jackendoff does not arise in Sinhala because it has distinctive morphological means to express the function of unbounded paths. (24b) given earlier and repeated here as (42) shows how this function is expressed through the ablative form.

(42) ibba watura yaT-in giyaa
tortoise water under-ABL went
'The tortoise went under the water.'

The ablative expresses the path traversed by the tortoise. A similar example is Given in (43).

(43) Ranjit haemadaama apee gee lang-in ya-nawa
everyday our house near-ABL go-IND
'Ranjit everyday goes by our house.'

The sentence does not just indicate that the reference object is a location near 'our house', i.e. a location within a short distance from the house. It implies a place passed through; being a route, it is not *near* but *via near* that is addressed by the ablative. This path function is directly associated with activity verbs of motion.

In some cases, though there is no significant differntiation in the propositional meaning, the speaker may impose the noncanonical-path perspective on a situation otherwise seen as stationary. Observe the following example:

(44) a. gama maed-in loku paara-k ya-nawa
village amid-ABL big road-INDEF go-IND
'There is a wide road going through the village.'

This sentence exemplifies "perspective point", one of the four "imaging systems" of language outlined by Talmy(1983). Though the trajector in this example is a stationary object extending over the entire path at a single point of time, and not an occurrence at successive points in time which characterizes a motion event, it is conceptualized as being in virtual motion or "fictive motion"(See Talmy 1996). The use of a motion verb *yanawa* 'go' with a path-indicating phrase in this case depends upon an understanding of the canonical dimension of a road which allows to conceptualize it as a linear object extending horizontally. Sinhala native speakers' intuition says that there cannot be a canonical event-type, linguistically realized with a canonical locative phrase, when a road is selected as the trajector as in (44b), though it is possible with a stationary object like a rock as in (45).

(44) b. * gama maeda loku paara-k tie-nawa
village amid big road-INDEF be-IND
'There is a big road (leading) through the village.'

(45) gama maeda loku gala-k tie-nawa
village amid big rock-INDEF be-IND
'There is a big rock in the middle of the village.'

Both the geometries of the object and the motional aspect of the verb work together to enhance the path-reading of the sentence.

6.3 Conclusion

We identified 'locative source' or 'beginning of path' as the prototypical sense of the ablative, and contrasted it with the ablative particle which expresses both the beginning of path and the path traversed. Then we discussed that the ablative form can also express 'non-canonical spatial source' which does not refer to the beginning of path. These non-canonical ablative expressions incorporate Place- and Path-finctions. A considerable amount of information was provided as to how such utterances as "*x* sits from *y*' and "*w* puts *x* from on *y*' that do not follow the canonical principles of the ablative semantics can be interpreted accurately. Establishing dichotomy between Place alone and Place plus Path, as we repeatedly

illustrated through stative predicates and dynamic verbs of motion respectively, one can claim that these ablative-path expressions are cognitively based on locative structures. This harmony of ablative and locative was observed as a wide-spread phenomenon in Sinhala against the mainstream localist view that considers it as an antonymic relation(Anderson,1871:120).

However, by focusing on the path-function, one can also make a claim about the ablative-path expressions to the effect that on the path continuum, they are close to goals rather than sources. The function of ablative-path expressions, then, is naturally understood as to indicate a path with approximate goals. Finally, we examined that while the ablative form can address a path with approximate goals, it can also focus on path alone without implying any approximate goal. This path, more precisely the intermediate points of path can be mentioned as another element of the spatial relationship expressed by the ablative form.

Bringing the facts inferred from this discussion into a general view, we can say that objects moving or interacting in different ways are flexible enough to adjust to non-canonical event-schemata that represent alternative speaker-perspectives. Ablative form in Sinhala is such a case that it expresses the canonical sense of locative source and also incorporates the non-canonical path-perspective. The difference between the two perspectives can be stated in the following way: while the prototypical case of the ablative captures the beginning of path, the ablative-path expression specifies a path perceived to be traversed by a trajector, without explicitly indicating the actual beginning of path or actual reaching of ultimate goal. Unlike the ultimate source and ultimate goal at the ends, this non-canonical sense involves a sequence of transitory locations. Depending on appropriate contexts, the ablative form can encode different portions of the path, beginnings, routes, or approximate goals. An ablative expression with the same morphosyntactic form can preserve the prototypical meaning in appropriate contexts, and also occur as a non-canonical path expression in different contexts. (27) earlier given as an ablative-path expression and repeated here as (46) is a good example.

(46) puusa puTuwa uD-in paenna
cat chair on-ABL jump-PAST
'The cat jumped over the table.' or
'The cat jumped off the table.'

One can also suggest that there is a meaning transfer from the prototypical ablative to the non-canonical path expressions. The non-canonical path expressions are semantic specializations of the ablative construction. They do not necessarily set an initial spatial bound to a motional event. The range of semantic variations expressed by the non-canonical path expressions also bear evidence for the fact that they are transferred or additionally acquired meanings. This relationship of the basic and developed meanings is further open for concept ual development. Observe the following examples:

(47) a. naeTTuwo perahaer-ee e-nawa
dancers procession-LOC come-IND
'The dancers are coming in the peocession.'
b. rajjuruwo perahaer-en e-nawa
king procession-ABL come-IND
'The king is coming in the procession.'
c. ? naeTTuwo perahaer-en e-nawa
dancers procession-ABL come-IND

According to the examples, both the dancers and the king are coming in the procession. In (47a) the trajector is located in the landmark, the 'procession' in that the speaker and hearer take the dancers as a part forming the procession while in (47b) the trajector is detached from the landmark by virtue of the ablative morpheme which changes the status of the landmark from a place to a place plus path. In this situation, the trajector is not just a part of the procession, but acquires a position of ceremonial welcome. The oddity of (47c) may be due to the

general tendency that the 'dancers' are considered as one item of a procession, and accordingly treated as a trajector occupying a locale of predication within a linguistic expression. However, (27c) can be appropriate for indicating a situation in which the dancers are given a ceremonial welcome for their excellent performance and conceptually treated as a trajector compatible with the ablative trajectory of 'procession'.

Chapter 7— Conceptual Expansion of the Ablative

Introduction

In this chapter I will examine how the spatial source is used as a metaphorical template for expressing a wider range of meanings from non-spatial domains. I shall observe how the non-spatial events are organized through the structure of source-related motion events. The basic elements involved in the motion structure will be ground, path, figure, and motion semantically and syntactically represented as in (1).

(1) Motion Situation: GROUND + PATH FIGURE MOVE (semantics)
NOUN + ABL SUB PRED (syntax)

We have seen that the basic image schema for the ablative includes movement, starting point or source, and path as shown in the Diagram 1, which entails the proposition "*x* moves away from *y*".




Diagram 1

This image-schematic structure is expanded to new domains allowing the Ablative marker to take on new case functions. Assuming that language as a whole is metaphorically structured (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and that spatial source is extended to non-spatial sources, the question arises what topological aspects of the ablative structure are preserved in the metaphorical mapping from physical motion to less concrete, or abstract motion of entities. The concept of source is understood as an abstract relation between two entities *x* and *y*. We are not concerned with the particulars such as the relative spatial position of the two objects or actual distance between the entities. We are not certain as well whether they are objects, places, people, animate beings, or events. The crucial point is that *x* is the theme, figure or trajector and *y* is the ground and source. The path-line in Diagram 1 represents the trajectory traversed by the figure.

The image schema for the ablative consists of (1) a source, (2) a theme, (3) prior location of the theme at the source, (4) theme's movement away from the source, and (5) movement along a linear path. Prototypically, the source-specifying expression a nominal. To be precise, originally it would only express a location, and comes to denote a source when added with the ablative, the path-specifying morpheme.

We understand the concept of source as an abstract temporal relation, which means that the place where the theme moves from is first at time t_1 and that the theme passes each successive location at a later moment of time t_i. These time indices can be considered as locations. The relation "later than" represents the more or less immediate succession of one location by another along a path that includes a sequence of AT relations (cf. Miller and Johnson-laird 1976).

With respect to motion, the initial location in the path is where the trajector moves from, while the final location is where the trajector moves to. Given the two endpoints, the intermediate relations are where the trajector moves along. Source, then, should be taken as an abstract relation that a trajector bears to the initial location. It will be a place when the relation is explicitly locative, but can be a person, a point of time, an event or any abstract relation depending on the semantic structure. Thus the ablative morpheme specifying source can refer to an abstract type of motional events of actions.

In the metaphorical mapping from physical motion to non-physical motion this internal schematic structure of motion remains constant across domains. Other motional aspects of non-topological nature are neglected in this process of of mapping. For instance, such specific details as the relative distance between two entities, manner of motion, and color of objects need not be in identity across

domains. When the image schema is mapped onto new domains, it acquires new, secondary meanings relevant to the new contexts.

7.1 Metaphorical Extension

I shall now discuss some cases in which the image-schematic structure of source and motion is transferred to new domains and gains new meanings in different contexts associated with a variety of event types. A basic topic to be discussed is the ACQUISITION IS MOTION metaphor through which the meaning of the ablative is shifted from the domain of spatial motion to the domain of acquisition; the origin of the acquisition process, namely the original possessor of an entity before its transition is perceived as starting point or source, while the animate participant who is at the receiving end is conceptualized as the endpoint or goal. In the simple case, the motion event is taken to consist of the theme/patient treated as the figure and the original possessor considered as the ground.

(2) Chitra-gen salli hamba unaa
-ABL money found
'Money was received from Chitra.'

(3) gurutumaa-gen taeaegi laeb-unaa
teacher-ABL presents be received-PAST
'(We) got some presents from the teacher.'

The original possessor, object of transit and verb of transition are arranged in the same way we demonstrated earlier to be isomorphic with the structure of source-centered motion events. The source marker known by the function of indicating the place of origin has acquired the additional function of indicating the original possessor. As to adjust to this new function, the morpheme has developed from *-en* to *-gen* which specifies the animacy of the lexical morpheme. We take this shift as metaphorical because a basic, concrete relation is exploited here to conceptualize a more abstract concept.

While the verbs of transition involved in the above propositions are intransitive, we can find transitive motion events obtainable by adding the causal factors like 'agent' and 'transfer of energy', identifying the theme as patient and transforming the verb into an active, causative-type verb. Verbs of acquisition, transfer and grab frequently appear in such events, with the ablative marker used to express the transition away from possession.

(4) nariya kapuTa-gen keeju kaeaella gatta
fox crow-ABL piece of cheese took
'The fox took the piece of cheese from the crow.'

(5) Suba Yasa raju-gen sinhaasanaya peahaera gatta
king-ABL throne usurped
'Suba usurped the throne from the King Yasa.'

(6) Ranjit ma-gen liuma uduraa gatta
me-ABL letter snatched
'Ranjit snatched the letter from me.'

In all these situations the nominal marked with the ablative denotes the original possessor, and the object of transfer is taken as the figure moving away from the possessor. Thus they are conceptualized as motion events based on figure/ground organization.

In encoding commercial transactions, the former owner is considered as analogous with the place of origin in spatial motion:

(7) api mee kaD-en baDu gan-nawa
we this shop-ABL goods buy-IND
'We buy things from this shop.'

(8) mama Ranjit-gen kaemaraawa gatta
I -ABL camera bought
'I bought the camera from Ranjit.'

Given the relation involved is transitive, the trajector functions as the theme or patient appearing between the source-specifying nominal and the verb. Another participant occupies the subject position representing agentive role and projecting

the type of event as caused-motion. In such situations, while the source appears as a relation that links the object to the initial location, the sentential subject serves to manifest the final location or the receiving end as perceptually determined starting point.*

The predicates representing abstract motion events discussed so far have acquisition or transfer as a common semantic feature. However, some verbs which do not lexically designate events of acquisition or transfer also can be seen to be involved in events of abstract motion. Observe the following example:

(38) Chitra lamain-gen salli ekatu kalaa
children-ABL money collected
'Chitra collected money from the children.'

In this case, following the approach of Construction Grammar, we can observe that acquisition or transition is associated not with the verb *ekatu karanawa* 'collect' but the ablative construction as a whole in that act of collecting is considered as a precondition for transfer (See Goldberg,1992: 59). The same hypothesis can be considered to work when coding an event of asking or requesting in which the person who is requested is marked for the ablative:

(10) kokaa hiwalaa-gen taegga ill-uwa
crane fox-ABL reward ask-PAST
'The crane asked the fox for the reward.'

Here also, the act of asking can be considered as a precondition for transfer. An object is expected to transfer from the source participant to the requesting participant. The verb *illuwa* 'asked' is only a prelude to this event of future transfer. A similar precondition-coding verb used with an ablative nominal can be seen in the following sentence also:

(11) mama eyaa-gen paara aeh-uwaa
I he-ABL way ask-PAST
'I asked him the way (to ...).'

Here again, some information is expected to come from the ablative participant to the agent(inquiring person), for which inquiring would be a precondition. Ablative participant representing the source of information is treated as the ground, while the information sought by the speaker is taken to be the figure. Considering the requested person as a source is not so rare: in English this phenomenon can be seen in some formal expressions of request:

(12) May I ask a favor <u>of</u> you?
(13) No questions were asked <u>of</u> us.
(14) All I request <u>of</u> you is that you come early.

Events involving such speech acts can be included in the domain of speech communication and their conceptual and linguistic organization is to be understood in terms of the specific metaphor SPEECH COMMUNICATION IS MOTION. The same metaphor works in coding the act of hearing as well as the act of asking. The two verbs differ in their way of profiling: the profile of the verb 'ask' keeps the initiation of the communication activity on part of the subject participant, namely the first speaker, while the profile of 'hear' does not include this initial area of the activity; instead, it limits itself to the terminal area of the activity, namely the response of the partner or second speaker. Look at the following example:

(15) api Ranjit-gen honda kataawa-k aeh-uwaa
we -ABL nice story-INDEF hear-PAST
'We heard a nice story from Ranjit.'

The nominal participant representing the source of information takes ablative Marking. The participant of the terminal area of communication activity occupies the subject position denoting agent role or unmarked-participant role. Given the above description, (15) differs from (11) in that it presents an instance of actual

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* See MacWhinney 1977 for a detailed discussion of the factors involved in the choice of starting points.

transfer of information instead of designating a precondition for such a transfer. This situation in speech communication is organized as a motion event; the participant from which the flow of information starts is marked with the path-specifying morpheme. The source marker is used as a metaphorical vehicle for indicating the conceptual path of communication.

Note that acquisition and communication are not mutually exclusive domains; they can be rather established as two sub-domains of an higher-level domain which might be called 'transfer' or 'exchange'. The predicate 'learning' in (16) will represent this interrelated nature of the two domains, though it weighs in favor of acquisitional aspect.

(16) Chitra Mendis saar-gen ingriisi igena gan-nawa
teacher-ABL English learn-IND
'Chitra learns English from Mr. Mendis.'

Chitra becomes the clausal subject by virtue of being the action-chain head and causal agent. The thing learned or knowledge is taken as a figure moving along a perceptual path. The ablative nominal representing the source of knowledge in this case is taken as the place of origin for a motional event.

In all these events the potential receiver occupies the agent position, while the original possessor or the source of information is marked with the ablative. However, a different conceptual template can be imposed on the event by reversing the two elements of the action-chain. In one of such shifts, the original possessor is preferred to be the focal participant and selected to serve as the starting point with respect to energy flow, consequently occupying the prototypical agent position in the clause structure. The participant at the receiving end, on the other hand, is selected as the endpoint with respect to energy flow and marked with the dative.

(17) Mendis saar Chitra-Ta ingriisi uganna-nawa
teacher -DAT English teach-IND
'Mr. Mendis teaches English to Chitra.'

Three facts have been brought to light by this observation. First, the scenes analyzed here can be taken as representing two different situation-types involving motion, one indicating the origin of the motion (examples (4)-(16)), and the other the destination of the motion(17). Secondly, the same scenes are expressed differentially by the speakers by imposing a particular perspective on them. They focus on different dimensions of the event, structuring it as a departure from, or arrival at, a location. Following MacWhinney(1977), we can say that (16) reflects the perceptually determined perspective whereas (17) conveys the relationally determined perspective. Thirdly, the most interesting elucidation to be made is that a variety of situations which are not necessarily spatial can be conceptualized in terms of source. We will continue to follow the third fact with more detail.

Another abstract domain to which the ablative prototype is extended involves events of sensation. Acts of sensation are coded as intransitive events in which the stimulus appears as the theme in the subject position while the location from which the sensation emanates visually is marked for ablative:

(18) puhul horaa kar-en daene-e
gourd thief shoulder-ABL be understood-1 PER SING
'The gourd-thief is understood from his shoulder.'

(19) mee pintuura-en punchi lama-ek pene-e
this picture-ABL young child-INDEF be seen-1 PER SING
'You can see a young child from this picture.'

Though these events do not represent motional situations in the external world, they are perceived and organized by the structures analogous with motion structures for linguistic coding. The ablative form is used as a conceptual metaphor to express the path relation between source and stimulus. The difference in order as to which comes first, source or stimulus, is attributed to whether the stimulus is counted as definite or indefinite. The stimulus situation includes a perceptual image produced through a physical background which is taken as the place of origin for the image invoked. This perceptual path is signalled by the ablative

form. The metaphor involved can be phrased as EMANATION OF SENSATION IS MOTION.

In the following examples, a different sort of non-spatial path involving an entity seen to be emanating from another entity can be identified:

(20) satun-gen apa-Ta karadaray-ak naeae
animals-ABL us-DAT trouble-INDEF no
'There is no any trouble from animals.'

(21) ganwatur-en barapatala haani
flood-ABL heavy damage
'heavy damage from the floods.'

The speaker views the trouble or harm as coming from a ground-like entity which in actual terms corresponds to the source of trouble/harm in the external situations. This abstract path between figure and ground is specified by the ablative morpheme. The use of the spatial relation for expressing the more abstract relations is facilitated by a metaphor like EMANATION OF EVILS IS MOTION. Next time,the same external source can take on the agent role in the clausal organization as seen in the following examples in which agent and source are correferential:

(22) sattu apa-Ta karadara kara-nawa
animals us-DAT trouble-IND
'Animals trouble us.'

(23) ganwatura barapatala haani gee-nawa
flood heavy damage bring-IND
'Flood brings us heavy damage.'

In this clause-type, the source of damage/harm is assumed to initiate the activity and thus occupies the prototypical position for action-chain head. Again, the difference in conceptualization has made the same propositional meaning appear with different coding patterns.

Activities of some other domains for which ablative construction is metaphorically used include emancipation, exemption, oblivion, prevention, expulsion, etc. In some of these domains where the predication is represented by a process verb, the figure is perceived as moving away from an abstract entity and used in the subject position, forming an intransitive event.

(24) minissu wahalbaw-in nidahas unaa
people slavery-ABL free became
'People got free from slavery.'

(25) eyaa mage hit-in aeaet unaa
she my mind-ABL distant became
'She went away from my mind.'

(26) dumpaanay-en walaki-mu
smoking-ABL refrain-HORT
'Let's refrain from smoking.'

In these examples, the animate participants occupying the subject position are considered as figures.* The ablative nominal denoting an abstract state is selected as ground. The intuitive motivation for this selection is derived from the fact that the ablative nominal indicates an initial location from where the movement of the subject participant takes place along an abstract path. The causal chain can be expanded by choosing a non-figural object as the action-chain head. When a participant external to the figure is involved in the action-chain, it will appear as the clausal subject, pushing the figure into the direct-object position. Transitive events brought out by such operations are illustrated by following examples:

(27) sattu siwalaa rajakam-en pannaa daemmaa
animals fox throne-ABL expelled
'The animals expelled the fox from the throne.'

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* The subject participant remains implicit in (26).

(28) mama eeka hit-in ain kalaa
I it mind-ABL removed
'I left it out of consideration.'
(29) mee winaasay-en raTa galawaa gan-na oonae
this disaster-ABL country save-INFIN should
'We should save the country from this disaster.'

The ablative nominals in (27)-(29) denote abstract domains from which the figure is assumed to move away. The events are organized according to the structure of propulsion events in spatial motion: an animate participant initiates the propulsion and the figure separates from the ground. Both in the spatial domain and the abstract domains the initial location is grammatically indicated by the ablative form which functions as the metaphorical vehicle mapping the two different domains. The whole process can be generalized into the metaphor SEPARATION FROM AN ABSTRACT STATE IS MOTION.

7.2 Extension into More Abstract Areas

The variety of senses of the ablative expression discussed so far are taken to be derived from the prototype meaning of 'locative source' or 'spatial source'. The new meaning will be built into a new, prototype-like category when its distance from the central category is so large. While the peripheral properties of the prototype category are highlighted, the link between this new meaning and the original meaning is maintained by the unific topological features and metaphors. In this section we will focus on some categorial metaphors and try to examine their mediation in expressing events belonging to more abstract domains.

An important cognitive domain which is integrated in the semantic field of spatial motion would be instrumental relation. Langacker(1991), proposing his analysis of event structure and role conceptions, shows the sequence of AGENT = = => INSTRUMENT = = => PATIENT as constituting a canonical action chain. According to this analysis, an instrument in canonical sense is a physical object manipulated by an agent to affect a patient. While the concept of instrument includes a tool (30) or a body part (31) by the terms of prototype extension, it may include vehicular instruments also as in (32), all of which are coded as ablative nominals.

(30) amma pol kaTu haend-en bat bed-uwa
mother coconut shell spoon-ABL rice serve-PAST
'Mother served rice with the coconut-shell spoon.'
(31) lameya at-in kalu laeaella maek-uwa
child hand-ABL black board wipe out-PAST
'The child erased the black-board with his hand.'
(32) api bas ek-en ya-nawa
we bus-ABL go-IND
'We'll go by bus.'

Why is the instrument linguistically coded by the ablative form? The answer lies in the fact that the prototypical instrument involves energetic interaction, in which one participant transmits energy to another through physical contact. In this transmission of energy, the instrument is used as an intermediary through which energy flows from the action-chain head to the action-chain tail. While the action-chain head which is the primary energy source is characterized as agent, the instrument which is the secondary energy source in the linear path is construed as being analogous to locative source and marked with the corresponding case form, the ablative. In the extended use, even when there is no energy goal involved in the event, instrument is treated as a locative source with respect to an assumed energy path as seen in (32).

In support of the argument that the prototypical instrument involves energetic interaction, we might point to the fact that instrumental phrases normally occur with verbs that contain a causative component, i.e. DO condition or CAUSE condition as in (33a). (33b) is out because the verb does not include DO or

CAUSE but only BECOME as a condition.

(33) a. pihiy-en amba kapa-nawa
knife-ABL mango cut-IND
'(We) cut mango with the knife.'

b. * pihiy-en ata kaep-unaa
knife-ABL hand be cut-PAST
'My hand got cut by the knife.'

c. pihiya-Ta ata kaep-unaa
knife-DAT hand be cut-PAST
'My hand got cut by the knife.'

We might say that the instrumental phrase in Sinhala, unlike in English, entails intentionality*. (33b) suggests that the ablative use with instrumental sense is unacceptable when forceful contact is not involved in which case the dative use will be appropriate as in (33c)**. Thus we argue that the use of ablative form for instrumental sense has a cognitive component: the instrument is characterized as a place of origin for energy flow and construed as being analogous to ablative source. In this SPACE-to-INSTRUMENT mapping, ablative form acquires new meanings such as instrumentality and energetic interactions.

If this analysis is correct, it will offer some useful insights to explain, at least, a part of the multiple use of ablative form covering different domains which include anthropocentric concepts as well as relational concepts. Let us first consider the case of paraphrastic instruments that are introduced through the ablative form. Some of these expressions, e.g. *magin* 'by/by way of/ through' (lit. 'from way') and *baegin* 'by'(lit. 'from portion') have become established as grammaticalized forms. The original meanings of some other instrument-forms, e.g. *balen* 'by force of', *udawwen* 'with the help of' and *pihiTen* 'thanks to/through somebody's good offices' are quite accessible to the native speakers. These expressions appear to be paraphrastic by virtue of having some extra element like 'force', 'help' or 'good offices' incorporated into instruments. This extra element seems to be a speaker-centered aspect rather than an intrinsic part of the instrument. In the formation of this expression the ablative morpheme is added to the noun that denotes this extra element, not to the direct instrument. Observe the examples:

(34) deyyan-ge pihiTen wibaage paas u-naa
gods-GEN thanks to examination pass-PAST
'Thanks to gods, I passed the exam.'

(35) api kaT-ee balen waeDa gan-nawa
we mouth-LOC by force work take-IND
'We set them to work by commanding them.'

It is reasonably clear that these instrumental phrases contain the element of energy transmission as the underlying conceptual domain in which force itself is treated as instrument.

Closely following the periphrastic instrumentals is the instrumental phrases that lexically designate 'purpose'. In the following examples, the ablative appears with the purpose nominals:

(36) Ranjit bandina adahas-in salli ituru kalaa
marry idea-ABL money saveed
'Ranjit saved money with the idea of marrying.'

(37) Chitra sarasavi yana aramun-in waeDa kalaa
university go aim-ABL worked
'Chitra worked with the aim of going to college.'

The notion of energy transmission can be applied in this case also: purpose

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* Miller and Johnson-Laird(1976) shows that in English "use" carries an intentional entailment that is lacking in "with". See the examples given in (44) and (45) in this chapter.

** See Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of the use of dative.

itself is treated as instrument; instrument serves as the place of origin for energy flow. Not only purpose but some other abstract concepts including mental and cognitive forces also can be categorized as non-material instruments. The examples below are illustrative:

(38) kaurut eka hit-in waeDa kalaa
everybody one mind-ABL worked
'Everybody worked together in unity.'

(39) preema-en welii siTina yuwala-k
love tie up-PP be couple-INDEF
'a couple tied up by love'

We take these ablative nominals as representing non-material instruments which transmit force along an abstract path.

According to the analysis we are advancing here, manner adverbials with ablative ending can be explained as based on the same schematic form: an adjective denoting a quality is added with the ablative morpheme. Some examples are given in (40).

(40) honda+in > hondin 'well'
ikman+in > ikmanin 'quickly'
sampuurna+en > sampuurnayen 'completely'
keTi+en > keTiyen 'in short'
saera+en > saeren 'strictly'
hem+in? > hemin 'slowly'

We assume that qualities are used as instruments to represent their relation to the actions; when a quality becomes instrumental, involved there will be energy transmission. One can observe that most predicate modifiers in Sinhala, specifically, adverbs used to denote a particular manner of doing some thing like those given in (40) are marked with ablative, which is a phenomenon not so conspicuous with regard to sentence modifiers like those given in (41), for example:

(41) nitarama 'frequently'
samaharwiTa 'sometimes'
haemadaama 'everyday'
maeaetakadi 'recently'

The morphological manifestation of the adverbs in (40) seem to be isomorphic with the conceptual analysis of energy flow denoted by these terms; the ablative form serves as a vehicle for the instrumental force exerted by these different qualities in triggering off actions. So the metaphor involved here INSTRUMENT-to-QUALITY can be subsumed in the general metaphor of SPACE-to-INSTRUMENT we have been considering so far.

It should be mentioned, however, that whether an adverb takes ablative or dative form can be a conceptual matter involving the profiled properties of the root adjective, or rather a linguistic matter.. For example, all the root adjectives except one in (40) can be added with dative form.

(42) honda+Ta
ikmana+Ta
* sampuurna+Ta
keTi+ya-Ta
saera+Ta
hemihi+Ta

With the dative form, they tend to evoke the sense of criteria or standards as shown in the section 8.5, while the ablative marking seems to be motivated by the sense of intense force attributed to the quality denoted by each of the adjectives. I cannot find any satisfactory answer to the question why some adjectives like *sampuurnayen* 'completely' cannot take dative marking.

Another function fulfilled by the ablative form is to denote involitive agent. The postposition *atin* denoting involitive agent in Sinhala stems from *ata* 'hand' plus *-in*, the ablative morpheme. Usually, *atin* construction occurs with the involitive forms of verbs. The lexical trace of 'hand' may provide a clue to

sense of the inadvertent participation indicated by this form. Consider, for instance, the sentences in (43):

(43) a. lameya paensala kaeDu-waa
child pencil break-PAST
'The child broke the pencil.'

b. lameya at-in paensala kaeDu-naa
child *atin* pencil get broken-PAST
'The pencil got broken by the child (inadvertently).'

The animate participant in the nominative form in (43a) indicates direct, agentive participation in the volitive action denoted by the active form of the verb. (43b), on the other hand, which uses the involitive form of the verb has the animate participant marked with *atin* postposition to indicate its non-agentive participation. The difference between the two sentences can be made explicit by adding a purposive adverbial like *hitaa-mataa* 'intentionally'.

(43') a. lameya hitaa-mataa paensala kaeDuwaa
'The child broke the pencil intentionally.'

b. *lameya atin hitaa-mataa paensala kaeDunaa

As (43'b) shows, *atin* construction does not go well with the purposive adverbial because it presupposes non-intentionality.

Is there any motivational link between *atin* postposition and non-intentionality factor? I assume that ablative form first acquired instrumental meaning and then was extended to the role of inadvertent participant, by associating body-part instrument with non-agentive instrument. In English the instrumental "with" can appear in both intentianal and non-intentional meanings: note that the example in (44) lacks intentional entailment carried by the one in (45), as pointed out by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976:521).

(44) He broke the window with his elbow

(45) He used his elbow to break the window

However, (46) is easily associated with intentional meaning:

(46) He broke the window with a hammer

This semantic difference involving "with" phrase is not overtly expressed at the morphosyntactic level in English. Sinhala makes the differentiation by the split use of volitive/involitive forms of the verb. Non-intentional meaning is expressed by the involitive form of the verb and grammaticalized, body-part instrumental. Body-part instrument is taken to indicate the cause of an action rather than agent of it. When *atin* is used to denote a canonical instrument lexically referring to 'hand', energy transmission involved in the action is naturally associated with the ablative form. When *atin* is used as a grammaticalized form, on the other hand, the sense of energy transmission is backgrounded retaining only causality, which leads to the non-intentional interpretation. Thus the INSTRUMENT-to-INADVERTENT PARTICIPANT metaphor was created.

One important characteristic of this transfer from instrument to inadvertent participant can be analyzed in terms of "semantic bleaching"(Given, 1975) or "semantic generalization or weakening of semantic content"(Bybee and Pagliuca, 1985). It means that in semantic abstraction the lexemes that serve as the imput carry rich semantic contents whereas the output of the process will bear some reduced forms by losing their semantic specificities. Before, we saw that the SPACE-to-INSTRUMENT mapping absorbs new meanings of energetic interaction, forceful contact, and intentionality. As instrumentality with these meanings presupposes some agent and activity, the sentences in which instrumental forms occur will take subjects representing volitive agents. When the instrumental develops as a grammaticalized from to denote an inadvertent participant, it will lose these semantic specificities, in particular, those related to energetic interaction and agentivity. This development can be captured as involving the following metaphorical categories:

SPACE > INSTRUMENT > CAUSALITY

I will next turn to the conceptual domain of time. By examining the SPACE-to-TIME metaphor, we can see how the category TIME is metaphorically derived

from Space. Temporal terms marked with the ablative morpheme serve as adverbs. It is noteworthy that these adverbs do not refer to a point of time, though they express time deixis. When an event takes place at some point of time, the temporal adverb takes dative form, as we will demonstrate later. That temporal adverbs take dative forms or ablative forms is an observable fact; in either case, the underlying assumption is that time flows along a path. We perceive this temporal path from different standpoints; we refer to it as a terminal point or as a starting point. Time reaches a certain point before the assumed event takes place, and this motionless destination of time is linguistically coded with the temporal term plus dative form. The temporal term plus ablative form, on the other hand, refers to a temporal starting point; as the event unfolds with this starting point, the motional character imposed by the speaker on the event is overtly manifested by the temporal adverb with ablative form:

(47) mama oya pota kal-in kiywa-laa tie-nawa
I that book time-ABL read-PP have-IND
'I have read that book earlier.'

(48) poToo sati-yak-in de-nna puluwani
photoes week-INDEF-ABL give-INFIN can
'We can give you the photoes in one week.'

(49) oyaa ude-en e-nna
you morning-ABL come-IMP
'Please, come in the early morning.'

(50) apee yaalukama ad-in iwarai
our friendship today-ABL end
'Our friendship will end from today.'

In (47), the speaker goes back to a time away from the present temporal location of the communication and refers to it as the starting point from which begins his experience of 'having read'. The adverb in (48) refers to a future time. The speaker needs one week's time; the listener understands that the referred time for 'giving photoes' starts from that point. Referred by the adverb in (49) is the period which begins from morning; it is not towards the end of the morning. The adverb in (50) clearly refers to a time starting from 'today', the day the speech act occurs, for the end of a friendship. Each adverb that consists of a temporal term and ablative form marks a starting point from which begins the action or event denoted by the predicate. So the adverb represents a source while the event can be taken as a figure moving away from the source. One will find that the basic image-schematic structure of the ablative we proposed earlier, that is, a temporal relation between an object and an initial location is well preserved here.

All these examples show how the temporal domain is conceptualized using source concept metaphorically. Locative source linguistically expressed by the ablative morpheme forms the vehicle in this metaphorical equation. However, some source concepts of the temporal domain manifest themselves through adpositional phrases consisting of a source-specifying nominal and a path-specifying particle.

(51) api udee indan raeae wenakan waeda kara-nawa
we morning from night to work do-IND
'We work from morning to evening.'

(52) 10 indan 11 wenakan ingriisi wyaakaranaya
10 from 11 to English Grammar
'We have English Grammar from 10 to 11.'

(53) Ranjit 1985 indan 1990 wenakan Japaan-e hiTiya
from to Japan-LOC was
'Ranjit lived in Japan from 1985 to 1990.'

(54) mama apreel aga indan saebaTikal ya-nawa
I April end from sabbatical go-IND
'I am on sabbatical from the end of April.'

In these examples, temporal origin is expressed by adding the ablative particle to the temporal term(cf. 6.1). The use of the ablative particle is similar

to its homophonic spatial counterpart, *indan*, in that the event has a time vector which begins at time t_1 and ends at t_n. *Indan* identifies the source or tail of a direction vector and the path traversed by the figure. The process of moving in time represented by the event the predicate denotes is similar to a figure's motion. In (52), the class of English Grammar is taken to be the figure. Though the head of the path is left indeterminate in (54), being on sabbatical leave is conceived as a motion event.

In the last chapter, we identified two functions of the ablative particle *Indan*: a) indicating the spatial origin of a path and b) focusing on the path itself rather than just the beginning of it. In the semantic abstraction, what is obvious is the substitution of temporal sense for the spatial sense of the prototype, that is, locating an event according to its temporal dimension, not according to its physical location. However, the function of path-focus is preserved in the new conceptual domain, where the location of an event or duration of a state is presented by reference to a temporal term that fixes the beginning of the time vector.

Another instance of using spatial expressions for more abstract concepts is seen in what we may call the SOURCE-to-CAUSE metaphor where the locative source is used metaphorically to refer to a causal relation:

(55) maduruwan-gen leDa boo we-nawa
mosquitoes-ABL diseases spread-IND
'Diseases spread from mosquitoes.'

(56) maeleeriyaaw-en minissu malaa
malaria-ABL people died
'People died from malaria.'

(57) siya diwi nasaa gaeniim-en sidu wuu maranaya-k
suicide-ABL occurred death-INDEF
'a death caused by suicide'

(58) kiyawiim-en daenuma waeDe-nawa
reading-ABL knowledge develop-IND
'Reading will develop the knowledge.'

(59) sinaasiim-en tara wee (a saying)
laughing-ABL gain weight
'One will be gain weight by laughing.'

The ablative nominals in these examples denote causes for the events presented by the remaining parts of the sentences. In (55), mosquitoes and spread of diseases are put into a cause-and-effect relation. In (56) and (57), respectively malaria and suicide are seen as causes of death. In (58) and (59), reading and laughing are respectively seen as causes for the events of developing the knowledge and gaining weight.

It is interesting to note that the same temporal relation that characterizes the notion of source gives the causal interpretation to the ablative construction. While the initial location was considered to occur first at time t_1, the figure's location was seen to be later at t_2. Underlying this temporal relation there is a causal implication: "what occurs earlier will be the cause for what occurs later." In conceptual development of the ablative, what existed only as an inference or a secondary meaning was established itself as the core meaning of the form. Thus, in the group of examples (55-59), causality is no more an inference; it explicitly serves as the central meaning. The image-schematic structure abstracted from the morpheme's meaning is mapped onto the new domain of causality.

This transition of the ablative from the source relation to the cause relation leads to more "abstract" grammatical functions. For example, we can see that the ablative form that denotes causal sense can introduce not only noun phrases but subordinate clauses also. Observe the following examples:

(60) man ikmanaTa aawa-in hondaTa giyaa
I soon came-ABL well went
'It turned out to be good, since I came soon.'

(61) mahansi welaa waeDa kara-pu ek-en pala-k naeae
hard work-PP NM-ABL fruit-INDEF no
'All our hard work produced no results.'
lit. 'we gain no results from working hard.'

In both examples, the subordinate clause marked by the ablative form denotes causal sense. In (60), ablative marker is added immediately after the finite verb whereas in (61), the nominal marker eka is used to nominalize the verbal clause before adding the ablative marker. Again, we find that the temporal relation abstracted from the ablative marker carries a causal relation implicated with it and makes a conceptual shift from the source relation to the causal relation via temporal relation. The relation "later than" is shifted to the relation "caused by" and the shifted meaning is conventionalized. The two events e_1 (initial location) and e_2 (final location or figure's location) are combined by the ablative marker. The causal relation is inferred from the temporal sequence. E_1 and e_2 are thus understood in terms of cause-effect relation. We cannot find any lexical item indicating the sense of 'reason', 'cause' or 'allow'. The ablative marker is grammatically and metaphorically used to achieve this function.

A noteworthy point is that the ablative construction can, as (61) shows, represent a situation that fails to establish a causal relation between e_1 and e_2. In our life there are cases in which a particular sort of event will not bring the expected results. Likewise, in the linguistic expression of cause there might be states of affairs in which e_1 holds but e_2 does not. This means that in defining the linguistic concept of CAUSE we should accept not only (CAUSE(e_1, e_2)), but (not CAUSE(e_1, e_2)) also. Accordingly, the ablative is used to express potential causality, in terms of which we can say that the function of the ablative proceeds to a more abstract level with its spread to a metacausal relation.

Our data shows that ablative marker is used to introduce clause segments which imply cause. This is a metaphorical use of the ablative marker in a higher level of abstraction. The metaphorical relation manifest itself in two separate planes: On the one hand, the causal relation is conceptualized in terms of the locative source and, on the other, a clausal elements are organized by means of a nominal entity or case marker. The former works at the semantic level, while the latter involves a configuration of the syntactic level. Thus, the structure of the motion situation is employed to express the relational concepts involving one and the same propositional structure (intraclausal) or spreading across different propositional structures (interclausal). We see in the latter process that the case marker is developed into a clause subordinator.

7.3 Conclusion

While the concept of spatial/locative source accommodates a large variety of expressions, its function in the realm of interclausal relations seems to be not so widespread compared with the dative marker which is to be shown as performing a wider range of subordinating functions. However, since the ablative form serves as the metaphorical vehicle establishing the link between different conceptual domains, the schematic structure of 'departure from the initial location' is taken to be the unitary source in the underlying representations of these expressions. In the conceptual expansion of the ablative marker, spatial/locative source implicating external phenomena is taken to be basic, while all other expressions extending from spatial to non-spatial or abstract sources are expected to build around this core property as shown in the following diagram.

We also found that the ablative prototype is flexible enough to change its structure by acquiring new meanings in different contexts. The categories and subcategories consisting of varied functions of the same linguistic form can sometimes be described as family resemblance categories.

As evident from this discussion, dynamic locations and motion situations, in particular locative sources, play a vital part in human conception. Motion events intrinsically involving directionality and a path lend their template structure to

numerous instances of human experience which are to be coerced into the linguistic system. The path expressions we have observed in this chapter enable us to identify various objects, entities, participants, points of time, or events as initial locations from which something moves away. Starting with most prototypical forms of locative sources, we proceeded to observe some non-canonical locations and a wide range of abstract sources. They prove to be an important link between perception and language, while showing significant signs of interrelation that are characteristic of chaining processes.

While the ablative forms indicate origin and intermediate points of path, the next important part of path expressions comprises destinations or goals. When describing the path of moving objects, people tend to indicate how Figures reach their destination. In the next chapter, I will turn to this particular portion of path and provide illustrative data with collaborative analyses that will help prove our semantic hypotheses.




Diagram 1

Chapter 8—Dative Case and Goal Expressions

Introduction

Our conceptual and linguistic apparatus as represented in the language structure can be shown to work within an overall framework supported by an exhaustive inventory of categories and functions. With the help of this rational apparatus, man can organize the world and conceptualize the reality with different approaches. Certain aspects of a category are foregrounded while others are backgrounded so that a core usage of a linguistic form, centered originally around a prototype would gradually be extended to include the coding of a variety of peripheral instances. Having options of varying triviality or significance available, speakers resort to alternative uses of a linguistic form that tend to highlight different attributes of a situation. In addition, as we have already seen, a single concrete concept is employed across a large number of domains, whereby differences in senses are downplayed or ignored, allowing semantic overlapping and an idealization of the source concept for coding purposes.

Given the significance of these approaches, it is widely recognized that the choice of one surface form against another is a meaningful choice made by the speaker in accordance with his conceptualizations, reacting to different overtones of meaning carried by different linguistic structures. A relevant question to ask here, then, would be whether this is equivalent to saying that each and every overtone of meaning correspond to a distinction of surface form in language. The answer should be "no" because if we are to find a distinct form for the all semantic components of our universe, at least for the tremendous variety of semantic and aspectual differences associated with different events, language will lose its feasibility as a conceptual/logical apparatus.

Therefore it is customary to lump a large variety of senses into a single surface form, and using one form for different meanings would minimize the number of morphemes in a language, creating function words. As Haiman points out, homonymy and polysemy represent this type of paradigmatic economy. Especially, polysemy is motivated both economically and iconically because "recurrent similarity of form must reflect similarity in meaning"(Haiman 1985).

Polysemy refers to a linguistic state in which a single form corresponds to several meanings. The cluster of meanings subsumed by the given form would exhibit patterns of related, but distinct senses. While polysemy pervades both lexical and grammatical morphemes, this same phenomenon as a characteristic of grammaticalization chains functions to combine these two ends, enhancing the shift from concrete semantic entities to abstract ones. Among linguistic expressions, lexical or grammatical, case markers are considered as a highly polysemous area. However, till recently many linguists regarded grammatical case as a semantically empty category. The facts such as logical impossibility of providing an adequate general definition for the category of case, unavailability of a counterpart of it in the sister sciences of logic, epistemology and metaphysics, and absence of a single semantic value for most case markers were given as evidence for their being semantically empty. Lyons(1968) has brought this line of thinking into light in the following way:

> The Aristotelian opposition of 'matter' and 'form' was also invoked by certain grammarians to distinguish between what we may refer to as *major* and *minor* 'parts of speech'. Only the major 'parts of speech' (nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs) were meaningful in the proper sense of the term: they 'signified' the objects of thought which constituted the 'matter' of discourse. The other 'parts of speech' (prepositions, conjuctions, etc.) did not 'signify' anything of themselves, but merely contributed to the total meaning of sentences by imposing upon them a certain 'form', or organization. This distinction recalls, on the one hand, that made by Aristotle between 'words' properly so called and 'conjunctions'

> and, on the other, the distinction traditionally drawn between 'full' and 'empty' words in Chinese grammatical theory. It was taken up and given further currency by the grammarians of the Port Royal, and was used by Leibniz and many philosophers who have been influenced by him. The distinction is frequently drawn in modern treatments of grammatical theory in terms of 'lexical' and 'grammatical' meaning. (Lyons 1968:273)

These traditional assumptions about grammatical categories would be proved invalid by some recent approaches like Emergent Grammar framework proposed by Hopper(1987) and grammaticization theory developed by Bybee(1988), etc. Hopper's notion of Emergent Grammar enables to perceive every linguistic activity "as a continual movement towards structure". Case markers in many languages start this 'movement' or journey from concrete entities like objects or actions easily associated with semantic correlations available in parallel fields of semantic investigation. In their movement towards structure they will absorb conversational inferences to create new meanings, resulting in semantic overlap and polysemy (Traugott 1988).

A similar approach was taken by Bybee(1985, 1988) whose "independent development" hypothesis says that grammatical morphemes develop independently of one another and are not necessarily expressed in parallel fashion*. With this hypothesis, she argues that "if grammatical meaning is inherent to a gram (grammatical morpheme), deriving from the lexical source of the gram, and if grams develop independently of one another, then we might expect overlaps in meaning, with fine or subtle distinctions between grams in some cases rather than maximal contrasts". These studies reveal that grammatical forms as well as grammatical meanings are not static but dynamic, ever-changing components of language and that in this evolutionary course a single grammatical morpheme will not remain confined to a single semantic domain but may transit more than one semantic domain.

In this chapter I will study diachronic and synchronic process leading to polysemy, type of conceptual manipulation occurring in this process, function of metaphor as a device employed in this process and the relevance of these phenomena for linguistic description. I have chosen to focus mainly on one instance of polysemy, namely dative morpheme which is a complex category representing a network of related senses, each centered on a prototypical value and later assumed as extended values. I will examine certain important stages of this process in the light of recent developments in case semantics and cognitive grammar.

8.1 Role of Domains in Cognitive Grammar

Cognitive semantics views linguistic meaning as encyclopedic(Langacker 1987 and 1991). In this view, an expression is thought of as a point of access to a network of concepts and further to whole knowledge systems invoked by it. Mere dictionary definitions do not help to identify meanings of words because words themselves are not containers for meaning; they only serve to elicit knowledge systems. A construction is viewed to consist of component structures that are integrated to form a composite structure. However, component structures are not to be taken as *constituting* the composite structure, Langacker(1991) emphasizes, -- their function is to categorize and motivate certain facets of it. Thus, the properties of the composite structure would be 'emergent'.

As part of a composite structure's (an expression's) meaning, a specific conception is evoked -- this is referred to as a cognitive domain in Cognitive

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* This hypothesis was proposed against the structuralist view according to which a grammatical meaning does not have an inherent meaning of its own, but rather its value depends on maximal contrasts, and against the "structural coherence" hypothesis which says that grammatical morphemes forming contrasts in a specific semantic domain will have the same expression properties(See Bybee 1985).

Grammar framework. The domain structure or the combination of the array of cognitive domains which is referred to as domain matrix functions as a necessary condition for a complex linguistic structure. As will be evident from this discussion, 'domain' is a notion very crucial to understanding linguistic meanings. To be precise, domain, as designated by Langacker(1987), is a coherent area of conceptualization, with respect to which semantic units are characterized.

Usually a base against which semantic structures are profiled includes specifications in a single domain or multiple domains. Domains can be basic or abstract: basic domains include, for example, three dimensional space, time, color, etc. whereas abstract domains include a concept or a conceptual complex that presupposes another domain, e.g. human relations, emotional states, speculations or belief systems, etc. It would seem that concepts like location or shape are more abstract compared with the basic domain of three-dimensional space. Since a base always functions as a domain for the characterization of a higher-order concept, a domain structure will spread starting from a basic domain along an array of more abstract domains as exemplified by the following line:

(1) space > shape > square > angle > line

Here the whole array of domains can be presented simply as belonging to the domain of space. A square, for example, is characterized with respect to the basic domain of space. Simultaneously, it can be profiled relative to the abstract domain of geometric figuring. A full set of domains thus presupposed simultaneously, and collectively called the domain matrix constitutes the base of a semantic structure.

While the whole knowledge network prevails as part of semantics, the constellation of domains is structured hierarchically according to central/peripheral organization. This organization, leaving central domains easily accessible, helps to distinguish a composite structure's (an expression's) meaning from another. In addition, the semantics of a composite structure can be derived by invoking a different domain which does not belong to the original domain matrix. Properties of the composite structure being not static, but rather emergent, the component parts cannot fixedly decide the meaning of the structure. Underlying assumption is that the meaning of an expression depends on encyclopedic knowledge and may comfortably transit across more than one domain. The concept evoked by *square* can shift from the domain of geometric figuring to the domain of spatial area as in (2)

(2) There is a band playing in the square

or to the domain of address coding as in (3)

(3) He lives at No 17 Torrinton Square

Extensions of this kind are examined in detail below.

While all these notations provide us with useful conceptual tools to understand linguistic meaning in relation to cognition, there are some questions yet to be answered before formulating an adequate theory. The questions arising here can be included in such areas as the nature of the relation between an abstract domain and the basic domain, distinction between profile-base relations on the one hand and taxonomic relations like type vs. instance on the other, difficulty of accurately defining central-peripheral relations of domains, and the problem of continuity vs. discontinuity of domain relations and its influence on cognitive shifting across domains. The observations made by Croft(1993) in relation to some of these questions suggest a few critical assumptions, though not precisely answering them. Answering all the questions may require extensive cognitive/ typological analyses that are beyond the scope of this work. The problem to be addressed soon is the cognitive activity of shifting across different domains.

Before proceeding to the next section, some clarification about shifting across different domains is needed. The process of semantic shift involves two dimensions. One dimension emphasizes that a single semantic domain exhibits a structural diversity with different means of expression. This is what Bybee (1985) shows in her paper titled "On the nature of grammatical categories": grammatical morphemes from the same semantic domain do not usually have structurally

parallel expression. For example, English has five grammatical means for expressing tense. This structural diversity is due to the fact that new grammatical forms, despite existing forms representing the same semantic domain, develop out of different lexical forms, the result being different grammatical means for expressing similar notions. Futures, verbs indicating mental ability, "Perfects" and Progre ssives are given as some examples showing this common path of development. The other dimension of the shift deals with the emergence of new meanings rather than the emergence of new forms. In such a situation a single form or structurally similar forms will exhibit a semantic diversity, expressing a variety of concepts coming from different domains. We will look at this second kind of dimension in detail, analyzing it as an instance of conceptual expansion.

8.2 Conceptual Domains and Metaphor

Conceptual framework developed by Lakoff(1982 and 1987) and others has contributed largely to the understanding of interrelated topics of meaning chains, metaphorical transfer of meaning and polysemy. Sweetser(1988), based on Talmy (1985) and Lakoff(1987), describes meaning in terms of cognitive-conceptual structures and demonstrates how mapping of inferences from one domain to another occurs through metaphor and image-schema transformation. Again, Croft (1993), following Lakoff and Johnson(1980) and Langacker(1987), argues that domain adjustment or the unity of domains is a major factor that serves to impose semantic coherence on an utterance when meaning shift occurs through conceptual effects called "domain mapping" and "domain highlighting" that would create metaphor and metonymy respectively. Following the line of argumentation built by these scholars, I will assume that conceptual shift from one domain to another or mapping across domains is metaphorical in nature since it occurs as a process in which entities of the target domain, typically abstract contents, are conceptualized by using properties of the source domain, a domain of more concrete contents.

Using a concrete domain as a metaphorical vehicle for an abstract domain seems to be very common practice in human language because coding abstract concepts via immediately accessible and easily observable experience indicates a primary defining property of language, namely creativity. By linguistic creativity is meant creative manipulation of language in terms of concepts and contexts on the part of the speech community(Heine et al 1991). Talmy(1983), Lakoff and Johnson(1980), Langacker(1991) and many others have shown that spatial orientation is frequently used as a metaphorical vehicle to conceptualize situations, states and qualities. I will show here that the same spatial orientation is used as a metaphorical template for expressing a wider range of concepts. We will see how this kind of expansion has taken place in Sinhala, concentrating on the varied case functions developed from one and the same morpheme, namely the allative/dative marker.

In view of the fact that the grammatical morphemes used for various case functions first occur in spatial domains, I will designate spatial goal traditionally marked with the allative morpheme as the primary prototypical instance of this category. Hence the prototypical meaning of the allative marker *ta* in Sinhala is to be understood as <physical goal in space>. Terminologically, since this morpheme is widely known in the literature as dative marker, I will choose to use the latter form here. When the essential ingredient of <physical goal in space> or, further strictly, <physical motion to a spatial goal> is taken as the structural template, one cannot deny the possibility that non-spatial domains implying a motion to a non-physical goal are also conceptualized as having the same or similar structure for the sake of cording purposes.

As the first step in this process, the non-spatial event is organized in the mind through a structure analogous with motion structures. A topological image-schema is built by idealizing the basic concept of the source structure. The image -schema is abstracted from the source structure and preserved in mapping onto the domain of non-spatial concepts. The preservation of the image-schematic

structure is indicated by retaining the earlier morphological form or a reduced form of it within the target structure even after the semantic shift. In reality, building an image-schema will not be needed until the conceptualizer becomes cognitively prepared to derive a target structure from a domain of more concrete concepts. Sweetser(1988) sees the mapping of spatial motion onto the domain of intentional actions as a case of preserving image-schematic structure across historical meaning change. We will here observe what should be the image-schematic structure for the dative form if it is expanded to different domains.

We will start from the general semantic conditions of motion structure. Talmy(1975) considers a motion situation to consist of

(4) one object moving or located with respect to another object.

Accordingly, the semantic structure of motion is represented as in (5).

(5) Motion Situation: FIGURE GROUND + PATH MOVE

Grammatical categories corresponding to each component of a motion situation are

(6) Syntax: SUBJECT NOUN + DATIVE VERB

One important aspect of motion structure is that motion-specifying verb can be either of the two topological deep verbs MOVE and BE. This is motivated, as Talmy(1975) observes, by the fact that there are two situations that one object is considered to be in with respect to another object, namely the *moving* and the *located state,* either of the two can function as the MOTION of a motion situation. Talmy has further proposed a putatively universal system of abstract MOTION/LOCATION subsituations lying at the core of the motion situation. According to this system, object-specifying nouns appear as topological deep nouns, that is, a physical object can be idealized into different topological objects such as a point of space or a point of time, etc. For example, while the reference object specified in (7a) is a container, it becomes an idealized topological object, i.e. a point of space in (7b).

(7) a. The ball is in the box

b. The box is 20 feet away from the wall

Following these notations, we will assume that ground-specifying nominals in a motion/location structure are marked with a path-specifying surface form which can be best represented by deep morphemes TO (with respect to motion) and AT (with respect to location). The essence of the expression of path is the specification of the destination of motion, that is, it specifies a figure's reaching the ground rather than just indicating the path along which a figure traverses. If we use the sentence (8) to mean that John walked along a path that goes in front of the house, passing the house, it cannot be rendered in Sinhala, with the dative morpheme.

(8) John walked in front of the house

The appropriate translation will be

(9) John gee issaraha-in aewida gena giyaa
house front-ABL walk AUX went
'John walked in front of the house.'

Again, if the sentence is used to mean that John walked at a place in front of the house, dative morpheme will be uncalled for:

(10) John gee issaraha aewidd-a
house in front of walk-PAST
'John walked in front of the house.'

Dative expression is applicable only if the sentence means that John walked to the place in front of the house:

(11) John gee issarah-Ta aewida gena giyaa
house front-DAT walk AUX went
'John walked in front of the house.'

This type of sentence as in (11) is considered to include an expression of goal. As would be clear from this discussion, the specification of path in our image-schema for the dative should be restricted to the end of the path. Thus, the basic image-

schema for the dative, which I propose would consist of movement along a path towards some endpoint as presented in Diagram 1, which entails the proposition "*x* moves to *y*".




Diagram 1

The image schema consists of (1) a theme, (2) a goal, (3) theme's orientation or movement towards the goal, and (4) movement along a linear path. The concept of goal is understood as an abstract temporal relation between *x* and *y*. As *y* is the place where *x* moves to, what emerges as the essential inference is that goal is a theme's posterior location. Goal, thus, should be taken as an abstract relation that a theme bears to the final location.

As the Diagram 1 shows, movement, path and endpoint are highlighted, whereas the starting point or source is downplayed in such a way that the abstracted inferences can be easily projected into non-spatial domains. Further, a closer look at motion events of spatial domain will reveal that they can have source suppressed in origin. Example (12) shows that a dative expression with unspecified source sounds natural.

(12) boole bima-Ta peralu-naa
ball ground-DAT roll-PAST
'The ball rolled down to the ground.'

Ikegami(1987), proposing the 'goal-over-source principle', demonstrates that the source and the goal are psychologically not equally valued as constituting elements of a completed motion: "The mention of goal is essential, but the mention of the source is only optional"(Ikegami, 1987:135). Leaving the source obscured without making any explicit mention of it immensely helps to highlight similarities, and bring out an abstract isomorphism, between spatial motion events and non-spatial motion events. As we will see later in detail, most non-spatial motion events including mental action verbs, physical action verbs and attention verbs do not require a straightforward source, or a figure's movement away from such a source to be aligned with their actions or states. Observe the following examples in (13) (with an attention verb) and (14) (with a mental action verb):

(13) gurutumaa lameya-Ta prasansa kalaa
teacher child-DAT praise-PAST
'The teacher praised the child.'

(14) ma-Ta amataka unaa
me-DAT forget-PAST
'I forgot it(involuntarily).'

In (13) 'teacher' is coded as the initiator rather than the source of the action, and in (14) the situation is conceptualized without any idea of source. However, directing an action towards an entity as in (13) or a mental state's occurring with respect to an (animate) entity as in (14) is understood as isomorphous with moving along a spatial path towards a physical goal. This path-based movement towards an endpoint would be the shared topological feature transfering from domain to domain.

8.3 Source Domains and Source Structures

We have focused on the basic image-schema for dative. We turn now to the nature of source domains in general and some specific instances of the source structure expected to play an important role in our discussion. First, let me briefly consider one important typological distinction drawn about metaphor with regard to its explanatory power for understanding grammar.

Recent studies of cognitive/linguistic activity have taken two different approaches to metaphor, which are considered to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In one approach, metaphorical chain is described in terms of

a few basic categories which bear prototypical relations with word classes and constituent types. Such categories are arranged in such a way that their degree of "metaphorical abstraction" and "egocentric distance" is represented along the following scale:

(15) metaphorical categories
PERSON > OBJECT > ACTIVITY > SPACE > TIME > QUALITY

This approach concentrating on "categorial metaphors"(Claudi and Heine 1986, Heine, et al. 1991) is distinguished from the one proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in which the process is viewed in terms of conceptual metaphors like

(16) AN INSTRUMENT IS A COMPANION
IDEAS ARE PEOPLE
LOVE IS PATIENT

A clear-cut distinction is made by Heine, et al.(1991) to the effect that the metaphors called "categorial metaphors" are wider in scope and are more useful to comprehend an entire area of human experience whereas the conceptual metaphors are based on isolated experience and are limited in scope. What seems to be the sole reason given by them for this value difference is that a cluster of conceptual metaphors appears to be included in one of the categorial metaphors given in (15). However, we will prefer to take this as a typological distinction rather than a value distinction of the type given by Heine, et al. To make this assumption substantial, one has to observe that "categorial metaphors" become explicit as a result of a macro-level analysis while conceptual metaphors show up in the course of a micro-level analysis.

While categorial metaphors may help us to comprehend human experience By arranging it into a well-organized chain of concepts, it cannot be denied that there are many conceptual domains which do not easily fit into this well-knit organization. Possession, purpose and cause, a few examples mentioned by Heine, et al. themselves suggest that human experience includes much more complex phenomena that cannot be fathomed by the scale of categorial metaphors. However, we accept that this unidirectional arrangement of categories provides a nice clue to understand how the level of 'abstraction' advances in a universally acceptable way leading to grammaticalization.

Since our focus here is on conceptual expansion of categories rather than grammaticalization, we will deal with conceptual metaphors that are based on one root metaphor, namely spatial motion, and see how it is used as a metaphorical vehicle to conceptualize more abstract states and qualities. First, we will show that the dative morpheme has its basic prototypical meaning built around spatial orientation.

(17) Ranjit kaDee-Ta giyaa
shop-DAT went
'Ranjit went to the shop.'

(18) ganga muuda-Ta gala-nawa
rivers sea-DAT flow-IND
'Rivers flow into the sea.'

(19) lameya wala-Ta waeTu-naa
child hole-DAT fall-PAST
'The child fell into the hole.'

In each example above, the noun marked with dative denotes a concrete entity conceptualized as the physical goal of the motion event. However, as we have seen already, not necessarily physical objects but idealized topological entities also can appear as endpoints of spatial motion.

(20) Sunil gaha yaTa-Ta diiwa
tree under-DAT ran
'Sunil ran under the tree.'

(21) Ranjit eliya-Ta giyaa
out-DAT went
'Ranjit went out.'

In (20) what is specified by the nominal phrase with dative marking is not a physical object but a bounded extent of space, while in (21) it is an unbounded extent of space*.

Here one other matter came to light which merits special emphasis: the ground or the action-chain tail specified by the nominal phrase, whether it is a concrete object or a topologically idealized entity, should be marked with the dative morpheme in linguistic coding if it is conceptualized as the endpoint of motion. Thus, the following three sentences are taken to reflect speaker's differences in conceptualization with respect to the ground or action-chain tail.

(22) a. api kandu naeng-aa
we mountains climb-PAST
'We climbed mountains.'

b. api kanda naeng-aa
we mountain climb-PAST
'We climbed the mountain.'

c. api kanda-Ta naeng-aa
we mountain-DAT climb-PAST
'We climbed up the mountain.'

The three sentences differ in the way the final participant is treated in the grammatical structure. The ground-specifying noun in (a) does not carry any nominal suffix, in Hopper's words, has "dropped the trappings characteristic of N (nominal) categoriality" (Hopper 1984). With this decategorialized nominal form, the expression indicates a generic, routinized activity rather than refering to a specific physical entity. The ground-specifying noun in (b), in contrast, appears in its full prototypical form, referring to a specific physical entity. Though it is not marked for any case, judging from the sentential position, the nominal can be shown to be the direct object of the verb *naenga* 'climbed'. This will be contrastive with the sentence (c) in which the ground-specifying noun is marked for dative.

Let us now see what motivates each grammatical structure in these sentences. (22a) mentions of climbing as a generic event without referring to a particular mountain. This meaning will fade away, if the noun is modified allowing a different construal. In (22b), first, ground-feature of the final participant is weakened by the choice made by the speaker to use it as a focal participant of the clause. Second, by using the nominal as a direct object, the denoted entity ist reated as directly affected by the action, simultaneously increasing transitivity of the clause (Hopper and Thompson 1980). Consequently, with the verb *naenga* 'climbed' rising along the scale of activity, a new sense is added in that the action-chain head (the mountain-climber) is treated as the conqueror of the mountain. In (22c), on the other hand, the entity is treated as a non-focal participant, less directly affected, by using the nominal as indirect object. With dative marker, the entity is coded as the endpoint of motion rather than the ultimate energy sink. Regarding this difference, it will be interesting to note that even in English 'climbing up the mountain' suggests partial and indirect effect while 'climbing the mountain' is a more drastic act (See Langacker 1991: 7.2.2).

8.4 Domain-crossing as a Conceptual Expansion

In the examples considered, we have illustrated the prototypical meaning of the dative morpheme. We will now see what kind of additional senses dative morpheme may acquire by expanding to new domains. Let us observe the following examples.

(23) Chitra-Ta yatura hamba unaa
-DAT key found
'Chitra found her key.'

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* See Talmy 1975 for a detailed analysis of these notions.

(24) maTa liyum-ak laebu-naa
me letter-INDEF receive-PAST
'I received a letter.'
(25) Ranjit-Ta shishyatvay-ak laebu-naa
-DAT scholarship-INDEF receive-PAST
'Ranjit received a scholarship.'

These examples deviate not only from the dative prototype but, to some extent, from the intransitive-clause prototype as well. In the examples discussed so far, the clausal subject appeared in the initial position of the clause whereas in the examples given above, subject has gone to the second position in terms of linear position. The situation apparent in these examples goes contrary to the notion of natural path accepted in Cognitive Grammar, according to which a particular ordering of elements within a clause follows a path cognitively natural (Langacker 1987, 1991). The key theoretical belief is that while different natural paths may co-align with one another, the respective starting points of these paths will coincide bringing a dimensional harmony. Parallelism observable between subject choice and the imposition of figure/ground organization is attributed to this natural path (Langacker 1991). In our examples, the clausal figures, *yatura* 'the key', *liyumak* 'a letter' and *shishyatvayak* 'a scholarship' have become clausal subjects. However, if we inquire what qualifies them to be starting points, the situation would take a more complex form.

The clausal figures in question are not energy sources or agents; none of them is the first word of the clause. Unmarked relations require that human agents be figures and that human agents acquire and get hold of controlled entities. Figures are better starting points than grounds because, as MacWhinney (1977) conjectures, "it may be that humans perceive themselves as figures with the external world as ground." In our examples, the reverse applies: external entities are regarded as figures while humans are perceived as grounds; both are marked relations. So the inanimate entities became clausal subjects and figures because of their status as perceptually determined starting points. However, speakers' preference for the entities in the unmarked relation cannot be suppressed and as relationally determined starting points they become the first word of the clause. Thus, the given situations can be taken as resulting from a conflict between perceptual and relational interests, following MacWhinney(1977).

The fact that human participants instead of inanimate entities can be regarded as grounds will bring new interpretations to the dative morpheme as well as to the endpoint of motion. When human participants selected as ground-specifying nominals are combined with dative morpheme, the resulting composite structure is to be characterized by properties containing special elements which are hitherto unaccompanied with the prototype meaning. As to the level of individual participants, we can say that the domain of inanimate objects has changed to the domain of human participants.

Going beyond individual-participant level, we will see that this domain-shift is taken as occurring within a larger conceptual domain. Notice that the figure-specifying nominal may denote an abstract entity as in (25). Further, the motion verbs in all these examples specify some sort of non-spatial motion, i.e. 'receiving' and 'finding'. With this prior knowledge, I propose that when propositions involve verbs of acquisition, human participants or, at least, animate participants can be perceived as the ground and conceptualized as the endpoint of acquisition process. As the dative is used for this purpose, its meaning shifts from the domain of spatial motion to the domain of acquisition, so the metaphor can be phrased as ACQUISITION IS MOTION. Here the process of acquiring something concrete or abstract is understood as analogous to a figure's moving along a spatial path to a physical goal. The metaphorical use of the language of spatial path to refer to acquisition path is evidenced in the following examples:

(26) ada ma-Ta liyum-ak aawaa
today me-DAT letter-INDEF came

'Today a letter came to me.'

(27) watt-en ena aadaayama madi
plantation-ABL come income not enough
'The income coming from the plantation is not enough.'

(28) palaweni taeaegga Chitra-Ta giyaa
first prize -DAT went
'First prize went to Chitra.'

According to these examples, the events of transferring and income-earning are conceived of as motion events of going or coming. Therefore it is not an isolated case that the domain of acquisition is profiled by the metaphorical use of the same morpheme once used to specify physical goal. It should be noted at this moment that the examples in (23), (24) and (25) were rendered in English with human participants as figures conforming to English tradition; thus Sinhala sentences and English translations are not to be taken as semantically equivalent.

As the first step, we saw a case in which change from spatial goal to non-spatial goal occurs with some corresponding changes in constituent order. We can now broaden our line of regard to enable us to get an overall picture of this transition extending over wider domains and not necessarily attended by word-order changes. One such wider domain includes situations such as inchoative process, change of state, beginning to do an activity, stepping in a new field, etc. All these situations which imply certain change from one state to another can be conceptualized in terms of spatial-motion structures. Look at the following set of examples:

(29) Sunil-ui Nimal-ui kataawa-Ta waeTu-naa
-too -too talk-DAT fall-PAST
'Sunil and Nimal started to talk.'

(30) lameya ninda-Ta waeTu-naa
child sleep-DAT fall-PAST
'The child fell asleep.'

(31) eyaa ekka kataawa-Ta ya-nna epaa
he with talk-DAT go-INFIN don't
'Don't go to talk with him.'

All these sentences express some situations in which the first participant steps into a new activity or a new state. Dative morpheme and the motion verbs like *waeTunaa* 'fell' and *yanawa* 'go' in these sentences can be identified as the aspects directly projected from source structure, i.e. motion structure. With these linguistic forms used as metaphorical expressions, the core sense is shifted from the domain of spatial motion to a new domain. Note that the grounds specified by dative nominals designate not physical objects but some abstract regions retrieved from processes like 'talk' and 'sleep'. Motion verbs in these sentences imply the acts of entering such abstract regions. New senses are then to be profiled in the domain of what we collectively call change of state.

Thus it is possible to account for the development of additional senses by postulating the utterances in (29), (30) and (31) as instances of the common metaphor, CHANGE OF STATE IS MOTION. States of 'talking' and 'sleeping' are considered as endpoints of motion while entering such states are considered as analogous with moving along a path to a goal. Though only goals are manifestly expressed in the utterances, they presuppose implicit sources such as 'state of non-talking' and 'state of non-sleeping'. If we assume that this type of movement from a state of non-existence to a state of existence gain metaphorical expression through motion structures, it should also be logically plausible that each motional event would be followed by a non-motional state. Usually, the following 'implicational' relationships are supposed to hold, combining motional event and non-motional state, as indicated by Anderson(1971).

(32) a. He has come here

b. He is here (now/already)

(33) a. He has gone to London

b. He is in London (now/already)

In other words, if the situations in the domain of change of state are understood as having the structure similar to that of spatial motion exemplified by (a) sentences above, they should be followed by non-motional states of the type in (b) sentences. Our data prove that this condition is satisfied in Sinhala. Observe the following non-motional states in (b) sentences, comparing with the relevant change of states given earlier and repeated here as (a) sentences:

(34) a. Sunil-ui Nimal-ui kataawa-Ta waeTu-naa
-too -too talk-DAT fall-PAST
'Sunil and Nimal started to talk.'

b. Sunil-ui Nimal-ui bara kataa-wak-a
-too -too heavy talk-INDEF-LOC
'Sunil and Nimal are engaged in a serious talk.'

(35) a. lameya ninda-Ta waeTu-naa
child sleep-DAT fall-PAST
'The child fell asleep.'


b. lameya nind-e
child sleep-LOC
'The child is asleep.'

As evident from the glosses, (b) examples in each pair are locational with the same structure as (b) sentences in (32) and (33). This relationship between dative/motional constructions and locative/stative constructions appearing in both domains, spatial motion and change of state, provides a good piece of evidence for the structural integrity of different domains achieved through metaphorical mapping.

8.5 On the Significance of Endpoint

It was observed that among the source-path-goal components of a motion situation, only path and goal show salient features contributing to the image-schema of the dative morpheme, while source tends to play an insignificant role, letting to be suppressed in most cases. In this section, we will further go to say that even path along which a figure traverses can be ignored so that only the endpoint of path would be focused in certain situations. This kind of treatment is equivalent to what Langacker(1991) calls scope of predication in which certain portions of an action chain are selected to cover within the linguistic expression. Depending on such construal decisions, linguistic expressions may include motion situations with its all portions — source, path and goal — profiled as in (a) (Diagram 2), or with body portion and tail portion, i.e. path and goal subsumed as in (b), or with only the tail portion rendered explicit as in (c).

Diagram 2: construal selection of motional portions



In this section, focus will be on the last type of this three-fold profiling, in which the endpoint is taken as salient and much importance is attached to the sense of direction. This is, however, not to claim that path is a totally irrelevant aspect for certain motion situations. Path and direction are closely interrelated: the concept of path contains, inter alia, direction while direction incorporates the conception of path. What we are going to address is not the basic, spatial truth that a figure passes a sequence of places or, as Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) describes, "a sequence of AT relations", but a secondary focus characterized, on the one hand, by directionality rather than sequential process and, on the other hand, by perceptual properties rather than spatial properties. We will take dative as functioning with this definite sense and disagree with Bennardo (1993) who maintains that the specific spatial relationship indicated by TO is the same one expressed by AT and hence the preposition TO is a special case of AT relation. We start with the following examples:

(36) paana-Ta maesso aede-nawa
lamp-DAT flies be drawn-IND
'Flies are swarming to the lamp.'

(37) atta bima-Ta paat unaa
branch ground-Ta lower-PAST
'The branch lowered to the ground/bent towards the ground.'

(38) dakuna-Ta haere-nna
right-DAT turn-IMP
'Turn to right.'

(36) with a motion verb implies that the Figure moves toward the Ground in which case the Figure's movement along a spatial path toward a physical goal is highlighted. Here we use the preposition "toward" in its specific sense. While both TO and TOWARD are path-specifying prepositions in English they differ in a significant way: we assume that TO indicates the end of the path that does not possess a direction whereas TOWARD indicates the contiguity of the path that has a direction to the endpoint that does not have a direction. TOWARD is, thus, a clearly directive preposition that denotes neither the ultimate end, nor

the whole of the path. In (36), when we say that flies are swarming to the lamp, it should be taken as emphasizing direction; it cannot be taken as holding 'implicational' relationship with *Flies are in the lamp/on the lamp.*

(37) with an inchoative verb is ambiguous between two meanings, i.e. whether the branch lowered to the ground or lowered downward. In the latter case, movement's direction, rather than movement towards a specific goal, is implied. This means 'the ground' in this case denotes not a physical object but an idealized topological point of space. In (38), dative morpheme combines with a ground-specifying nominal, whose lexical meaning refers to a route direction, and grammatically reinforces the sense of direction.

In short, dative morpheme in Sinhala can bring into focus goal or direction depending on the context. Direction, however, is not a deviation from the prototypical meaning; it is closely related to the concept of goal and hence naturally included in the basic image-schema for dative. With respect to each motion event, it is considered that there is a time difference between the place the theme is initially located and the place it moves to. Dative marker indicates that the theme's motion is directed towards the final location or that the successive position is closer to the landmark.

Now we can see an extension from this prototype in the coding pattern of what we call by a unitary term ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS. Paying attention to a particular entity is taken as involving a path leading to goal (Lakoff 1987). Directed motion is mapped onto directed attention while goal is mapped onto focused entity, creating the metaphor PAYING ATTENTION IS MOTION. Topological feature of directed motion toward an endpoint is preserved through this process of mapping between the domain of spatial motion and that of attentional action.

(39) mama kataawa-Ta aehunkan dunna
I speech-DAT listened
'I listened to the speech.'

(40) anik lamai eyaa-Ta hinaa unaa
other children he-DAT laughed
'Other children laughed at him.'

(41) Chitra malwala-Ta kaematii
flowers--DAT like
'Chitra likes flowers.'

In each example, the noun denoting the entity to which attention is directed is marked for dative, implying the entity is an endpoint toward which perceptive and emotive actions are directed. Another implication of this coding pattern merits special consideration: the focused entities themselves are not perceived as trying to receive attention; they only occupy the last portion of the path of conceptual contact. The conceptual contact is actually initiated by some active pa rticipants coded as clausal subject. The position of endpoints can be occupied by an animate/human participant, an inanimate object or an abstract entity. They are mere target objects of perceptive and emotive actions.

The same or similar type of construal of the ground object's semantic role, and the strategy of domain-mapping can be observed with a class of verbs which we would call TREATMENT VERBS. Directed motion is mapped onto action of treatment and goal onto the entity in regard to which treatment is made. The metaphor involved is understandable as TREATMENT IS MOTION.

(42) Chitra amuttan-Ta sangraha kara-nawa
guests-DAT treat-IND

'Chitra is entertaining/offering her hospitality to guests.'

(43) api kaurut waeDihiTiyan-Ta salaka-nawa
we everybody elders-DAT treat-IND
'All of us look up to elders.'

(44) eyaa waeDakaarayan-Ta salaka-nne ballan-Ta wagee
he servants-DAT treat-EMPH dogs-DAT like
'He treats his servants like a dog.'

In these examples, treatment, irrespective of its manner, whether with respect or with contempt, is understood as going from one participant to another along a mental path until the goal is reached. The participant who receives treatment may be an animate object or inanimate object grammatically treated as indirect object and marked as goal. The entity which is considered as initiating the mental activity appears in the subject position. The selected clause-type delivers goods, thus, giving the impression that one participant is directing one's feelings, thoughts or some sort of evaluation towards another participant. Thus, the meaning of dative has shifted from concrete, spatial domain to a highly abstract domain of treatment, evaluation, approach, etc.

One important implication involved in dative pattern is that (mental) energy flow is unidirectional according to which dative participant is always at the receiving end of mental path and therefore cannot exert control over the mental activity. In this sense, our conception of dative becomes different from the analysis of dative prototype proposed by Smith(1987) based on German data. According to Smith, a dative participant can be construed as simultaneously exerting control over its immediate sphere of interest (with 'active property') as well as being acted upon (with 'passive property'). "The experiencer's simultaneous active and passive involvement in the action is a departure from the ACC(USATIVE) prototype and effectively bilateral, which motivates DAT(IVE)" (Smith, 1987:367). We will have a closer look at this issue and will show that Smith's stance about dative is unacceptable in several respects.

First, I will summarize the main thesis proposed by Smith as follows: A primary distinction between the cases on the clausal level involves the invocation of the abstract notion of asymmetry. According to this notion, accusative prototypically marks participants in highly asymmetrical interactions which are conceived as maximally-affected patients (as opposed to agents), whereas dative tends to mark participants in terms of bilateral involvement in which dative entities, while affected in some way by the clausal action, unlike accusative entities which are unilateral, are conceived to be either actually or potentially capable of independent action in their own right.

While this analysis is intended to capture the dative prototype in an innova -tive way, it seems that Smith has placed a misconstruction on her data in his vigorous attempt to prove that dative-marked nominals tend to take part in bilateral interactions as opposed to the accusative-marked entities carrying highly asymmetrical interactions. For example, let us see how he interprets the following sentences in German:

(45) Er diente der Familie seit vielen Jahren
DAT
'He had served the family for many years.'

(46) Hans gehorcht mir
DAT
'Hans obeys me.'

He states that the nominative entities in these examples are actually conceived

to be under the control or power of the dative entities in some sense, which highlights the potency of the dative participants. According to Smith, both *dienen* 'serve' in (45) and *gehorchen* 'obey' in (46) profile only one side of an objectively symmetrical relationship involving the exertion of power over an individual and that individual's response to that power or control. Making a comparison with the accusative entity which is conceived as powerless with respect to the force asymmetrically exerted on it by the nominative entity, he asserts that the function of *dienen* and *gohorchen*, broadly speaking, is to profile the other side of this asymmetric relationship, in which reaction of the controlled entity is highlighted. This line of thinking allows the nominative entity to be taken as the controlled entity.

Diagram 3: Smith's characterization of Accusative and Dative

ACCUSATIVE:		
	NOM	ACC
	controller	controlled
DATIVE:		
	DAT	NOM
	controller	controlled

Smith advances matter-of-factly this idea of NOM=the controlled: "In this construal, the controlled entity is conceived as the head of the action chain in the relational profile, ..., but not itself in profile (though it is within the scope of predication)"(Smith, 1987:386). One may wonder how the nominative entity can become the controlled entity while it remains the head of the action-chain, By the same token, one may ask how the dative entity can be the controller exceeding the expected potency of the nominative entity. This kind of analysis, while drawing on the principles of Cognitive Grammar, might be shown to be contrary to some important notions of it.

Many insightful observations in Cognitive Grammar come from consideration of the interface between conceptual structure and linguistic structure. An understanding of the mechanism of linguistic coding is essential for semantic description of composite structures. It has been repeatedly argued that speaker's conceptualization or construal is materialized in the form of clause structure. Speaker will have made some decisions pertaining to construal and coding when he selects a particular clause structure. Mainly, such decisions are made as to the set of participants to be included, their status with respect to A/D organization and the scope of predication to be covered.

According to this way of describing linguistic structures, a selected clause structure will include the profile or part of the profile made by the specific verb and the scope of predication. If any part of the profile made by the verb is excluded from the clause structure, it is because the speaker did not intend to express that meaning. Each clause-type manifests a specific profiling line from among multiple profiling options permitted by a given scope of predication or a given participant profile. As langacker puts it,

> The scope of predication delimits the basic conceptual content to be conveyed, and essential aspects of this content are rendered explicit by an appropriate choice of lexical items. It remains for the speaker

considered to be a natural result arising from the initial stage of the long process of meaning shift, which Heine et al. 1991 refers to as "context-induced reinterpretation". On the other hand, the sentences in (47), (48) and (49) with what we call "advanced metaphorical abstraction", whose new meaning is taken to be "conventionalized" belong to a later stage, if not the final stage of this process.

Once the acquired meaning is conventionalized, the given form can be used in further new contexts to imply additional senses whose properties are not to be found in the prototype meaning. Note the use of dative in the following sentences:

(52) api niitiya-Ta waeDa kara-nawa
we law-DAT work-IND
'We work to regulations.'

(53) anun-ge kiima-Ta waeDa kara-nna epaa
others-GEN word-DAT work-INF don't
'Don't work to others' word.'

(54) mehema bera taale-Ta paya tiya-nna
this way drum rhythm-DAT steps keep-IMP
'Keep steps to the drum-rhythms this way.'

Smith's theory of bilateral involvement does not help us to understand these sentences. More adequate analysis will be possible only if we take them as another extension of dative prototype. We have already seen that verbs denoting events like obeying somebody or offering resistance to somebody can have their action-chain tails marked for dative. I will argue that when this meaning for dative is conventionalized, dative form can be used with verbs which do not fall in the realm of motion in a straightforward way. The verbs appearing in the above examples, *waeDa karanawa* 'work' and *paya tiyanawa* 'keep steps' do not imply movement towards some entity, in this case towards the entities denoted b ythe dative nominal.

For our hypothesis to be true, shared topological feature of directed motion should be shown to underlie the dative structure. It is noted that dative is capable of evoking the image of perceptual contact. As we have seen, after making contact with the action-chain tail, the action-chain head would go to resist it or to yield to it. Usually this 'afterimage' rather than the original contact is foregrounded by the verbs like 'obey' and 'standing against'. When such 'afterimage'-specifying verbs do not appear explicitly in the clause, dative is taken to evoke a secondary focus in which acts of yielding are foregrounded while acts of resisting are backgrounded. The entity to which the action-chain head yields is conceived as the endpoint of perceptual path and marked for dative. The events like 'working' and 'keeping steps' in the above examples (53) and (54) are understood to occur after yielding to some entity like 'regulations' and 'drum-rhythm'.

As a general observation, we can say that dative-marked nouns in this clause-type include something to comply with, e.g. a request, something to abide by, e.g. a rule, something to conform to, e.g. the customs, something to go by, e.g. an advice, etc. All these are indicative of a standard, criterion or a frame of reference expected to guide human behavior. This kind of conceptualization attributed to dative can be observed cross-linguistically. Observe the following examples which show that such phenomena are coded in a similar fashion in English:

(55) We all work to a budget.

(56) Journalists have to work to tight deadlines.

We take the propositions involved in each sentence above as subsituations of yielding. As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a general linguistic tendency to give prominence to acts of yielding over acts of resistance. This tendency allows the dative nominal to represent the entity against which yielding occurs rather than the entity to which resistance is put up, when no verb specifying the acts of yielding or resisting appears overtly in the clause.

At another level, we can find a natural psychological tendency which can be taken as the principle at work behind such linguistic manifestations: human beings tend to perceive acts of yielding as bending towards an entity. For example, one of the famous teachings of Confucius says "The essence of a gentleman is that of the wind; the essence of small people is that of grass. And when a wind passes over the grass, it cannot choose but bend" (D.C. Lau(trans.), 1979). In English we would find the phrase *bend to something* to mean 'yield to something' which can be used in the following way:

(57) a. Finally, the woman bent to the man's will

b. Chitra was able to bend Ranjit to her will

Looked in this way, it will not be difficult to understand that linguistic expression of the concept of compliance with rules, criteria, standards, etc. is a conceptual expansion from the spatial endpoint given in examples like (37) repeated her eas (58).

(58) atta bima-Ta paat unaa
branch ground-DAT lowered
'The branch bent down to the ground.'

Though it is a far long way from spatial goal to the concept of a criterion or standard, the grammatical morpheme remains in the same categorial status, serving different purposes. This process is referred to as "structure-preserving abstraction" in Heine et al. 1991. This kind of transition is metaphorical obviously because a concrete entity, the spatial goal is employed as a metaphorical vehicle to express more abstract concepts like rules, criteria, standards, etc. The process can be reduced to a separate metaphor as STANDARD IS GOAL. In this transition a peripheral property of dative meaning turns to a core property in a specific context given here as 'compliance with rules, criteria, standards, etc.' Though the distance between the two senses is large, they are bound to one another by sharing the properties of the prototype to a lesser degree; the extended meaning is conventionalized and comes to be used naturally and frequently overcoming any incompatibility.

8.6 Family Resemblance Line

The nature of a prototype category is such that its properties will serve as the basis for extending the category in various directions whose interrelation appears as a family resemblance network. Therefore, we do not need to state mapping rules or, for that matter, lexical rules for each extension: relationships among metaphors and the syntactic specifications inherited from the prototype relation can be captured in a systematic way along the line of resemblance. One may, however, wonder how a specific structure associated with one class of verbs can smoothly transfer to a domain related with another class of verbs. I will consider the question in detail in this section.

The same dative form is argued to be associated with a family of closely related senses. One abstract sense is referred to as the perceptual path involving the conceptual domains of treatment, evaluation, and behavior, etc. as discussed

in the preceding section. Related to this abstract field is another distinct category in which an agentive participant executes an activity bringing physical or mental suffering to a second participant. Dative morpheme is applied to indicate the direction of activity or the path that energy flows with respect to the ground elements. There is a range of verbs involving direct physical action and, to a limited extent, indirect mental action, whose objects are conceptualized as endpoints. Included in this class of verbs are *gahanawa* 'hit', *talanawa* 'beat', *aninawa* 'stab', *widinawa* 'shoot', *wada denawa* 'torture', *wina karanawa* 'hurt', *danduwam karanawa* 'punish', *baninawa* 'scold', *rawanawa* 'frown', *ochcham karanawa* 'tease', *wirittanawa* 'despise', etc.

All these predicates highlight some kind of attack directed on some entities. The entities that experience physical violence or mental suffering from such actions bear the role of ground and are added with dative morpheme to specify the direction or endpoint of energy flow. The metaphor involves understanding attacks being directed to a specific entity; attack is perceived as movement from one participant to another. Activity itself is conceptualized as the figural object. The existence of such a metaphor is evidenced by the following expressions:

(59) wada denawa lit. 'give torture'
danduwam denawa lit. 'give punishment'
baenum ahanawa lit. 'hear a scolding'
raewum labanawa lit. 'get frowning'

They are considered as 'giving' and 'receiving' acts, with the action moving from the 'giver' to the 'receiver'.

An agentive participant will appear as the clausal subject of these expressions. Following examples will illustrate the expressions licensed by the metaphor.

(60) Ranjit lameya-Ta gaeh-uwa
child-DAT hit-PAST
'Ranjit hit the child.'

(61) guruwaraya Ranjit-Ta raew-uwa
teacher -DAT frown-PAST
'The teacher frowned at Ranjit.'

(62) Ranjit Chitra-Ta iirshya kara-nawa
-DAT envy-IND
'Ranjit envies Chitra.'

(63) eyaa samanalayan-Ta-t wada de-nawa
he butterflies-DAT-too torture-IND
'He tortures even butterflies.'

(64) wiwurta aartikaya raTa-Ta wina kara-nawa
open economy country-DAT do damage-IND
'Market economy does damage to the country.'

(65) usaawiya waeradikaruwan-Ta danDuwam kara-nawa
court offenders-DAT punish-IND
'The court punishes culprits.'

Involved in all these examples is the sense of directionality and path of energy flow. The participant who experiences sensation or offence is presented as the endpoint of the physical activity and the energy goal. Specific metaphor at work is HARMFUL EVENT EQUALS MOTION. The first participant or energy source is coded as the clausal agent while the participant at the receiving end, or energy goal is coded in dative form. Of note here is the fact that the concept of actual recipient is not necessarily implied. That is to say, (60) may not carry the implication that the child was attacked. Ranjit did his part by using an

instrument or a body part, and swinging it or moving it towards the child. But we are not sure whether it made contact with or impacted the second participant. Therefore the child is not to be taken as the actual recipient of the attack in this case. Thus we can say, for example,

(66) Ranjit lameya-Ta gaeh-uwa, namut eka paara-k wat waed-une naeae
child-DAT hit-PAST but one blow-INDEF even be hit-PAST no
'Ranjit hit the child, but the child did not get even a single blow.'

The same fact is convincingly revealed by the famous Sinhala proverb:

(67) widd-ee haawa-Ta, waed-unee pandura-Ta
shoot-PAST-EMPH hare-DAT be hit-PAST-EMPH bush-DAT
'A hare was aimed at; but a bush was hit.'

To native intuition, the two dative forms in (67) are different: the dative in the initial clause indicates only the direction of energy flow, while that of the latter clause represents the actual contact ground of the activity.

Dative case marking has been exposed to different interpretations because of its polysemous nature. According to one interpretation, the participant who suffers or experiences an offence is marked with dative because the entity is affected by such events (Wierzbicka 1988). "Loosely speaking, the use of dative implies a situation which is not controlled by a person Z but which is likely (though not certain) to have an effect on Z. Thus, whether a person is offered something, shown something, told something, or whether things happen in or near his body, he is likely to be affected by these events, and affected in ways in which things -- as opposed to people -- cannot be affected(i.e. mentally)" (Wierzbicka 1988:427)

According to another interpretation, the fact that the path followed by the energy or action is never conceived to make actual contact with the recipient provides the semantic motivation for dative marking(Smith 1987). This approach further maintains that the entity grammatically marked as dative is not construed as totally passive or patient-like but rather as actually or potentially potent(secondary agent) in its own right (ibid: p.378). Our analysis is slightly different and depends on the conception of path from action-chain head towards action-chain tail followed by the action. This path-like behavior lends the secondary participant its current linguistic form shared with dative, as shown in the above discussion.

Another class of verbs which allows its second participants to take dative form includes verbs of communication such as *kataa karanawa* 'talk to', *kiyanawa* 'say', *daenum denawa* 'inform', *stuti karanawa* 'thank', *prasansa karanawa* 'praise', *suba patanawa* 'wish somebody well', *aachaara karanawa* 'greet', *awawaada karanawa* 'advise', etc. The domain-schematization for verbs of communication presupposes motion-event frame. Accordingly, the communicator is viewed as action-chain head or agent while the addressee is treated as the action-chain tail or goal. Transition of a message by the agent towards the addressee is understood as motion. Thus the COMMUNICATION IS MOTION metaphor is created. In the following examples, the communicator represents the initial location, the addressee is conceptualized as the ground entity or the final location, and the communication act aimed at the final location is viewed as a transition parallel to a path. The core schema of the theme and the ground plus path __ in particular, the theme's motion towards the final location __ is shared by both motion events and communication events.

(68) Ranjit lameya-Ta kataa kalaa
child-DAT talked

'Ranjit talked to the child or called the child.'

(69) haamuduruwo minessun-Ta nitara awawaada kara-nawa
monk people-DAT often advise-IND
'That monk often advises people.'

(70) hiwalaa kapuTaa-Ta aachaara kalaa
fox crow-DAT greeted
'The fox greeted the crow.'

Some verbs of communication allow a nominal or a phrase, denoting the message (referring to its content or nature), to appear clause-internally. The piece of message in such a case is conceptualized as the figural entity moving along a path towards the addressee as in the following examples:

(71) Ranjit maru kataawa-k kiy-uwa
nice story-INDEF tell-PAST
'Ranjit told a nice story.'

(72) Ranjit Chitra-Ta rahasa-K kiy-uwa
-DAT secret-INDEF tell-PAST
'Ranjit told Chitra a secret.'

(73) Ranjit Chitra-Ta kaempas eka wahapu bawa daenum dunna
-DAT campus one closed that informed
'Ranjit informed Chitra that the campus was closed.'

(71) and (72) have nominals referring to the nature of the message, while (73) has a phrase referring to the content of the message, both of which can be taken as figural entities transferring from one participant to another. While a verb like *kiyanawa* 'tell' can appear without a ground-specifying noun as in (71) or with a ground-specifying noun as in (72), another verb like *daenum denawa* 'inform' seems to be bound to specify the ground as in (73). Usually a sentence like (74) appears to be unstable or incomplete because it does not signify the addressee.

(74) ?Ranjit kaempas eka wahapu bawa daenum dunna
campus one closed that informed

However, if we take Ranjit in (74) as a broadcaster or an announcer, the sentence will not sound odd, in which case *daenum denawa* would be equivalent to *announce* in English, focusing on the message rather than the addressee. Hence (75) is fully acceptable.

(75) reeDiyoo eka kaempas eka wahapu bawa daenum dunna
radio one campus one closed that announced
'The radio announced that the campus was closed.'

Looked in this way, though there are apparent exceptions depending on which entity, addressee or message, will be brought into focus by the lexical verb, the general tendency shows that the FIGURE + GROUNG + PATH archetype of a motion event provides the schematizing structure to a communication event involving a message and an addressee. The recipient role of the verbs of communication is put into analogy with the terminal end of the path followed by a figural object, and easily conceptualized as goal. Hence the communication goal is expressed with the same homophonous form as the spatial goal, which in turn serves as a metaphorical vehicle to map the domain of spatial motion onto the domain of communication.

8.7 Interrelation between Metaphorical Extension and Constructional Extension

So far we have discussed mainly intransitive motion constructions. However, the particular verb class examined in the preceding section shows the tendency to include both monotransitive and ditransitive verbs, which leads us to consider metaphorical extension simultaneously with constructional extension. Therefore I will dedicate this section to illustrating the interrelation between metaphorical extension and constructional extension.

The constructional extension to be considered here is similar to the analysis of "subsumption links" suggested by Goldberg(1992). According to this observation, a ditransitive motion construction is related to an intransitive motion construction by a subsumption link in which the latter is a subpart of the former. In other words, the former is considered as an extension of the latter. Let us first consider the following caused-motion event.

(76) Ranjit kaasiya mulla-Ta tallu kalaa
coin corner-DAT pushed
'Ranjit pushed the coin into the corner.'

(77) api mal paattiya-Ta watura daemma
we flower bed-DAT water put
'We sprinkled water on the flower bed.'

The sentences can be semantically and syntactically represented as follows:

(76')	AGENT	FIGURE	GROUND+PATH	MOVE+CAUSE	(semantics)
	SUB	DO	IO	PRED	(syntax)
(77')	AGENT	GROUND+PATH	FIGURE	MOVE+CAUSE	(semantics)
	SUB	IO	DO	PRED	(syntax)

The fact that they indicate events of caused-motion rather than natural motion makes them differ from simple motion structures: the motion is caused by an agent external to the figure, i.e. by an action-chain head that exists independently from the figure. The natural order of constituents as to whether figure precedes ground as in (76)/(76') or vice versa as in (77)/(77') is considered to be determined by the semantic parameters of ATTENTION FLOW and VIEWPOINT proposed by DeLancey(1981), a point which we are not going to deal here.

Next, these caused-motion structures are viewed as related to the simple motion events of the following type:

(78)	FIGURE	GROUND+PATH	MOVE	(Semantics)
	SUB	ID	PRED	(syntax)

This structure (equivalent to Theme Goal Motion in traditional terms) is meant to include the following type of expressions:

(79) puusa wala-Ta waeT-unaa
cat hole-DAT fall-PAST
'The cat fell into the hole.'

(80) ata-Ta salli e-nawa
hand-DAT money come-IND
'Money comes to our hands.' ('We get money.')

It is assumed that cause-motion construction is expanded from this type of intransitive motion structures by adding the CAUSE feature. When the CAUSE feature is added, the original figural object loses its status as action-chain head (agent) and a new action-chain head occupies the initial position of the linear structure as causal and clausal subject. Under this analysis, the intransitive motion structure in (78) is understood as a subpart of the caused-motion-event structures given in (76') or (77')* .

The kind of relationship given above can be identified as structural extension based on component structures. Though the notion of integration and expansion among these structures was adopted particularly for the characterization of a grammatical construction, it will be simultaneously developed to provide

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* Again, the problem of the order of constituents is ignored here.

substantial descriptions of semantic and conceptual structures. A structure is taken to be built on a constructional schema as well as on a image schema; such a schema will serve as a template for forming new composite structures and expressions on the same structure. For example, ditransitive structures can be taken as an extension of motion structures both structurally and conceptually.*

Structurally, sentences like

(81) Ranjit Chitra-Ta lium-ak yaeuwa
-DAT letter-INDEF sent
'Ranjit sent Chitra a letter.'

(82) gurutumaa Sunil-Ta taegga dunna
teacher -DAT prize gave
'The teacher gave Sunil the prize.'

are taken to be extended from the simple(intrans.) structure given in (78). Roughly speaking, (81) and (82) can be considered to be related to (83) representing a change in locus and (84) representing a change in possession respectively.

(83) Chitra-Ta lium-ak aawaa
-DAT letter-INDEF came
'Chitra got a letter.' lit. 'A letter came to Chitra.'

(84) taeaegga Sunil-Ta giyaa
prize -DAT went
'The prize went to Sunil.'

If we associate the base structure given in (78) with the skeletal meaning *Y* MOVE TO *Z*, the expanded structures related to (81) and (82) are associable with *X* CAUSE *Y* MOVE TO *Z*. These recurrent patterns cannot be characterized without proper reference to the schematic units like CAUSE, MOVE and TO, which categorize and motivate the composite structures. Viewed in this way, structures are characterized as conceptual entities accommodating construals rather than fully predictable, static entities.

Accordingly, at the conceptual level ditransitive constructions are shown as a metaphorical extension of the caused-motion construction. The semantics prototypically associated with caused-motion construction is physical "caused-motion", i.e. motion of an object through space by an external agent. Ditransitive construction acquires an additional sense of "change in possession". In a ditransitive construction, the participant which bears the role of ground in the event-frame is a possessor as in (81) and (82), while in the caused-motion event, the ground element will be only a location as in (76) and (77). Put in another way, the goal can be inanimate in the caused-motion construction, but should be animate in the ditransitive construction to be reinterpreted as 'possessor' and thematically 'recipient'. Further, an animate source is added to interpret as 'previous possessor' and thematically 'agent'. Following expressions will show the different stages of this conceptual transfer:

(85) api mal paattiya-Ta watura daemma
we flower bed-DAT water put
'We sprinkled water on the flower bed.'

(86) api lameya-ge kaTa-Ta watura wakkalaa
we child-GEN mouth-DAT water poured
'We poured some water into the child's mouth.'

(87) api lameya-Ta watura widd-aa
we child-DAT water shoot-PAST
'We shot water at the child.'

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* It should be noted that dividing linguistic activities into two poles as structural and conceptual is done only for analytical purpose. A strict dichotomy would be inappropriate, since they are linked up by categorizing relationships and are interdependent.

(88) api lameya-Ta watura dunna
we child-DAT water gave

(85) repeated from (77) is a caused-motion construction in which both the figural element and the ground element are inanimate objects. (86) in which the ground element is related to an animate entity, is still considered as a caused-motion construction because the animate entity denoted by the genitive nominal is not thematically bound to the event structure. In (87), though a thematically bound animate noun is selected as the ground element, the expression cannot be fully accepted as indicating a case of transferring possessorship because the dative participant's role as a recipient is not clear: it can be a just goal or a will ing recipient depending on the context. (88) clearly presents an event of transfer in possessorship and hence can be taken to exemplify a situation in which the transition from a caused-motion construction to a ditransitive construction has successfully occurred.

We assume that the relationship between two constructions is metaphorical because the basic and concrete concept of physical motion is employed here to conceptualize the less concrete domain of change in possession. The change in possessorship is understood as causing the possessed entity to move from the hand of one participant into the territory of another participant. The central metaphor in this case is tentatively identified as CHANGE IN POSSESSORSHIP IS MOTION. The idea that transition of possessorship is related to the change in location is not something new: Gruber(1967) suggested that for transitions of possession, *to* is used before possessor/goal in English, not *into*, in many cases. This may be taken to indicate that goal can be an animate or inanimate object in the source structure, while it will be an animate participant in the target (metaphorical) structure,, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The motion and goal(ground plus path) will be the core schema shared by the both constructions in the process of combining the two different domains.

The central metaphor is further extended to submetaphors so that a wide variety of situations is coerced into the same conceptualization pattern and finally accommodated within the same clause-type. We can observe that a number of semantic domains gain expression through the ditransitive construction. A variety of verbs can be seen to appear with the construction, most of which probably can be taken to represent distinctive classes. With these semantic variants, it will be difficult to explain all such expressions by appeal to a single metaphor.

Coming to a terminological problem, Goldberg(1992) argues that "possessor" is not the right term to refer to the semantic role of the indirect object in the ditransitive construction and that "recipient" is more accurate than "goal" and "possessor". Goldberg tries to account for her contention: many of the metaphors involving transfer as in (89) do not imply the concept of possession or transfer of possession.

(89) Joe gave Mary an insult

However, we can show that even "recipient" would not be adequate to capture the full semantics of the ditransitive construction. Let us observe the following data:

(90) Ranjit nimal-Ta baisikalee wikk-aa
-DAT bicycle sell-PAST
'Ranjit sold the bicycle to Sunil.'

(91) mama klaak-Ta yatura baara dunna
I clerk-DAT key handed
'I handed the key to the clerk.'

(92) minihaa lameyaa-Ta waeDee paewar-uwaa
man child-DAT job entrust-PAST
'The man entrusted the job to the child.'

(93) gaeaeni minihaa-Ta honda sapattu paar-ak dunna
woman man-DAT nice shoe blow-INDEF gave
'The woman gave the man a nice blow from her shoe.'

(94) Ranjit chitra-Ta poronduw-ak dunna
-DAT promise-INDEF gave
'Ranjit offered Chitra a promise.'
(95) kathikayaa apa-ta alut adahas-ak dunna
speaker us-DAT new idea-INDEF gave
'The speaker gave us a new idea.'

A closer look at this set of examples will reveal that the metaphorical expressions do not inherit all the semantic specifications supplied by the source structure. Instead, we see that they represent varied degrees of metaphorical abstraction. In (90), with the commercial verb *wikka* 'sold', the entity denoted by the direct object is transferred from one participant to another. The participant encoded as indirect object will go to possess the transferred object. So this example clearly represents a transfer in possessorship. Next, the verb *baara dunna* 'handed over' in (91), though lexically designates a scene of transfer, does not imply a transfer of actual possession, that is, the transferred object does not come into the possession of the dative participant who will, instead, handle the object as something temporarily transferred to him. The figural object in (92) does not represent a physical object, which brings it into contrast with (90) and (91). With the verb *paewaruwa* 'left something to somebody', the transferred entity can be a concrete object or an abstract entity. In terms of vertical type/instance correspondence of nominals, the entity denoted by the direct object (*waedee* 'job') belongs to an upper level in the type hierarchy and hence refers to an abstract entity.

In (93), (94) and (95), the transaction does not involve transferring a physical object. The events involving intangible entities such as a promise and an idea do not imply a figural object's departure from the subject participant or its coming into physical possession of the indirect-object participant. In some cases, however, intangible entities are rendered transferrable by using a cognate noun or other kind of nominal form corresponding to the causal verb as in (93)-(95). Following derivations will illustrate this individuating process:

(96) pahara denawa 'hit'(V) > paharak denawa 'give a blow'
porondu wenawa 'promise'(V) > poronduwak denawa 'give a promise'

It seems clear from our discussion above that ditransitive verbs are used in different semantic contexts. According to the context, the relation and interact-i on between the referents of the subject nominal, direct-object nominal and indirect-object nominal take varied shapes. Even a more limited case like, e.g. the verb *denawa* 'give', as seen above, covers a range of distinctive relations allowing widespread variations behind the underlying general sense. Now we might wonder if it is possible to capture all these variations and extensions in some way, for instance, under the umbrella of a systematic metaphor.

One way to solve this problem would be to characterize possession in a broader sense so that numerous situations can be included in it. It might be relevant here to consider the basic analysis by Miller and Johnson-Laird(1976). "Unlike spatial location, however, possession goes beyond what is perceptible; as Snare(1972) remarks, a stolen apple does not look different from any other apple. Possession is primarily a conceptual matter" (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976:558). They define a verb of possession as any verb that incorporates one or more of the three separate notions of possession, i.e. inherent, accidental, and physical possession. While (90) and (91) above in our data may be characterized b y such notions of possession, examples (92)-(95) do not seem to fall into any such category. In (94) and (95), although the subject participant "gives" something to the indirect-object participant, there is transit of any tangible object away from his possession. What we can conceive is that an energy force moves along an energy path as in (93) and that a conceptual entity moves along a mental path as in (94) and (95).

In coding these non-perceptible events and less dynamic acts, human speakers seek shelter in more tangible, easily manipulable experiences like motion events. We saw that motion events are associated with particular image schemata,

such as transition of a figure among ground elements, following a path toward the selected ground element, and an external cause enabling this transition. This kind of image schemata underlying the structure of locomotion and prototypical forms of motion verbs are aptly exploited in the conceptual organization of events of transfer and in expressing them as ditransitive constructions.

The process by which we understand the events of transfer according to the image schemata representing caused-motion events consists of conceptual, lexical and syntactic analogies. The metaphorical relations emerging from these analogies can be taken as grounded on the central metaphor CHANGE IN POSSESSORSHIP IS MOTION thereby allowing further extensions into submetaphors.

Another way of thinking would be to consider these metaphorical relations in terms of the parameters of energy path and mental path emerging from the range of phenomena such as transfer of possession, entrusting, contact, communic ation, perception, knowledge, etc. which are subsumed in the wide range of dative uses. This latter approach allows us to consider the endpoint of path as the unique rationale of numerous dative uses in ditransitive constructions. The whole range of dative participants in the ditransitive constructions can be reduced to the semantic constituent of goal. Using path and goal as core schema and dative form as metaphorical vehicle, the domain of causal events is mapped onto the concrete domain of physical motion. Considering the breadth of the domain, a more general metaphor like CAUSAL EVENTS ARE MOTIONS might be appropriate.

Semantic field of causal events is so extensive that it can include different event-types spreading over time and space into a large network bound by the core schema. We will examine here one such event-type known in the literature as "benefactive construction". Ditransitive construction was considered above as an extension from the caused-motion event, "*X* CAUSE *Y* MOVE TO *Z*" to the secondary sense of transfer, "*X* CAUSE *Y* RECEIVE *Z*". Benefactive construction goes one step further by allowing to code future transfer or "intended transfer" a ssuggested by Goldberg(1992). In this case, ditransitive construction acquires a new sense making way to the benefactive construction. Observe the following examples:

(96) mama taatta-Ta kamisay-ak gatta
I father-DAT shirt-INDEF bought
'I bought my father a shirt.'

(97) taatta girawa-Ta kuuDuw-ak hada-nawa
father parrot-DAT cage-INDEF make-IND
'Father is making a cage for the parrot.'

These sentences cannot be taken to express actual transfers of the type "*X* CAUSE *Y* RECEIVE *Z*". Subject participants perform certain actions, e.g. "buying" and "making" as denoted by the verbs in (96) and (97) respectively, whose benefits will be transferred to a second participant specified by the dative nominal. So the dative morpheme here indicates the endpoint of a future transfer.

We will see through the examples below how the dative case marking is motivated by the path analog and the concept of endpoint.

(98) api watta-Ta TaeTTaray-ak gatta
we land-DAT tractor-INDEF bought
'We bought a tractor for the land.' or
'We took/drove a tractor to the land.'

(99) taatta kumbura-Ta watura adi-nawa
father field-DAT water draw-IND
'Father is drawing water for the rice-field.' or
'Father is drawing water to the rice-field.'

The semantic ambiguity of these sentences comes from the parallel existence of both the newly acquired meaning and the original meaning. According to the original meaning, they represent only caused-motion events. Dative morpheme indicates spatial direction and the endpoint of a spatial path. Metaphorical interpretation, however, does not allow such a spatio-directional meaning. In these

new contexts, the speaker's purpose is not to express that the subject participant causes direct-object entity, i.e. tractor or water, move to the dative entity, i.e. land or rice-field, but to imply that the subject participant performs an action with the intention that its benefit will go to the dative participant. It is for this sense that we usually take the dative participant as the beneficiary. Thus the polysemy is evidential for the transitional stage between the spatial meaning and benefactive meaning.

Acceptance of these sentences with metaphorical meaning will pose a serious problem to the theory of ditransitive constructions, which requires that the dative participant be an animate being. Does it mean that this rule will not apply to Sinhala as individual languages may behave differentially with respect to rule-selection? We are not going to take up this problem here because of space limitation, though it deserves thorough examination. Instead, we turn to consider the problem of more immediate concern to us here: benefactive constructions are different from caused-motion constructions and from other ditransitive constructions in that they do not signify spatial transfer of objects. Following type of "benefactive" sentences will give support for this claim:

(100) Ranjit lameya-Ta liuma liya-la dunna
child-DAT letter write-PP gave
'Ranjit helped the child by writing the letter.'

(101) lameya siiya-Ta dora aera-la dunna
child grandfather-DAT door open-PP gave
'The child opened his grandfather the door.'

Can these sentences be taken as expressing that the subject participant causes the dative participant to receive the entity denoted by the direct object? Usually, *liyala dunna* [write-PP + GAVE] or *aerala dunna* [open-PP + GAVE] does not imply that 'the letter was given after writing' or 'the door was given after opening'. These grammaticalized forms denote actions done for the benefit of somebody else. However, the fact that the predicate of (100) is polysemous while that of (101) is not, as will be shown below, will demonstrate how the metaphorical meaning has developed from the source structure and further will provide evidence for the existence of the conventionalized metaphor.

When we take (100) above to be in the benefactive meaning, the predicate must be considered to consist of an action verb 'write' and an auxiliary verb (GIVE). In this context, we understand that the child was not in a position or capacity to write the letter; so Ranjit wrote it for the benefit of the child. In another context, however, the sentence can be taken in the literal sense in that both 'write' and 'give' are considered as action verbs. In this case, dative nominals can interfere between the two verbs:

(102) Ranjit liuma liya-la lameya-Ta dunna
letter write-PP child-DAT gave
'Ranjit wrote the letter and handed it to the child.'

With this change in constituent order, the only interpretation appropriate would be the one involving the spatial transfer of an object. Here the entity denoted by the direct object and understood as the transferred object will be prominent. Because of this sense of spatial transfer, the example (102) can be easily converted to(104) which appears with the same structural properties and linear ordering, apart from the animacy of the dative participant.

(104) Ranjit liuma liya-la peTTiya-Ta daemma
letter write-PP box-DAT put
'Ranjit wrote the letter and put it into the box.'

We believe that the caused-motion construction with the sense of spatial transfer as in (100) provided the source structure for the benefactive construction. Thus, it is proved that benefactive events are conceptualized in terms of motion events. The unification between the two domains, the transfer of a physical object and the transfer of a causal effect, is achieved through the metaphorical expression including transfer-indicating verb GIVE and path-specifying morpheme *Ta*.

Next, we can see in the example (100) that the metaphor is fully

established, with some restrictions on the referential structure. In this sentence, the entity represented by the direct object lacks a salient figural property, i.e. movability in this particular context. With little opportunity for the direct-object participant to be construed as a figural object or a transferrable object, the sentence cannot be associated with the domain of physical transfer. Further, an animate being is obligatorily selected as the dative participant. Thus, the sentence can be interpreted only in the domain of causal-effect transfer and hence only metaphorical meaning is available for it. Accordingly, I will conclude that the TRANFER OF CAUSAL EFFECT IS MOTION metaphor appears to be conventionalized with this clause-type.

Finally, we will see that the apparently ideosyncratic behavior of the specialc lass of causative verbs called 'ingestive' verbs can be accounted for by appeal to t he metaphor. According to Masica(1976), 'ingestive' verbs are those "having in common a semantic feature of *taking something into* the body or mind (literally or figuratively) ..."(p.46). The idea to be proposed here is that the 'ingestive' causative construction is a development from the dative construction. First, look at the following sentences that have most common 'ingestive' verbs in their predicate position.

(105) lameya bat ka-nawa
child rice eat-IND
'The child is eating rice.'

(106) puusa kiri bo-nawa
cat milk drink-IND
'The cat is drinking milk.'

The subject of an 'ingestive verb' takes the dative case marking after causativization. In other words, the causee of the causatives of 'ingestive' verbs is assigned with the status of indirect object, transforming the construction into a ditransitiv eone.

(105') amma lameya-Ta bat ka-wa-nawa
mother child-DAT rice eat-CAUS-IND
'Mother is feeding rice to the child.'

(106') Chitra puusa-Ta kiri po-wa-nawa
cat-DAT milk drink-CAUS-IND
'Chitra is feeding milk to the cat.'

As Masica(1976) observes, these ditransitives are to be distinguished from primary ditransitives such as "give", "write", and "send", which have an inherent, not a derived, double object.

An obvious question to ask is whether there is any semantic and cognitive motivation for the causee of 'ingestive' causatives to take the dative case marking instead of accusative or instrumental marking. Previous studies of causativization by some linguists(e.g. Shibatani,1973 and Comrie,1985) have demonstrated the fact that the difference in degree of coercion is expressed by different case marking patterns in the causative construction. Shibatani(1973) suggests that distinct causative rules assign *ni* to the agentive noun and *o* to the patient noun when they occur sentence-internally in Japanese. Accordingly, (108) below with the indirect-object postposition *ni* is taken to be less coersive while (107) with the direct-object postposition *o* has a higher degree of coercion.

(107) Taroo ga Hanako o aruka-ase-ta
SUBJ DO walk-CAUS-PAST
'Taroo made Hanako walk.'

(108) Taroo ga Hanako ni aruk-ase-ta
SUBJ IO walk-CAUS-PAST
'Taroo had Hanako walk.'

Causativization affects the semantic and grammatical relations of the complement subject, the subject of the basic verb: a new causer joins the event and the participant represented by the complement subject becomes the causee. That is, when the causer usurps the subject position the causee has to seek a

new grammatical face. Now, the causee, which represents the possessor of a body or mind into which ingested things go, being separated from the action-chain head can explicitly appear as the ground element. The core schema of the causative ingestive event includes a causer representing somebody who feeds, a causee denoting somebody who is fed, figure's path or endpoint analogous with the direction of the ingestive process, a figure to represent food, and a verb indicating the specific action of feeding. All the elements taken together constitute a caused-motion event: Agent-Ground-Path-Figure-Move+CAUSE. This conceptual structure motivates the syntactic and lexical representation of ingestive causatives. Thus, the path specified as the endpoint is represented by the dative morpheme.

The ingestive events thus far we have discussed imply bodily ingestion, which can be furher extended to include mental and perceptual fields. Let us consider the following data:

(109) Chitra ingriisi igena gan-nawa
English learn-IND
'Chitra learns English.'

(109') MenDis saar Chitra-Ta ingriisi ugan-wa-nawa
Mr. -DAT English learn-CAUS(=teach)-IND
'Mr. Mendis is teaching Chitra English.'

(110) Chitra poToo eka daekk-aa
photo see-PAST
'Chitra saw the photo.'

(110') Ranjit Chitra-Ta poToo eka pennuwa
-DAT photo showed
'Ranjit Showed Chitra the photo.'

These sentences can be understood by the same formula presented for (105)/(105') and (106)/(106'). The clausal subject in (109') makes the dative participant 'inbibe' a kind of knowledge while the clausal subject in (110') brings a perceptual experience to the dative participant. In these situations, knowledge and perception move as figural objects or ingested entities into the mind of the dative participants. The clausal-subject participant as the causer enables this movement. The representation of these event occurs according to the same ditransitive motion structure.

Though (111) does not represent a straight ingestive event, I will include it as a variant of the same subtype because its conceptual structure is schematized in a way similar to that of an ingestive event.

(111) Chitra baba-Ta alut aendum-ak aende-wu-waa
baby-DAT new clothe-INDEF wear-CAUS-PAST
'Chitra dressed the baby with a new clothe.'

After all, it is not unnatural to conceptualize the events of feeding somebody and dressing somebody in a similar way: the difference is whether one deals with an internal body or external body.

We have observed here how the complement subject of 'ingestive' verbs take the dative case marking subsequent to causativization. We have seen that it is quite logical for ingestive events to be schematized as a subtype of ditransitive construction in a way comparable to caused-motion events. The domain of ingestive actions is smoothly mapped with the domain of motion events, using the ground plus path form as the metaphorical expression. Thus, ingestive causatives can be considered as a subclass of expressions based on the general metaphor CAUSAL EVENTS ARE MOTIONS or aligned with the specific metaphor INGESTIVE EVENTS ARE MOTIONS.

8.8 Conclusion

In this chapter we presented dative expression as a polysemous unit: it involves a conceptual network with related senses clearly displaying a family resemblance line. Various senses were taken as different stages of the process of spread from the prototypical value to non-prototypical and peripheral values.

Value-harmony was described in terms of domain-mapping, metaphorical transfers, and constructional extensions directly accounting for the polysemy. Extensions from the prototypical meaning or the basic event structure were analyzed as involving schematic semantic components without clear-cut boundaries, thereby proving the fact that semantic overlap is very natural for case markers. Thus, we showed how the new nuances of meaning are assigned with different semantic roles of possessor, recipient, experiencer, location, goal, etc., all to be subsumed within the same dative case form. We have further seen how the task of specifying the semantic role is supported by some other factors like starting point/end-point sequence and figure/ground organization.

All this goes to suggest that space is a topographic model of human experience. Space provides a fundamental ordering in relation to which experience is organized and linguistically expressed. Still there are various aspects of metaphor use to be studied in the context of language learning, understanding, or reasoning. The entire range of dative uses that spreads over a vast area of the language will prove especially telling. One such uncovered domain includes a range of unintentional events and involuntary processes that can be categorized as 'motion events without external causes'. If we observe this category, we will see that emotions like happiness, cognitive states like memory, and physical experiences like hunger or cold move along an abstract path towards an animate participant. Time, manner, reason or cause, purpose and result are some other abstract domains subsumed in the dative form. To formulate an adequate theory of grammaticalized spatial metaphors, it is necessary to observe all these phenomena with particular emphasis on the preservation of image schema. These essential aspects of metaphorical use are to be dealt with in the next chapter.

Chapter 9—Motion events without External Causes

Introduction

We have so far discussed the following basic schemata:

Simple motion structure: *X* MOVE TO *Y* (realized as *X Y* TO MOVE in Sinhala)
Event form: FIGURE GROUND+PATH MOVE
Syntactic form: SUB IO PRED

The caused-motion structure was taken, following localist tradition, as synchronically deriving from the simple motion structure:

X MOVE TO *Y* ----------> *X* CAUSE *Y* MOVE TO *Z*

This caused-motion structure further extends to various ditransitive patterns, acquiring different senses, e.g. *X* CAUSE *Z* RECEIVE *Y*. We saw that the figure in a simple motion structure can be an inanimate entity or animate entity. We introduced it as 'natural motion' because the entity that undergoes change of state/location is a self-moving actor or an object construed as self-moving. We showed that the change of state/location is instigated by an agent external to the figure in the caused-motion structure and related ditransitive patterns.

We now discuss a constructional schema subsuming a large range of motion events including states, unintentional events and involuntary processes. These kinds of events without the activity of some external agent will be shown as related to simple motion events. So the basic structure is *X* MOVE TO *Y*, same as in natural motion events. The realization of this structure in Sinhala, however, brings some peculiar consequences to the surface occurrence pattern, some of which were observed in the discussion of the ACQUISITION IS MOTION metaphor. In this pattern, animate/human participants are regarded as GROUND entities while inanimate or abstract entities are encoded as FIGURE entities. In most cases, however, animate/human participants are retained in the TOPIC position while figural objects are kept in the COMMENT position.

9.1 Possessive Constructions

I start this chapter with a discussion of possessive sentences, which will illustrate how states of possession are expressed metaphorically using the template structure of motion events. Some pioneer works on the relations between locative and possessive constructions have brought into focus the fact that these constructions are built on the spatial relations. For example, Lyons 1967 suggests that "It is clearly not by chance that the case of indirect object(the 'dative') and the directional 'motion towards' fall together in many languages" (Lyons 1967:392). Anderson holds a stronger view: "the 'dative' is to a considerable extent a predictable variant of the locative"(Anderson 1971:103). Clark argues that the possessor in the possessive constructions is simply an animate place (Clark 1978).

Beginning the discussion, we note that the possessive sentence, in spite of its stativeness, is capable of idealizing as a limiting case of motion. In 6.3, following Talmy 1975, we posited the located state as a subsituation of the motion situation, specified by the BE verb. A sense of motion and directionality is attached to the relation between the possessor and the possessed object by viewing the former as a goal, or a place with respect to which the latter exists. The path-specifying morpheme TO is used to indicate the endpoint of this abstract motion. Thus, the possessor nominal and the recipient nominal share the same dative case marking *Ta* in Sinhala. Many languages like German, Japanese, Georgian, Tamil and Malayalam use the dative/allative marking to indicate possessor. Compare the following pairs of possessive and locative sentences from Sinhala.

(1) a. lind-ee watura tie-nawa
well-LOC water be-IND
'There is water in the well.'

b. ma-Ta salli tie-nawa
me-DAT money be-IND
'I have money.'

(2) a. gah-ee wandur-ek in-nawa
tree-LOC monkey-INDEF be-IND
'There is a monkey on the tree.'

b. eyaa-Ta put-ek in-nawa
he-DAT son-INDEF be-IND
'He has a son.'

Following the analysis of locative sentences offered in Chapter 3, it is observed that (1a) and (2a) represent the [LOCATIVE + NP_{indef} + V_{exist}] pattern. In both cases, accordingly, the locative nominal denoting a place is brought forward to the TOPIC position, leaving the nominative nominal that denotes the located object in the COMMENT position. The same locative-nominative order is followed by the possessive sentences in (1b) and (2b) in which the first and the second nominals denote possessor and possessed object respectively. The shared property of the two constructions, i.e. the locative nature, explicitly appears not only in the order of constituents but in the verbal forms also. Both constructions share the same deep verb BE which appears in surface as *tienawa* and *innawa.* The choice of the verb (*tienawa* vs. *innawa*) depends on whether the subject of the verb is an inanimate noun or animate noun: inanimate subjects take *tienawa* while animate subjects take *innawa*..

The lixical origins of the verbs further reveal their inherently locative nature. *Tienawa* is diachronically derived from the active verb *tiyanawa* 'put, place' as shown in (3). The derivation itself is valid synchronically for some verbs, which contain a similar phonetic factor as in (4):

(3) tiyanawa 'put' > tienawa 'be put'

(4) a. kiranawa 'measure' > kirenawa 'be measured'

b. iranawa 'tear' > irenawa 'be torn'

The derived form *tienawa* can be used as an intransitive verb with the inchoative meaning 'be put, be placed' or with the stative meaning 'be there, exist', the latter of which was grammaticalized as an existential verb used in locative constructions and as an auxiliary verb for expressing progressive aspect. While many Sinhala grammarians will concede the fact that (4) represents some readily applicable derivations, there will be some hesitancy in accepting (3) as bearing such a derivational relationship. The existence of such a derivational relationship amply demonstrated by the fact that both the active form and stative form have one and the same form, *tibba,* as the past tense in colloquial Sinhala:

(5) a. Ranjit pota meese uD-in tibba
book table on-ABL put-PAST
'Ranjit put the book on the table.'

b. pota meese uDa tibba
book table on be-PAST
'The book was on the table.'

The other existential verb *innawa* used with animate subjects can be taken to be related to the 'body-posture' verb *indinawa* 'be seated'. After undergoing a phonological erosion, it becomes *innawa* acquiring existential meaning. Strangely enough, the past tense of the existential verb, i.e. *hiTiya* is identical in form to the past tense of another 'body-posture' verb, *hiTinawa* 'stand'. The paradigm of existential verbs in Sinhala is given in Table 1 below.

Clark(1978) has pointed out that in many languages the verbs used in locational constructions have an inherenly locative meaning. Our brief discussions shows that Sinhala BE verb also carries a locative element in its lexical content and that this locative feature is shared by both locative and possessive constructions.

	PRESENT	DIACHRONIC TRACE	PAST
INANIMATE	tienawa	<---- tiyanawa ---->	tibba
ANIMATE	innawa	<---- indinawa ---->	unna*
		hiTinawa ---->	hiTiya

Table 1: Paradigm of existential verbs

Next, we see how the possessive construction becomes different from the locative construction. Even a moment's glance will reveal that the nominal in the TOPIC position has different morphosyntactic forms in its surface occurrence: locative case in locative constructions and dative case in possessive constructions. This difference is attributed to a basic semantic division in the Topic section of the two constructions. The initial nominal in one construction denotes location, and the other possessor. An inanimate object usually becomes location while only an animate being can become a possessor. This basic truth plays a role in assigning locative case to the initial noun of locative sentences and dative case to that of possessive sentences. Animacy can be assumed as the semantic variable involv-i ng the choice of locative or dative case marking in these sentences.

At this point a question poses itself. Locative marker for a nominal denoting location is understandable; but why is the dative marker for a nominal of possessor? The answer to this question is easily found in the area of domain-mapping and metaphorical linking, to be particular, by applying the concept of spatial metaphor to this situation. We assume possession and location as two different domains. Possession is a more abstract domain compared with the concrete domain of location. In conceptualizing this abstract domain, more tangible and concrete facts appear to be useful: the possessed object is viewed as coming to a place which happens to be an animate participant. This animate location is treated as goal and indicated by the dative case. Thus possession is conceptualized as a locomotion event, in which the POSSESSOR IS GOAL metaphor motivat-e s dative marking. The animacy of the initial nominal makes the morphosyntactic change while its topicality changes the figure-ground order.

Though location and possession were considered here as different domains they do not seem to be far-removed from one another. We can see some possessive sentences in which the possessor is coded in a locative form in spite of the fact that an animate noun selected as the ground element is used in the TOPIC position.

(6) man langa salli tie-nawa
I near money be-IND
'I have money with me.'

(7) eyaa at-ee warad-ak naeae
he hand-LOC fault-INDEF no
'He has no fault.'

In these sentences the first nominal denoting a possessor is added with a locative postposition and expressly retains the locative element. We can say that the speaker views the scene as one between location and possession. However, the shift from one domain to another occurs at the level of conceptualization and is reflected in the following type of variation:

(6) a. man langa salli tie-nawa (repeated from (6))
I near money be-IND
'I have money with me.'

b. ma-Ta salli tie-nawa
I-DAT money be-IND
'I have money.'

(6a) with the possessor in a locative phrase refers to a particular situation of possession, while (6b) with the possessor in dative form presents a

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* The use of *unna* as the past tense of *innawa* is limited to a few dialects.

general situation. This kind of difference in interpretation may come from the fact that a locative sentence implies the existence of an individuated entity while a possessive sentence presents an event or state of affairs with a person implicated in it(See Palmer,1954). This difference can be seen clearly in (7a and b):

(7) a. eyaa at-ee warad-ak naeae (repeated from (7))
he hand-LOC fault-INDEF no
'He has no fault.'
b. eyaa-Ta waradinne naeae
he-DAT make mistakes no
'He doesn't make mistakes.'

(7a) has a located/possessed entity individuated in the nominal form, while the variation in (7b) does not include a nominative nominal and uses a verbal form (intransitive) indicating an event or state of affairs. We assume that with the process of non-individuation, the degree of abstraction of an utterance increases. Therefore, we conclude that the possessive sentence reveals a greater degree of abstraction, which is expressed metaphorically using motion/goal structure.

9.2 Physiological Processes

Among the situations without involvement of an external cause, involuntary physiological experiences and uncontrollable sensations caused by them fall in one of the most representative categories. This category mainly includes predicative adjectives like *asaniipai* 'be ill', *weedanai* 'feel pain', *kaekkumai* 'itch', *hankitii* 'be ticklish', *nidimatai* 'be sleepy', *baDaginii* 'be hungry', *tibahai* 'be thirsty', *rasnei* 'feel hot', etc. and rarely a noun like *kaessa* 'cough'. Each of these adjectives and nominals signifies a physical or biological state. An animate participant implicated in such a state is called EXPERIENCER, and the nominal denoting the experiencer is typically marked for dative.

(8) ma-Ta siitalai
I-DAT cold
'I feel cold.'
(9) babaa-Ta baDaginii
baby-DAT hungry
'The baby is hungry.'
(10) lameya-Ta asaniipai
child-DAT ill
'The child is ill.'

These predicative adjectives with dative subjects rule out the possibility of involving any external agency, even though they may be seen as reaction to an external cause, for example, like cold weather. Therefore sentence (8) does not imply something like 'It is cold today' or 'It's windy today'; it only implies that the experiencer denoted by the dative nominal is in a physiological state of involuntary sensation, i.e. feeling cold. When there is an experiencer with respect to which a state of involuntary sensation prevails, this conceptual structure is organized in such a way that it is represented in accordance with the core schema sequence of spatial motion: Figure Ground+Path Move.

Some clarification is in order. As the physical and biological states in question do not involve any figural object, and the adjectival or nominal predicate itself signifies the state, only ground elements appear in these sentences. The experiencer bears the role of ground and occupies the Topic position. Since the state prevails with respect to the ground element, the motion should be taken, in this case, abstractly as stativeness, in terms of Talmy(1991) stationariness, not translational motion. The relation of the state to the ground is indicated by the dative morpheme. Thus the domain of involuntary sensation is mapped onto the more concrete domain of spatial motion.

The expression of such physiological experiences will take slightly different forms when they are taken as processes rather than states. Some adjectives

denoting states become verbs after adding the connective wenawa 'become', e.g. *asaniipa wenawa* 'become ill'. Some nouns transform into conjunct verbs by incorporating a motion verb like *yanawa* 'go', *enawa* 'come' and *waeTenawa* 'fall', e.g.*kibuhum yanawa* 'sneeze', *aeaenum yanawa* 'yawn', *uguraTa enawa* 'belch' and *ikka waeTenawa* 'hiccup'. Verbs thus derived denote physical or biological processes.

(11) taatta-Ta asaniipa unaa
father-DAT become ill-PAST
'Father became ill.' lit. 'Illness came to Father.'

(12) ma-Ta aeaenum ya-nawa
I-DAT yawn-IND
'I yawn.' lit. 'Yawns go to me.'

(13) lameya-Ta ikka waeTe-nawa
child-DAT hiccups fall-IND
'The child is giving a hiccup.' lit. 'The hiccups fall to the child.'

In these expressions, the experiencer who undergoes the change of states or involuntary bodily processes is coded as the dative participant. Such utterances vividly show how path-analog is used to conceptualize change of states. Dative nominals represent ground elements; adjectival or nominal parts of predicates play the role of figural objects; motion verbs characterize change of states or processes. Thus the core structure of Ground+Path Figure Move is preserved in the schematization of process-experiences. The preferred metaphor can be PHYSIO-LOGICAL STATES OR PROCESSES ARE MOTION.

9.3 Emotional Experiences

Another range of states and processes without the activity of agent involves emotional experiences. This category includes adjectives like *satuTui* 'be happy', *kanagaaTui* 'be sad', *pudumai* 'be surprised', *bayai* 'be afraid', *tarahai* 'be angry', *laejjai* 'be shy', *aaDambarai* 'be proud', and *aasai* 'be fond of'. The occurrence of feelings is perceived as parallel with the conceptual structure of motion events, that is, happiness, sadness, anger and fear are taken to move along an abstract p ath toward an animate participant. The animate participant, or the experiencer involved in this motion event becomes the goal and is coded in dative. A noun denoting an individual as in (14), referring to the mind of an experiencer as in (15) or representing a group or a community as in (16) can receive dative marking.

(14) ma-Ta hari satuTui
I-DAT very happy
'I am very happy.'

(15) hita-Ta bayai
mind-DAT afraid
'I feel afraid.'

(16) mulu gama-Ta ma laejjai
whole village-DAT Emph ashamed
'The whole village is ashamed.'

Some emotional states can be converted into inchoative- and active-type predicates by adding the lexical connective *wenawa* 'become' or *karanawa* 'do'. These derived predicates do not occur with dative subjects because their lexical aspect designates the experiencer not as a goal of emotions but as someone active in summoning up emotions. Let us compare (a) and (b) expressions in the following pairs.

(17) a. ma-Ta satuTui
I-DAT happy
'I am happy.'

b. mama satuTu we-nawa
I happy become-IND
'I become happy.'

(18) a. ma-Ta pudumai
I-DAT surprised
'I am surprised.'
b. mama puduma we-nawa
I surprise become-IND
'I get surprised.'

(a) expressions indicate cases of uncontrollable occurrence of feelings: happiness and surprise occur to the experiencer as if an object moves into a goal.
(b) expressions, on the other hand, imply that the emotions are forced by the experiencer, that is, he has control over the emotions to some extent. (b) sentences are thus taken to represent situations activated by force-dynamics, while (a) sentences carry certain experiences which can be easily explained using path-analog: the experiences in emotional domain are expressed by using the event-schema characteristic to spatial motion. The combination of different conceptual domains is achieved by a metaphorical equation of the kind "OCCURRENCE OF EMOTIONS IS MOTION".

9.4 Involuntary Cognitive Processes

Non-agentive motion events also involve perceptive, sensory and mental experiences which can be categorized as involuntary cognitive processes. Verbs like *teerenawa* 'understand', *hitenawa* 'occur to', *matak wenawa* 'remember', *daenenawa* 'feel', *penenawa* 'see', *aehenawa* 'hear', etc. come under this category. Grammatically, we can observe that three basic lexical items, each realizing the dative nominal, nominative nominal, and verb lineally appear in these representations.

(19) ma-Ta eeka teere-nawa
I-DAT it understand-IND
'I understand it.' lit. 'It is understandable to me.'

(20) ma-Ta honda suwand-ak daene-nawa
I-DAT good smell-INDEF feel-IND
'I feel a good smell.'

While the dative nominal denotes the experiencer, the nominative nominal signifies the content of the experience as in (19), or it may specify the stimulus for the experience as in (20). In terms of path-analog, dative nominal represents the ground whereas nominative nominal acts as the figure. With this pattern, the overall representation of cognitive processes clearly reflects the conceptual structure of motion events; the sequence of ordered constituents carry the meanings of goal, starting point and abstract motion.

We pay our attention to two anomalies observable here. One concerns the nominative subject: How can an inanimate participant become the clausal subject in spite of the presence of an animate participant, which is naturally qualified for energy source. As there seems to be no any possibility, in these specific contexts, of the animate participant becoming an agent or any other external agent appear -ing overtly, the inanimate participant which acts as the starting point relationall yqualifies to become the subject in the sense that it is the most prominent participant of the event chain.

Next anomaly arises from the fact that all the verbs in this category carry some sort of derived forms, evidential from morphophonemical features. Some are derived from active forms, e.g.

(21) hitanawa > hitenawa
'think' 'occur to'
ahanawa > aehenawa
'hear' 'be heard'

In case of conjunct verbs, the lexical connective *karanawa* 'do' is substituted by *wenawa* 'become':

(22) kalpanaa karanawa > kalpanaa wenawa
'think over' 'be thought'
amataka karanawa > amataka wenawa

'put out of mind' 'slip one's mind'

When we find such 'become'-type, derived inchoative verbs, we can expect their base-verbs to be 'do'-type, active predicates usable with an animate noun of the nominative subject position, which indicates the energy source of the action. With this dichotomy, we can observe the relevance of dative marking vs. nominative marking to the interpretation of sentences:

(23) a. oyaa eeka teerum ga-nna oonae
you it understand-INF should
'You should understand it.'
b. ma-Ta eeka teere-nawa
I-DAT it understand-IND
'I understand it.'

(24) a. mama eeka gaena hungak hit-uwa
I it about much think-PAST
'I thought hard about that.'
b. ma-Ta nikamaTa ehema hit-una
I-DAT just so think-PAST
'I just thought so/It simply occurred to me.'

(a) examples code active cognitive processes like 'understanding' and 'thinking' caused by the nominative participant who summons, or arrives at, the content of cognitive activity indicated by the object nominal. (b) examples, on the other hand, code the reverse direction, referring to the cognitive experience as a passive, involitive process: the content of, or the stimulus for, the experience moves along a mental path towards the experiencer denoted by the dative nominal. The experiencer is conceptualized as the locus of sensory and mental process, exhibiting parallelism with the Ground+Path Figure Move schema. This parallelism between the two domains is established by using the dative expression as a metaphor.

9.5 Action Processes

The conception of path applied in the contexts of involuntary physical/biological processes, unintentional emotional experiences and involuntary cognitive processes can be further extended to the nonvolitional actions or action processes. There is hardly any need to demonstrate that inchoative verbs denoting action processes are derived in Sinhala from action verbs. Some examples are given below:

(25)

	VOLITIVE	INVOLITIVE
Intransitive	anDanawa 'cry'	> aenDenawa
	naTanawa 'dance'	> naeTenawa
	duwanawa 'run'	> diwenawa
	paninawa 'jump'	> paenenawa
Transitive	kanawa 'eat'	> kaewenawa
	balanawa 'see'	> baelenawa
	bonawa 'drink'	> pewenawa
	kiyanawa 'say'	> kiyawenawa

The volitive-involitive split arises from the particular syntactic and semantic properties reflecting the characteristic distinctions between the two types of predicates. While volitive verbs take nominative subjects denoting potentially controlling actors, or energy sources, involitive verbs trigger dative subject specifying involitive experiencers, or energy targets. For example, in (26) a nd (27), (a) sentences code volitional actions while (b) sentences express situations in which the experiencer does not intend to perform the activity but he or she cannot help it as in the case of (26b) or he finds himself doing it impulsively as in (27b).

(26) a. Chitra anDa-nawa
cry-IND

'Chitra is crying.'

b. Chitra-Ta aenDe-nawa
-DAT get to crying-IND
'Chitra bursts into tears.'

(27) a. Ranjit naTa-nawa
dance-IND
'Ranjit is dancing.'

b. Ranjit-Ta naeTe-nawa
-DAT get to dancing-IND
'Ranjit gets to dancing (impulsively).'

Though our examples given here are limited to intransitive events, both transitive and intransitive verbs can occur with dative subjects. However, Gair (1971) suggests that intransitive verbs have a higher possibility of occurring with dative subjects. Chandralal(1993) points out that an intransitive involitive verb can occur with a nominative subject, accusative subject or dative subject depending on the lexical aspect of the specific verb, and proposes that actor role, undergoer role and experiencer role are responsible for the morphosyntax of the constructions respectively.

Transitive involitive verbs can appear with nominative subjects, ergative subjects (*atin* form), dative subjects or oblique subjects(See Inman 1993). We may suggest that transitive involitives cannot assign accusative case marking to the animate participant because they already have an object nominal specifying the undergoer role. Leaving this point for future investigation, we turn to the dat ive subject, which is relevant to our main thesis.

All the transitive involitive verbs given in (25) occur with dative subjects. Some of them can appear with an ergative subject or dative subject, allowing different interpretations. The following pair of examples will illustrate the point:

(28) a. man atin liuma paeaeg-unaa
I ERG letter trample(INVOL)-PAST
'I happened to trample the letter.'

b. ma-Ta liuma paeaeg-unaa
I-DAT letter trample(INVOL)-PAST
'The letter was trampled under my feet.'

The ergative subject marked with *atin* postposition in (a) example denotes an involitive agent (cf. Gunasinghe 1985). (b) example, on the other hand, represents an involitive participant, not an agent. As we mentioned earlier, dative participant precludes the possibility of involving any agency. Regarding this semantic contrast, Inman(1993) presents the following observation: "In fact my own research suggests that what makes dative subjects different from ergative subjects is that dative subjects imply that the effect of the verbal action comes about spontaneously, without any action (or intention) on the part of the subject in bringing it about. In contrast, ergative subjects allow for the possibility that the effect of the verbal action is the result of some other (possibly, intended) action on the part of the agent" (Inman(1993: 164).

We can give a more elegant analysis of how dative subject differs from ergative subject by appeal to the path schema which we have developed here. By applying the conception of path, we can clarify the reason why the subject of an involitive verb is marked for dative to give the 'spontaneous' meaning. Inman acknowledges that "spontaneous 'non-intentionality' is a property of the dative marked subject itself, ..."(Inman,1993:166). The next essential question would be what motivates dative marking.

I maintain that the nominative nominals appearing in the transitive involitive constructions mark the starting points of non-volitional action processes, and that the dative subjects code only the targets of such action processes. Thus dative subjects do not have any potential to be agents; they are just experiencers of action processes. Note that (28b) above refers to a process of 'being trampled on'. This process is perceived to start with the object denoted by the nominative

nominal, viz, 'the letter', that is, no any agentive participation is allowed to be involved in this process. The animate participant is seen as the endpoint with respect to which the letter starts to be trampled on. This abstract path of directed relation is specified by the dative morpheme.

The following examples will further reveal the specific meaning of the dative marking:

(29) a. ?Chitra atin watura pew-una
ERG water drink(INVOL)-PAST
'Chitra accidentally drank water.'
b. Chitra-Ta watura pew-una
-DAT water drink(INVOL)-PAST
'Chitra accidentally drank water.'
c. Chitra atin lameya-Ta watura Tikak pew-una
ERG child-DAT water a little drink(INVOL)-PAST
'Chitra accidentally fed the child some water.'

(29a) is slightly odd because it does not provide sufficient information and therefore defies The maxim of Quantity, the second maxim of conversation in Grice's theory(Grice, 1978): while the ergative phrase *Chitra atin* denotes intermediate agency, an essential piece of information, i.e. the experiencer of the ingestive process is omitted there. (29b) does not refer to any agency; the endpoint or experiencer of the ingestive process is explicit. In (29c), both intermediate agency and the experiencer of the ingestive process are presented, making it adequately informative.

Our discussion shows that nominative subject, ergative subject and dative subject occupy different positions on a scale of animate participants representing the degree of their energy application. While the nominative subject occupies the highest position, dative subject may be very low on this scale. A full examination of the continuum including other major points like accusative subject and oblique subject cannot be pursued here; further research is needed for a satisfactory assessment.

Here I refer to one important pragmatic aspect of transitive involitive pattern which is relevant to our topic. Dative subject is frequently used with transitive involitives to indicate that the experiencer is an involitive doer, or rather a victim of circumstances. For example, if one asks a smoker a question like "How many cigarettes do you take a day?" in Sinhala, a native speaker's answer will be something like (30), which helps to show that his smoking is not done willingly but on impulse, and gives it a justifiable touch.

(30) ma-Ta nam wissak witara pewe-nawa
I-DAT TOP twenty about drink(INVOL)-IND
'As for me, I smoke about twenty (cigarettes) involuntarily.'

The lack of volition may indicate a lack of commitment towards the bad habit. In case of a good, praiseworthy action, this may show a speaker's reluctance to accept his commitment as a sign of modesty. Wierzbicka (1988) points out that dative subject construction is used with a similar purpose in Polish language. According to Wierzbicka, "This construction, which embodies a purely subjective perspective, is largely restricted to first person in statements and second person in questions"(Wierzbicka,1988:426).

What is important to us is that this construction allows us to view the agent as involitive experiencer because its constructional schema decrees that objects, states, or processes would move to the experiencer fixed as the ground element, thereby attributing the perceptual relation to the object/situation. The abstract movement of the process toward the experiencer assumed here parallels s patial motion. The relation between the two domains is conventionalized as a metaphor: ACTION PROCESS IS MOTION.

9.6 Conceptual Analysis

This special category of motion events brings out some important points about event conceptualization and linguistic expression. First, it shows that the

conceptual organization of linguistic expressions cannot be grasped by just referring to the internal relations among constituents, "actor-action-object" ("actor-object-action" in VOS languages) and their way of mapping to the syntactic relations in the actual appearance of sentences, as often done in the Transformational Grammar tradition. While the "actor-object-action" order that corresponds to the Noun-Noun-Verb sequence in the surface structure is predominant as the basic transitive prototype in linguistic activity, this kind of sequential information will prove inadequate in analyzing many other construction types, especially those peripheral ones that do not conform to the canonical order.

Involitive verbs briefly discussed in this chapter charasteristically require dative experiencers. This dative-subject requirement can be attributed to a specific semantic constraint on the part of involitive verbs. That is, the verbs appearing in the dative subject construction cannot include a specification of a direct external cause. Consequently, experiencer noun is expected to play the role of ground with respect to which involitive state/inchoative process occurs. Thus, apart from the predominant Figure Ground Move pattern, we have an alternative Ground Figure Move pattern.

Here we can make a path-based distinction between two sentence-processing models: Natural Motion (energy flow) vs. Inverse Motion (Ground-Figure alternative). Natural Motion, with a high degree of cognitive salience, is the most natural way of conceptualizing events. Our notion of natural motion is adopted from the billiard-ball model based on the notion of action-chain as proposed by Langacker (1991). Inverse Motion, which implies a kind of directionality completely reversed from that of energy flow, is partially correlated with the A/D (conceptually autonomous/dependent) organization.

We assume that the natural motion model allows the speaker to trace a situation as a gradual unfolding from one participant to another in terms of force -dynamics, making some reference to the internal temporal sequencing of events. The inverse motion model, on the other hand, leaves the speaker with an alternative perspective to view the situation as a total event, occurring autonomously, as we have seen in dative subject construction, without the involvement of any external agency. Here the focus is not on the PARTICIPANTS but on the PARTICIPATUM to which the salient participant is attached as experiencer/affectee/ground.

Seen this way, our description of dative subject construction is not inconsistant with the assumption of "thematic relationship" schematized by Langacker 1991.Following quotation will be appropriate here:

> "Strictly speaking, a thematic relationship involving a mover, experiencer, or patient is limited to the motion, mental experience, or change of state itself, exclusive of the forces that bring it about. A pure thematic relationship of motion, for example, consists of nothing more than a continuous series of locative configurations distributed over a span of conceived time; even if we believe that all motion involves energy in some way, it is nonetheless true that a non-energetic conception of motion is internally coherent. We can likewise imagine a person simply having a certain mental experience (feeling an itch, being joyful, etc.) without evoking any conception of its cause. Many changes of state are readily conceptualized with no essential reference to force dynamics: hair growing longer, the fading of a colour, the solidification of a liquid, and so on. Even for events that are saliently energetic, it is often possible to factor out the force-dynamic component and conceive of the change of state autonomously. We can, for example, envisage the bursting of a balloon as merely the rapid spatial deformation of a rubber membrane, abstracting away from such notions as inflation and the release of pent-up pressure"(Langacker,1991:289).

Also attested is the often-regarded aspectual opposition between the perfective and the imperfective(Comrie,1976), or static vs. dynamic(Lyons1977), described in diverse terms by many other linguists. Natural motion partially correlates with imperfective or dynamic aspect, while inverse motion is aligned

with perfective or static aspect. Verbs belonging to the imperfective class occur with participants capable of agency or control, while verbs of the perfective class mostly include those of spontaneous nature that do not require external agency. This aspectual opposition can be shown to function as a penetrating categorial parameter of the morphological system that cuts across the system of more overtly seen categories like tense, voice, modality, etc., traditionally associated with verbs.

If we assume that the prototype of natural motion is characterized by the correspondences Subject=Agent=Cause, Direct Object=Patient=Figure, Indirect Object=Ground, and Move+Cause, then deviation from it turns the event to start 'from the other end' with non-prototypical values Indirect Object=Ground, Subject= Figure, and Move, causing some derivational changes in the verbal domain. While the meeting point for the canonical-event conception is determined by the morphosyntactically unmarked values, non-prototypical values do not tend to bundle in their realizations of syntactic structures. Hence is their marked behavior. Such deviations and attendant derivations signal greater openness to variations which e nable us to redefine and differentiate them. The underlying assumption is that the increase of markednaess correspond to the increase of conceptual complexity. We assume that derived states and inchoatives of involitive nature have several potential internal structures, one of which is to be chosen by the speaker depending on the specific context. Note that the following pairs juxtapose the twofold perspective of unmarked vs. marked values discussed above:

(31) a. eyaa biima-Ta purudu we-laa
he drinking-DAT get into the habit-PP
'He has got into the habit of drinking.'
b. eyaa-Ta beema purudu we-laa
he-DAT drinking get into the habit-PP
'To him, drinking has become a habit.'

(32) a. lameya ninda-Ta giyaa
child sleep-DAT went
'The child went to sleep/fell asleep.'
b. lameya-Ta ninda giyaa
child-DAT sleep went
'Sleep came to the child.'

(33) a. miniha naDuw-ak-aTa ahu unaa
man court case-INDEF-DAT be involved-PAST
'The man got involved in a court case.'
b. miniha-Ta naDuw-ak waeTu-na
man-DAT court case-INDEF fall-PAST
'Court action was taken against the man.'

In (a) examples, the initial participant is conceptualized as starting point and figure, which moves with respect to the state or object fixed as the ground.* This kind of conceptualization follows temporal sequencing of natural motion. The directionality is completely reversed in (b) sentences by conceptualizing the animate participant as endpoint and ground with respect to which the state or object is to occur or move as a figural object. This way of viewing things is founded on inverse motion. Thus, we see that indirect object and datives ubject show different signals for directionality. (34) shows how the manipulation o f conceptual entities leads to different choices in the surface structure implying o pposite directions of motion.

(34) a. state/object = ground ---> Indirect Object: ---------->◎
b. experiencer = ground ---> Dative Subject: ◎<----------

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* Agentivity is abolished here by choosing a 'become'-type verb.

(34a) conforms to the natural motion model because a nominative subject joins this structure, encoding an underlying agent or actor as starting point. In (34b), the nominative phrase encodes an abstract entity or an inanimate object viewed as moving toward the animate participant, which can be taken as evidential for the inverse motion model.

However, we can find a rare example of bi-directionality in which both indirect object and dative subject are simultaneously treated as endpoints:

(35) a. mama meeka-Ta kaematii
I this-DAT like
'I like this.'
b. ma-Ta meeka-Ta aasai
I-DAT this-DAT like
'I like this.'
c. mama meeka-Ta aasai
I this-DAT like
'I like this.'

In (35a) the animate participant directs his liking toward an object: the animate entity becomes the target of liking. In (35b), however, not only 'the thing liked' but 'the person who likes' also appears in dative form: the animate participant becomes the target of desire by virtue of being its locus. Thus the adjectival predicate *aasai* allows the proposition to be bi-directional while the other adjectival predicate, *kaematii* licenses only a monodirectional structure. The predicate *kaematii* bears morphosyntactically unmarked values: its subject should appear in nominative. The predicate *aasai*, on the other hand, is open to variations: its subject can appear in dative as in (35b) or in nominative as in (35c). Thus, using the same predicate, a proposition can be attributed a bidirectional perspective or a monodirectional perspective by different speakers or the same speaker depending on different circumstances.

In this chapter we focused on motion events without external events. We attempted to capture their essence by taking them as instances of inverse motion representing non-prototypical values. However, this inactive or non-volitive occurrence of things can be shown as a widespread pattern rather than an exception in South Asia and some other regions in contrast to Western countries where energetic relations are considered as base for ordering of experience. As Count Hermann Keyserling rightly observes:

> In the tropics __ I feel it already __ it does not occur to one to judge psychic phenomena by a different standard from physical ones; it never enters one's head to take them seriously metaphysically. Everything that happens in me, develops in me as the plants develop out there. It is not I who think but something thinks in me, it is not I who wish, but something wishes in me. Actually this is what happens everywhere, but in Ceylon where Nature does everything essential, ... , everyone becomes conscious of this truth. For the most mediocre native, Buddha's doctrine of cognition must be a matter of course, while the most cultured European very exceptionally perceives its truth. The latter is conscious of action precisely where the Oriental recognises inaction...
>
> (The Travel Diary of a Philosopher)

Looking this way may allow one to take inverse motion as a canonical type of event-conception observable in Sinhala and many other languages. Assessing the implications of our date, I will summarize my conclusion along the following lines.

The clause structure and the organization of argument structure indicate whether an activity is in line with the natural energy flow of event structure (according to western mind) or contrary to it. Depending on the nature of the event, the same propositional content may be expressed in two different ways, one with a direct combination and the other with an inverse one.

Chapter 10—Expression of More Abstract Concepts

Introduction

Thus far we have been concerned with the overall network of conceptual expansion. We have observed how the various senses of the dative expression are derived from the basic or core sense. Our approach toward the conceptual shift from the source structure to the target structures easily matches with the theory of lexical networks proposed by Lakoff(1987) and Norvig and Lakoff(1987), according to which a network of different senses is expanded from one particular source item which includes "a radially structured category, with a central member and links defined by image-schema transformations and metaphors"(Lakoff 1987:460). The different senses of dative use discussed so far are all part of the prototype category of 'spatial goal'.

Now we may move to an alternative approach which will enable us to see that the transition occurs from one prototype category to another prototype-like category. New categories are developed by foregrounding the nonfocal or peripheral properties of a prototype category. Here we will briefly consider some categorial metaphors and try to demonstrate more abstract levels of metaphorical extension. For example, we will observe how temporal relations, causal and resultant notions, concepts of purpose and manner, etc. are conceptualized in terms of spatial relations.

10.1 Clause-internal Relations

First, we will see how the SPACE-to-TIME metaphor fulfills the function of domain mapping. While goal and direction constitute the core property of dative prototype, time usually maintains a very low profile in its semantic composition. However, time can become a focal feature by foregrounding itself to form a new prototype. At the initial stage of this shift the dative took on the function of indicating a point in time, a concept very close to the notion of directionality, as in (1) and (2):

(1) miniha welaawa-Ta aawa
man time-DAT came
'The man came on time.'

(2) api aTa-Ta piTat we-nawa
we eight-DAT leave-IND
'We are leaving at eight o'clock.'

Later this temporal use has extended to cover a duration of time as in (3) and (4).

(3) udee-Ta siitalai
morning-DAT cold
'It is cold in the morning.'

(4) raeae-Ta wal uuro e-nawa
night-DAT boars come-IND
'At night come boars.'

Though 'point of time' and 'span of time' can be considered as separate semantic units, they seem to be treated in equal terms for linguistic purpose: Whether point of time or span of time, this linguistic entity is taken as implicating a future orientation or goal. For instance, (2) and (3) can be paraphrased as (2') and (3') respectively.

(2') When it becomes eight o'clock, we leave.

(3') When it becomes night, boars come.

A final location associated with a future moment is a hidden feature of the goal schema. Thus the temporal relation can invite the inference of goal orientation, which can be taken as the motivative factor for the development of dative, from spatial relation, to temporal relation.

A similar case of prototype extension appears to be responsible for the SPACE-to-PURPOSE metaphor. This specific metaphor can be understood as a

mind) or contrary to it. Depending on the nature of the event, the same propositional content may be expressed in two different ways, one with a direct combination and the other with an inverse one.

(14) oya kiya-nne irisiyaawa-Ta
that say-IMPH jealousy-DAT
'They say so from jealousy.'

(15) mage taniya-Ta oya-t e-nawa-da
my loneliness-DAT you-too come-IND-Q
'Would you come with me for I am alone.'

In these examples, dative nominals present some abstract entities as the cause for the actions denoted by the verbs. Probably the level of abstractness involved in CAUSE can be greater than that of PURPOSE. One can consider here the question of establishing the relative degree of metaphorical abstraction regarding the categories like PURPOSE and CAUSE. In Heine et al.1991, human participation is given as one of the criteria determining the degree of conceptual/semantic grammaticalization. They observe "that the category PURPOSE is less grammaticalized than CAUSE since PURPOSE normally presupposes some human agents and activity, whereas CAUSE does not"(Heine et al. 1991:157). However, as the purpose phrase itself is based on a nonhuman or inanimate participant, we would not be able to hold PURPOSE and CAUSE separate from one another so easily. This means that the two categories remain contiguous in terms of conceptual expansion. In many languages causal sense and purpose sense give some overlapping implicatures and can be coded by one and the same morpheme. Following example is from Japanese:

(16) a. jishin no tame ni densha ga dassen shi-ta
earthquake for train NOM derail-PAST
'The train derailed because of the earthquake.'

b. minna shoorai no tame ni gambari-mashoo
everubody future for work hard-Hort
'Let's work hard for the future.'

no tame ni marks CAUSE in (16a) and PURPOSE in (16b). The same situation can be observed with the dative morpheme in Sinhala.

(17) a. Sunil haa Nimal amba geDiya-Ta pora kaeawa
and mango-DAT quarrel-PAST
'Sunil and Nimal quarreled over the mango.'

b. Sunil eya-Ta pora kaeaewee kaeaaedarakama-Ta da, naetnam
it-DAT quarrel-PAST-EMPH greediness-DAT Q or
takkaDikama-Ta da?
robustness-DAT Q
'Did Sunil quarrel over it from greediness, or from robustness?

The dative marker in (17a) specifies PURPOSE. In (17b), however, only the first (anaphoric) dative nominal presents PURPOSE; the other two dative nominals express CAUSE.

Cognitive Grammar assumes that the cognitive nature inherent in each morphosyntactic category is different and coherent. Then why the same morphosyntactic category is used to represent different case functions like PURPOSE and CAUSE? The answer to this question would be that though PURPOSE and CAUSE are different as conceptual categories, there exists some conceptual contiguity between them. Note the following two sentences:

(18) a. I work hard to earn money and become rich.

b. I work hard because I want to earn money and become rich.

A fact which is not different in terms of truth values is viewed in ways which are cognitively different and accordingly coded differently: (18a) presents it as a PURPOSE while (18b) codes it as a CAUSE. Both sentences are acceptable as answers to a question like *Why do you work so hard?* This means that the interrogative *why* refers to both PURPOSE and CAUSE, which is suggestive of the conceptual contiguity of the two categories.

While we accept the conceptual contiguity between PURPOSE and CAUSE, the two categories can be distinguished from one another in an important way.

Our collection of data shows that PURPOSE in most cases implies a concrete object, while CAUSE is well represented by an abstract noun. This may be taken to mean that CAUSE is more abstract than PURPOSE or, at least, more open to the force of abstraction. This difference may be attributed to the cognitive nature of the respective conceptual category. PURPSE can be equaled with reaching the fruits which are observable and tangible. CAUSE, on the other hand, is going deep into the roots, not easily observable or tangible, with no physical dimensionalities to grasp. Note in (17) 'the mango' implies PURPOSE, while 'greediness' or 'robustness' represents CAUSE.

Observe also the following examples:

(19) a. mage upan dinee-Ta monawa da de-nne?
my birthday-DAT what Q give-EMPH
'What do you give me for my birthday?'

b. hit-ee duka-Ta kawi kiya-we-nawa
mind-LOC pain-DAT poems sing-INVOL-IND
'I break into song for my mental suffering.'

In these examples, though both PURPOSE and CAUSE refer to abstract relations, their degree of abstractness is different: Purpose implies a more specific temporal unit while CAUSE is a more abstract mental condition. However, a notable exception to this argument can be seen in the type of sentences given in (10)-(12). We will look at this problem later in a different perspective, turning to the question why CAUSE is presented through the dative morpheme.

Another function derived from the dative prototype is RESULT. The image-schema of GOAL appears to be preserved in the semantic extension occurred via the SPACE-to-GOAL metaphor. RESULT is viewed as a goal reaching from a prior state.

(20) liuma alu bawa-Ta pat unaa
letter ash state-DAT change-PAST
'The letter went into ashes.'

(21) Nimal eewa kuDaa kaebali-wala-Ta kaDa-nawa
them small piece-PL-DAT break-IND
'Nimal breaks them into small pieces.'

(22) mawa lee kira-Ta harawa-la de-nawa
mother blood milk-DAT change-PP give-IND
'Mother converts blood into milk and gives (children).'

(20) follows Figure-Ground-Path-Move pattern while (21) and (22) are based on Agent-Figure-Ground-Path-Move+CAUSE pattern. All the dative nominals represent RESULT derived from the sense of goal-orientation by means of metaphorical extension and image-schema preservation. Though RESULT seems to be functionally contiguous with PURPOSE, at the present stage of our research we do not have any evidence to show that they constitute a continuum.

A case function more significant in terms of metaphorical abstraction is MANNER developed from the dative prototype. Grammatically dative marker is used to form adverbs of MANNER as shown in the following examples.

(23) tawa punchi-ya-Ta kapa-nna
more small-NM-DAT cut-IMP
'Cut it smaller(finer).'

(24) lameya diga-Ta haraha-Ta iri aend-aa
child length-DAT breadth-DAT lines draw-PAST
'The child drew lines the length and breadth (of the paper).'

(25) miniha puduma widiha-Ta wiyadam kara-nawa
man amazing way-DAT spend-IND
'The man spends extremely.'

(26) maalu kira-Ta uya-nawa
fish milk-DAT cook-IND
'(We) cook fish with coconut-milk flavor.'

(27) eyaa lassana-Ta sindu kiya-nawa
she beautiful-DAT songs sing-IND
'She sings cleverly.'

(28) lamai tarange-Ta duwa-la amba aehindi-nawa
children race-DAT run-PP mangoes pick-IND
'The children raced against each other to pick mangoes.'

(23) is very close to the RESULT expression in meaning(cf.(21). However, as there is no any lexical item indicating a concrete entity implied as RESULT in this sentence, we treat it as a MANNER expression. In both (23) and (24), dative form, which expresses Path, is added to the nominal form and thereby ENTITY is changed to MANNER. We have discussed earlier a clause-type in which the dative nominal is indicative of a standard, criterion or a frame of reference viewed as the endpoint of perceptual path(5.5). We assume that a similar kind of conceptual manipulation works in expressing MANNER through dative morpheme. A piece of lexical evidence for the existence of such an event-type is provided by (25), in which dative morpheme is added not directly to the adjective *puduma* 'amazing' but to the adjacent term *widiha* 'way'. The conflated expression means 'amazingly or extremely'.* Once the dative form is conventionalized as a metapho rical expression for MANNER it can be used with different degrees of abstraction as seen in (26)-(28) in which some abstract entities such as 'competition' and 'cleverness' are included in MANNER expressions.

We have seen here how the dative prototype has given birth to a wide range of new categories with different degrees of abstraction. It shows the systematic process in which "abstract" meanings are expressed in terms of more "concrete" meanings. The functions of the dative morphology discussed in this section are summerized in Figure 1.

PLACE-----→TIME------→PURPOSE-----→CAUSE-----→RESULT-----→MANNER

Figure 1

10.2 Inter-clausal Relations

In the preceding section, while we saw how some abstract concepts have come to be conceptualized in terms of more concrete spatial relations, it points to the development of new categories whose main function is to construct relations working at the clause-internal level. Next, we turn to a level of much more abstract categories whose function is to establish coherent relations and to structure texts at the inter-clausal level. Case markers discussed so far are to be redefined at this level as subordinate markers.

Here we are concerned with a level at which clauses are treated as nouns and added with case markers. The case marker acquires a new function as a subordinate marker or clause-embedding marker. Heine et al.(1991:205) argue that this kind of metaphorization does not involve meaning: "The metaphorical relation consists in the fact that clausal contents are conceptualized in terms of nominal concepts, that is, the relevant clause is referred to by means of a noun." They mention the following aspects as salient stages involved in the development of case marking from noun to clause:

0 Case marking is confined to nouns
I Case marking is extended to verbs in some nonfinite or nominalized form
II Case marking spreads to fully inflected, finite verbs
III The case marker is reanalyzed as a clause subordinator
IV In accordance with its new function, the clause subordinator is further grammaticalized

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* Note also that in (23) there appears a suffix to mark nominalization between the adjective and the dative morpheme.

Observing from the angle of these reanalysis patterns, they introduce the transfer from a nominal to a clausal component as "metaphors within the syntactic component".

Yet another way of looking at the phenomenon would be to observe the evolutionary process as starting from spatial relations. The spatial relation is metaphorically used to locate one event or clause against another. By doing so, we can extend the metaphor to the domain of meaning, without confining it to the syntactic component. The fact that "clauses are treated metaphorically as nouns" as maintained by Heine et al. 1991 is only part of the story. The quotation of Genetti(1986) drawn by them to support their argument, which includes the words "can be at least partially explained by a strong tendency toward nominalization", is a strong suggestion of this truth.

A closer look at Genetti's study(1986) reveals that the main purpose of her paper is to provide a semantic explanation for the development of subordinators from postpositions. "The semantic explanation which I propose to account for the patterns of grammaticalization relies on a localistic theory outlined by Lon Diehl (1975). Diehl's theory is similar to those of Gruber(1976) and Anderson (1971), in that his schema uses four deep semantic cases __ Theme, Location, Source and Goal __ to account for all basic case relations in all sentence types"(Genetti,1986: 393). According to Genetti, by extending a postposition to a more abstract field, its semantic scope is broadened. "Dat(ive) and All(ative) are both semantic goals, with purpose as their logical extension"(ibid:394). Following this line of thinking, we will show that the development of case markers to subordinators further enhances semantic/metaphorical abstraction.

In understanding the process of the development of dative case marker to subordinate-clause marker, first we should pay our attention to the nature of subordinate clauses, whose finite verb is added with the dative marking. There seem to be some semantic restrictions on the clauses allowed for being marked with dative morpheme: most of such clauses imply intention, purpose or some kind of future action. The regularity can be captured along the lines:

> When the event E_1 indicates a potential intention, desire, preparation or attempt, the event E_2 which is subject to E_1 or denotes the content of E_1 will become a subordinate clause with dative marking added to its finite verb.

When a finite verb is converted to a subordinate clause verb in the above sense, this complement verb takes the infinitive form carrying a dative element in many languages. The Sinhala infinitive is formed by adding the dative morpheme to the verbal gerund with ending *-nu*. Thus, [VERB + *nu* + *Ta*] means 'to V' or 'for V+ing'. For example, we have *kara-nuwa-Ta* 'to do' and *bala-nuwa-Ta* 'to see' as archaic infinitive forms in Sinhala. With gerundive suffix undergoing a vowel reduction, *karan-Ta* and *balan-Ta* came into use. There are some other variants: the most commonly used forms in modern Sinhala are *kara-nnaTa* and *bala-nnaTa,* or *kara-nna* and *bala-nna,* with the dative ending being obscured or fading away.

Now we can see how the subordinate clause with a verbal infinitive is embedded in the matrix clause. Observe the following examples:

(29) mama alut baisikalay-ak gan-naTa tiiranaya kalaa
I new bicycle-INDEF buy-INFIN decided
'I decided to buy a new bicycle.'

(30) lamai tama samatkam dakwa-nnaTa pulapulaa siTi-nawa
children own talents show-INFIN be looking forward-IND
'The children are looking forward to showing their talents.'

(31) Ranjit ya-nnaTa suudaanam unaa
go-INFIN prepared
'Ranjit prepared to go back.'

(32) tatta ikmanin waeDee nima kar-anna utsaaha kalaa
father quickly work finish-INFIN tried
'Father tried to finish the job soon.'

(29)-(32) respectively denote events of intention, desire, preparation and attempt aimed at a future action. Each subordinate clause denotes the content of, or the future action subsequent to, such pre-actions. Basically what we see here is a metaphorical transfer from spatial domain to the abstract domain of time, based on goal orientation. Goal, which originally belongs to spatial structure, is projected onto temporal structure using the dative expression as metaphorical vehicle. Since the transition from the event E_1 to the event E_2 involves time, 'goal-oriented temporal movement' can be given as the general cognitive motivation for the development of the subordinate marker from the dative form.

In the next step, even when the event E_1 does not denote a strong action of intention, wish or desire, if the event E_2 implies a future action, it can be embedded as a subordinate clause with dative marking. Look at the following examples.

(33) a. mama ee waeDee kara-nnaTa baara gattaa
I that job do-INFIN undertook
'I undertook to do that job.'

b. lamai malla paehaera gan-naTa katikaa kara gattaa
children bag snatch-INFIN had talks about
'The children came to some understanding to snatch the bag.'

(34) a. Mahadaenamutta taappaya bindahela-nnaTa niyama kalaa
wall break down-INFIN ordered
Mahadaenamutta ordered to break down the wall.'

b. ee aya wipatti-walin walaki-nnaTa upades de-nawa
they disasters-OBL escape-INFIN advise-IND
They offer advice to escape from disasters.'

Though the lexical verb in (33a and (33b) do not imply overtones of strong will or intention, the event E_1 refers to a task to be fulfilled in future while the event E_2 denotes a kind of intentional action attributed to the same actor. The event E_1 in (34a) and (34b) further deviates from an event-type of 'will or intention'.

The difference between (33) and (34) can be expressed in terms of deontic vs. non-deontic classes of verbs. Following the definition given by Bybee and Pagliuca 1985, we may say that verbs in the deontic class predicate certain conditions on a willful agent. The examples in (33a) and (33b) include such agent-oriented verbs. This tendency appears to be facilitated by the fact that the agents of both the main clause and the subordinate clause are manifested in unison by one and the same subject nominal of the sentence. The subject nominals in (34a) and (34b), on the other hand, denote only the agents of the main clauses; the agents of the subordinate clauses are not specified by the subject. Put in other words, the finite verbs of these sentences do not predicate anything concerning the agents of the subordinate clauses. They are speech act verbs with no reference to intention, will, desire, etc.

Looking from (34a) and (34b), subordinate clauses can be detached from intentioal actions and can be located in the sphere of goal-orientation or rather future-orientation set forth by the event E_1 in the main clause. Thus, we can safely say that the use of the dative marker to introduce subordinate clauses is based on the concept of temporal motion towards a future goal. This is a metaphorical mapping of spatial domain onto the domain of temporal motion and future actions. Given that goal is a theme's posterior location, the event E_1 in the main clause is taken to be analogous to the presence of a theme, while the event E_2 in the subordinate clause represents the posterior location. Dative marker specifies the futurity relation between the two events.

10.2.1 Obligations and Intentional Actions

Once we understand that dative subordinate-clause marker is used in metaphorical extension to indicate future actions, there will be no difficulty in interpreting the following type of sentences:

(35) maTa ya-nnaTa tie-nawa*
me go-INFIN have-IND
'I have to go.'

(36) eyaa-Ta kara-nnaTa tiena waeDa goDa
he-DAT do-INFIN have work amount
'The amount of work he has to do.'

(37) Nimal gan-naTa yana baDuwa mokad-da?
buy-INFIN go thing what-Q
'What is the thing Nimal is going to buy?'

The meaning of these sentences is derived from the construction [V+INFINIT + *have/go*]. Depending on the auxiliary verb *have/go*, two separate but similar structures can be identified:

(38) a. Dative Subject - Verbal Infinitive - *have*
b. Nominative Subject - Verbal Infinitive - *go*

According to the formalization in (38), the most prominent animate participant appears in dative form when the predicate consists of a verbal infinitive followed by the auxiliary *have*; the subject participant takes nominative form when the verbal infinitive is followed by the auxiliary *go* in the predicate. Both composite structures HAVE TO and GO TO have developed to indicate future actions. The emergence of this sense is closely associated with contextual factors t hat are capable of invoking the abstract domain of temporal motion/temporal goal which was merely a peripheral feature of the component parts and became a core feature through metaphorical extension. The original meaning that was based on the domain of spatial motion/goal is backgrounded in the process: Since the verbal infinitive indicates an activity, 'having' or 'going' combined with dative form in this composite structure implies a motion in time towards the activity. Thus, the construction came to represent an action yet to be completed.

Next, we see how the twofold division of the construction has come to bear individual functional values. In a previous discussion of motion events without external causes(Chapter), we have seen that the verb *tienawa* 'have' in Sinhala has under-gone a transition from the concrete and physical meaning originally associated with it to more abstract senses of 'having' and 'possessing'. Further it was observed that the animate participant implicated by the event of 'having' or 'possessing' is morphosyntactically marked as dative participant. With dative marking, the animate participant is no more considered as a volitive agent. Semantically, this non-volitional participant combined with future action, or, structurally, the composite structure of [dative participant + verbal infinitive + *have*], i.e. (38a), acquires the new meanings of obligation and necessity. If an action is undertaken to be completed by somebody not volitionally, but for some internally felt conditions and for some external conditions such as law, moral pressure, promise, etc., it should be a sense of necessity or a sense of obligation. Such contextual information will facilitate the interpretation of the sentences (35) and (36).

The other structure as given in (38b) is different from (38a) explicitly in terms of its component parts: [Nominative subject + verbal infinitive and auxiliary *go*]. Here the future action combines with a volitive agent denoted by the nominative subject. In (37), the animate participant is going to do an intentional

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* As mentioned before, verbal infinitives in colloquial Sinhala have developed from [VERB + *nu* + DATIVE] by undergoing phonetic erosion, that is, by dropping the dative morpheme. Therefore, to most native speakers, *maTa yanna tienawa* will sound more natural than *maTa yannaTa tienawa*. However, in some dialects another variant, *maTa yanTa tienawa* seems to be normal.

action; he is determined to do something. The abstract motion from this situation towards the future action denoted by the subordinate clause is specified by the dative subordinate marker. This kind of subordinate clause analysis will explain some other developments like Sinhala desiderative *oonae* clause and inchoative/ inceptive aspect. We will trace the evolution of such structures and their relationship with modal and aspectual developments.

10.2.2 Modal Development

Constructions based on *oonae*, originally an adjective to mean 'need' or 'want', have developed to cover both deontic and epistemic meanings. First we will see the deontic use. We designate *oonae* as the governing matrix-clause verb, which will take a dative subject for indicating desiderative mood. Desideratum will be indicated by a noun, or a subordinate clause that consists of a verbal infinitive plus dative marking. The verbal infinitive with dative marking inherently relocates the desideratum as a future action. Example (39) illustrates this.

(39) a. [Dative subject [infinitive + dative] *oonae*]
b. maTa ya-nna oonae
to me go-INFIN want
'I want to go.'

When the governing matrix clause verb appears with a nominative subject it usually indicates obligation in a deontic context. The difference between the modal of obligation and the desiderative modality lies not only in the subject marker but in the compositionality of the structure also. The nominative subject in the modal of obligation is taken to be originally belonging to the subordinate clause, and to have later joined the matrix clause becoming the common subject of both clauses. (40) illustrates the difference:

(40) a. [Nominative subject - infinitive + dative] *oonae*]
b. mama ya-nna oonae
I go-INFIN should
'I should go.'

Note the difference in the embedding of the clauses in (39a) and (40a): infinitive clause is embedded in the [dative subject - *oonae* predicate] construction in the Former, whereas the [nominative subject - infinitive clause] construction is embedded in the *oonae* clause in the latter. A good piece of evidence for the existence of such a difference is provided by the minimal pair given in (41) below.

(41) a. maTa ([ ])oonae
to me want
'I want.'
b. * mama ([ ])oonae
I should

(41a) is perfectly acceptable as an utterance in the form of a response coming up in a conversation; the listener will think that the nominal entity indicating the desideratum is omitted. (41b), on the other hand, has no place even as a piece of shortened utterance because *oonae* clause with the nominative subject cannot be realized without a verbal infinitive; the subject plus verbal infinitive forms a cognitive unit.

Further we assume here that the modal *oonae* used in the sense of obligation in the deontic context later took on the epistemic sense of probability. Consider the following examples:

(42) oya golla kaurut raeswiima-Ta e-nna oonae
you people everybody meeting-DAT come-INFIN should
'You everybody should come to the meeting.'

(43) paha wena koTa miniha e-nna oonae
five become when man come-INFIN should
'He should come by five o'clock.'

(44) ada heTa wahi-nna oonae
today tomorrow rain-INFIN should
'It should rain today or tomorrow.'

(45) eyaa-Ta teere-nna oonae
he-DAT understand-INFIN should
'He should understand it.'

(46) * paha wena koTa miniha-Ta e-nna oonae (probability)
five become when man-DAT come-INFIN should

(42) is an example for the modal of obligation: the addressee in the second person subject phrase is indicated to be bound to fulfil the obligation. For (43), though the deontic reading with the sense of obligation cannot be ruled out, epistemic reading sounds more natural.* (44) which does not involve an animate or volitive agent but refers to general conditions allows only probability (epistemic) reading. (45), though there is an animate participant coded in dative, cannot be taken as an example of desiderative modality. We take the issue for consideration as follows.

In *oonae* construction, the verb of the subordinate desiderative-modal clause is always volitive; however, the subject is dative because case is assigned by the matrix clause verb as shown in (39a). In the epistemic domain, which does not require a volitive agent, the verb of the subordinate probability-modal clause can be of the volitive-type as in (42) or involitive as in (45). The subject takes nominative or dative form depending on the verb class, volitive vs. involitive. As we mentioned earlier, epistemic meaning has developed from the sense of obligation used in deontic contexts. Thus it is to be expected that the structure for the modal of obligation given in (40a) licenses case to be assigned by the verb of the subordinate clause. On this principle, (46) is unacceptable with probability sense, which shows that the epistemic interpretation is out when the sentential subject is coded in dative while the complement verb remains volitive.

Another instance of extending dative marker to subordinate clause marking is ability/possibility expression. Ability as a state or an attribute internally situated in an animate participant is expressed by a predicate that belongs to the matrix clause. The content of ability, the future-oriented action, is expressed as a subordinate clause with dative-marked infinitive form.

(47) mee bas ek-en ya-nna puluwan
this bus-INST go-INFIN can
'You can go by this bus.'

(48) palawaela-wal-in jiiwat we-nnaTa etaram amaaru da?
wild fruit-PL-INST live-INFIN so difficult Q
'Is it so difficult to live on wild-fruits?'

(49) maTa piina-nna baeae
to me swim-INFIN cannot
'I can't swim.'

puluwan in (47) is the adjectival predicate commonly used for the ability sense. *amaaru* in (48) is a lexical item used to mean 'difficult'. *baeae* in (49) is the particle expressing negation of ability. These matrix-clause predicates take an active or animate participant, when relevant, as the subject which is to be marked for dative. The quality of ability is attributed to the animate participant. In all these sentences, subordinate clauses ending with verbal infinitive of dative marking represent future-oriented actions.

This *puluwan* construction loses agent-attributed, internal quality in its semantics as well as morphosyntactic means of manifesting it, when it comes to express the sense of possibility. Once the subject is exempted from marking for

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* We follow the characterizations of the two terms provided by Traugott(1989) based on Palmer(1986): "deontics have to do with will, obligation and permission, while epistemics have to do with knowledge and belief about possibilities, probabilities, and so forth"(Traugott 1989:32).

dative and is left to appear in unmarked nominative case, the construction no longer involves internal condition of an agent, but rather presents a general occurrence or a prophetic future.

(50) miniha aayet teere-nna puluwan
man again be elected-INFIN can
'He may be elected again.'

(51) eeka we-nnaTa baeae
that become-INFIN cannot
'That is impossible.'

These sentences which include subordinate clauses with involitive or impersonal verbs marked with dative as infinitive forms illustrate that the propositions contained in the utterances do not represent agent-oriented actions though they are related to future. They express speaker's evaluation or belief toward the situation. One can say that they evoke the feeling that general situation is such that the proposition is true, thus leading to an epistemic interpretation.

Semantic development of modal markers from deontic use to epistemic meaning as attested in English and many other languages has been the subject of a number of linguistic works. Lyons 1977 and Coats 1983 have dealt with the development of epistemic meanings in English. Bybee and Pagliuca 1985, based on the results of a survey of modality notions in some twenty-five languages, states that "All of the historical evidence available on the semantic development of modals points to the unidirectional evolution of agent-oriented modalities into epistemic modalities" (Bybee and Pagliuca,1985:66). Traugott 1989 claims that "the modals in question show not only the well-known shift from non-epistemic to epistemic, but also a shift from relatively weak subjective epistemicity to more strongly subjective epistemicity"(Traugott,1989:43).

Our findings in consonance with the above-mentioned hypotheses put forward by various linguists support the claim that most of the meaning changes show shifts from concrete to abstract, from external to internal, from objective to subjective, etc. The development of the dative use from physical goal to temporal goal, from spatial motion to future-oriented motion, from deontic to epistemic, from propositional to textual, etc. brings out this never-ending ('emergent') and 'unidirectional' tendency of meaning chains from different perspectives.

10.2.3 Aspectual Development

Not only modality notions but aspectual notions also can be expressed by using dative form as a subordinate marker. Aspectual distinctions are considered as more abstract concepts since they express some accessory circumstances defining the signification and the extent of the action, which cannot be indicated by grammatical tense (Binnick 1991). In most languages, therefore, aspectual marking appears to be fully grammaticlized.

I will briefly consider how the dative marking has been instrumental in expressing inceptive sense. Different forms are employed to express closely related but different notions depending on their degree of specificity. The matrix clause verb will be a full lexical form when the moment of beginning of an event is coded as a specific situation and it will take on a grammaticalized form when referring to a more general meaning (See Bybee and Pagliuca 1985). In the following examples, while the matrix-clause verb is realized as a lexical form, the verb of the subordinate clause, marked with dative, indicates the action to begin.

(52) a. wibhaage paTan gatta
examination started
'The examination started.'

b. api kolamb-in gamana paTan gatta
we Colombo-ABL journey started
'We started our journey from Colombo.'

(53) a. minissu waeDa kara-nnaTa paTan gatta
people work do-INFIN started
'The people started to work.'

b. Udee aTa-Ta minissu waeDa kara-nnaTa paTan gatta
morning eight-DAT people work do-INFIN started
'The people started to work at 8.00 A.M.'

(54) a. lamai okkoma sinaa se-nnaTa unaa
children all laugh-INFIN became
'All the children started to laugh.'

b. * udee aTa-Ta lamai okkoma sinaa se-nnaTa unaa
morning eight-DAT children all laugh-INFIN became
'All the children started to laugh at 8.00 A.M.'

The lexical verb *paTan gatta* 'started, began' referring to a specific activity appears in its full lexical status in (52a) as an intransitive verb and in (52b)as a transitive verb. In (53), though its place is in the matrix clause, *paTan gatta* functions as an auxiliary verb, whose meaning is incomplete without the contribution of the main predicate that appears as the complement verb. However, the referential meaning of the matrix-clause verb is retained there. This makes a contrast with (54). The matrix-clause verb *unaa* in (54) lexically means 'became'. It acquires inceptive sense only by combining with a complement verb which appears in the subordinate clause with infinitive ending. *unaa* expression in this context is a grammaticalized form with a generalized meaning. Compare (53b) and (54b): *paTan gatta* can be used with a phrase indicating referential time as in (53b) because its meaning is specific. The use of *unaa* expression with such a phrase is unacceptable; the contradiction in (54b) may be due to the combination of generalized meaning and specific time. Further, as (53a and b) bring out volitional actions, the reference to a specific time in (53b) enables us to see it as a planned action. Then, this volitionality is backgrounded in *unaa* expression, which is a grammaticalized form. Thus, we may say that the reference to a specific time does not make any sense, but brings only oddity to an expression like (54) whose core property is spontaneity.

The semantic change still proceeds; *unaa* expression can acquire epistemic meaning. In this development, internal and subjective element of the proposition is strengthened. The inceptive event coded by verbal infinitive plus *unaa* expression can invite an inference of unwillingness, i.e. one can implicate that the inceptive event occurred against one's will. This implicature is conventionalized by

transforming the morphosyntactic vehicle of the animate participant from nominative to dative, a manifest practice for coding involitive participant in Sinhala. (55) is a fine example.

(55) eyaa-Ta gedara ya-nna unaa
he-DAT home go-INFIN happened
'He had to go home.' or 'He happened to go home.'

This development of epistemic meaning can be attributed to the Third Tendency regarding semantic change proposed by Traugott(1988, 1989).

(56) TendencyIII: Meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief-state/attitude toward the proposition.
(Traugott,1989:35)

There is a similar expression in Japanese, though we cannot say anything as to how strong the speaker's subjective evaluation and attitude toward its proposition is, compared with the Sinhala expression. Japanese example is provided in (57).

(57) watashi wa nihon ni iku koto ni natta
I TOP Japan DAT go NM DAT became
'It has been decided that I am to go to Japan.'

Strangely enough, or it is no wonder that the sentence is structured with a nominalized verbal complement (*koto* being the nominalization marker) plus particle *ni* and the the finite verb 'become'. This can be juxtaposed by a closely following but different structure whose component parts are a nominalized verbal complement, particle *ni* and the verb 'do'. This is exemplified by (58).

(58) watashi wa nihon ni iku koto ni shita
I TOP Japan DAT go NM DAT did
'I have decided to go to Japan.'

We have already discussed this structure with Sinhala examples (see ex. (29)) repeated here as (58') which turns out to be the Sinhala counterpart of (58).

(58') mama alut baisikalay-ak gan-naTa tiiranaya kalaa
I new bicycle-INDEF buy-INFIN decided
'I decided to buy a new bicycle.'

10.2.4 Purpose Clause and Related Constructions

In the widespread network of semantic developments of dative marker, a highly outstanding place is occupied by the purpose clause. The development of dative marker into the purpose-clause subordinator has been attested in many languages. Observing the transfer of the dative/allative from case marker to subordinate purpose-marker as an established grammaticalization pattern, Genetti (1986) argues that the process of semantic extension can be easily accounted for by the application of the Space Case Schema proposed by Diehl(1975).

According to Genetti(1986), the relevant space is 'logical' which concerns the relations of propositions and clauses. She shows that dative and allative both being semantic goals, purpose is their logical extension. If one clause is, semantically, goal of another, then it is also purpose. This analysis is resonant with our discussion of subordinate clauses, according to which the clause-final morpheme is dative. Path-specifying morpheme is metaphorically used to express a path toward future. Purpose is essentially future-oriented. The movement takes place not in space, but in time. Thus, the transfer is metaphorical__ from the concrete domain of spatial motion to the domain of purpose. Some examples are given below.

(59) api perahaera bala-nnaTa nuwara giyaa
we festival see-INFIN Kandy went
'We went to Kandy to see the Perahera Festival.'

(60) Ranmenika dara kaDa-nnaTa gihin
firewood collect-INFIN gone
'Ranmenika has gone to collect firewood.'

(61) manamaaliyo hoya-nnaTa karadara we-nna epaa
brides look for-INFIN bother-INFIN don't
'Don't bother about us, looking for brides.'

(62) aetta kiya-nnaTa laejja da
truth tell-INFIN ashamed Q
'Are you ashamed of yourself for telling the truth?'

In (59) and (60) both the matrix clause and the purpose clause have concrete verbs. The time gap between the two events, E_1 and E_2 enhances the realization of purpose. The case is not so simple in (61) and (62) whose matrix clauses comprise mental verbs. Their unfolding in time and the relation with the subordinate-clause actions, i.e. relation between E_1 and E_2, do not manifest in clear-cut terms. Note in (62) the matrix-clause predicate does not denote an action leading to the purpose: it is not a state that ends when the goal is reached, that is, there is no linearity relation between the goal and the 'prior' event. What happens here is that subordinate-clause actions are conceptualized as logical purposes and marked with dative as purpose clauses. We may say that the metaphorical extension has proceeded to a greater level of abstraction with these sentences.

Permissive and manipulative causation in Sinhala can be considered as a further extension of purpose clause.* For expressing causing events, verbs like *denawa* 'give', *iDa denawa* 'allow'(lit. 'give space') and *harinawa* 'let' are used in permissive causation, while the verb *salassanawa* 'arrange' appears in manipulative causation**. The caused events in all these causative types are embedded with the dative subordinate marker.

(63) meyaa maTa ya-nnaTa denne naeaea
this person to me go-INFIN give not
'This person does not allow me to go.'

(64) eyaa-Ta waeDa kara-nna iDa de-nna
he-DAT work do-INFIN allow-IMP
'Let him work.'

(65) lameya-Ta taniyama i-nna hari-nawa da
child-DAT alone be-INFIN let-IND Q
'Do you let the child be alone?'

(66) api lameya-Ta nidaa ga-nna saelaess-uwa
we child-DAT sleep-INFIN arrange-PAST
'We arranged for the child to sleep.'

For each and every sentence, speakers assume that the causing event denoted by the matrix clause occurs first, leading to the subsequent event of goal. The movement from the potential action of 'non-involvement' or 'involvement' toward the secondary event achieved as the goal is indicated by the dative subordinate-marker. The same inference is maintained in mapping the domain of spatial motion onto caused-events via purpose clause.

10.2.5 Cause Becomes Goal

Earlier we discussed how the SPACE-to-CAUSE metaphor works with nominal entities. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the sphere of clausal complements also. Here we can see the development of the dative form along the completely opposite paths of PURPOSE and, on the other hand, CAUSE. While the development of dative to purpose clause is a well-attested, cross-linguistic phenomenon, the use of dative to express causal sense is not so widespread. Following examples show how the dative form has acquired causal sense:

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* See Shibatani(1976a and b) for details of these causative types.

** I will not discuss here how these verbs are correlated with the degree of resistence experienced by the causer. A detailed analysis on this subject appears in Shibatani 1973 and Goldsmith 1984.

(67) api mee iDama gatta-Ta ee minissu tarahai
we this land bought-DAT that people angry
'Those people are not happy with our buying this plot of land.'

(68) apee dihaa aawaa-Ta bohoma stutii
our place came-DAT very thank you
'Thank you very much for visiting us.'

(69) Ranjit bala-nna ya-nna baeri unaa-Ta Chitra kanagaaTu we-nawa
see-INFIN go-INFIN could'nt-DAT feel sorry-IND
'Chitra feels sorry for she could not go to see Ranjit.'

In these sentences the clausal complements have nothing to do with the sense of purpose. We are concerned here with the relation between the finite, matrix clause and its complement clause. As the clausal morphology shows, dative morpheme is added to the past-tense verb of the complement clause, which neither forms a verbal infinitive nor is related to a future action. The linearity relation between the two events is such that the speaker assumes that the event denoted by the complement clause occurs first and the matrix-clause event later. Depending on this linearity relation, the first event is taken to represent the cause for the second event. Though not so regular and widespread, the development of dative into subordinators expressing cause can be seen in some other languages also (See Heine et al. 1991). They have raised the question as to whether there is some topological structure preserved in the development from ALLATIVE or Purpose to CAUSE/REASON.

I propose that the two-way development of dative shares a common topological feature in the ways which I shall illustrate below. I maintain that movement toward a goal is the original meaning of dative. Along spatial dimension, movement occurs toward a goal (forward) or toward a cause (backward) seen in the goal perspective. (36) discussed in 5.5 and repeated below as (70) is an example for the former, while (10) given in the present chapter(7.1) repeated here as (71) exemplifies the latter.

(70) paana-Ta maesso aede-nawa
lamp-DAT flies be drawn-IND
'Flies are swarming to the lamp.'

(71) pihiya-Ta ata kaep-unaa
knife-DAT hand be cut-PAST
'The hand got cut by the knife(accidently).'

With the temporal dimension, on the other hand, forward movement refers to a non-past event as in (59) while backward movement refers to a past event as in (67). Movements occurring synchronically among spatial domains cut vertically across temporal domains. The interaction of these two dimensions with volitional/non-volitional or intentional/non-intentional participation gives rise to many of the observed patterns of dative case marking and dative-marked embedding structures.

A monoclausal or multiclausal structure has different dimensions whose intersecting elements are organized according to a particular ordering. With respect to the natural path, i.e. energy flow, the starting point and the end-point are defined, and the semantic roles are assigned, within the two domains largely divided as source domain and target domain. While agent and patient emerging from the polar domains as salient participants have a valid claim to being unmarked choices for 'direct case' relations, at the level of oblique case relations source and goal represent another asymmetric relationship. A Figure moving away from a Ground and one moving toward a Ground are considered as belonging to opposite domains and marked with distinct forms, ablative and dative. This sense of directionality is essentially expressed in the cases involving physical motion since directionality is inherently situated in energetic interaction of physical objects and cause-effect relationships as well.

The questionable case we have encountered is that the source meaning is not expressed in the ablative form, as conventionally done and, instead, conforms

to the dative expression in some of our examples. The first point to remember here is that such linguistic expressions marked with dative in most cases do not refer to concrete objects; When referring to concrete objects, they do not represent typical energetic interactions occurring between participants. A clause with a dative subordinator describes a fact given as a reason for another action or state usually denoted by the main verb as in (67)-(69). A noun phrase marked with dative expresses a source meaning, when it refers to an object as an inactive participant involved in a process as in (10)-(12). Especially in case of multiclausal structures, when the complement clause with a dative subordinator expresses source meaning, we take it as metaphorical in nature and abstract in content. Th e examples in (67)-(69) with clausal complements and matrix clauses show that the spatial goal is mapped onto a verbal clausal segment that expresses the cause meaning.

Metaphorical transfer, as we have repeatedly showed in this work, embodies natural path and directionality inherent in causal relationships. The arrangement of entities involved in less concrete relationships follows a perceived path conforming to the figure/ground sequence. The path of the Figure as characterized with respect to the Ground and specified by morphological means will remain constant and provide the necessary template for the metaphorical transfer from a concrete domain to an abstract domain.

The rule of natural correlation will be violated if the dative expression is used as the metaphorical vehicle, while the metaphorical content remains an event involving the concept of cause. Such a situation implies that a dative path, which belongs to the target domain in terms of energy flow, cannot be mapped onto the ablative path emerging naturally from the source domain. However, I argue that this kind of mapping of source (metaphorical content in this case) and target (metaphorical vehicle) into a single dative case is possible with metaphorical extension, and will propose that a conceptual mechanism with intersecting factors and crosscutting dimensions is at work here as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Unision of Source and Goal in Dative Path

DOMAIN:	SOURCE	TARGET
DIRECTIONALITY:	<———	———>
	backward	forward
SPACE:	movement toward a cause	movement toward a goal
TIME:	movement toward a past event	movement toward a future event
AGENTIVITY:	inadvertent, non-volition	agent-oriented, volition
LINEARITY:	preceding the Figure	following the Figure
REFERENCE:	anaphoric	cataphoric
GRAMMATICAL RELATION:	indirect object	indirect object
CASE RELATION:	goal	goal
CASE FUNCTION:	cause	purpose
CASE FORM:	dative	dative

In target domain, movement is understood as directed toward a goal. In prototypical cases involving active participants, movement proceeds with the help of certain attributes of a participant such as willingness, volition or intention. The movement or goal need not be spatial; movement can proceed through time toward an abstract entity, i.e. a future action or a purpose. When the future activity or purpose is expressed by a clausal complement, the verb of the subordinate clause is transformed into a verbal infinitive by adding dative case form. Thus a noun in a simple clause or an infinitive clausal segment in a complex clause

can take the place of the indirect object. The matrix clause functions as Figure, while the infinitive clause becomes the Ground. In linearity relation, the activity of the matrix-clause verb occurs first and then the activity of the infinitive clause. The dative subordinate marker, therefore, is used for cataphoric reference.

Dative subordinator can be used for anaphoric reference as well, that is, to evoke a past event. In a past event, the subordinate clause expresses a source meaning. The linearity relation also is reverse: the activity of the sub-ordinate clause precedes that of the matrix-clause verb. This implies a backward movement through time: moving forward, a clausal trajector attains a purpose; moving backward, it leads to a source. Thus directed motion, path and source are expressed by using the dative form that belongs to the target domain. According to this analysis, the source concept gains manifestation through the spatial metaphor of dative, only when it is attributed with the goal-like perceptual relation by the conceptualizer. This is a case of extension of dative use to the source domain. A similar phenomenon, i.e. the metaphorical extension of the dative expression to cover source concepts, is evidenced in the following type of sentences in English:

(72) This play is usually attributed to Shakespeare.

(73) The cause of fire was traced to a faulty fuse-box.

(73) Let's go to the roots of the problem.

According to this analysis, causing-event is a conceptual event with a particular perspective imposed by the speaker on the external situation and this conceptual nature is signaled by the type of clause or the type of clause-embedding selected for its expression. The fact that the relation of the subordinate clause to the governing clause is marked with dative form indicates that the cause relation is perceived with the perspective of goal, rather than of source and that the linguistic encoding of events is to be distinguished from external facts and objective reality as advocated by Cognitive Grammar.

10.3 Conclusion

We have produced many examples of linguistic/metaphorical abstraction. The range of uses of dative included abstract concepts of time, purpose, cause, result, and manner at intra-clausal level and purpose, future action, intention, desiderative sense, obligation, ability, probability, inception, permission and cause at inter-clausal level. These situations marked with dative show that the elaborate network of dative uses covers clausal segments as well as nominal constituents. The use of dative as a clausal conjunction for establishing the relationship of the subordinate clause to its governing predicate is suggestive of linguistic intuition about actions and the relationship between actions. The discussion in this section was intended to demonstrate how linguistic expressions are built around basic human experience, physical and social, and how they are extended to cover abstract conceptual structures. It is evident from this discussion that metaphorical transfer can project such basic experience as agent-oriented situations onto more abstract domains of varied epistemic meanings. Finally, we have tried to seek an insightful explanation for the development of dative to cause relation, attributing it to the perceptual template of goal conceptualized by the speaker.

Chapter 11 - Conclusion

We have mainly dealt with locations __ static and dynamic__, focusing on locative, ablative, and dative markers. The overall spirit of the analysis derives from event-based characterization of case roles and the dynamic view of language.

First, we examined the organization of static locations, nature of canonical locations and their capacity to absorb new meanings. I discussed the facts about the structure processing of spatial relationships as represented in linguistically encoded locative relationships. The mapping between spatial terms and their corresponding regions occurs in diverse ways, allowing morphosyntactic variations both intralinguistically and cross-linguistically. What seems to be common to these varied patterns is that many of the morphosyntactic phenomena are governed by semantic, pragmatic and cognitive factors. In different languages, identical semantic/pragmatic/cognitive factors seem to work as determinants of word or constituent order.

As a result of an interplay of these linguistic and extralinguistic factors, on the other hand, locative relationships based on the main ontological categories such as object, person, place, and existence are recruited to understand and express nonphysical experience and abstract relations. The linguistic expressions based on such concrete entities and clearly structured relations are mapped with abstract and relational constituents via a set of state and event schemas that can be considered as topological invariants. A crucial part of the analysis occupied the extensive use of state/event schemas, which enable to establish a principled relationship between the conceptual structures expressed by such locative relationships, accounting for their homeomorphism.

Then proceeding to dynamic locations, we established <motion away from a source> as the semantic core of the ablative. Source was taken as an abstract re lation that a trajector bears to the initial location. The image schema includes the theme's prior location at the source. How the non-canonical source or unbounded path gives rise to ablative-marked oath expressions was considered with details.

By examining the conceptual expansion of the ablative we were able to see how a basic grammatical structure is employed as the core of a range constructional variants. The ablative case was represented as a network of different but related situations bound up within the source relation. The derivation of new meanings and their interrelations are summarized in the Diagram 1.




Diagram 1

Originally, the spatiality was a focal feature of the ablative prototype. Later it becomes a peripheral feature in the domain of ABSTRACT SOURCE, out of which derives a new prototype called INSTRUMENT whose core properties do not necessarily include spatiality; force and intermediate path constitute its core. We identified TIME and CAUSE as two subcategories developed from the ablative prototype, preserving its basic image schema of "a theme's prior location at a source and movement away from it".

While the spatial concept is employed for expressing different concepts in "more abstract" domains, the metaphorical transfer across such domains is immediately reflected in the presence of the morphological character of the original category. This also helps to preserve the iconicity between cognitive and linguistic structures. The process was observed in detail by following the theme of isomorphism as reflected in the dative category while focusing on its linguistic implications such as polysemy, in later chapters.

We have seen that dative encodes a wide range of roles covering the destination of spatial motion, perceptual goal, resulting state, standard or criteria, object of attention, causee, possessor, recipient, beneficiary, and experiencer, etc. with a yet wider network of submeanings. While the definition of recipient is expanded to include possessors of objects, beneficiaries of actions and addressees or interlocutors, the category of goal is expanded to include recipient, experiencer, causee and even standard or criteria. Though dative can encode a large variety of semantic roles, all these roles, meanings and categories have developed from a central meaning; what works as the template is physical goal expanding into a goal of an activity, process or state. This shows how the abstract conceptual structures involving complex human experience are derived from patterns pertaining to basic human experience like motion structures, as Cognitive Grammar emphasizes. We have discussed a variety of categorial metaphors and examples of constructional expansion, showing how metaphor and image-schema transformation contribute to settle or adjust the otherwise odd relations between such structures while completing domain-mapping.

Another conclusion inferred from the discussion is that the functions of dative can be identified in terms of grammatical relations as well. I have observed that dative can mark the non-subject complement of some intransitive verbs and three-place verbs. These dative participants are called indirect objects since the entities referred to are considered to be indirectly affected as opposed to the entities directly affected and hence to appear as direct objects of transitive verbs. Depending on whether they take a dative complement or not, predicates can be low or high on the transitivity scale: when appearing with an indirect object they become low on the transitivity scale and with a direct object they become transitive.

Another widespread function of the dative, as discussed in this section, is encoding the roles normally assigned to subject. Experiencer role taking dative form and appearing in subject position is called dative subject by some linguists (Sridhar 1979 and Klaiman 1980), considering the peculiar way of mapping case marking and grammatical relation. It can also be called 'indirect subject' by viewing the combination of active/inactive alignment and grammatical relations. Indirect subjects are different from indirect objects in terms of the constituent order and position of the respective grammatical relations accepted to be typical to SOV languages and, on the other hand, from direct (active) subjects in terms of active/inactive alignment and source/goal(starting point and endpoint) designation. With dative case assigned to the nominal in the subject position, signaling

endpoint, the construction represents inverse motion rather than natural motion; hence it is also called inverse construction.

The inverse alignment downplays the role of active participants; rather than participants, participatum is emphasized giving rise to a sort of impersonal construction. Dative participant in such an impersonal context is reanalyzed as part of some internal event typically lacking external agency and considered as inherently inactive. Compared with active, transitive constructions, this impersonal construction brings some aspectual and modal changes. We discussed dative's acquisition of such new meanings in the last chapter of data analysis. While the active construction with *oonae* predicate expresses the modal of obligation, the *oonae* predicate and indirect subject in the inverse construction are used to express desiderative modality. The nominal subject used with the potential particle expresses probability, while the dative subject used in the inverse construction with the same potential particle expresses ability or permission.

What is important is that our analysis presents a unified view of indirect-object and indirect-subject relations based on the dative prototype, simultaneously achieving the task of capturing all the meanings of the case in a single network in both conceptual and morphosyntactic terms.

Modal and aspectual developments discussed in Chapter 10 bring out the vast area of abstract concepts or inner world covered by the dative use. We saw how the dative gained new meanings of purpose and cause, intention and future action, desiderative sense and obligation, ability and probability, inception and permission, etc. The degree of abstraction increases as the development occurs from external to internal, from objective to subjective, from physical to temporal, from deontic to epistemic, etc. In the context of interclausal relations, the development turns from propositional to textual.

Finally we have seen how the goal perspective is imposed on a causing-event in which a cause turns out to be a goal, encoded in the conceptual structure. It shows that a speaker's conceptualization can reanalyze and reshape external situations in terms of different case frames.

Throughout the dissertation, in the last two chapters in particular, I have repeatedly demonstrated that the basic image schema for a given case marker is preserved along the endless chain of extensions. It was evident that the relations among the expressions in the derived domains can be traced to those that obtain in the existing domains. These relation patterns can be interpreted both as diachronic and synchronic phenomena. The presence of such relational networks has significant linguistic implications: a person who is acquainted with a radial category, via learning how some of the expressions in the group are used, will have easy access to other areas in which minimally different senses are observed to mimic the central member of the category. Whether in production or comprehension, learning different members of a radially structured category will not occur as a separate, isolated act. Such implications agree with the widely acknowledged idea in Cognitive Grammar that metaphorical expressions develop from a very systematic way of thinking. According to Lakoff and Johnson 1980, metaphor refers to the organizing, structuring concepts rather than to isolated, individual expressions.

The detailed survey of the three main networks of related senses structured around the case categories, locative, ablative, and dative, amply demonstrates the fact that there is a limited number of basic cognitive structures that constitute the source of semantic and metaphorical extensions. This was actually what we assumed in Chapters 4-10. It was assumed that identifying a set of basic

event schemas might help to formulate a constrained theory, of event-chains and, finally, of linguistic expressions as well. Following the Cognitive Grammarians (for example, Jackendoff 1997), I believed that mind maps information from spatial representations into the propositional format called conceptual structure. This formal system includes some finite number of primitives and principles of combination and interacts with syntactic structures to generate infinite number of expressions. However, as well-known now, spatial representations are themselves not adequate to construct language. The spatial type of spatial abstractions called image-schemas mediate in translating spatial analyses into propositional form.

Depending on the ontology of states and events, from which some of the most elementary human experiences and spatial representations are derived, we distinguished our source structures as static locations and dynamic locative relations. First, we observed the image-schema involving static location, such as *be-at* relation, objecthood, surfaces __ vertical and horizontal __, containment, contact, support, region, and boundary. Later we focused on "dynamic" image schemas of movement, path, animate and inanimate motion, self-motion and caused-motion, interaction and energy transmission, causing-to-move and caused-to-be-moved, beginning-of-path, intermediate path and end-of-path, etc.

The main claim made in the dissertation is that abstract predicate-argument relationships encoded by the locative, ablative, and ablative expressions can be traced back to other domains of human conceptualization, particularly to more concrete physical domains related to basic human experience. In the preceding chapters, we observed locative, ablative and dative constructions with reference to their conceptual sources, namely cognitive and linguistic distinctions that encode physical objects, their locations, and motions. It was hopefully shown that recurrent types of experiences expressed by these constructions are associated with ontological distinctions between location, existence, and different kinds of motions.

The importance of the notions like location, source, and goal was emphasized in the process of tracing the conceptual development of case categories. I characterized various types of constructions in terms of event schemas and propositional formulas that provide convenient templates for describing events. These image schemas and propositional structures were treated as part of an inventory of cognitive models available to humans for structuring experience in general and for expressing more abstract concepts in particular. Therefore, I have naturally focused more on the cognitive processes whereby linguistic categories are produced and interpreted. Consequently, the recurring theme of the dissertation is the conceptual nature of case categories: how they evolved, how they were structured diachronically, and eventually how they developed into conventionalized linguistic patterns as case markers.

A large part of the analysis comes from the elastic nature of image schemas that allows them to function as an appropriate medium to bridge the transition from space to linguistic representation in general and as a convenient instrument to handle more complex conceptualizations, such as temporal relations, internal states, logical and causal relations, epistemic meanings, clausal embeddings, etc. in particular. Our analysis of data was presented in such a way that it demonstrates how these abstract relationships are encoded in conceptual structure according to the rules of object relationships and place relationships represented as predicate-argument organization or figure-ground organization. The analysis also brings out the process in which the conceptualizer ignores the

details of a given event, generalizing from one instance to another. The process allows the speaker to categorize location and motion into a wide range of sub-categories.

In this study, the basic source propositions giving rise to different case categories were established as in (1).

(1) a) x is at y
    b) x MOVE from y
    c) x MOVE to y
    d) z CAUSE x MOVE to y

These source propositions were shown to be very schematic and flexible, and so capable of changing their internal structures and proportions, absorbing new meanings, and evoking new inferences. They were taken to be responsible for conceptualizing and representing the whole range of physical, nonphysical, and abstract events. We can regard them as convenient "meaning packages" which help reify conceptual units that are not directly available to perceptual experience and so concetize them through phonetic forms. Thus a causal relation is represented *as a source* or *as a goal* through the ablative form or dative form respectively.

The fact that a given linguistic form is repeatedly used metaphorically or otherwise to express more abstract concepts and the process involved in such conceptualizations have a vast effect on linguistic categories. One such result is polysemy. Case categories are typically polysemic because their process of development from basic, simple structures to the representations of complex events of varied levels naturally involve some kind of overlapping.

As our study has shown, a given case category has different functions, additional interpretations and varied levels of information, abstract or concrete, gene ral or specific, etc. The dative case, for example, denotes the goal of motion, indirect object, recipient, experiencer or involitive agent, purpose, cause, etc. We have observed that all these instances share some semantic properties in a concrete or a quite abstract way. While a given case category might denote more than one case function, the underlying case relation was observed to be associated with a particular clause-type or a propositional form, appearing with relevant figure-ground relations.

According to this approach, surface manifestations of case relations are very important as they represent clause-specific perspectives of events. By defining case relations with respect to clause-types, we could elucidate the conditions under which the mapping of grammatical structures with particular event-types repeatedly occurs and limit the number of case relations to a small set of event schemas with designated participants, eliminating redundancy. Thus we were able to distinguish three main case relations in terms of event construal based on spatial features, revealing basic cognitive motivations for such correlations and emphasizing the flexibility of our cognitive abilities. Diagram 2 shows the three case relations we identified as basic role conceptions.




Diagram 2

I have also highlighted the relevant properties of case categories by which

the degree of membership in such categories are to be defined. The assignment of these properties are governed by such linguistic factors as the nature of the nominal phrase, lexical entry of the verb, and the association with subcategories. As for the locative phrase, we observed how the assignment of the properties like DEFINITE/INDEFINITE distinction, ANAPHORICITY, and MARKED/ UNMARKED features vary with the subcategories of locative and existential constructions. The selection of locative vs ablative categories was shown to be affected by which feature, STATIVE or PATH, is included in the lexical entry of the verb. The selection of subject as nominative vs dative is influenced by the features of CONTROL and VOLITION. The status of subcategories like experiencer(dative subject) and causee(indirect object) is determined by ANIMACY.

While nominal constituents were in the center of our discussion, under no circumstances could we neglect the major role played by the lexical entry of the verb. Since case markers, by definition, are supposed to carry most of the relational information obtaining between verbs and their nominal complements, the lexical semantics of the verb is considered as immensely contributing to the semantic representation of the sentence by means of the event structure encoded by the verb. In this situation, it seems generally the case that the clause-type including clausal participants selected by the speaker is elaborated by the event-type encoded by the verb. This is evidenced by the fact that verbs which share the same event schema also share the same clausal organization. This may lead us to accept some sort of classification of verbs as "case-frame providers" based on the construals admitted by them. For example, some of the verb classes we encountered in our dative analysis can be isolated as follows:

Verbs of transfer: give
hand over
send
deliver
carry
bring
present
offer

Verbs of communication: say
call
teach
advise
complain
answer
scold
curse
praise
thank
wish
congratulate

Verbs of harm: hit
beat
whip
slap
threaten

Verbs of attitude: help
serve
devote
obey
surrender
yield to
be loyal
be a traitor
be indebted to

Our analysis has proved that the semantic features of the verb stem impose a particular perspective on a given situation by allowing the nominal complements to bear specific semantic roles. That is, the semantic role is easily predictable through the verb that admits a specific event schema.

(1) Chitra Mendis saargen ingriisi igenagannawa
'Chitra learns English from Mr. Mendis.'

(2) Mendis saar ChitraTa ingriisi ugannanawa
'Mr. Mendis teaches Chitra English.'

In sentences (1) and (2), the ground-specifying nominals are understood as denoting source and goal respectively as the verbs conforming to the source-path schema and goal-path schema separately carry the obvious construals involving their participants. However, when optional construals are available for the same verb, case marking is taken to signal subtle distinctions in the construal of the participant's semantic role.

An exploration of a Sinhala verb inventory will show that it only includes a few verbs that admit alternate expressions of nominal complements. This should be very contrastive with a language like English in which many verbs allow alternations in the expression of complements, known in literature as locative alternation, dative alternation, and transitive alternation. This is an empirical question calling for a detailed analysis of verb inventories in the relevant languages with particular attention to their crosslinguistic implications.

In summing up, the essence of my thesis can be outlined along the following lines.

Linguistic expressions are usually polysemous; there cannot be a single core meaning that is capable of accounting for all these senses.

However, cross-cutting this diversity of senses, there obtains unity, that is, all different, but related expressions can be derived from one and the same underlying structure.

The senses of each expression form a radially structured category, with a central member and links defined by an image-schema.

Hence the meanings of expressions, including grammatical forms, are represented by image-schemas and metaphorical models.

Grammatical forms are selected according to role-based perspectives; case roles do not remain constant across paraphrases. Even though the different clause-types are identified with a systematic paraphrasis relationship, they are not regarded as representing the same category. The determination of a case category depends on the particular morphosyntactic means of representing external situations.

The degree of membership in a case category is defined in terms of prototype features or 'derived' features that have drawn on them.

Identity between different expressions is not accidental; they are marked with morphosyntactic regularities that can be described by means of a restricted

set of event schemas. Therefore, in general, linguistic expressions are nothing but motivated form-meaning correspondences, though such correspondences do not occur in a simple, straightforward fashion.

The approach followed in this dissertation was source-centered, that is, illustrating the variations of one and the same event schema and describing their structural similarities with respect to the source structure and the conceptual transfer patterns involved. This enabled us to grasp different development lines of the same source structure and some generalizations about their evolution. However, such development lines can also be observed from a target-centered viewpoint, that is, illustrating the variations with respect to a given target structure. This is how Bernd Heine deals with POSSESSION(Heine,1997). In his book, Heine attempted to describe salient processes of conceptual transfer with respect to the domain of possession and to understand why possessive constructions are formed the way they are. Thus he was able to demonstrate alternative options available to languages for evolving a specific grammatical category.

Though we found, in the course of our analysis, some different encodings of the same target concept, for example, using both the dative and ablative structures for expressing the conceptual category of CAUSE, we were unable to do an in-depth analysis of the internal structure of such development lines, owing to the limitations of our approach. Among the questions that remain to be addressed are: Are there any correlations between different source schemas and different constructions expressing the same concept? On what grounds can one source schema, rather than another, become an eligible candidate for a given conceptual category, when there are some alternative options available? All this goes to say that a more comprehensive study of the conceptual transfer patterns is required.

Only three cases were examined at length in this work, partly because of our strong dependence on the localist paradigm and partly because of the prominent features of Sinhala as a non-configurational, "high-semantics" language. The "grammatical relations" like subject and object that also function as controller or "pivotes" of some other grammatical processes, which are often discussed with reference to English, may not have any particular relevance to a language like Sinhala(Bath 1988). However, on the view of event structure and kinetics, which can be taken as a main thread running through our whole work, we can not neglect the importance of case categories like nominative and accusative, or case relations like agent and patient. Though I made a few random remarks about these cases with the purpose of making some contrast with other categories, they are by no means adequate in arriving at a healthy conclusion about an inventory of case roles, or a universal inventory of event schemas. A quite interesting question from the viewpoint of particular grammar will be which additional cases are to be posited in the grammar of Sinhala.

We have confined our data base to Sinhala and have occasionally turned to some other languages to pick up collaborative data. Almost all the analyses being of the Sinhala sentences, there was no need to consider the semantic implications of a syntactic process like dative shift as in English. On the other hand, the semantic significance of the 'local' cases denoting a variety of concepts like INSTRUMENT, LOCATION, and CAUSE, as observed in Sinhala, does not have direct relevance in English as it can encode all these concepts through the single role of nominative. One may also wonder if there are any areal and genetic lines underlying the conceptual development of case categories. So as to capture the cross-linguistic generalizations and also to increase cross-typological

validity of our theory of grammar, a detailed analysis of languages other than Sinhala is urgently required.

Finally, let me mention a field of study to which the present approach needs to be extended. One would expect some empirical tests to be conducted of possible implications this approach might have to a theory of language learning. Speakers cannot arbitrarily associate nominal constituents with any of the existing case markings. Language has rules stating how predicate-argument relationships, both concrete and abstract, are expressed by linguistic structures. The predicate-argument relationships encoded in the conceptual structure are systematically mapped into syntactic structures through case categories. The narrowing down the predicate-argument organization into the potential range of conceptual categories that allow language to be mapped onto them will naturally enhance the child's early acquisition of syntax. Along this direction, our study of image schemas and conceptual development of case categories may be extended to the field of native language acquisition.

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